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INTRODUCTION 
' 
In the fourth decade of the 20th century, the United 
I 
I States assumed a new attitude toward the countries of 
:Latin-America. For approximately 150 years, the United 
I States followed a policy which in one way or another 
antagonized the nations south of the Rio Grande. From 
I 
1776 to 1902 we either ignored the Latin-American nations, 
took advantage of their weaknesses, or assumed an attitude 
' I 
of condescension toward them, Our refusal to recognize 
the rebellious Spanish colonies until after we had safely 
I p~chased the Floridas from Spain enraged Simon Bolivar to 
the point of his refusing us an invitation to the Panama 
C~nference of 1826. The Monroe Doctrine appeared to many 
Latin-Americans not a protection for them but a means of 
mal,intaini~g Yankee domination o:f the Western Hemisphere. 
The annexation of Texas, Polk's Corollary to the Monroe 
' ' D9ctrine, the War with Mexico, and the action by which 
Theodore Roosevelt procured the Panama Canal Zone gave 
l~ttle ass'urance of our good will. Even th~ Washington 
Conference o:f 1889, which ultimately led to the formation 
ofi the Pan-American Union, seemed to Latin-Americans to be 
an attempt to :form an alliance dominated by the United 
st 1r tes rather than a desire to form a league of coordinate 
states. 
iv 
The Spanish-American War led to a period characterized 
by a "policeman" attitude on our part. The Roosevelt 
Cqrollary together with the concept ot' 11 the white man's 
' burden" were our justit'ications t'or repeated intert'erences 
in the internal at't'airs ot' the Caribbean nations. Through 
I 
the device ot' the Platt amendment to the Cuban Constitution, 
w~ continually intervened in Cuban politics--a warning, the 
landing of marines, the sending of a battleship. In 1905 
TJ:J;eodore Roosevelt appointed an American receiver of customs 
I 
for all customhouses in the Dominican Republic, and in 1916 
t~e United States Navy began an occupation of that country 
which lasted :for eight years. The year 1909 began our inter-
vention in Nicaraguq, 1915 our Occupation of Haiti, 1916 the 
! 
sending of Pershing into northern Mexico to catch the elusive 
Pancho Villa. Until the end of the First Wo~ld War we 
:frequently intervened in Panama's internal affairs. 
I 
The intervention in Haiti, however, dit'fered somewhat 
fromrthose or"' the others. 
~ 
We went into Haiti in order to 
stabilize the country's polities, protect American invest-
i ' 
menta, and prevent European interference, but remained :for 
purposes of tutelage in Anglo-Saxon democracy akin to the 
! policy :followed in the Philippines. A treaty and a new 
constitution were :forced upon the Haitian people. Despite 
I 
great adverse criticism of the Occupation during the 1920's, 
the.re is no indication that American military :forces were 
v 
p~anning to withdraw by 1936, the date determined by the 
I 
tveaty as the end or the Occupation. 
In the me~ntime, the United States was not winning 
' t:~iends by her actions in Haiti. Neither Haiti, Latin-
America, Europe, nor our own liberal American press showed 
very much enthusiasm t:or the experiment in tutelage. The 
I 
Nation actually pictured our Occupation as a barbaric 
aggression marked by individual acts of: great cruelty. 
I 
1 Hoover came to the presidency in 1929 with a vast 
background in Latin-American at:t:airs. He knew that we 
ne~eded to change our policy toward Latin-America it: we were 
to retain its "friendship, but he had no genuine certainty 
as: to what this new policy was to be. He wanted the United 
! 
States to be a "good neighbor," but precisely what did this 
phrase mean? What constituted a good neighbor? Were we 
! 
no:t a good neighbor in attempting to teach Haiti how to run 
an orderly prosperous nation along principles of: Anglo-Saxon 
I democracy? Surely our interventions in Mexico, the Dominican 
""' Republic, Panama, Nicaragua had occurred as much with the V 
wef!.t:are of: those nations in mind as \_:l;hat of:! our own. 
j 
When riots broke out in Haiti at the end of: 1929 in 
protest against the Occupation, Hoover decided to t:ind out 
I 
I 
once and t:or all it: our thirty-year policy ot: interventions 
in the Caribbean really served valid purposes·both t:or the 
vi 
United States and for the countries occupied. He sent the 
Forbes Commission to Haiti (1) 
(2)-toassess the Occupation, and 
! 
to settle the 
( )ct;:, 3 determine 
disturbances, 
a foreign 
poticy which would promote friendship instead of animosity 
between the United States and her neighbors to the south. 
! 
And on Forbes' report of 1930, Hoover began the changes 
I 
which chara.cterized the "Good Neighbor Policy" of t.he 1930's 
and 1940•s. 
Formally, there were two commissions, that of Forbes 
' and that of Robert Russa Moton. Hoover originally planned 
to send one commission composed of prominent white and 
i 
colored Americans, but Haitians themselves objected to the 
prJsence of American Negroes on the commission. Accordingly, 
th~ Forbes Commission consisted of white men who went to 
Ha~ti at the end of February, 1930, and stayed the first two 
weeks in March, for the purposes mentioned above, while the 
Moton Commission consisted of noted American Negro educators 
who! arrived and left in June that same year, and whose task 
was1 solely to assess Haitian education after f'if'teen years 
of fhe American Occupation. 
In a larger sense, however, the Moton Commission was 
only an extension of the group led by Forbes. Moton's more 
elaborate report on education confirmed the findings of' the 
! 
first group, and Moton's consultations with Forbes through 
vii 
c~rrespondence and meetings prior to the second group's 
dJparture in June leaves no doubt that Forbes was the 
! dqminating rigure or both groups. 
i 
i 
I 
This study is an attempt to probe a little known but 
immensely important area in United States diplomatic 
rJlations with Latin-America. 
I 
It seeks to show the place 
o~ the Hoover Commissions in averting bloodshed in Haiti, 
I iri changing our thirty-year policy or intervention in the 
I 
C~ribbean, and in our adopting a new attitude toward our 
I' 
so:uthern neighbors. It seeks to detail the process by 
w~ich the Forbes Commission arrived at its conclusions. 
I 
AJd, incidentally, it attempts to bring to light one aspect 
I 
orl the public career or the hitherto neglected W. Cameron T ... 
I 
viii 
QOMPREBENSIVE REVIEW OF TEE WORK OF OTHER INVESTIGATORS 
IN TEE FIELD 
This study has been based primarily upon unpublished 
~aterials--the Forbes Journals, Forbes' ?ersonal Copy 
9~ the Report of the Commission ~or the Study and Review 
o~ Conditions in Haiti and his 11 In Retrospect," corres-
i 
pondence to and ~rom Forbes, material prepared by the 
State Department ~or the use o~ the Commission, and 
' 
tre mass of documents held by the National Archives at 
Washington, D.C. Although a large amount o~ writing 
hks been done on the American Occupation o~ Haiti, much 
o~ which mentions the Commissions o~ 1930 in perhaps a 
I 
p~ragraph or two, no writer has dealt up to this point 
ih very great detail with the subject of this study. 
Two reasons why no previous author has written upon 
t~e subject probably are the ~allowing: (1) During his 
I 
li~e-time, no one apart ~rom his ~amily and personal 
~riends was permitted by Forbes to read his Journals. 
He placed a restriction upon them, stating that they were 
! 
not to be used until ten years a~ter his death. He died 
i~ 1959, but his executors gave the present author permis-
s~on to use them ~or this study. (2) The Government 
p~aced a restriction upon the use of the National Archives 
I . 
Collection pertaining to the Forbes Commission, but the 
S~ate Department, acting through Dr. E. P. Parks, Chie~, 
H~storical Division, li~ted the restriction ~or this study. 
The rollowing previous works have given more 
~han mere passing comment to either the Forbes or 
Moton Commissions, or both: 
ix 
Walter Johnson's William Allen White's America (New York: 
Henry Holt and Co., 19~7). Johnson, in writing this book, 
interviewed W. Cameron Forbes, obtaining a brier resume 
or the work or the Forbes Commission in Haiti. See 
Pf· 411-424. 
Arthur c. Millspaugh's Haiti Under American Control, 
191$-1930 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1930). 
I Helen Hill Weed r s articles in Vol. 130 or the 
Nation, "Fresh Hofre ror Haiti. 11 (March 19, 1930) and 
"Victory in Haiti' (March 26,.1930). 
CHAPTER I 
THE FORCES AT WORK 
An understanding of the problems faced by the Presi-
den.tial Commissions of 1930 requires a knowledge of the 
! 
for
1
ces which made Haitian life what it was at that time. 
Stating the deplorable conditions of Haiti--her failures in 
' 
public education, the poverty of her people, the corruption 
I 
in her government, the constant turmoil or revolution and 
i 
violence, the lack of commerce, the ruin or her agriculture--
! 
is merely to describe surface effects; to determine and 
! 
analyze the forces responsible for these resultant condi-
' . 
tiona is rather our task in this first chapter. 
! 
Very rarely is a nation able to make a sudden break 
with its past. Examples of such a break are the French 
I 
Revolution of 1789 and the Russian of October, 1917. 
But.closer study or these only confirms the fact that a 
I 
nation evolves from its origins; it does not break with 
I 
them and begin again upon totally new f'ounda·tions. Haiti 
! '·\ 
bro~e with France in the revolution of' 1791, but she could 
I 
not escape her origins. Essentially, she reverted to what 
! 
she was in French colonial days, while employing diff'erent 
I 
terms for old institutions. She abolished the leather whip, 
but in ita place was the liane, a whip-like vine which 
i 
produced the same effect. She has probably had more 
I 
revolutions than any other country, but no nation has had 
I 
fewer beneficial results from them. To a large degree, 
the tragedy of Haiti has been her inability to escape her 
origins. 
2 
The island of Hispaniola, originally discovered and 
settled by the Spaniards, had by the latter half of the 18th 
Century altered considerably both in racial stock and in 
administrative control.l The frail, gentle aborigines whom 
I Columbus had found on the island. in 1492 had been so deci-
mated by harsh enslavement and disease by the first third 
... I 
1. Comparatively little has been written in English about 
Haitian History. Those works by EngliSh-speaking authors 
.de !!fling generally with Haitian history !'rom its beginning 
to !1915, which are particularly use!'ul are, as !'ollows: 
H.P.Davis, Black Democracl; the story of Haiti (New York: 
The. Dial Press, 1928); Hu ert Herring, A Hlstor} of Latin 
America (New York: Alfred Knopf' and Co. ,1955); ames G. 
Leyburn, The Haitian Peo;e (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1941); Arthur c. 1lspaugh, Haiti Under American 
Control. 1915-19~ (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1930) 1 
chapter I in par icular; Ludwell Lee Montague, Haiti and 
the United States 1 1 -1 8 (Durham: .Duke University Press, 
19 0 ; Mary Wilhelmine Williams, The People and Politics 
of Latin America (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1930), revised 
edi~ion by R.J.Bartlett, 1945. 
01' the aforementioned works, the Davis and Leyburn volumes 
are especially neat and heLpful. in their presentations. 
Fre:hch-speaking historians whom the reader may wish to con-
sult are, as follows: Dant$s Bellegarde, La nation haitienne 
(Paris: J. de Gigard, 1938) and the same author's Haiti and 
Its· Peo le (Washington, 1922) 1 new edi ti.on .published In 
3; Abel Nicholas Leger, Histoire di7lomatigue 
d'Haiti Port au Prince: Aug. A. Heraux, 193~; Jacques 
Nloho!as Leger, Haiti: Her Histoj1 and Her Detractors (New 
York: Neale Publishing do., 1907 ; Thomas Madiou, H1stoire d'H~iti (Port-au-Prince: Th.Courtois, Vole. I-III, 1848, 
Vol. !V, 1904), new edition, Port-au-Prince, 1922; 
3 
of the 16th century--Krieger records that only six or seven 
hunl'-red were living by 15332 --that the Spaniards, seeking to 
! 
escape the condemnations of Fr. Bartolome de ~as Casas,3 
I 
began the importation of African Negroes, whom they believed 
to be more suited to the slave labor of the plantation. 
These importations became so extensive that the Negro popu-
! 
lation soon far outnumbered the white. Moreover, the 
continual depredations of French buccaneers, soldiers of 
for~une, and renegades against the western third of the weak 
I 
Spanish colony eventually concluded with Spain's recognition 
Louis Elie Moreau de Saint-Mery, Description topographique 
Physique, civile, politique et historique de la partie 
frahcaise de l'ile Saint-Domingue (Philadelphia, 1797). New 
edit~on by Soci~t~ de 1 1 histoire des colonies franpaises, 
1958, in two volumes. This work is probably the best 
source book for the period before the rising of the slaves. 
Very useful because of its compactness is the textbook 
int~nded for use in the Haitian public schools by Dr. J.C. 
Dorsainvil, Manuel d 1 historie d 1 Haiti (Port-au-Prince: 
Probure des Fr~res de 1 1 lnstruction Chr~tienne, 1934). For 
a study of the economic-conditions in Haiti during the cru-
cial period through Boyer, see R. Lepelletier de Saint-
Remy1s Saint-Domin ue· Etude et solution nouvelle de la 
question haitienne 2 vols.; Paris: A. Bertrand Co., 1 6). 
2. I Herbert M. Krieger, 11 The Aborigines of the Ancient 
Island of Hispaniola, 11 Annual Report of the Smithsonian 
Institution for 1929 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian 
Institute, 1929), p. 478. 
3. Hubert Herring, History of Latin America, pp. 101. 
4 
! 
by l700 or France's virtual possession or this portion or 
the island. Although this western portion never extended 
ver1 far inland--twenty-rive, thirty, forty miles at the 
most--the industry of the French Colonials worked a miracle 
' of wealth and accomplishment. 
Given this narrow stage and an interval or peace, 
French enterprise and ingenuity worked something 
like .a miracle. The hunting grounds or the buccaneers 
were transrormed into well-ordered plantations pro-
ducing corree, cotton, cacao, tobacco, indigo, and, 
above all, sugar. Highways, sugar mills, and elaborate 
irrigation systems were constructed to serve the plan-
tations, while distilleries, lime kilns, brickyards, 
potteries, and tanneries were operated as subsidiary 
industries. By 1742 the sugar production or Saint-
Domingue alone exceeded that or all the British West 
Indies combined; by 1743 the colony contributed sub-
stantially two-thirds or all French-grown tropical 
produce, its commerce constituting more than a third 
of the foreign trade of Franee~4 
By 1790, Saint-Domingue was France's wealthiest colony--
rar imore profitable than Canada and her furs had ever been--
and her population consisted of approximately a half-million 
people. Colbert's mercantilist views found closer realization 
I 
in Saint-Domingue than they had ever found elsewhere. Vast 
plantations filled the valleys of the mountain ranges, 
! 
small ports handled a flourishing trade between France and. 
the ,rum distilleries of New England and a tight social 
I 
structure had been reared that was the model and envy or 
the planters or Virginia and South Carolina. 
I 
~· Montague, Haiti and the United States, p. 5. 
Yet the social structure was not so sound as it out-
warrly appeared, and in this sociological embryo were to be 
:found the ingrained and stultii'ying dif1'iculties of 1930 
Hai~i.5 Haiti consisted by 1790 of three free classes: the 
' grands. blanca, or whites who owned the great plantations; 
5 
thej petits blancs, or whites who. either worked 1'or the grands 
I 
blanca as clerks and overseers or wor.ked :f.or themselves as 
small planters, artisans, shopkeepers, lawyers, merchant 
shippers, or Just followed lines comparable to the white trash 
of the antebellum southern United States; and the gens de 
couleur, who were free men in whose veins ran African blood. 
The 1 28,000 free men of color existed as a result of the 1685 
Code Noir promulgated by Louis XIV long before Saint-Domingue 
! 6 became as pro1'itable as it did • 
••• The Grand Monarch had issued a Code Noir to cover 
all colonial dealings with Negro slaves. Article 59 
speci:t'ied that when a slave secured his liberty, either 
by cash purchase or by gift of his white master or par-
, ent, he was to be regarded as a full French citizen. 
1 He might own land, dispose o:f his wealth as he pleased, 
bear testimony in legal cases (even against whites), 
marry as he pleased, vote, bear arms, travel where he 
wished, embrace any career, own slaves or :free them. 
To Louis and his ministers such provisions probably 
did not seem particularly magnanimous, :for race pre-judice was not a characteristic of the French, and it 
could hardly have been supposed that enough slav§B 
would ever be 1'reed to create much of a problem. ·r 
5. ILeyburn, Haitian People, Chapters I and II, passim. 
6. -Generally, in contrast with the Anglo Saxon, the Latin 
has had a tendency to regard the colored races as his equal. 
The iFrenoh, Spaniards, and Portuguese are noted :for the ab-
sence of racial discrimination. 
7. ,Leyburn, p.l6. 
! 
I 
I 
6 
I Not enough slaves ~ :t'reed to create much of' a proll-
leJ. Yet Ai'ricans did become :t'ree, Primarily they were 
muljlattoea who were :t'reed because they were children of' slave 
mothers and white masters who, :t'inding them socially embar-
raa~ing, sent them to France :t'or extensive education or to 
I 
posftiona in the small towns. of' Haiti, or perhap.s gave them 
sm~l plantations in more removed. sectors or the country. 
I Borp mulattoes, their descendants, seeking to mate with white 
I 
ratrer than black, became 9-U.adroons, octoroons., or men whose 
prime purpose was to :t'orget the drops of' Africa that merged 
I 
with the blood-stream of' the European. Occasionally pure 
I 
I Negroes were to be :round among the gena de couleur--:t'reedom 
I 
:t'orl Iaith:t'ul service, the reward of' a mistress, the gi:t't of 
. I 
a dying man to a beloved :t'riend--but the gena de couleur, 
who later ·became known as af:t'ranchis, were basically sepa-
ratjd :t'rom the great mass of the Haitian people by their 
mixjure of' l:ibo.d. Well-educated, thirsting with ambition 
to rake their places with the ruling whites, seeking to 
I prove .their auperiori ty over the African slave mass, shrewd, 
and I ever-incre.aaing. in numbers, they soon owned by 1791 
approximately a third of' all the land end a :t'ourth of all 
I 
the I slaves in the colony. L. E. Moreau de Saint-Mary re-
cor~a thai; out of' a populat.ion of' 519,000 in 1790, only 
40,000 were whites (grands and petits), 28,000 af:t'ranchis, 
andl452,000 slaves. 8 
I 
I 8. lMoreau de Saint-Mary, Description de Saint-Domingue, 
Vol I, page 285. One should note at this point the 
I 
7 
Had the Frenchman in Haiti been as liberal as his 
' br~thren in France itseir, the ugly patterns which plagued 
I 
Haitian history in the years prior to 1930 might not have 
beJn set, But the white settler could not abide the growth 
or a threatening, and what he believed to be inrerior, 
class. This was especieJ.ly true of the petit blanc, whose 
I 
only reasoned superiority in the colony lay in the color 
or his skin, and whose position was rapidly challenged by 
thJ wealth and growing power or Arricans. The petit could 
make no distinction between the Arrican whom he whipped in 
th~ sugar rields and the Arrican whose carri_age and horses 
plowed the dusty avenues or Cap Francais, Las Cayes, and 
Port-au-Prince. Nor could Frenchwomen tolerate the 
specific meanings or the following terms: (1) mulatto: 
those Haitians with some elemmt or white blood. Although 
the mulatto is supposed to be half Negro, hal£ white the qu~droon a quarter Negro and three quarters white, the octo-
romone eighth Negro, the term mulatto generally was applied 
to anyone with some portion or his blood white, especieJ.ly 
i£ his skin was light. (2) arrranchi: those Haitians, both 
mulatto and Negro who had been freed in colonial. days, were 
ed~cated, owned slaves~ and/ror the most part aped French 
maziners and custome. \3) elite: the general term for the 
Haitian aristocracy. Elusive in any speciric meaning f it 
came to mean all Haitians who could trace their ances-cry 
back to freedom in colonial times, were educated, wealthy, 
spoke French rather than Creole, and rollowed gentle pursuits 
such as law, commerce, land-holding. Although the $lite in-
cludes pure Negroes, they are relatively raw in number since 
the constant pressure or the a1'£ranchi was to marry the light-
skinned. The arrranchi woman had a horror of having a child : 
da~ker than herself', with the result that the elite over the . 
course or Haitian history has had a tendency to become lighter-
er.;.skinne d, 
Writers on Haitian history have a tendency to use the 
' ; terms mulatto, arrranchi, elite interchangeably, though as 
indicated there are ditterences. 
' 
8 
at'franchis upon finding that young Frenchmen with a practi-
1 
cal eye for gain were as willing to marry warm-blooded 
I 
wealthy colored girls as patrician French women bred in the 
I balflrooms of cultured but decidedly cooler white. society. 
Nor were they particularly overjoyed at the ever increasing 
I 
abilities of at'franohi woman in the arts of charity, liter-
atUre, or physical adornment. By 1790, over the course of 
seyeral decades, the blanca encouraged a rising flood of 
color prejudice that was hitherto not present in French 
lite and that was to embitter the at'f'ranchis for generations 
to1. come. The more the at'franchi tried to escape his Af'rican 
heritage, the more he was repelled by the white man; the 
' farther he tried to fle~ f'rom the slave camp, the more point-
edly he was ever re.minded of' his ancestry. By 1790, when 
the two power.ful classes of Haitian s.ociety, the ruling 
I 
I 
white and the desirous-of'-ruling at'franchis, were ready for 
civil war, the Revolution in France set the stage f'or a 
settlement of' the issue. 
I • 
The colonial assembly met in May, 1788, to consider 
I 
sending delegates to the first Es.tates-General to be con-
vof:ed since 1614. In this assembly, the grands blanca who 
controlled the situation did two things which Leyburn con-
I 
Siders blunders becaus·e -tlln:ey called the attention of' France 
tofthe state of' conditions in Saint-Domingue: (1) thirty-
seren deputies were named to represent Saint-Domingue; and 
• 
a list of grievances was drawn up with a request that 
grands blanca be left !'ree o!' French i.nter!'erence in 
governing of the colony. 9 The petition and the deputies 
called attention, indeed, to the state o!' a!'.fairs in Saint~ 
Doiningue, especially the attention o!' the radicals in Paris 
whb wished to abolish slavery in all French territories. 
I 
The French National Assembly, which had promulgated the 
I 
"Rights o!' Man", did not grant the Haitian slaves their 
! 
!'r~edom--oppoaition !'rom the grands blanca was too great--
bu~ it did pass a resolution which ostensibly granted equal 
political rights to descendants o!' !'ree men. The interpre-
tation o!' the resolution was, however, left to the ruling 
cllisa, which re!'used to concede the a!'!'ranchis anything at 
all. When Ogf! and Chavanne led a demonstration at Cap-
Franfais demanding rights !'or the colored class, they were 
I 
9 
se;tzed and executed "with notable brutality" in March, 1791. 
Mattera were complicated by the rising o!' the black slaves 
i'i 1ve months ·later.lO 
No one knows !'or certain, and the acc.o.unt.s. are coni'lict• 
,, 
ing but the chances are that the. a!'i'ranchis enc.ouraged or 
I 
perhaps stimulated the slave insurrection. Only by this 
m~thod could they _have !'rightened the white planter into 
r~cognizing the common peril and the need of affranchi 
9.[ Leyburn, pp. 20-21. 
' 10. Davia, Chapter III, passim. 
• 
assistance in dominating the slave. 
i 
10 
Most likely, this was 
al~ that was intended. But, if the arfranchi attempted a 
ru!se to serve his purposes, he created a Franken.stein which 
I 
sdon went beyond his control. The Negro stir became a vast 
fl,ood wllich within ten yenrs 1 time drove the white man from 
Ha'i tian shores but at the same time left the arfranchi a 
hqpelessly tiny stick swirling across the surface of a great 
tfdal wave that had neither his assistance nor his sympathy. 
I:fi he was formerly an out.sider looking in upon a society 
he admired and wished fervently to become part of, he was now 
equally an outsider, but to a society he wanted no part of 
I 
and could not admire.ll 
After a bloody and ferocious two-year period of in-
surrection in which unspeakable cruelties were inflicted 
' ' b~ white upon black and black upon white, while the arfranchis, 
who had discovered that the insurgent slaves bad a tendency 
t9 be friendly with them, tried to obtain control of the 
slave revolt to their own advantages, matters were additionally 
I 
11. As the historian Madiou indicates, the mulatto was, in 
a sense, lost. He could not enter the white man's world, and 
he dared not the Negro 1 s. He travelled between two worlds, 
was a member of neither, and to a very great degree was a 
mm without a country. Behind the mulatto's mind may be the 
strange suspicion that like the white man~ he is not really 
en Haitian at all. But where is he to go. In what nation 
would he be accepted? In a white nation he would be treated· 
as an inferior. In a black nation, he would merge with a 
race be does not accept. France? Here he would be welcome 
as a Frenchman, no better, no worse, and he would lose the 
ptoivileged status he holds in Haiti. By force of oircum-
s~ances, then, he remains Hai tisn. 
I 
11 
' co~plicated by the invasions of British and Spanish who 
trlied to put down the revolt before it spread to Jamaica 
and Spanish Santo Domingo. Add to this the rise of a 
' 
i 
radical party in Paris which determined to liberate the 
' 
i s~aves, thus arousing the fury of the grands blancs, petits 
blancs, and gens de couleurs against Republican France, and 
·t~e picture of Saint-Domingue in 1793 is one of inter-class 
and inter-race struggle, political cleavage, and national 
antipathies of a complexity rarely seen in the history of 
' 
apy nation: Negro against colonial white; white colonial 
a'gainst radical French; affranchis against the colonial 
vfhltes on the basis of colonial white supremacy but in 
sympathy with the whites against emancipating the slaves; 
the French, Negroes, and a majority of colonial whites and 
i 
affranchis opposed to English and Spanish. Nor were the 
lines clearly drawn between races and classes; if anything, 
' 
the lines were blurred and indistinct rather than clear at 
I 
any point. Within a year conditions indicated that only a 
' 
strong man could bring order out of the welter of confusion 
'in which Saint-Domingue found itself. This man proved to 
be the former slave Toussaint L 1 0uverture. 12 By 1796 he had 
not only beaten the Spanish and the British, but he stood as 
I 
! 
1
12. Toussaint was born a slave at Breda near Cap-Franyais 
approximately 1746. Despite his condition of servitude, 
!somehow he learned how to read and write, and displayed such 
'abilities of leadership that his master made him superintendent 
12 
France's governor-general in .Saint-Domingue. Only one 
rival stood between himself and absolute power in the 
I / French colony, Andre Rigaud, the mulatto leader of the 
I 
affranchis. By 1799, after a brief conflict decided by 
T~ussaint's superior capabilities and enormously superior 
' manpower, the affranchi power was broken and the Negro 
s:tood supreme on his own soil. 
df the other Negroes on the plantation. During the revolt 
qf 1791, he joined the leaders of the Negroes, Jean-Francois, 
Biassou, Boukmann, and Jean Jannot as a physician to the 
troops, but only after he first aided his master to escape 
the general massacre of the whites. Jean-Francois arrested 
him for partiality to the whitesL-but he was liberated by 
Biassou. On the death of Louis All.!, many of the leading 
blacks, including Toussaint, joined the Spanish, who bad 
invaded Saint-Domingue, and here Toussaint gained the 
military reputation that lifted him to the_ command of four 
thousand black troops. Upon the liberation of the slaves 
by the Republican government at Paris, Toussaint deserted 
to the French with ell his troops, turned .on the Spanish 
and the English who had invaded Saint-Domingue, and drove 
them both out. By 1796, he was generally considered by 
whites, blacks, and mulattoes the only man to restore order 
in the colony. Only the mulatto chieftain Rigaud still 
questioned himi and in a civil war Toussaint emerged the 
yictor. From 799, until 1802, Toussaint set his hand to 
rebuilding the colony, with himself as governor-general. 
However, Napoleon's determination to bring Saint-Domingue 
into closer relationship with France frightened the blacks 
~nto fears of renewed slavery, and a new war broke out,· this 
.time one for liberation !'rom France herself. Toussaint did 
not bring this fight to completion. Invited to a dinner for 
~the purpose of discussing Haitian affairs,. and completely 
'trusting of the whites, expecielly French honor, Toussaint 
~as placed in chains and shipped to France where he quickly 
1d1ed of cold and starvation. The final liberation of Haiti was accomplished by Toussaint 1 s chief general, Dessalines. 
·See Ralph Korngold 1 s Citizen Toussaint. (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1944). Also see Martineau's novel The Hour and 
the Man, a novel which idealizes Toussaint, and which Wendell 
Phillips admired enormously :for the hopes which it held out 
to the freed American Negro. 
13 
From 1799 until 1802 peace returned to Saint-Domingue, 
~d Toussaint became something of a symbol of the purest 
tdeals of the French Revolution. 13 Member of a formerly 
degraded slave class though he was barely literate, Toussaint 
proved to have the shrewdness, kindness, stability of charac-
ter, and capacity for leadership that offered to bring his 
country out of the stormy seas of rapine and lust into the 
' t~anquil waters of a calm future. As Leyburn says of him: 
To many Toussaint was a hero with elements of saint-
liness. In the overheated atmosphere of-prejudice and 
hatred in Saint Domingue, he pursued a calm policy of 
moderation. Under him, anarchy and massacres came to 
an end. With an army at his beck and call, he used 
force only to maintain freedom for his fellow blacks 
and to defend the colony against foreign invasion. 
As nominal governor-general after 1799 he revived pros-
perity, inculcated discipline as an antidote to the 
intoxication of liberty, respected his contracts, and 
was a friend to law and order. On the other hand, he 
l}. So great a symbol of liberty and the unlimited possi-
bilities of Man that William Wordsworth wrote the following 
poem on his death: 
' 
Toussaint, the most ~ppy of men! 
Whether the whistling. Rustic tend his plough 
Within thy hearing, or thy head be now 
Pillowed in some deep dungeon's earless den;--
0 miserable Chieftain! where and when 
Wilt thou find patience! Yet die not; do tho!f 
Wear rather in thy bonds a cheerful brow: 
Though fallen thyself, .never to rise again, 
Live and take comfort •• Thou hast left behind 
Powers that will work for thee; air, earth, and skies; 
There's not a breathing of the common wind 
That will forget thee; thou hast great allies; 
Thy friends are exultations, agonies 
And love, and_ man's unconquerable mind. 
had moments of inordinate vanity, and would brook 
no interference. His henchmen had to endure merci-
less tongue-lashings. His own people's freedom, about 
which he was publicly so sollcitouy,. was in many re-
spects little better than slavery. ~ 
He set up a Constitution, divided the country up into 
military districts, set over each a commander, checked the 
passions of his people against the whites still left in 
Saint-Domlngue and encouraged the former white settlers 
' 
to return, and through persuasion and force herded the 
masses of the blacks back to the plantations. Men like 
' 
Dessalines and Christophe15showed themselves particularly 
ass.iduous in bringing the ten-year neglect of the fields 
to an end. Shirkers were burled alive, sawn between two 
~lanks of wooa, whipped and quartered, and subjected to 
the ingenious tortures. The emancipated slaves now found 
themselves .in Davis' words. "once more slaves--slaves of a 
military state. 1116 -
Yet the ultimate result might have been salutary had 
Toussaint been permitted his way. As it was, the emergence 
qf Napoleon to power in France brought about the Negro 
! 
1eader's fall. 17 The First Consul could not abide having 
14. Leyburn, pp. 26-27 
' I 
15. The syste11 probably originated in the mind of Dessalines. 
~6. Davis, p. 56 
l7. Saint-Domingue had in addition to its natural wealth, 
a military significance to Napoleon as a base toward build-
~ng a new empire in the New World, i.e. Louisiana. 
I 
this "gilded African" rival him within the French culture 
ks the champion of the rights of man, and in January, 1802, 
Napoleon's brother-in-law General Leclerc arrived at Cap-
Frangais with twenty-thousand veterans to restore White 
control to the island, his hands filled with paper promises 
from the First Consul. Whites and mulattoes in general 
hailed his arrival, but General Christophe, black commander 
?f the city, was not quite so elated. The black troops re-
' sisted, and the War for Haitian Independence began. When 
it ended two years later, Toussaint had died of cold and 
starvation in a dank French prison in the Jura Mountains 
of Southeast France; Dessalines ruled an independent country 
known as Haiti (an aboriginal Indian name meaning "mountain-
bus"); Leclerc was dead of fever; fifty thousand troops, 
or two French armies, had been consumed, one by fighting, 
: 
the second by disease; the country lay prostrate with 
ruined trade, destroyed plantations, rotting fields, a 
frightened hungry population, burned towns and villages, 
and an enormous army that was to remain Haiti's chief ex-
pense through the one hundred and twenty-five years that 
were to follow; and a hatred of the whi.te man that was not 
to be shaken for at least a century.18 
! 
,· 
/ 
16 
Dessalines proclaimed independence on January 1, 1804, 
and then embarked upon an unabashed tyranny. He professed 
I I , 
llberte, but this 1 iberte meant 1 iberty from France, and 
I 
I • , _, 
he failed to mention egalite and fraternite as part of his 
I 
I 
beliefs. Like Toussaint, a former slave, but, unlike him, 
! 
u~forgiving, and ruthless, he hated the whites (remembering 
h~w they had turned against Toussaint at the arrival of 
I 
Ljclerc), distrusted the mulattoes (even though his hope 
was to unite all Haitians of Negro ancestry), and sought 
I 
' I 
ever to be on guard against the French. To these ends, he 
! 
d!ivided all Haitians into two classes, cultivators and 
i 
sbldiers, sent the cultivators to the ruined plantations 
i 
I 
and fields, sent the soldiers to supervise them, and lived 
b~ the philosophy of the mastery of the state over the 
I 
p;eople. Slavery had been abol !shed and the whip forbidden; 
ini, their 19 places were serfdom and the even more brutal liane •. 
I 
I 
~new constitution was established in 1805 proclaiming 
' 
' 
Haiti an empire and Dessalines himself absolute monarch. 
I . 
Ajll Haitians were proclaimed 11blacks 11 in the effort to 
I 
unite mulattoes and Negroes; and Dessalines even offered 
i, 
Pletion, Rigaud:s chie: ge:eral in the civil war with Tou:-
saint, his daughter Celimene in marriage (which offer Petion 
I 
r
1
espectfully declined). Whites were massacred wherever and 
119. The whip was a symbol of French tyranny and Haitian ~lavery. The long, supple branches of certain vines were 
r1;o less vicious, but in the mind of Dessal ines the symbol ism, 
l:fad been erased. . , 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
17 
I Vfhenever they could be found by a ruthless army, and that 
' army was kept large 
Jver-present danger 
beyond its needs, ostensibly to meet the 
of French invasion but actually for the 
' 
' 
I 
' . 
' conceiving 
i 
and revolt 
i qommanded. 
I 
Haiti's welfare to be synonymous with his own, 
I broke out, particularly in the West where Petion 
Leaving his home in the valley of the Artibonite, 
He rode with a few officers to Port-au-Prince. Upon reach-
' ling Pont Rouge on the outskirts of the capital, October 17, 
I 11806, he was as sass ina ted by the very troops he was to command. 
I . . 20. Toussaint's Constitution declared the Roman Catholic 
~eligion the only publicly professed one in Haiti, but Des-
salines' of 1805 refused to admit a dominant religion. 
18 
:~.~::,'::.::u::0•::::dh:0f:::;.:n::~.::r::: ::.::h:ld 
I Christophe fully expected to become emperor of Haiti, 
i 
' but the South, dominated chiefly by mulattoes, threw its 
I 
wbight behind P~tion, and we have the spectacle of a Haiti 
I 
I 
divided against itself until 1820, the North controlled by 
I 
the "Emperor Jones" and dominated by Negroes, the South 
! 
gbverned by Petion and dominated by the mulatto.21 
. ., 
Christophe and Petion were as different in background, 
i t~mperament, philosophies as men may be, and their 
i . 
I r~spective areas were governed accordingly. Christophe, 
Negro, an ex-slave, illiterate, whose whole experience had 
! . 
b~en gained in the revolutionary and civil wars, and aware 
I . 
ot no other system of government than that of force and a 
I 
t¥orough system of discipline, was well-fitted to carry on 
' I 
the political principles of' Dessalines. Though he did not 
! - . 
vary the soldier-cultivator system which had brought so 
! 
mhch prosperity to the country, though he did not lift tbe str:-:lpt 
21. See Duracine Vaval, "Alexander Petion: l'homme et sa vie," 
R~vue de la Societe d 1Histoire et de Geo ra hie d 1Haiti, 
Vol. III, No. 7 July, 1932 and the same author's Le Roi 
di'Haiti Henri Christophe;" Revue de la Soci~te· d' Histoire 
ep de Geographie d'Haiti, Vol. II, No; 3 (June, 1931). 
These two articles give good comparisons of the statecraft 
of the two men who dominate the period. Also ~ee Davis, 
chapter VI; Leyburn, pp. 42-64. A very brief' summary of 
the two administrations is given in Seld&n Rodman's popu-
l~r book Haiti: the Black Republic (New York: Adair Co., lr54l. pp. 16-20. 
I 
i 
I 
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code of discipline from the backs of the black serfs, though 
he hated the French no less violently, he did agree with 
Toussaint rather than with Dessalines in his recognition 
that Haiti needed the white men, their talents, education, 
techniques, especially the English, whom he particularly 
admired. Where Dessalines had been the slave-master, he was 
the stern patriarch; where Dessalines hated, Christophe 
feared--but also respected. 
He established the elaborate Code Henry, an attempt to 
emulate the French pattern of setting down on paper complex 
~achinery for human behavior, masterfully drawn and impos-
sibly applied. Education was made compulsory under the 
English Lancastrian system then in vogue; laborers were 
' 
given partial weekends off for rest and prayer, though they 
still were not permitted to move :from the land or change 
occupations; a sound currency was established; the work day 
~as l~mited to specific hours; :foreign traders were en-
couraged as well as foreign investment; the printing of 
~ooks was encouraged; and even rules set down for the regu-
lation of the people's dress. Though the system of state-
owned lands worked by cultivators remained unaltered, he 
' 
did permit proprietors to lease state lands, pay a certain 
portion of the profits to the state and retain the rest. 
I ~this death, Christophe's treasury yielded a surplus of 
' kix million dollars in gold. 
I 
20 
He crowned himself Henry I in 1811, but was wise enough 
to create a peerage as well to satisfy the ambitions of his 
! v 
powerful subordinates. Though he governed the great masses 
of the people through force, he dealt with his generals more 
gently, with an eye to their desires and an ear to their 
tongues. Though ignorant, he had, unlike Dessalines, a 
' p~ssion for culture which d.it'ove him to try "to make Haitians 
the most civilized, educated and creative people on earth. 112~ 
But like Dessalines, his egomania, that treacherous servant 
of many great men, overwhelmed him and made him its slave. 
As the magnificent palace of SansSouci, rising in brick 
and concrete near Milot, represents Christophe 1 s'attempt 
during the early part of his rule to bring culture and glory 
tp Haiti, so the Citadelle, a vast fortress constructed at 
the expense of thousands of lives symb'olizes the tyrant 
into which he, like Dessalines, finally became! His benevo-
lence had been based on force, and only upon the basis of 
increasing force could his problems be solved. The hardships. 
I 
of the North soon equalled its prosperity and contrasted much 
/ 
too vividly with the ease and tranquillity of Petion•s 
mulatto-controlled South. Desertions to the South increased, 
both by mulattoes and Negroes, Christophe imported Dahometa23 
22. Rod1lla:n, p. 17. 
I 
I 
23. These were Africans imported by Christophe from Dahomey 
in Africa as a special bodyguard and police-force. Rodman 
~ells us that during the latter part of his reign when, like 
Dessalines, his benevolence had evaporated in the heat of his 
egomania, Christophe tried to impress several foreign digni-
taries with the loyalty of these Dahomets by ordering a platoon 
~f them to march off the parapet of the Citadelle. 
f./ 
21 
' from Africa which he used for a private police force, nobles 
and common folk alike were subject to the severest scrutiny, 
and taxes fell on strong and weak alike. In 1820, after 
i 
suffering a paralytic stroke, he escaped revenge of his 
enemies by committing suicide in his palace of Sans Souci, 
dramatically as ever, with a silver bullet. Legend has it 
that his queen and a faithful servant dragged his body up 
the treacherous path to the Citadelle and dumped it in a 
vat of q.1 ickl ime. 
" Petion, in his administration of the South, followed 
an entirely different line. Born in freedom a mulatto, 
educated in France, cultured, intelligent, he unwittingly 
set the pattern for Haiti's later history. 
I 
He was the antithesis of Haiti's three eminent blacks 
in all but military skill. Toussaint's genius as a 
fighter lay in his surprise moves, Dessalines' in his 
recklessness, Christophe's in his bulldog determina-
tion; but Petion was a great general because he knew 
when to retire and so lead his enemy into an exposed 
position. The three Negroes had been born in slavery; 
" Pet'ion, coming of a cultured and sophisticated affranchi 
family, grew up in France. Dessalines was a crude ruf-
' fian by comparison, .while in the face of Petion 1 s 
suavity Christophe's impetuousness seemed rankly un-
couth. Where they~bludgeoned, Petion persuaded, where 
they hacked their way through opposition in the deter-
mination to gain an end, he graciously yielded and so 
won new friends. Tactful at every point, he survived 
even such contretemps a~ .. hls refusal of the hand of 
the Emperor's daughter.~ 
is known as the Jefferson of the Republic, and he bears 
~ strong intellectual resemblance to his contemporary in 
~· Leyburn, p. 52. 
I 
I 
the United States. He believed in the ultimate capacities 
of the people; he understood the need of the Negro masses 
~or training in democracy; he wished to unite mulatto and 
Negro; he refused to follow the Toussaint-Dessalines-
Christophe pattern of great state-owned plantations run by 
the soldier-cultivator system of forced labor, but prefer-
' red to break up the government lands into smaller plots 
which were either sold, leased, or given away to individual 
.cultivators. ~hough Leyburn praises him for his kindness 
~ 
t:oward his people, his forbearance, his understanding of 
human nature, sincere patriotism, lack of personal ambi-
tion, supple and flexible mind, and his desire--where Des-
~alines wished to be emperor and Christophe king--to be 
just the simple president of his people, 
the fact remains that his country was rich when he 
came to power and poor when he died; united in 1806 
and divided in 1818. Candor compels his admirers to 
admit that many of the calamities of the social and 
economic histor25of Haiti can be traced back to Petion•s administration. . . 
~ 
Petion set a policy of distributing land to the people which 
' in a country that does not follow the British rule of primo-
geniture is national suicide. As each owner died, the land 
was distributed among the sons, and so on and so on, until 
I 
Bait! by the 20th century became a country of tiny plots of 
I 
' ~round no longer capable of producing the sugar and coffee 
I 
i 
I 25. Leyburn, p. 53 
! 
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which were Haiti•s staples and her wealth, and barely large 
¢nough to support the f~!lies to which they belonged. And 
! 
in the process he broke the power of the affranchis--or 
" elite, as they came to be called--the only class capable of 
~unning the country with any semblance of ordered democracy, 
forcing them from an economic position based upon land to 
one based upon office-holding and commerce. 
Unfortunately for Haiti, the years between 1807 and 
1820 saw a country divided between two separate extremes of 
philosophy, neither one of which was by itself the solution 
to the economic and pol !tical problems which Haiti faced. 
' Had Christophe the faith in democracy held by Petion, or 
. ~ P,etion the passion for efficiency of Christophe and Dessalines, 
Haiti might have been set upon the traditions of democracy 
and bard work. As it was, she obtained neither tradition. 
When Christophe died in 1820, the country was reunited under 
/ 
Petion•s pattern in the South. 
His successor Jean Pierre Boyer governed from 1820 un-
til . 26 1844, and his ~lite administration hardened the forces 
I' 
already crystallized in Haitian life: (1) The elite took the 
place of t"he whites as the aristocrats, distinguished not 
by landbolding as in colonial times but by education, liter-
acy, manners, office-holding, and wealth derived from govern-
I m~nt and commerce. (2) The civil service fell into the hands 
26. Leyburn, PP• 64-87i Davis, pp. 114-118; Rodman, p.l8-20 
24-
o,:r the 
I 
' elite, while the army remained in the hands o:r the 
Negro, creating a bipolarization in Haitian politics. (3) 
the parceling o:r land continued, and wild co:f':fee took the 
place o:r sugar and plantation co:f':fee as the staple, with 
the result that the soldier-cultivator system fell into 
disuse. The last attempt at restoring prosperity to agri-
culture, Boyer's Code Rurale o:r 1826, which was the :final 
attempt to restore the great plantations, failed miserably. 
The peasants "had •• a taste o:r liberty with economic anarchy 
and they pre:ferredthis to compulsion and •••• signing of' 
dubious contracts.n27 Putting it another way, "Material 
gain is desirable but not at the expense of' liberty. 
~eedom means something, even in poverty.n28 
The term :freedom, however, one must understand, meant 
something other than it meant in the northern nations. It 
did not mean :freedom o:r enterprise, vigor o:r action; it 
meant the :freedom to do nothing. The middle class which 
was so badly needed to build the nation simply never came 
into being. If' it existed at all, it existed in the :few 
whites who still lived in Haiti, whites who served much the 
! 
same purposes for the country that the Jews served during 
the Middle Ages. 
! 
The people were divided into rich and poor, 
~ultured and uncultured, but they were not divided on the 
27. Rodman, p. 19. 
' 
28. Ibid. 
25 
basis of the torpor which set in upon the population. The 
status quo became a sort of desired commodity to change 
! 
which became something of a crime against good taste; that 
some should be wealthy, others horribly depressed, became 
as much a part of Haitian life in the 19th century as the 
oppressive heat. 29 But at least the masses were no longer 
the pseudo-serfs they had been; they were now peasants free 
' 
to work their tiny plots of earth had they the desire or 
the energy to do so. 
From 1843, the year of Boyer's overthrow by a group of 
young mulattoes, until 1915, the date of the American In-
tervention, Haitian history became little more than a series 
of revolutions, in which politics became submerged in self-
~eeking, fundamental doctrines of democracy were lost, and 
great issues were practically non-existent. The government 
revolved, rather, between the Ins and the Outs. It was a 
~ government in which the elite, outvoted by a Negro majority 
consisting of an illiterate 95 or 96 per cent of the people 
and outmatched by an official Negro army and thousands of 
Negro guerrillas (called cacos in the North and piquets in 
' 
the South) hiding in the mountains, sought to promote its 
i.nterests either through its natural arm, the civil service, 
or by backing Negro revolutionists more amenable to its con-
. t 1rol. Elections were corrupt, bribery common, ignorance 
2,9. See the report of Samuel Hazard, a correspondent of the 
New York Herald, who visited Haiti in the middle of. the 19th 
century. He speaks of a period a generation after Boyer, but 
his comments are still applicable. Davis, pp. 128-130. 
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a~ong presidents normal, and violence habitually based upon 
tne cacos, that natural spawn of continued disorder, who 
I 
occupied the heights at the beck and call of any aspiring 
/ 
presidential candidate whose success might offer booty and 
adventure. 
Ordinar lly we think of revolutions in terms of gigantic 
proportions: the overturning of an order, the tearing down of 
a system to construct a newer and better, the influx of new 
ideas. By this view, only one revolution took place in 
Haiti, that of 1791-1804. This revolution alone went to 
the bottom of Haitian life. Those that followed affected 
less and less the Haitian mass. Toussaint, Christophe, 
, 
Petion, Boyer were the fashioners of government; those who 
followed were merely disturbances upon the surface of the 
waters, whose effects neither spread wide nor sank deep. 
The violerce at Cap Frangais (Later called Cap<,-Haitien), 
at Les Cayes, and at Port-au-Prince, whether it turned right 
' 
or left, produced little in the way of benefits for the two 
m:!Jllions lingering in tte thousand valleys of the country, 
hiding in the hills, or grubbing for bread in the alleyways 
of' the towns. In this way, at least, Haiti did not imitate 
France, for in France• s continual violence we do find a strong 
searching of the Gallic soul for a better life that does not 
' seem to be manifested in Haitian political meanderings. 
From 1843 until 1915, Haiti endured thirty-two heads of 
state. ' / / Riviere-Herard, the mulatto set up by the elite to 
27 
~eplace Boyer, was overthrown in 1844 by the Negro army, 
~nstituting Negro control of the presidency for the entire 
I 
' period from 1844 until 1915, with the exception of Geffrard, 
Salnave, Boisronde-Canal, and Hippolyte. Guerri~re stayed 
' 
in power eleven months, his successor Pierrot eleven months, 
, 
Riche less than a year. Soulouque, Domingue, Boisronde-
' Canal, Salomon, Legitime, Alexis, Simon, Oreste, Zamor, and 
' Theodore were deposed by revolution; Salnave was tied to a 
pole and shot; Hippolyte died in office; Leconte was blown 
up in his palace; Auguste died by poison; Simon Sam retired 
under pressure; and Jean Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, the last of 
I 
1the presidents prior to the American Intervention in 1915, 
was torn to pieces by a mob in Port-au-Prince after murder-
ing one hundred and sixty-seven of his political enemies in 
1
a prison blood-bath. Nissage-Saget alone, a mulatto, managed 
by some ama~ing quickness of mind to retire peacefully at 
the conclusion to his four -year term. In one hundred and 
eight years, twenty-four executives held office, seventeen 
:were deposed by revolutions, two of whom were publicly 
murdered; two were allowed to retire peacefully from office, 
:eleven served for less than one year each. From 1908 until 
,1915 alone, so violent and hopeless had Haitian politics 
become since the grand days of Toussaint that seven presi-
ldents were selected and deposed: Simon by revolution; Leconte 
! 
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by an explosion in his palace; Auguste by poison; Oreste 
by exile; Zamor by revolution (and was later murdered in 
the same massacre by which Sam destroyed his other political 
opponents); and Sam by lynching. The record reads more like 
a, 1 ist of American summer television programs thal'l the history 
of a proud people.3° 
Whether one subscribes to the theory that history is 
the resu 1 ts of the actions of great men or the results of 
forces too deep and too strong for men either to control or 
modify to any great extent, or even if one denies any thesis 
to history, one cannot deny tbat by the time of the American 
Intervention specific forces endemic to Haiti and Haitian 
1 ife had established themselves--forces that would destroy 
the Occupation and that could not be overlooked by the com-
missioners of 1930 in any attempt to settle Haitian affairs 
anddetermine United States policy in that area. Strong man 
rule vied with group rule, dictatorship with democracy, the 
~lite with the mass, the civil service with the army, the 
North with the South and West of P~tion 1 s old regime, uni-
versal education with education for the few. 
Few historians disagree that at the time of liberation, 
the hope of Haiti lay with the only educated class left in 
! 
the country, the affranchi. Had the affranchis lent their 
I 
cultivation, their superior knowledge of the world, their 
I 
30. For an excellent summary of this period, see Davi~ 
Chapter VII, Part I, Chapter I, Part II. 
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' 
wealth and talents to the development of the country, they 
m[ght have led the Negro along paths of education to a 
stable, prosperous modern democracy. Had they not despised 
manual labor, they might have formed a group devoted not only 
to literary and cultural pursuits but to the technical sciences 
which form the heart of any sturdy modern democracy. And 
~d they been pure Africans this is precisely what they 
might have done. But they were not; they were the descend-
ants of white parents who denied them, and psychologically 
i 
they were whiter than the French who had now been either 
driven from the land or dead. Like the Jewish Torquemada 
who in fleeing from his Jewishness became more anti-Semitic 
than the most fanatic Inquisitors, the mulatto denied all 
connection with his Negro brother. For him the white 
aristocrat had never left Haitian shore~:~_; he himself was 
now the white aristocrat, and the black man was still his 
slave. The mulatto was a Frenchman heart and soul; he spoke 
French and not the native Creole, wore French clothes, aped 
French manners, and dressed his wife and children in Parisian 
fashions; he was educated in Gallic literature, wrote French 
codes and constitutions, and selected law for his profession; 
his food smacked of Normandie and his wine of Bordeaux, the 
i 9hampagne, and the Loire. And the cleavage which had arisen 
I in colonial days between white and mulatto now became be-
' i 
fween affranchi and the Negro mass a great chasm unly to be 
transcended by the most miraculous processes. The mulatto 
30 
had escaped massacre because the Negro slave had considered 
him to be African; he accepted freedom from massacre grate-
fully but he would not accept its concomitant, being African. 
Nor would he accept anything that might destroy his single 
advantage over the mass: his education--with all that this 
implies in matters o£ the sheer ability to read and write, 
create and interpret legislation, keep commercial records, 
publish newspapers and journals, maintain an-awareness o£ 
w'orld conditions, ·and accumulate wealth. Education for the 
masses o£ the people, the only real hope £or a strong modern 
nation, would have destroyed the singular strong point o£ 
the mulatto, and against this he set his race. 
, 
The elite spoke continually through Haitian history 
£or parliamentary government, which superficially at least 
seemed to substantiate its claims that it spoke for demo-
cratic government. But without mass education, parliamentary 
government meant only representative government £or the 
, 
elite,, which was another way o£ enabling it through a 
controlled legislature to offset the strong powers o£ a 
Negro president placed in office by a Negro army. Haitian 
politics or the period berore 1915 was a constant struggle 
/ Qetween the Negro army and the elite £or positions or strength, 
I 
each totally selfish, while the mass o£ the people sat un-
changed and ill-considered--ir considered at all-in its 
' 
i tiny plots in the valleys and mountainsides o£ the nation. 
I 
31. 
True, there were two parties after a fashion, the Liberals 
/ 
'(representing the elite) and the Nationalists (representing 
the Negro Army leaders), but the liberals were not liberally 
minded and the nationalists were not concerned with national 
;interest. , Without the interest of the elite, the only class 
that could bring about a genuine democratization and tech-
nical modernization of the country, Haiti was ~helpless as 
' 31 
the League of Nations had been without the United States. 
i 
11 The Liberals squandered their opportunities in 1822, 1843, 
,1859, 1870, and 1876. They were never to have another ••• 
Thereafter no serious effort was made to establish respon-
sible government, and the problem of subordinating the 
milita~ to the civil power remained unsolved.n32 
, 
Had the elite controlled the army, Haitian history 
~efore 1915 might have been, despite its oligarchical 
despotism, at least relatively free from violence. But 
;the af'franchi had missed his opportunity to raise armies 
during the ware of' the 1790's, leaving the major fighting 
to black generals. By the time Boyer took command of a 
:united Haiti in 1820, so many Negro generals of experience 
existed that they could not easily be retired. Nor was a 
:shabby, ill-uniformed, worse paid, illiterate army the place 
for 
I 
' 
~1. 
! 
32. 
the cultured mulatto who preferred the conversation of 
Leyburn, Chapter XII. 
Montague, pp. 18-19. 
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the law office and the government post; and when we consider 
'that the primary source of recruits was the rural Negro 
whom only Negro officers could understand and control, we 
~ee that by Boyer's time the army was largely to be in com-
mand of its own situation. T.he revolution of 1843 had been 
a movement of mulattoes, that of 1844 one of the army, and 
from that time forward until the Intervention, only three 
'genuine mulattoes (Nissage-Saget, Boisronde-Canal, Auguste) 
held the presidency. The ~lite could not stand against the 
guns of the army, poor as those guns may have been, and he 
withdrew into his aristocratic shell to try less obvious 
methods of retaining power. 
The army offered an ideal situation to the illiterate 
'Negro who wished either advancement in 1 ife or security • 
. It gave him employment, the spoils of war, some excitement, 
a feeling of importance, and security. It was the only way 
.I 
.to advancement for a man who was barred by the elite in 
every way. Boyer spoiled things for the army, however, by 
getting France to recognize the independence of Haiti in 
'1838. Until that time a huge army was demanded by the 
i generals and the presidents to defend the country against 
'the ever-present danger--so they said--of French re-invasion. 
After 1838 no such danger was imminent. Laziness, lack of 
training, a laissez-faire attitude encompassed the military, 
together with a sense of disintegration, until the Negro 
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generals discovered, as did the Roman armies on the frontiers 
or the Praetorian Guard two millenia before, that they might 
raise an emperor by merely lifting him upon their shields. 
Overmilitarization has been as much a drain upon the 
Haitian population as the.yaws, hookworm, and yellow fever 
which have ravaged the body. Men feared to go to market 
lest they be impressed into service by one general or another 
on the road, hiding in the hills like animals, sending their 
women to the towns and trading centers. The small revenues 
obtained by the government often went primarily to line the 
pockets of generals. Crops went into the ever hungry maw 
of foraging troops. If it--furthered the careers of a few 
young blacks who had pretensions of military honor, it de-
stroyed the lives of thousands of young men who despised 
the miserable existence it offered. Candler33tells us that 
irt 1842, when the population was still less than a million, 
the district governments had nine generals, sixty-three 
colonels, forty-eight lieutenant-colonels, nine captains, 
one lieutenant, and twenty-eight medical officers; in the 
standing army were thirty-three colonels, ninety-five 
lieutenant-colonels, eight hundred twenty-five captains, 
six hundred fifty-four lieutenants, five hundred seventy-
seven suhlieutenants and ensigns,six thousand eight hundred-
fifteen noncommissioned officers, twenty-five medical officers, 
and twenty-eight thousand soldiers. With no foreign enemy 
34 
to :fight, they controlled the districts in which they were 
1ocated, plotted, counter-plotted, and welcomed the adventure 
o:f occasional :forays against the cacos in the hills or the 
special delights o:f revolution. The mulatto hated the Negro 
Army clique, yet it was his own :fears that kept it going, 
' / like the rattlesnake chasing its tail; had the elite been 
willing to open up other channels o:f advancement to Negroes, 
the Army would have lost its main attraction. But to do 
this would have meant mass education and the destruction 
' o:f the elite advantage anyway, so the mulatto accepted the 
army as a preferable evil and tried to mitigate its effect 
upon his 1 if e. 
Historians have a way of stating that the times find 
the man. They found the man in Toussaint, but such a man 
! 
was not to be :found again. The first and best o:f the 
Haitian rulers, he had the understanding of his people, that 
Dessalines and Christophe did not possess, firmness of 
, 
Will that Petion and Boyer lacked, and perhaps the insight 
into his people of no other Haitian leader after him. 
Dessalines and Christophe forced their people--and not for 
I / 
very long; Petion catered, :for all his ideals, to elite 
~nterest; Boyer's long twenty-five years of control was a 
I 
mere waiting :for the storm, with no significant achieve-
ments to call leadership. And when the storm came in 1844, 
Je see launched a line o:f incompetents in the presidential 
I 
chair. Haitians worshipped the strong-man ideal, but the 
problem lay in :finding the strong man to :fit the ideal. 
Far :from being strong, the presidents competed .with each 
other :for weakness and immorality, culminating inthead-
ministrations o:f Domingue, Auguste, and the second Sam. 
Domingue's so-called government serves the example. 
35 
Nissage-Saget, as we recall, by some twist o:f :fate, managed 
to retire without a revolution at the close o:f his term o:f 
o:f:fice. He selected in May o:f 1874 Michel Domingue, a 
Negro general in command o:f the Southeastern Department, and 
appointed him commander o:f the army. Domingue was elected--
11elected11 in the sense that no one objected at the time--
on June 11, 1874, :for a term o:f eight years. He immediately 
turned over the government to his nephew, the unscrupulous 
Septimus Rameau, who lost no time in looting the treasury. 
He :floated a loan to France :for twenty-six million :francs, 
most o:f Which :found its way into the pockets o:f Rameau and 
his :friends. Revolt brewed, and Rameau ordered the arrest 
o:f General Brice, Montplaisir Pierre, and Boisronde-Canal, 
three very influential men in the country and three whom 
Rameau particularly suspected o:f rebellion. Brice was killed 
in his o:f:fice, Pierre in his own house a:fter a long defence 
in which, according to Sir Spencer St. John, he killed 
seventeen soldiers, wounded thirty-two, most mortally, and 
c~uld only be subdued by the employment o:f artillery.34 
34. Sir Spencer St. John, Haiti~ or the Black Republic, 
(London: Smith, Elder & Co., 188 ). 
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Boisronde-Canal, warned in advance escaped. On April 15, 
1876, Rameau was murdered while in the process of trying 
I 
to get government funds out of the country for his proposed 
exile, and Domingue set hurried sail for Jamaica. Jamaica, 
indeed, became between Boyer and the second Sam the happy 
hunting ground of exiled leaders of Haiti--exile based on 
pilfered funds from the Haitian· people. Boisronde-Canal, 
! 
succeeding Domingue, was the only president who seemed to 
pbssess a sense of responsibility, but after a serious riot 
In July of 1879, in which men were slain, he resigned and 
left the country in disgust. 
This is not to say that the men who held the presidency 
were basically immoral. To say this would be to have an 
unclear picture of the era. So natural had the confusion 
and rapacity become to Haltian politics that the presidency 
was not looked upon as a trust for the benefit of the nation; 
it was the prize which went to the victor, to be used for 
the victor's advantage. That the government had too little 
money to do any good for the people, but more than enough 
to make poor men wealthy seemed to be the philosophy. 
But even assuming that the governing groups were truth-
fully concerned with the benefit of their country, the prob-
lem of obtaining sufficient revenues with which to implement 
pr[ogressive ideas still had to be solved. The country had 
I 
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:no connnerce; apart from wild coffee she had nothing to sell. 
She had no resources in minerals, no cattle or sheep ranches, 
no longer any of the great cacao and sugar plantations which 
had made her so wealthy before the revolution of 1791. Her 
greatest wealth was in her agriculture, but as has been 
, I 
observed, Petion's policy of splitting up the great planta-
tions into smaller and smaller plots of ground, together 
with the Haitian tendency to divide inheritances equally 
among sons, destroyed the plantation system and with it the 
only source of large .revenues. Agriculture had sunk to little 
more than that Which Haitian women and old men laboring 
under primitive conditions with primitive instruments could 
i produce. Sugar was no longer shipped abroad, and just enough 
was produced to satisfy small local needs, while the tilling 
of the soil, the construction of fencing, the breeding of 
live-stock were neglected. The only cultivation worthy of 
the name was the growing of garden vegetables. Coffee, 
cotton, and bananas grew in a semi-wild state, rural homes 
were shacks with thatched roofs, sanitation was non-existent, 
and manual labor even among the Negro masses was shunned by 
everyone except the women.35 The stigma of slavery after 
150 years had finally penetrated uawn from the ~lite into 
35. The Haitian woman has been the heart and soul of labor 
in Haiti. The mulatto despised manual labor because of its 
c~nnection with slavery and the African homeland; the Negro 
male found it, on the other hand, almost impossible to follow 
38 
the lowest rungs of the racial ladder. Erosion of the land 
and carelessness in the protection of the once rich Haitian 
forests were gradually destroying the land that was still 
valuable. With such conditions and a virtually bankrupt 
treasury, graft seemed to be the only worthwhile pursuit 
of a president. 
Many Haitians, esp:cially young men who have been to 
the United States or Europe, blame the general torpor of 
the average Haitian, which certainly is a force to be reck-
oned with. At the end of 1923, the American High Commission-
........... -----..., 
er Russell declared(!:_~_a._ynot only)Were 95% of the people 
illiterate but that they were immoral as well and had the 
mentality of a child of not. more than seven years of age 
reared under advantageo~s conditions.36 Millspaugh remarks 
! in comment that 
whether such generaliz~tion were or were not helpful 
it is true that Haitians in the mass had not yet ad-
vanced far enough in understanding to identify their 
personal interests with good or bad government; and 
their relative number suggested that some change must 
be wrought in them. Their wants were mainly for the 
bare necessities of tropical and primitive existence--
for the simple reason that the turbulence of the times con-
stantly demanded his presence in the army. Either he was 
actually in service or he was in danger of being impressed. 
In desperation, most able-bodied young men hid in the hills 
while their women tilled the fields and brought the produce 
to market. 
36. General John H. Russell, Report of the American High 
Commissioner for 1925 (Washington, D.C: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1925), p. 4. 
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a thatch-roofed hut, a modicum of clothes, food natur-
ally grown and easil·y obtained, crude and sensual 
social life; and sexual satisfaction. To an American 
they appeared indolent, shiftless and poverty-stricken. 
Actually, they were for the most part care-free and 
contented, and possessed nearly everything in life that 
they had learned to want. To transform a person of 
this type into a functioning democratic citizen would 
·apparently necessitate his learning to want certain 
things that he had not hitherto wanted--among them good 
government~-and to be able to discriminate between good 
and bad government, as well as between good and bad 
leadership. 37 
The Haitian as an individual, whether mulatto or Negro, 
did not seem to be any different than any other man, regard-
less of race, who had to spend his life in the tropics·under 
a sun 130 degrees in the shade a good part of the year and 
over.a hun~red the remainder.38 This was a force beyond 
the control of the Commissions of 1930 but a vital one that 
had to wait for science and not politics to solve. The 
industrial nations lie in the temperate zone, and if we have 
difficulty in the United States in bringing technology and 
·chril rights below the Mason-Dixon 1 ine, how much more diffi-
cult developing them in. an area two thousand miles farther 
south? Add to the problem of climate tropical diseases unknown 
farther north,39 a geography that resembles a crumpled 
~.· 1. Millspaugh, Haiti Under American Control, 1915-1930, 
pp. 137-138. 
38. Wallace Thompson, "Climactic Influences in the Caribbean," 
Current History, Vol. XXXI (February, 1930), pp. 915-918. 
139. Leyburn, pp. 272-277, gives an e.xcellent summary. Dr. 
Camille Llferisson, "Diseases of the Peasants of Haiti," 
American.Journal of.Public Health, Vol. XXV, No •. 8 (August,l935). 
4-0 
piece of paper,4-0 an overpopulation problem that makes 
Haiti the most densely populated country in the western 
hemisphere,4-1 and an isolation that can only come from being 
a tiny patch of French culture and 1 angua ge in a vast cas is 
of English, Spanish, and Portuguese, and we have a few of 
the major forces with which W. Cameron Forbes had to contend 
in that winter of 1930. 
. 'Dr. Robert P. Parsons. History of Halt ian Medicine (New York: P.B.Hoeber, 1930), passim. 
Hookworm, malaria, yaws, cardiac and pulmonary infection, 
venereal disease, dysentery, cancer were so prevalent during 
the period before the AIDe rican Occupation as to be accepted 
by the people as part of the normal process of living. 
Forbes' Commission found that the health service of the Oc-
cupation was the only element appreciated by the masses of 
the people. 
lj.O. There is the legend that when Napoleon once asked what 
the geography of Haiti was like, one of his officers crumpled 
a' piece of paper and threw it on a table before him. 
lj.l. Leyburn states the following, p. 268: 
TWo and a half or possibly three million people live within 
10,200 square miles. These figures, if they are to convey 
a, reality, must be conceived in more familiar terms. Haiti 
is just about the size of Vermont, but has six times as many 
people crowded together among its mountains. In a list of 
countries still independent in 1935 Haiti ranked among the 
first ten in density of population, yet its economic life 
was agricultural, while the other nine have a high degree of 
indus trial izat ion. 
As one looks at a full page map of the Western Hemisphere 
it is difficult even to find the tiny wisp of color which 
marks the Caribbean Republic of Haiti. Of the twenty-two 
American countries, including Canada, Haiti is next to last 
in size (El Salvador is smaller), yet ranks thirteenth in 
population, and far-and away the first in density of popula-
tion, in the whole hemisphere. The figures are revealing. 
For the mulatto and his Negro imitator the solution 
to Haiti's problem in the 19th century, as with everything 
' 
else, lay along the French passion :for Constitutions and 
Codes. Taine42 counts thirteen French constitutions between 
1791 and 1875, and Haiti created :fifteen during the 19th 
century alone, Each constitution, created by either a 
mulatto president or ~a mulatto working at the request o:f 
a Negro president, was remarkably detailed, painfully con-
structed to consider all eventualities, masterful in the 
:fluency with which the parts :fitted into the whole, Nor 
were the numerous Codes, such as Christophe's Code Henry 
or Boyer's Code Rurale less carefully reared, The trouble 
was that they did not work. They did not work because they 
were not suited to the Haitian situation, They were French 
Country 
1.' United States 
2. Brazil 
3,, Me:x:ico 
4.' Argent ina 
5. Canada 
6, Colombia 
7. Peru 
8. Chile 
9. Cuba. 
10, Venezuela 
11. Bolivia 
12. Guatemala 
13. Halt i 
Population 
131,669,275 
43.246,931 
19,478,791 
12,762,000 
11,012,724 
8,730,000 
6,600,000 
4,626,508 
4,108,650 
3,451,677 
3,426,296 
3,044,490 
3,000,000 
Area (sq,ms) 
3,026,701 
3,275,510 
763,944 
1,078,278 
3,694,863 
448,794 
532,184 
296,717 
41,164 
352,051 
537,692 
4-5,452 
10,204 
Density 
43.5 
13.2 
25.5 
11.7 
2.9 
19.2 
12.2 
15.6 
99.8 
9.8 
6.3 
67.0 
294.9 
42. Carl L. Beckel) "Afterthoughts on Constitutions", The 
Yale Review, Vol. XXVII, No. 3 (Spring, 1938), p. 453,---
systems as badly sui,ted to the Haitian condition as the 
French constitutions have been unsuited to the Gallic. As 
Carl Van Doren43 has indicated, the American people hammer-
ed out in the hot July months of 1787 a constitution which, 
despite its defects, arose out of the patterns of American 
colonial life itself; Haitian constitutions have not been 
indigenous growths but rather ready-grown foreign plants 
set down in a hostile soil. Where the British and American 
constitutions were products of peoples they governed and 
suitable thereby insofar as any man-made product may be 
suitable, the Haitian constitutions have neither been the 
product of nor suitable for the people governed. Where the 
Founding Fathers in Philadelphia refused to copy in ~ 
the British pattern of democracy, the Haitian mulatto, 
blinded by his devotion to French culture and his passion 
to be a genuine Frenchman, borrowed with an almost fanatic 
devotion the very product of France which has always been 
her poorest export. 
Toussaint's constitution of 1801 did not separate the 
colony from France, but it established the strong-man doctrine 
of the governor-general's superior position over any legis-
l~tive body and set the groundwork for the Toussaint-Dessalines-
i 
Christophe cultivator-soldier system of forced labor. 
43. Carl Van Doren, The Great Rehearsal: the story of the 
makin and the United States 
, passim. 
43 
D~ssalines' constitution of 1805 (1) established the empire 
i 
wiith himself as emperor, (2) continued the forced labor 
provisions, (3) tried to unite the mulatto and Negro, as we 
' 
have seen, by calling all Haitians "blacks:'~ (4} required 
all affranchis to take up a trade in the effort to create 
the needed middle class which successful trading nations 
' 
must possess, (5) and contained the famous clause, 11 No white 
' 
man shall set foot on this territory as master or as land-
CJo/nerJI, a phrase which remained in Haitian constitution-
m~ing until that of Dartiguenave in 1918. 
, 
Petion, using 
the Constitution of the United States as an example, sought 
in 1806 to create a strong president who could be re-elected 
but could not obtain dictatorial powers or remain in office 
fbr life. 
, 
Christophe answered Petion with one in 1807 for 
t~e .North, and then another in 1811, in which he proclaimed 
himself King, Haiti a monarchy, and created a peerage • 
. # 
However, Petion 1 s second constitution, that of 1816, 
remains the most influential one in Haitian politics. Tired, 
w~ary, and somewhat disgusted with his people's will to 
achievement and the failure of the mulattoes to see further 
than their own interests, he amended the constitution of 
1806 to adopt the principle of the life presidency with the 
right of the incumbent to choose his own successor. The 
! 
i 
results could not have been worse, for upon the union of the 
N1"th and the South in 1820, the P"inciple of the benevolent 
I' I 
44 
]lfe president led too easily to the retention of power by 
incompetents. Were the Outs satisfied that the Ins could 
~e retired from office at the close of four years, the urge 
~o revolution might more often have been drowned in patience, 
~ut the prospect of being interminably deprived of the fruits 
of corruption was too much to ask of the ambitious. 
r Yet if Petion1 s second constitution was the most in-
fluential in 19th century Haitian politics, that of the young 
mulatto revolutionaries of 1843 was the most significant. 
It was' the first real step made toward achieving genuine 
' 
d,emocracy in that it attempted to attain a proper balance 
~etween legislature and president, direct election of the 
' i ~resident by the masses of the people (which implied build-
i~g a strong educational system), the subordination of the 
~ilitary to the civil arm, honest elections, and a legisla-
' i 
t;ure that would exercise alone the right of making laws. 
' Jl\either the Army, predominately Negro and illiterate, cared 
f'or such radical reform, nor did the older mulattoes; the 
I 
l~tter because they feared that giving an honest vote to 
apd establishing an educational system for the masses would 
I , 
h~ve deprived the elite class of its chief advantages, the 
! 
I former because it would not submit its almost unrestricted 
to the whims of the ~1 it e. Leyburn44 calls this 
~ 
1
. Leyburn, p. 239. 
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constitution "completely unreal istic)1 _, as it was, but had 
the ideals of the ruling classes been different it might 
have formed the substance of a worthwhile constitution 
I 
actually moulded to serve the real isms of the situation. 
The Negro Army revolt of 1844 brought a new constitu-
tion and a series of ineffective documents that contributed 
little to the betterment of Haitian politics. Each succeed-
ing one became little more than a statement of policy by 
those in power. This has been, in effect, what Haitian 
Constitutions precisely are: statements of party platforms 
(if one may apply that term to Caribbean politics), one-
sided statements of action, rather than an all-encompassing 
framework in which all parties, all groups, all elements 
agree to work and resolve their differences. Would it be 
overstating the case to say that Haiti has had so many 
constitutions that she has not really had any? 
' , . 
Riche returned to Petion 1 s document of 1816 modified 
by that of 1843 in that the president was not to be selected 
by his predecessor for life but was to be elected, but not 
by the people, but by the legislature in joint session; 
Soulouque overthrew all thought of democracy and created 
' the second empire; Geffrard returned to Riche's creation; 
Salnave in 1867 modified Geffrard 1 s work by inserting the 
provision that no legislation might be passed without at 
least two thirds of the members of both houses of the 
46 
legislature present, which made it possible for any group 
to hinder legislation through absence, a device which 
Salnave used to try to keep himself in power for life. 
, 
Thereafter no president tried to revive Petion' s "term 
for life" cone ept, though many still aspired to the role. 
Domingue created a constitution in 1874, Salomon one 
in 1879 and another in 1886, EYppolite one in 1889, which 
was the last until 1918. 
Nor were the Codes any the more successful. The ~­
Henry of 1812, the Code Rurale of 1826, and the Code of 
Salomon in 1883 were doomed to failure. The Code Henry 
(spelled on the English form hy Christophe to show his 
admiration for that country) consisted of seven parts: 
Civil, Commercial, Shipping and Maritime, Civil Process, 
Criminal and Police Process, Agricultural and Military. 
The agricultural section seems to have been Christophe's, 
hut the rest of it, despite Christophe's preference for 
E~glish forms, was decidedly French. If northern Haiti 
showed prosperity under Christophe, its prosperity was not 
the result of his Code but the result of the rigid system 
of discipline which any dictatorship may achieve within 
relatively short periods of time. 
The fact is that the mulattoes 
fJ the writing of these codes and 
off whether Negro or Mulatto sat in 
i 
who were responsible 
constitutions, regardless 
the presidential chair, 
4-7 
did not dare create an instrument which if carried to 
i~ealistic fulfillment would have given universal suffrage 
to the masses or the population, free elections honestly 
tabulated, a president truly sensitive to the desires of 
the people, and the dissemination of education throughout 
the country. The reason why no Constitution was devised 
that would be acceptable to all was that there was no group 
among the rulers--Negro army or mulatto civil service--that 
would sacrifice part or· ita interest to the betterment or 
the nation. The constitutions devised reflect not the 
patriotism or the sincere HS~tian, but the selfish passions 
of groups in power who wanted to stay in power--sometimes 
mouthing the glowing liberte', rraternite, egalite, but 
spoken with a sneer and a touch of contempt. The constitu-
tions had the trappings of the democrat and the heart of 
the sweat-shop boss. The rulers had little faith in the 
people, and where their interests in addition favored an 
ignorant mass, how could one truly expect liberalism to 
triumph. The genuine ideals or the young mulattoes of 184-3 
were all too quickly tossed aside as much too dangerous and 
all too sincere, which was perhaps worse. As Leyburn puts 
i:t when referring to Petion•s second constitution: 
(It) evolved a masterpiece of deceptive generosity 
in stating that there should be "universal suffrage--
except for women, criminals, idiots, and menials--by 
ballot." Although the group of criminals and idiots 
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might be small, women were more than half the popula-
tion, and 11menials 11 was interpreted to mean not only 
house servants but also peasants; in other words there 
was "universal suffrage" of about three per cent of the 
population at the outside, The elite and the army were 
the only potential voters, Since the elections were 
held under the watchful eye of the soldiers, and the 
ballots counted by presidential appointees, there was 
often extraordinary unity of public opinion.~5 
And yet we must not be unfair to these constitutions, 
Even had they been sincere, even were they the true embodi-
ment of democracy, written with honesty instead of with 
tongue in cheek, they would have had to be implemented by 
laws enacted by sincere legislatures, interpreted by a 
sincere judiciary, and enfo reed by truly intelligent, 
patriotic, self-sacrificing executives, few of whom exist-
ed in 19th century Haiti. 
On March 4, 1915, Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, who had en-
gineered his own revolution, became president. No sooner 
did he enter the office than Dr. Bobo, emerging from the 
safety of the Dominican Republic began the traditional re-
volt. In the course of the sordid affair Sam was personally 
attacked, taking refuge in the French legation at Port-au-
Prince. General Oscar Etienne, Sam's friend and military 
agent, herded 167 political enemies into prison and then 
shot them down, killing all but one or two who managed to 
escape by feigning death. The crowds rose in fury. A few 
members of the mob entered the legation, actually %melled 
Sam out" by the antiseptic on his bandages, found him hiding 
45. Leyburn, p, 243. 
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in a corner under a bed, and threw him to the waiting mob. 
~am was literally ripped to pieces and the parts o:f his 
body mutilated in the streets. General Etienne was 
dragged :from the Dominican legation and shot. On July 28th, 
1915, Admiral Caperton landed :forces in obedience to the 
:following message :from Secretary o:f State Lansing: 
State Department desires that American :forces be landed 
Port-au-Prince and that American and :foreign interest 
be protected; that representatives England, France be 
in:formed this intention; in:formed that their interests 
will be protected, and that they be requested not · 
land. In acting this request be guided your knowledge 
present condition Port-au-Prince and act at discretion.46 
Once American :forces had landed, disorder ceased. 
Caperton's purpose was to get a president elected who would 
be amenable to permitting the United States' settling o:f 
Haiti's internal di:f:ficulties. With Sam dead, the 
question o:f a president revolved about two men: Philippe 
Sudre Dartiguenave and the in:famous Dr. Bobo. On August 8, 
Captain Edward L. Beach, Caperton's Chie:f o:f Sta:f:f, held 
an audience with the two candidates. The :following conver-
sation gives a picture o:f the character o:f Haitian politics: 
"Gentlemen, it seems likely that one o:f you will be 
elected President o:f Haiti. Haiti is in great trouble; 
she has su:f:fered much. The United States has come 
to Haiti as a good :friend, interested only in Haiti's 
wel:fare, ln her happiness, in her prosperity. The 
United States has determined that revolution 
and disorder and anarchy must cease in Haiti; that 
46. u.s., Gong:bess, Senate, Inquiry into Occupation and 
Administration o:f Haiti and Santo Domingo. Hearings be:fore 
I a Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domin~o, 67th Gong., 
'lst Sass., pursuant to Senate Res. ll2, p. 1 77. Herea:fter 
re:ferred to as Hearings. 
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unselfish and devoted patriotism must characterize 
thereafter the acts of the Haitian Government •. 
Senator Dartiguenave and Dr. Bobo, realizing this 
momentous crisis in Haitian history, with the eyes 
of Haiti and of the United States upon you, do you 
promise that if elected President of Haiti you will, 
in your official acts, be guided solely by earnest 
devotion to Haiti's honor and welfare?" 
"I will !So promise," replied Dartiguenau-e. "I have 
no other ambition than to·be of service to my country." 
11 I promise," exclaimed Dr. Bobo, rather theatrically. 
11 I would be happy to lay down my life :f'or my beloved 
country. 11 . 
11 Senator Dartiguenave, in case Dr. Bobo should be 
elected, will you promise that you will exert every 
influence in your power to assist him for Haiti's 
good; that you will join with him heartily and help-
:f'ully and loyally?" 
11 I:f' Dr. Bobo is elected President, I will give him 
the most loyal, earnest support in every effort he may 
make for Haiti's welfare," replied Dartiguenave, with 
simple dignity. 
11Dr. Bobo, i:f' Senator Dartiguenave is elected Presi-
dent, will you help him loyally and earnestly in his 
e:f':f'orts to benefit Haiti?" 
11 No, I will notl 11 shouted Bobo. 11 If Senator Dartigue-
nave is elected President I will not help him. I will 
go away and leave Haiti to her :rate. I alone am :f'it 
to be President o:f' Haiti; I alone understand Haiti's 
aspirations, no one is :f'it to be President but me; 
there is no patriotism in Haiti to be compared w~th 
mine; the Haitians love no one as they love me. 11 4-7 
On August 12, Dartiguenave was elected to the presidency 
by the National Assembly, and then the United States proceed-
ed to make a treaty with Haiti based upon Theodore Roose-
lvel t' s corollary to the Monroe Doc trine: 11 Interna tional 
police power applied to Latin-American countries guilty o:f' 
7. Hearings, p. 31 • 
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,-, .. 
flagrant cases of chronic wrongdoing or an impotence which 
results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized 
sbciety.n~8 Under heavy pressure from Lansing, Dartiguenave 
signed. the treaty on September 16, 1915, the National Assem-
bly, equally reluctant, approved it in the face of American 
seizure of the Haitian custom-house and revenues, and the 
United States Senate approved the treaty in May, 1916. 
"Ratifications were not exchanged until May, 1916, but by 
executive agreement the terms of the treaty had been put 
in effect on the preceding November 29.11~9 
The treaty of 1915 was more forceful in placing Haiti 
under American control than the Platt Amendment with Cuba 
had been, or the treaty of 1907 with the Dominican Republic, 
in regard to those nations. Perhaps the State Department 
felt that it had been too lenient in dealing with the in-
ternal affairs of Cuba and the Dominican Republic. In any 
case, this treaty stated--and Haiti agreed completely to its 
terms under the administration of Dartiguenave--that Haiti 
must not alienate its territory to any foreign power or 
place its sovereignty under the control of any foreign power, 
its national debt could not be increased without the approval 
of the United States, all Haitian debts were to be tabulated 
48. See Henry Fowler Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt (New York: ~rcourt, Brace and Company, 1931) passim. 9· Discussions of events leading up to the treat¥ and the reaty itself are to be found in Davis, pp. 1~9-188; J.A.H. jHopkina and Melinda Alexander, Machine Gun Diplomacf (New York: 
1
Lewis Copeland Co.,l928), pp. 71-94; Millspaugh, Ha ti under 
American Control, Chapter II. · 
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and classified, and paid from funds made available by the 
general receiver, that this general receiver was to be 
nominated by the United States before appointment by the 
President of Haiti, and that certain officials of the 
Haitian government were to be appointed only after due 
nomination by the President of the United States, such as 
engineers of public construction and sanitation, financial 
advisers, officers of the newly established native constabu-
lary, and so on. The general rec_e.iver, who represented the 
heart of the American reform policies, was to apply all his 
collections of revenues to the expenses or his office and 
that of the financial adviser first, then to the "interest 
and sinking fund of the public debt," and third, "to the 
maintenance of the Haitian constabulary"; the "balance was 
to go to the Haitian government for current expenses." Ex-
penses of the receiver general and the financial adviser, 
be it noted, were not to exceed 5% of the customs revenue, 
unless by agreement of the Haitian Government and that of 
the United States. Article XIII together with Article I 
.indicated that the United States was to aid the Haitian 
~overnment not only in clarifying its finances but also in 
pndertaking engineering projects which would be necessary 
kor the sanitation and public improvement of the Republic. 
The treaty, finally, was to exist for ten years, but 
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c.ould be extended ten more, which it was, so that the e:r-
:fective date o:r the expiration o:r the treaty was 1936.5° 
Results o:r American Intervention until the year o:f'the 
Haitian Commission o:f 1930 are not included within the scope 
o:r this chapter. The details o:r these years are adequately 
treated in Millsapugh and the Reports o:f the High Commission-
er.51 A :rew pertinent points are necessary, however, :for 
an understanding o:r the reasons :for the agitation which 
occurre.d in 1929-1930. 
In 1918, a new Constitution went into e:f:fect. This 
Constitution was approved by a plebisc~te on June 12, 1918, 
which was highly in:fluenced by the gendarmerie. The 
gendarmerie o:r the government urged the voters to approve 
the Constitution, took charge o:f balloting, and while, 
ensuring the honesty o:r the voting, virtually predetermined 
the result by its mere presence i:r nothing else. 
5o. Julius Pratt, History o:r American Foreign Policy (New 
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.;I955), pp. 423-425· Also see 
Treaty Between the United States and Haiti: Finances, Econo-
mic Development and Tranquillity of' HB:Iti, signed at Port-
au-Prince, Sept. 16, 1915, printed in Millspaugh, Haiti Under 
, American Control, PP• 211-215, 217-222. 
' 51. Miilspaugh, Haiti Under American Control, pp. 64--167; 
' also see Russell, e orts o:r the Amer can Commissioner, 
1923-1929 {Washing on, D.C.: Un ted States Government Pr nting 
O:f:fice, 1923-1929); Clarence Streit, "Haiti: Intervention 
in Operation," Foreign A:f:fairs Vol. VI, No. 4- {July, 1928); 
A .c •. Millspaugh, "our Haitian Problem", Forei~n A:f:fairs, Vol. 
VII, No. ~ (July, 1930); Hubert Herring, A H story o:r Latin 
America, pp. 412-4-23; Davis, pp. 161-302, which is probably 
the best summary o:r the Occupation, its problems its achieve-
ments: Montague, Chapters XIII-XVI, an excellent view o:r the 
Occupation :from 1915 through the withdrawal in 1934-. 
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Among the many changes, administratively, which the 
new Constitution set up, the most important for the purposes 
I 
bf this paper are the following: a legilSlature was to be 
I 
/established which would be elected by popular vote and which 
~ould in turn elect the President, but this legislature was 
to be elected only on the call of the President of the Re-
public. Nor could the 11 call 11 come at any time; it could 
only come on the lOth of January of an even-numbered year, 
which ·year was to be fixed by the sole discretion of the 
President. In the meantime, all legislative power was to 
be exercised by the Council of State, a body of 21 citizens 
, selected by the President, himself, kept filled by the Pre-
sident, and which would have the power to select the Presi-
dent of the Republic on the expiration of his term of office, 
which was four years. This meant, in brief, that the govern-
ment of the nation lay in the hands of the Council of State 
and the President of the Republic, each of which selected 
the other, and that so long as the ~stem remained in effect 
a legislative assembly, popularly elected, might never meet. 
The purpose, obviously, was to give the Haitian and American 
Governments time to educate and prepare the people for self-
government in the light of Anglo-Saxon democratic traditions.52 
52. For text of Constitution, see Hearings, pp. 1551-1562. 
i 
i 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
' I 
I 
I 
i 
55 
Unfortunately, from the first, dissension arose. The 
., 
elite objected and many educated members of the so-called 
I [ower classes. Foreign Minister Borne was selected for the 
I 
~residency in 1922, and again in 1926. Though he apparent-
ily seemed to work for the betterment of the nation, he ap-
' 
preached the 1930 elections thoroughly unpopular and thorough-
ly opposed by the many-parties which had arisen throughout 
Halt i and the major cit! es. 
Adding to Borno 1 s unpopularit~was the appointment by 
Harding of John 
Connniss loner. S3 
Russell to the newly created post of High 
The purpose of creating this post was to 
unify under one direction the entire American governmental 
per so nne 1 in Hal ti 1 with .the further object of placing all 
American officials in Haiti under the State Department in 
Washington. His functions were many, but generally they may 
be summed up in the suggestion that he give direction and 
guidance to the Haitian Government. He was to be something 
of a 11 blg brother" to the Haitians, but with the 11 big stick" 
ever present, should it be needed, of the American marines 
apd the American officered Qa~~~· He was to investigate, 
rep0rt, and supervise the work of the treaty officials;· in 
the words of President Harding, he was ambassador extra-
ordinary "to represent the President of the United States 
53. Millspaugh, Haiti under American Control, pp. 99-105 
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!, 
i I 
~n Haiti for the purpose of investigating, reporting upon 
.and supervising the performance of their duties by the treaty 
I 
/officials in order that the purpose of said treaty may be 
:fully accomplished." Unfortunately, Haitians regarded Borne 
and Russell as exercising what may loosely be called a 
:"joint dictatorship," making Borne all the more p.npopular 
. as representing the elements that would turn Haiti, for all 
its faults--and many Haitians recognized its faults--over 
to the interests of a foreign power. 
To credit the opposition parties with doctrines ~ould 
be ~s much a delusion perhaps as to declare they had none. 
Yet, the truth of the matter is that the real difference 
between the Administration and the Opposition was that the 
Administration was "in" and the Opposition was "out." The 
"Outs" could bear their lot tolerably so long as they felt 
that Borno would call for legislative elections in 1930, 
which he declared he would not ·do. During his last adminis-
tration, 1926-1930, the presidential term had been changed by 
the Council of S~ate to six years. This meant that if the 
Council elected Borne to the presidency again, he would hold 
the office from 1930 through 1936, the date of the expira-
tion of the American Intervention Treaty. Borne wanted the 
Americans to remain; his-unpopularity would have ushered 
him out of his office some time ago had not American marines 
kept him there. He knew that American Marines had to be 
I " 
I 
ept in Haiti if he were to remain himself in the driver's 
d the Opposition, which meant that when the seat, so reasone 
treaty expired in 1936; as President of the Republic, he 
would negotiate another for perhaps another twenty years, 
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or thirty, or forty. 
A students• strike broke out on October 31, 1929, at 
the Central School of Agriculture. Mobs arose in Cap-
Haitian and Port-au-Prince. At Cayes, a strike occurred 
among the school children. Martial law was proclaimed on 
December 4, 1929, but the worst disturbance was yet to come. 
At the aforementioned Cayes, a mob of 1500 advanced toward 
the town, where they were confronted by a line of ~~ines. 
When the peasant leaders demanded the release of three 
prisoners, the marines refused. The peasants closed in 
upon the troops. At first the men fired over the heads of 
the mob. Their second volley killed ten and wounded twenty-
four others.55 
The country now threatened upheaval. The Opposition 
knew that unless 1930 saw national legislative elections, 
Borne might remain in power with American aid indefinitely. 
This was their time for action. In the light of this back-
ground, President Hoover decided to send a special investi-
gative commission to Haiti to report on conditions and make 
recommendations for future action by the United States Government. 
I 
i 
I 
I 
5~. Millspaugh, Hilt! under American Control, p. 176. 
55. New York Times, Dec. 8, 1929. 
Report of American High Commissioner, 1929. 
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Many good things may be said for the Occupation; it 
established a program that included construction of highways, 
the building of agricultural and technical schools, the 
honest administrations of revenues, the substitution of a 
well-trained and equipped gendarmerie for the ill-clad, ill-
fed mob that hitherto represented the Haitian Army, the 
institution of a health program that went far toward eradi-
cating the centuries old diseases of the people, and the 
establishment of efficient government. The fatal flaw, as 
Forbes was to discover, was that none of these things were 
done at the behest of, by, and through the Haitian people 
themselves. The value that came to Haiti came not by the 
sweat of the Haitians themselves but as the gift of a very 
rich uncle. We failed in Haiti because we did nothing more 
than substitute new rulers for the Haitian mass. The prob-
lems, as usual, were solved~ someone apart from the Haitian 
people. True, the new rulers had more responsibility than 
the old, were sincere and more efficient in their efforts, 
but the benefits came as they had always come--from the top 
down, and what Haiti needed was to lift herself by her own 
bootstraps. If Communism has taught us anything in the 20th 
century, it has taught that one gains little by giving gifts, 
which in the end only helps to promote indolence and inability; 
lasting benefits are only achieved by stimulating and teach-. 
ing a people how to reconstruct itself. It may make terrible 
mistakes, it may injure itself occasionally, it may nearly 
sink in its own fury, but this is the only way. 
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Judging men by hindsight, however, is all too 
easy. Despite the adverse criticism or our Occupation 
or Haiti and our interventions in the internal arfairs 
of other Caribbean nations, Hoover could not be certain 
in 1930 that we had been following a ralse policy. He 
required more inrormation, and he required men whom he 
could trust to obtain that information. The following 
chapters relate the means by which he achieved his 
purpose. 
60 
CHAPTER TWO 
DRAFTING OF THE FORBES COMMISSION 
In his message or December 3, 1929, President Hoover 
voiced his concern over conditions in Haiti and his rears 
1 
i'or the i'uture oi' the American Occupation. Four days later 
he asked Congress for approval oi' a 11 commission to Haiti 
to review and study the matter in an endeavor to arrive at 
some more definite policy than at present ••• our representa-
tives in Haiti have shown great ability and devotion, and 
have accompl,ished signal results in ,improvement oi' the 
material cond,ition oi' that people. Yet our experience has 
revealed more clearly than was seen at-first the difi'icul-
ties of the problem, and the entire situation should be re-
viewed ,in the light oi' this experience." He asked that the 
commission be constituted without delay and with an appro-
2 priation oi' $50,000 for expenses. 
Apparent as was the dislike of the Haitian ruling 
classes to the American Occupation, their sentment was not 
without' sympathizers in the United States. The Congressional 
debates indicated the spirit with which many Americans re-
garded our interference in Haitian affairs, and in Caribbean 
1. The Congressional Record. Proceedings and Debate of the 
Second Session of the 7ist Congress. Vol. LXXII, Part I 
(W~shington D.c., United States Government Printing Office, 
Dec. 2, 1929-Dec. 21-1929), p. 21. 
2.: Ibid., p. 232. Also see House Document 139, pp. 232,236. 
I 
politics in general. Even accepting Wilson's viewpoint 
that intervention was necessary in Haiti in 1915 to prevent 
German infiltration during the First World War, the dangers 
or that conflict were now gone, and many Americans were of 
the opinion that we no longer belonged in a roreign land. 
Harding himself in 19?0, expressed the Republican attitude 
when in campaigning for the presidency he rererred to the 
Constitution or 191S as a docuinent "jammed down their throats 
3 
at the points or bayonets." The Caco War or 1919-1920, in 
which American marines stamped out the Caco insurrection or 
Charlemagne Peralta, evoked the feeling that we were stamp-
ing out human liberties. 11 In spite or the intentions and 
verbal assurances or Americans, the course of events to 1921 
was such as to strengthen the suspicion that their real pur-
pose was to destroy Haitian independence and exploit Haitian 
4-
resources ror their own benerit." .In 1920 the Navy Depart-
ment itselr made several investigations, such as those or 
Rear Admiral Harry S. Knapp, Generals George Barnett and 
John A. Lejeune or the Marine Corps, Assistant Secretary or 
the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, and went so far as to set 
up a court or inquiry under Admiral Henry m. Mayo to investi-
gate complaints or Haitians against arbitrary actions of 
3~ The Congressional Record, Vol. 62, Part IX, p. 8963. 
4-J Millspaugh, Haiti under American Control, pp. 95-98. 
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individual marine officers. The court vindicated the accused, 
the smoke of suspicion lingered heavily in the air. Dr. 
Carl Kelsey• s study, 11The American Intervention in Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic, 11 done at the request of the Latin-
American Division of the State Department, was a defense of 
the Occupation and American policy; but this did not prevent 
repeated attacks in Congress, the liberal American Press 
(particularly publications of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People), and private writings. 
In 1921, twenty-four American lawyers submitted a report to 
the State Department entitled 11 The Seizure of Haiti by the 
United States, 11 in which they condemned the Occupation, its 
ultimat'e effect upon the intrinsic concepts of Democracy, 
and urged strongly its being brought to a speedy conclusion • .5 
The most significant wave of criticism came with the 
McCormick Committee in the Fall of 1921. After extended 
hearings which attempted to pierce the soundness of the In-
tervention, the achievement to date, and the prospects for 
the future, the Committee finally decided, as had Kelsey, 
.5. Millspaugh, Haiti under American Control, pp. 229-232; 
also see Senate Report No. 794, 67th Congress, Second Session. 
A good deal of the criticism of the American Occupation was 
sparked by artie les in Oscar Villard's ·The Nation; which 
began in 1920, a strong campaign of condemnation of the Wil-
son program in Haiti. See The Nation, Vol CX (February 21, 
~920), p. 226; Vol. CXI (July 11, August 28-September 4, 
September 2.5, 1920), pp. 64-6.5, pp. 236-238, pp. 26.5-267, 
pp. 29.5-297, pp. 307-310, pp. 34.5-347. 
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that on the whole the Occupation was worthwhile. It did 
feel that mistakes had been made in the actual handling of 
individual phases of the Occupation, but it did not disagree 
6 
with the Occupation in principle. 
The attacks, nevertheless not only did not cease 
throughout the 1920 1 s but rather increased, especially in 
the learned Journals and in individual books turned out by 
travellers. 
American criticism of the occupation did not cease with 
the investigation of 1921-22. A delegation of the 
National Popular Government League presented to Secre-
tary Hughes in April, 1922,an address indorsing the 
anti-intervention views of 24 lawyers representing the 
Foreign Policy Association. Senator King's amendment 
to the appropriation bill providing that no appropria-
tion could be used for the maintenance of marines in 
Haiti or the Dominican Republic, was defeated; but 
during the discussion of it on June 19, 1922, the 
Government's Haitian policy was attacked by Messrs. 
Borah, King and Norris. The Rodenberg option and the 
agricultural concessions in northern Haiti were fre-
quently cited as showing a purpose to.deprive Haitian 
peasants of their land for the benefit of American 
capitalists. Military direction of American civilian 
6. This was a select committee of the Senate composed of 
Medill McCormick, Tasker L. Oddie, Atlee Pomerene, and 
Andrieus A. Jones. In its report, the Committee stated: 
11There are certain elements in Haiti which can balk and 
perhaps delay the rehabilitation of the country. They can 
not prevent it. Th~ can do much to further It. The obvious 
duty of patriotic Haitians is to uphold their own Government 
in effectively cooperating with that of the United States 
under the treaty, and so hasten the day when Haiti may stand 
alone. The alternative to the course herein suggested is 
the immediate withdrawal of American support and the abandon-
ment of the Haitian r.eople to chronic revolution, anarchy, 
b'
1
arbarism, and ruin.' By Hoover's administration the current 
of thought seemed to_have passedto the viewpoint that nothing 
l~ss than complete and total annexation of Haiti would correct 
Haitian politics. 
See Report of the McCormick Committee, Senate Report. 
No. 794, June 26, 1922. 
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activities in Haiti was criticized; it was asserted 
that American practice in the republic had drirted 
rrom its original policy; and it was argued that 
stabilization could not be errected berore the expir-
ation or the treaty. Various proposals were advanced, 
rang~ng rrom demands ror abrogation or the treaty 
and immediate withdrawal to suggestions that the 
United States should prosecute its administrative 
task more erriciently and obtain if possible 
Haitian consent to continued Amerfcan tutelage 
after 1936.7 
In addition to the specific criticisms which had been · 
aimed at the American Occupation or Haiti, Hoover had 
apparently other considerations in mind: 
(1) In October., 1929, the stock market crashed, and 
the United States entered the worst economic depression in 
its history. Although the bitterness of the next several 
years did not immediately become evident, Hoover was 
quickly aware or the ract that the American people had 
enough problems to handle at home without going abroad.8 
(2) The Dominican Republic, Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, 
the Philippines had placed an enormous strain upon the 
American taxpayer with no visible results or benerits to 
the United States at large.9 
(3) The 11protectorate 11 system was hardly appreciated 
by the peoples protected, nor did it demonstrate any lasting 
7• Millspaugh, Haiti Under American Control, p. 175. 
8. See generally Lionel Robbins, The Great Depression 
(~ew York: Macmillan.and Co., 1935). Another userul 
work ror giving the picture on the home front is 
Jbhn Kenneth Galbraith's The Great Crash (Boston: Houghton-
M~rrlin Co., Inc., 1955). 
9. Streit, "Haiti: Intervention in Operation," Foreign 
Arrairs, passim. 
results. No sooner had Washington decided in 1925 to with-
draw'American marines from Nicaragua than Liberals and Con-
servatives were again at each other's throats in that be-
leaguered nation, and in 1927 American forces were again 
sent to restore order and supervise an honest Presidential 
election. In the meantime, Americans were being killed 
fighting the gu~illa General Augusto Cesar Sandino, who 
"was applauded by .Latin Americans generally, who took puckish 
satisfaction in the 'bandit' who eluded the American marines. 1110 
Cuba showed no signs of being able to maintain order despite 
the repeated American interventions under the Platt Amend-
ment, Panama had not profited by American tutelage, and the 
' 
turmoil in the Dominican Republic since American Naval 
forces had departed in 1924 indicated that the political 
habits of the Dominicans had undergone no radical change. 
The entire Roosevelt--Wilson policy of intervention in the 
Caribbean had neither achieved ostensibly any permanent 
benefits for the countries "tutored" nor for the United 
States, while the latter had earned for itself among Latin-
Americans a reputation for imperialism. 
(4) Hoover was of the 11 rugged individualist" school. 
The same basic policy which he later applied to the domestic 
economic difficulties during 1930, 1931, and 1932 he applied 
I 
10. Herring, A Histoty of Latin America, p. 449. 
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:to his Latin American neighbors to the south--interf'ere as 
little as possible, remain f'irm, things will work their own 
way to solution. In eco.nomics the policy later proved un-
sound; in dealing with the underdeveloped peoples who had 
passed beneath the shadow of' the American eagle, it proved 
to have considerable validity. 11 
(5) The great powers were meeting in London to dis·cuss. 
disarmament. At the same time, the Philippines clamored f'or 
independence. Once the Philippines became independent and 
the United States no longer bound to def'end them, the British 
reared that the less f'riendly Japanese f'leet might enter 
southeast Asian waters, close to British possessions. If' 
such were the case, then Britain could no longer adhere to 
the Washington Conf'erence ratio of' 5-5-3 f'or Britain, the 
United States, and Japan, respectively, Considering that 
Britain's navy had to be split three ways to protect posses-
sions in three great oceana, such ratio would have given her 
a Pacific f'leet inf'erior to that of' the Rising Sun. Were 
the United States to follow a policy of' withdrawal f'rom 
lands which could never possibly become integral states of 
the Union, then the Philippines would be as much a part of 
this policy as the Caribbean. Hoover wanted a report on 
11. An excellent insight into Hoover's political philosophy 
I i~ obtained through Richard Hofstadter's illuminating essay 
"Herbert Hoover and the Crisis of' American individualism, 11 
The American Political Tradition. (New York; Alf'red A. Knopf', 
Inc., 1.94:8). 
,Hait:1, so that polic:i.es evolved there m:i.ght be applied to 
the Ph:1.1:1.ppines as we11. 12 A£ter several conversat:i.ons w:i.th 
W. Cameron Forbes, who had been Governor or the Phil:1.pp:1.nes 
during the Ta£t admin:1.strat:1.on, who had been on the Wood-
Forbes Comm:1.ss:1.on to those :1.slands :1.n 1920, and whose two-
volume The Ph:i.lippine Islands had recently been publ:i.shed 
(1929), Hoover decided that he had :1.n Forbes the natural 
cha:i.rman £or a comm:1.ss:1.on to Hait:1.. 
(6) Hoover h:i.msel£ may be :1.ncluded in the cr:i.tics o£ 
the Occupation for larger reasons. OUr war with Mexico in 
1846-48, our action in slic:i.ng Panama from the Colombian 
nation in 1903 (despite our belated atonement to Colomb:i.a 
by a mill:i.on-dollar payment in the Treaty o£ 1921), our 
"dollar diplomacy" in the Caribbean, our refusal to £allow 
the decisions o£ the Central American Court which we our-
selves had set up to arbitrate controversies in that area, 
together with rising tides o£ both le£tist and rightist 
extremes south of the Rio Grande, convinced Hoover that, 
"unless we displayed an entirely diff'erent attitude, we 
should never dispel the suspicions and £ears or the •colossus 
o£ the North' nor win the respect or those nations.nl3 During 
12. W. Cameron Forbes, Journal, Second Series, Vol. III, 
1930-34, Houghton Library, Harv~rd University. Unpublished. 
Herearter referred to as the Haitian Journal. Forbes did not 
k~ep a day by day journal, but wrote as important events or 
thoughts occurred to him, with the result that it is sometimes 
difficult precisely to determine at which time he speaks. 
i 
13. Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover (3 vola. 
New York, Macmillan Company, 1952), Vol. II, The Cabinet and 
the Presidency, p. 210. 
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the few months intervening between his election to the Pre-
sidency and the taking of office, Hoover made a trip to Latin-
Am~rica, covering Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. He 
was particularly upset by the turmoil in Nicaragua, which 
American troops there could only allay but not solve. Sig-
nificant is the following passage from the fourteen addresses 
he made on that trip: 
I come to pay a call of friendship. In a sense I 
represent on this occasion the people of the United 
States extending a friendly greeting to our fellow 
democracies on the American continent. I would wish 
to symb?lize the friendly visit of one good neighbor 
to another. In our daily life, good neighbors call 
upon each other as the evidence of solicitude for the 
common welfare and to learn of the circumstances and 
point of view of each, so that there may come both 
understanding and respect which are the cementing 
forces of all enduring society. This should be equal-
ly true amongst nations. We have a desire to maintain 
not only t.he cordial relations of governments with 
each other but the relations of good neighbors. 
I have come on a visit as a neighbor. I have thought 
that perhaps I might symbo 1 ize the good-will which 
I know my count~ holds toward your own. My hope and 
my purpose and my aspiration are that better acquain-
tance, larger knowledge of our sister republics of 
Latin America, and the personal contact of government 
may enable 1~e to better execute the task which lies before me. Ll-
In his address of April 13, 1929, he said: 
•••• it ought not to be the policy of the United States 
to intervene by force to secure or maintain contracts 
14. Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover (3 vols. 
New York~··Macmillan Company, 1952), Vol. II, The Cabinet and 
the Presidency, p. 213. 
between our citizens and foreign states or their 
citizens. Confidence in that attitude is the only 
basis upon which the economic cooperation of our 
citizens can be welcomed abroad. It is the only 
basis that prevents cupidity encroaching upon the 
weakness of nations--but, far more than this, it is 
the true expression of the moral rectitude of the 
United States.l5 
In his Memoirs, he states: 
•••• To give proof of my determination to end force 
interventions •••• ! requested authority from the 
Congress for an official commission to examine the 
situation in Haiti and advise when and how we were 
to withdraw--in effect, how to extricate ourselves 
from the mess into which we had been plunged by the 
Wilson administration.lb 
Two questions arise at this point: One, did Wilson 
intervene in Haiti primarily to preserve the private interests 
of private American citizens in that troubled country, or 
were his purposes more wrapped up in the sincere desire to 
instruct Haitians in the methods of democracy, insure sta-
bility in a country not far from the American coast, and 
prevent the infiltration of Germans who represented to Wilson 
the direct antithesis of everything democratic? Two, if 
Hoover had already made up his mind that we should withdraw, 
why did he bother to send a commission to Haiti? The answers 
lie in Hoover's uncertainty. Before he would withdraw the 
Occupation, he had to be advised by someone whom he absolutely 
trusted and in whom he had deep confidence that Wilson's 
15. 
l{ew 
the 
Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of 
York: Macmillan Company, 1952), 
Presidency, P• 333· 
16. Ibid. 
Herbert Hoover (3 vola. 
Vol. II, The Cabinet and 
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policy had been wrong to begin with, that little had been 
achieved, that withdrawal was a wise American procedure, 
and that the precedent set by withdrawal would in the long 
run be of benefit to the American people. Only a commission 
could serve tpese purposes. 
During his administration, Hoover's use of 'the commission 
was the subject of many jibes. In rea 1 i ty Hoover created 
fewer commissions than any of the presidents since 1900. 
Theodore Roosevelt's administration was responsible for 107, 
Taft's for 63, Wilson's for 150, Harding's for 44, Coolidge's 
for 118, and Hoover's for 42. Of these, 22 were set up by 
. 17 
Congress, 20 by the President. 
In a tal:k at Johns Hopkins in 1920, Hoover divided 
public questions into two classes: (a) those in which one 
has "sufficient facts, figures, and common experience to give 
certain indication of the course of constructive action"; 
(b) those which are so complex, which arise out of so many 
political, social, economic factors, and are influenced by 
as many more, that any solut!on is not really a solution but 
rather an exercise in "pure judgment guided by adherence to 
national ideals." David Hinshaw states that Hoover felt the 
most dangerous animal in the country to be the man filled 
with the emotion and desire to pass a new law. 11 He is 
17. Herbert Hoover, The State Papers and Other Collected 
Writings of Herbert Hoover. William Starr MYers, ed. (New 
Yprk: Doubleday Doran and Co., 1934); Vol. II, p. 158. 
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prolific with drama and the headlines. His is not the road 
to the fundamental advance of liberty and the progress of 
the American people at this time in our history." 
The most effective antidote to this dangerous animal, 
he said, was that of placing him upon a "committee 
of a dozen people whose appetite is for facts." He 
believed, he said, that the "greatest catastrophe 
that could come to a country is that administration 
policies or legislation or voluntary movements shall 
be encouraged or enacted upon the basis of the emo-
tions, not upon facts and reason." 
The Presiqent of the United States ••• is confronted 
with a thousand problems, which in a measure do not 
fall within the scope of governmental agencies, con-
cerning which 11 truth must be searched :from a multi-
tude of facts; where individual and regional experience 
must be had; where new ideas must be recruited from 
the kaleidoscope.of a great shifting mass of humanity; 
where judgment must be distilled from many minds; 
where common agreement must be secured from conflict-
ing forces; where assurances must be given the people 
of the_ correctness of these conclusions; where their 
exposition must be secured." 
The subjects •••• covered the whole range of human 
thought concerning which he did not cl iilm for himself 
11 the combined knowledge or judgment of the technolo-
gists, the philosophers, the scientists, the social 
thinkers, the economists, and the thousand callings 
of our people." 
The commission or committee method of securing and 
assaying the facts and of helping to gain public ac-
ceptance of their conclusions he believed to he a 
"vital means of government by the people and for the 
people, now th~t the people have ceased to live the 
simple life."lti 
Hoover used the commission as a direct method for gather-
ing facts about a situation, publicizing those_ facts to the 
I public, and reaching a reasonable judgment. The appointment 
j 
18• David Hinshaw1 Herbert Hoover: American Quaker. (New York~ Farrar, Straus and Company, 1950)1 pp. 190-192. 
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or a commission to Haiti was the thirteenth commission 
appointed thus rar in Hoover's administration. Previously 
he had appointed the Federal Farm Board, and then commis-
sions to investigate crime and law enrorcement, child wel-
rare, the reduction or expenditures in military establish-
ments, Southern patronage, waterway developmeht in Cali-
rornia, the construction or a bridge across San Francisco 
Bay, rixing the boundary or the Yellowstone National Park, 
conservation or the public domain, a commission to represent 
the United States at the Althing celebration in Iceland, 
one to report on national illiteracy, and the last to make 
a survey or national trends.19 
In the House the question of Hoover's Commission was 
debated primarily by G. Huddleston (Ala.), C.L. Beedy (Me.), 
J.W. Palmer (Mo.), A.H. Greenwood (Ind.), s.s. Arentz (Nev.), 
H.W. Temple (Pa.), F.G. Johnson (Neb.), M.R. Wood (Ind.), 
J.C. Lithicum (Md.), o. DePriest (Ill.), R.W. Moore (Va~), 
R. Cro.sser (Ohio), H.M. Fish, Jr. (N.Y.), and M.D. Hull (Ill.). 
In the Senate, the chier debaters were C.A. Swanson (va.), 
J.J. Blaine (Wise.), G.W. Norris (Neb.), T.L. Oddie (Nev.), 
and S.D. Fess (Ohio). 20 
19. William Starr Myers and Walter H. Newton, The Hoover 
Administration: A Documented Narrative (New York:· Cblirles 
Scribner's Sons, 1936), passim. 
20. Mr. Fish introduced House Resolution 8$ initiating a 
study or Haiti. This became House Joint Resolution lfO as 
i~troduced by Mr. Porter, requesting a Committee to v sit 
Haiti. Later, as amended by the House, it became House Joint 
Resolution 170. In its rinal rorm, it emerged as Public 
Resolution 3'{. 
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The discussions went smoothly enough for the most 
part in both House and Senate. One or two points of 
controversy, however, strike our interest. Several members 
in the House wanted a bi-partisan commission because they 
felt that this type was more likely to give an unprejudiced 
report. Crosser replied that bi-partisanship alone would 
not ensure an impartial report. He wanted men of proven 
democratic leaning. "If the Commission to be appointed by 
the President consists only of members who believe in the 
See the Congressional Record, Vol. 72, Parts I-III (December 
2, 1929-July 3, 1930). Mr. Porter: Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, p. 772. Reported back, p. 835. Made Special Order, 
p. 905. Debated, p. 908. Amended and passed House, p. 923. 
Referred to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, p. 993. 
Reported with Amendment, p. 2093. Debated, PP• 2137, 2774, 
2846. Amended and passed Senate 2852. House agrees to 
Senate Amendment, pp. 3027, 3040. Examined and signed, pp. 
3091, 3123. Presented to President, p. 3208. Approved 
(Public Resolution 37) p. 3591. 
For general discussions of Haiti prior to the Forbes Com-
mission, see: 
House Document #36, 27th Congress, Jrd Session 
Senate Executiveocument #113, 32nd Congress,lst Session 
11 11 
· 
11 #25, 34th Congress,]rd 11 
'! '! '! #37, 36th Congress,2nd 11 
11 
'' 
11 #17, 41st Congress,Jrd 11 
11 11 
" #64, 49th Congress,2nd 11 
" " 
11 #69, 50th Congress,2nd " 
For discussions bearing directly on the Forbes Commission, 
see: Congressional Record, Vol. 72, 
621 , 
Message of President, pp. 232,286 
Expenses of Commission, p. 3209 
Remarks in House relative to affairs in Haiti, pp. 316, 
629, 676, 688, 811, 814, 823, 908. 
Remarks in House on House Joint Resolution 170, p.3040. 
Remarks in Senate on. affairs in Haiti, pp. 286,2137,2774 
Remarks in Senate on House Joint Resolution 170, p.2846 
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benevolent despotism doctrine or, in other words, of 
members who always assume that other people are not capable 
of governing themselves then we can be sure that the Com-
mission will come back and report that we should continue 
to govern the Republic of Haiti. 11 Hull asked Crosser whether 
he wanted 11 a commission prejudiced in advance?" Crosser 
answered no, 11 but I do not want them prejudiced against the 
principle of fundamental democracy. I would like to see 
appointed members with clear convictions as to the justice 
of dffinocratic principles, but that does not mean they would 
be prejudiced in regard to the evidence which might be pre-
sented to them. It is easy to ascertain whether or not a 
man bel !eves in democracy or bel !eves in autocracy. u21 
Hull suggested that the Commission consist of six 
men, three who believed in democracy for Haitians, three 
who did not subscribe to this doctrine, but Crosser objected. 
Hull then suggested that men be chosen without preconceived 
opinions. Crosser replied that men who have not very clear-
cut, definite views in regard to the justice and wisdom of 
the principles of government Py consent of the governed--that 
is, of democracy--would not be very well qualified to in-
vestigate the wisdom or propriety of the occupation of Haiti 
by the United States. 
I 21. Congressional Record, Vol. 72, p. 909. 
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Fish felt that the members should speak French and 
that at least two of the members should be colored citizens. 
De Priest supported this suggestion. He compared self-
determination in Haiti to that of the Negroes in the United 
States, remarking that he had received hundreds of tele-
grams asking that American Negroes be sent on the Commission. 
The trouble was that the Haitians themselves objected to 
having American Negroes on the Commission. "It was explain-
ed," said the New York Times, 11 to this government that the 
Haitians observed a lack of sympatny on the part of Ameri-
cans of their race and could not, therefore, welcome such 
a commission if one had been named.n22 
Huddleston finally arose in complete objection to 
the Commission, stating that anything the Commission was 
to discover was already well-known to the Congress and to 
the American people. For him the Occupation had been a 
mistake, and it had been prosecuted not for the benefit of 
the Haitian nation or the much-flaunted 11 political tutelage" 
principle, but for the sheer satisfaction of the greed of 
American businessmen. The indictment was severe: (1) 
Americans bought up the Haitian national debt at great 
discount and then refunded and increased it to forty million 
dollars, all now owned by the National City Bank of New York. 
(2) Americans cheaply purchased bonds of the national railroad, 
22. New York Times, Feb. 7, 1930, Vol.l86-D; ~.,pp. 912-13. 
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paid up the two million dollars in interest out of funds 
of the people of Haiti. Americans have that two million 
dollars and a bond issue of three and one-half millions 
on a railroad that earns seventy-five thousand dollars per 
year. The Fall transaction in Teapot Dome, said Huddleston, 
was honest compared to this. (3) Americans owned the best 
harbor in Haiti. (4) Foreign ownership of land was permit-
ted for the first time in the Constitution of 1918, and 
Americans now owned some of the most fertile land in the 
country. (5) American businesses profited enormously in 
Haiti from the abundance of cheap labor ($.20 per day). 
He went on to state that he found incongruity in the 
demand of these very members of Congress that American 
Negroes in the South be permitted to vote but denied in 
the same breath the right of Haitian Negroes to run their 
own; country. 
For Huddleston, the history of Haiti was known, other 
investigations had taken place, any textbook would give 
more information on the country than a ~ommission could 
discover, the Department of State has been in close contact 
with Haitian life and politics anyway, and furthermore, he 
felt, the Occupation had been begun by Executive action and 
should be settled by Executive action. His address approached 
the ludicrous as he described a dignified Commission in top 
ha-j:s and tails prowling about mountains and valleys for a 
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few days, peering into family huts and rural pots, and 
then finally sitting down to write a report which was to 
enlighten the world. Huddleston did not think any com-
mission ever really did any good or accomplished anything. 
The "average man in Washington, in his opinion, would know 
more than the Commission could discover. 11 I know what they 
are going to report," he said. 11You could write the report 
in advance. We had a Senate investigation in Haiti. The 
report was a partisan report. I do not mean partisan ac-
cording to political parties but according to the habit 
and thought and reaction toward the situation." 
On the other hand, he believed that genuine harm might 
result, that the Commission could be another nail in the 
coffin of Haitian autonomy. 
Who can tell what the end will be? Oh, bu1;.. you say 
that the Haitians are not fit to govern themselves. 
Nol Th~ are not; and four hundred years from now 
they will not be fit to govern themselves unless they 
make haste with great speed to overtake us in the 
meantime • 
.... We can•t live as an imperialism abroad and demo-
cracy at home, tyrant in foreign countries and free 
people in the United States. We cannot hold securely 
upon our liberties here and take them away from people 
that live in other parts of the world---poor or 
ignorant whatever they may be, the consequen~~s will 
come back to us--the recoil will fall on us. ~ 
Nevertheless, the House passed the resolution December 9th, 
1929. 
23. Congressional Record, Vol. 72, p. 923. 
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In the Senate Blaine inquired as to the period of 
time the Commission was to investigate. Was it going to 
investiga~e conditions prior to the time of Occupation, 
during the Occupation, Just at the present time? If at 
the present time and during the Occupation, then there was 
an implication that Hoover's Republican predecessors in 
the Presidency might have been at fault. 
Swanson replied that he did not know what Hoover was 
going to do in this respect and that the Senate had no 
right to direct him anyway. Foreign affairs were in his 
hands. 11All I know is that he is the first president who 
has ever manifested a real desire that an investigation 
be undertaken to enable him to reach a conclusion as to 
what ought to be done." ·He went on to explain that Harding 
felt no necessity to send a commission, since the Occupa-
tion still had a long while to run, nor even Coolidge, 
but by Hoover's administration the evidence appeared clear 
that by 1936, the date at which the occupation was to end, 
Haitian politics were not going to have been improved very 
much during American control.24 
McKellar questioned the right of the President to 
appoint a commission, feeling that this was purely a Con-
gressional duty, but Borah and Smoot pointed out that 
historically this had always been his right. The discussion, 
24. Congressional Record, Vol. 72, p. 2851. 
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as a matter of fact, showed, in opposition to McKellar, 
that it agreed with Huddleston's implication in the House 
that the Chief Executive had absolute right to appoint a 
commission, had always had that right, and did not need 
Congressional approval or permission. Huddleston had 
implied in the House that Hoover was trying to make matters 
appear as though the Congress were authorizing the Commis-
sion in the effort to shift responsibility for future 
American mistakes in Haiti from his own shoulders to those 
of the Congress. The Senate went so far as to amend the 
original resolution so that in its final form the Congress 
did nothing more than authorize funds necessary for the 
operation of a commission actually appointed by the Presi-
dent. This was a minor point, but illustrated Senate 
strategy. 25· 
The resolution, as amended, passed the Senate February 
l, 1930. The House agreed with the amendment, and the final 
resolution read, as follows: 
••••• That there is hereby authorized to be appro-
priated the sum of $50,000 to cover any expenses which 
may be incurred by the President in making an in-
vestigation by commission or otherwise of the condi-
tions in and_a study of the policies relating to Haiti. 
Such expenditures may include the expenses of any com-
mission appointed, the compensation of employees, 
travel, and subsistence, or per diem in lieu of sub-
sistence, stenographers and other services by contract 
if deemed necessary, rent of office inthe District of 
Columbia and elsewhere, the purchase of necessary books 
25. Congressional Record, Vol. 72, p. 2851. 
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and documents, printing and binding, official cards, 
and such o~ger expenses as the President may deem 
necessary. 
It was a rather innocuous resolution, but it threw responsi-
bility for resultant difficulties squarely where Congress 
wanted it to be--on the heads of President Hoover and his 
Commission. 
On the whole, the newspapers treated the usefulness 
of the Commission idea with a variety of opinion: while 
the Constitution of Atlanta, Feb. 8, called it "another 
step toward development of a new pol icy in the Caribbean111, 
the Salt Lake Tribune on Feb. 28, ridiculed 11Voodoo land 
beckons investigators •••• Down to the land of mumbo-jumbo. 11 
Hoover finally decided to use two commissions: one, 
composed of white men, to leave at the end of February; 
the second, composed of colored Americans, to leave after 
the political upheavals had been reasonably settled. To 
be chairman of the first commission and to set the tone 
for a revision of American foreign policy toward Latin 
America, he selected William.Cameron Forbes, whose menu-
mental achievement had been in the Philippine Islands and 
whose record of amity with alien cultures had been admirable. 
Forbes' life covered what many people in these middle 
years of the 20th Century like to call the best period of 
American history. Born in 1870 when the last bugle sounds 
were closing the struggles that threatened to destroy the 
26. Congressional Record, Vol. 72, p. 2852. 
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Union, his life Wi.tnessed the rise of the American in-
dustrial genius, the emergence of the United States as a 
world power, her achievement of world leadership; and it 
closed, as did those of Adams, Clay, Calhoun, and Webster, 
in times as dangerous for the continued existence of the 
nation as they were in the years which immediately preceded 
his birth. In a sense, he went full cycle. Yet lie is not 
remembered in particular measure, either by historians or 
the general public. He is one of those innumerable men of 
American democratic life who enter public service with the 
best that is in them, make their contribution, and quietly 
pass away with little more than a brief mention of their 
names. They either are soon forgotten or become the tiny 
shadows gently flickering in and out of the lives of the 
well-known personages who have captured the historical stage. 
Forbes was a man of energy and zeal who had an intense 
belief in the destiny of American democracy. The grandson 
of John Murray Forbes, who had made a fortune in the China 
trade during the days of the Clipper ships, and on his 
maternal side the grandson of Ralph Waldo Emerson,- he car-
ried in his heredity the shrewd business ability and in-
credible gift for observation of the one and the passion 
for learning of the other. Outspoken both publicly and 
privately, enormously rich, aristocratic, a lover of fine 
homes and the noble sport of polo, a talented writer of 
. ' 
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books on business and polo, he presents a complex per-
sonality which swings between the reaches of conservatism 
and liberalism and finally settles down at the liberal end. 
He was the patrician as liberal, so much so that he con-
sidered his governorship in the Philippines his greatest 
monument in life. Republican in his party affiliations, 
he was on intimate terms with Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, 
Coolidge, and Hoover, respected the second Roosevelt (to 
whom he was a distant cousin) if he did not quite always 
agree with him, and despised Woodrow Wilson to the very 
bottom of his bones. For him, Wilson was the false prophet 
of democracy, the blatant demagogue whose chief interest 
was himself and the development of an esoteric cult dedi-
cated to an altar at which Wilson himself presided as High 
Priest. Haiti, for Forbes, was just another of Wilson's 
terrible blunders. 
Educated at the Milton Academy and the Hopkinson 
School, he entered Harvard University, where in addition 
to a self-imposed heavy program of reading and study, he 
developed a strong interest in class football, which was 
later to bear results in quite a different line. 27 Upon 
graduation in 1892, he entered the newly organized Stone 
27. He enjoyed poetry throughout his life. Unlike the 
Anglo-Saxon and more like the Latin American statesman whose 
secbnd profession is that of the poet, Forbes loved to read 
poe'tr:y, more than write it. He tells us in his 11 In Retro-
spect' that he once in his youth wrote a poem which he called 
anq Webster Engineering firm, became officer and director 
in•several Boston banks, and then, just before the turn of 
the century, joined the family business, J.M. Forbes and 
Company, Merchants, located opposite the Old State House 
at the head of what was once King Street. 
Football first made his name known to Theodore 
Roosevelt. Harvard had been doing poorly in its annual 
games with Yale, and Forbes asked President Eliot for the 
chance to coach the Harvard team. His fury and vitality 
"Life and Death." He showed it to ·George Santayana, and 
asked for the great man's comment. Santayana replied that 
~t was very good, but that it was "not the work of a great 
poet but it was the work of a gentleman." Forbes never 
wrote again, but he continued to love poetry, read verse, 
and keep scrapbooks of bits of poetry cut from news-
papers and magazines. In his dying moments, in the Fall 
of 1959, his younger brother Edward relates that he sat 
:by the bedside of the failin* man quoting at random first 
lines from the quatrains of 'The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayam" 
,while Cameron completed each quatrain. It was his consola-
t16nc in his trials and his peace in the early hours of 
death. 
He also had a fondness for comic songs. When his spirit 
was troubled or he had perplexing problems to solve, his 
mind would wander over half-forgotten melodies. One of 
these tunes was !!!Move My Armchair, Faithful Pompey, 11 which 
had been his father's favorite and which the elder man had 
picked up as a soldier during the Civil War. 
In 1950, reaching the age of eighty, Forbes dictated a 
brief resum~of the salient features of his long life. 
The manuscript is brief, and from time to time Forbes 
would replace certain pages as his memory corrected 
itself or he felt he could improve uwon his writing. He 
called the manuscript 11 In Retrospect ; it was never pub-
lished. 
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thr~atened either to break the team completely or push it 
to victory. In 1900, after Forbes' remarkable win over 
Yale, Theodore Roosevelt is recorded to have begun a speech 
with the words: 11Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe the score 
was 17 to 0. 11 In this manner was the stage set for Forbes' 
entrance into public life. 11Want ing a change of scene and 
desirous of measuring myself against a major job, in 1902 
I asked President Theodore Roosevelt if he 
connection with the building of the Panama 
could use 
28 Canal. 11 
me in 
He 
also asked President Eliot to write a letter of recommenda-
tion, in reply to which Eliot sent the following to Reese-
vel t: 
Dear Mr. President: 
W. Cameron Forbes (Harvard A.B. 1892) is just the 
right sort of man for membership in the Canal Com-
mission. His business experience has been very ap-
propriate •. Neither money nor pressure would swerve 
him one hair from the line of public duty; at the 
same time he is pleasant and serene in dealing with 
people. He would take any unavoidable risks for an 
adequate object, but his judgment is good about risk, 
and also about plans, measures, and men. 
He comes of first rate stock and remembers it. 2 9 
Roosevelt liked Forbes' qualifications and would have 
used him, but administrative delay prevented Forbes• appoint-· 
ment to that particular commission. Instead, Roosevelt 
asked him to take a place on the Philippines Commission. 
28. Forbes, 11 In Retrospect;11• p. 6. 
29. Ibid. 
I 
J I. 
! WhJ ;Roosevelt became President on the death or McKinley, 
he selected Tart, a member or the Philippines Commission, 
ror his Secretary or War. Luke E. Wright rilled Tart•s 
vacancy, and Forbes was asked to rill Wright's position, 
that or Secretary or Commerce and Police. 
This :was not what Forbes or his ramily had contem-
plated. The governm·ent was under attack rr01;n the anti-
imperialist press, Forbes had had no experience with colored 
peoples, especially those of Catholic persuasions, and, 
frankly, he doubted his ability in this type of public 
service. He finally accepted, but only after enduring the 
pangs of his own conscience, awakening the sense of duty 
he had particularly inherited from his mother, and listen-
ing to the admonitions of those he respected. H. L. 
Higginson wrote: "Even ir you should not return, we should 
mourn you, but we should be glad you had done the right 
thing and we shall be very proud of you.n30 Other forces 
were upon him demanding that he star, such as the death 
6f his father in 1897, his grandfather, J. M. Forbes, in 
1898, and his uncle Malcolm Forbes, in 1904, which really 
placed the burden of the huge family interests upon his own 
shoulders. But in the end his idealism won the struggle 
and he took the job. He asked Roosevelt for instructions, 
30. Forbes, "In Retrospect, 11 p. 6. 
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and Roosevelt replied, "It' I had to give you instructions, 
I would not have appointed you." The words were mildly 
1 reproacht'ul, and Forbes never .forgot them. 31 
As Chief' ot' Constabulary, he had charge ot' the mili-
tary policy, six thousand men ot' the Post Ot't'ice, the Coast 
GUard numbering some twenty steamers and launches, govern-
ment business among the innumerable islands, the light 
house service, all corporations, .franchises, transportation, 
roads, harbors, and telegraph services. So aroused over 
the lack or adequate transportation within the main~lands 
did he become, that he entered upon a plan ot' highway 
construction tbat earned him the title ot' "The Roadbuilder" 
in the Philippines. Indet'atigable, .filled with the energy 
ot' youth and a rising sense ot' personal destiny, he set 
two major tasks t'or himself': ·knowing the islands and 
learning the Spanish language. Within a year's time, he 
is reported to have been making speeches in the native 
tongue ot' the people, and he eventually became the best-
travelled American administrator in the Philippines. 
Serving as Chiet' ot' Constabulary, then Vice-Governor 
under Smith, and later Acting Governor during the early 
months ot' 1909, in this last year Forbes .finally became 
Governor ot' the Philippines under Tat't, in which capacity 
he served until 1913, when he was summarily dismissed by 
31. Forbes, 11 In Retrospect," p. 6. 
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Woodrow Wilson. When the latter dismissed him, he did so 
in a curt manner which rankled Forbes: 
Washington, August 23, 1913. Harrison confirmed 
August 21. The President desires him to sail Septem-
ber 1. Harrison to accept and take office September 
2. The President desires to meet your convenience. 
Should Harri.son take linen, silver, glass, china, 
and automobiles? What also would you suggest? Wife 
and children will a32ompany him. Please engage for him 
servants you leave. 
Forbes never forgave Wilson. He could not understand 
his being dismissed merely because a Democratic administra-
tion had come into power, and there was never any question 
concerning his competence or ability. Wilson never explained 
his behavior.33 
Whether Forbes• dislike of Wilson influenced his work 
in Haiti or not cannot be determined. Probably it did not, 
for he was not the sort of man to permit his emotions to 
run away with him. But he did consider Wilson's 1915 action 
a blunder. The following letter to William Allen White; 
written after the Commission's trip to Haiti, gives a signifi-
cant view of Forbes' attitude toward the man who had given 
assent to the Occupation: 
32. Victor 
(New York: 
Grosset and 
G. Heiser, An American Doctor's Odyssey 
W.W.Norton and Co., Inc., l936; reprinted 
Dunlap, 1959), pp. 53-54. 
by 
33. Heiser, who worked closely with Forbes in the Philip-
pines, says of him: 11 1 have known all the governor-
generals of the Philippines and, in my opinion, the one 
most gifted in administrative ability was W. Cameron 
Forbes. He laid a firm foundation for sound government 
which might totter in political earthquakes but would not 
fall. His nine years of ·service ••• did much to create the 
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Dear Mr. White, 
••• My grievance against Wilson is that he seemed 
to me to be utterly insincere, a straight out and out 
phrase-maker, interested in the sound or his tones, 
and careless with their meaning. His utterances 
might be said to be more or less oracular but as to 
his idealism, I cannot see it. He took and wrecked 
our whole Philippine machine, scattered the trained 
men to the rour winds and then went and butted in on 
~iti and Santo Domingo, put men to run them entirely 
untrained £or the job o£ conciliating dependent peoples, 
and made the kind o£ mess o£ it which you and I have 
seen. 
£orces which would eventually make the Islands rully rounded 
and sel£-sustaining economically. Improvement o£ harbor 
£acilities and reduction or abolition o£ Harbor dues did 
much to stimulate commerce. His brilliant achievements 
in all these £ields ranked with those o£ Lord Cromer in 
Egypt ••• He ran the Philippines as a business; politics 
were allowed to play no part ••• Philippine revenues were 
small, and much money was needed to turn into reality 
the American dream o£ rehabilitating the Islands. Forbes 
started in to develop their material resources. But 
be£ore this could be done, roads bad to be constructed. The 
military caminos which the Spanish had built £or conquest 
had long £allen into decay and disrepair. Forbes built new 
ones, also £or conquest, but this time intended to seize 
the treasures o£ Mother Eartb ••• So persistently did Forbes 
bend his energies in this direction that, half-jokingly, 
hal£ a££ectionately, he was dubbed Caminero Forbes. Wealth 
began to £low along the roads which he had opened. His 
e££orts resulted in raising sugar production £rom fifty-
thousand tons to a million and a hal£ a year and in develop-
ing the copra industry to an extent hitherto undreamed o£. 
Wherever we went in Southern Luzon we used to see the silvery 
white hemp ribre hanging out to dry ••• Forbes encouraged 
gold-mining ••• Forbes did much to advance the Philippine 
tobacco industry against the bitter antagonism o£ American 
corporations already interested in the Cuban product ••• 
Forbes• interests were not alone material. He had a strong 
sociological bent, particularly toward penology ••• such was 
the power o£ Forbes• personality that it pervaded every 
department. The esprit de corps was raised to so high a 
pitch that all labored joy£ully and without regard £or 
their own interests; even the office boy was heart and soul 
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He declared for freedom of the seas. And what 
does freedom of the seas mean? The Germans yelled with 
one voice: That is what we are fighting for. English-
men say they have no objection to freedom of the seas. 
The question was interpretation of what that meant. 
Did it mean liberty or license? Did it mean the right 
of pirates to ply their wares as between belligerents, 
blockading ports, all the rest of the things that 
enter into the question of freedom of the seas--all left 
to the imagination and in my judgment intentionally so. 
The phrase was pleasing to the ear of the phrase-maker 
and to the unthinking among the world's hearers, a 
group which includes a great many big-hearted women 
whose emotions are more powerful than their intellects. 
Many of this sort are to be found among our family and 
friends, pacifists who continue endangering the peace 
of the world by an effort to assure peace by unwise 
methods. 
Self-determination of small peoples--what did that 
mean? It meant the North was in the wrong in the Civil 
War, and yet people who would rather have their tongues 
pulled out by the roots than admit such a thing went 
around hugging themselves and shrieking self-determina-
tion as if it were a panacea for all world ills. I 
think no phrase unthinkingly turned out by any other 
charlatan has made so much mischief in so short a time 
as that one did. And yet, when Wilson came to draw his 
League of Nations Covenant, as our phrase-maker termed 
it, self-determination was found to be twisted around 
into a period of tutelage for weaker peoples, they not 
to be consulted as to whether they are in need of help 
nor as to whom the tutor is to be. And so we got 
our mandate system, utterly in conflict with the 
principles enunciated by our "idealist," too proud to 
fight 
a part of the movement and firmly convinced that if he were 
not there at eight t> 1-clock in the morning the wheels would 
stop (An American Doctor's Odyssey~ pp. 50-53). 
The Manila Merchants Association, which had not been 
particularly friendly to Forbes during his administration, 
stated in its publication that Forbes' Governorship was 
11 one of the most notable achievements-in colonial government 
that has been recorded on the pages of the world 1 s history. 11 
( 11 In Retrospect," p. 13) 
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I think the story of our Mexican situation under 
Wilson almost the most shocking thing to be found in our 
history--General Pershing sent down into Mexico, not allow-
ed to take possession of the two railroads that flanked 
him, not allowed to shoot, ordered to go in and catch Villa 
with his hands. I happen to know personally what Pershing 
thought of it, and he is an able and practical man. The 
petulant taking of Vera Cruz, with the silly statement 
given out that he proposed to settle the land problem in 
Mexico at that time, was another asinine performance of our 
"idealist". The ostensible object was to obtain a salute 
for the Flag, which he did not get. 
Go right through Wilson's record and you will find 
first one and then another of these rhetorical outbursts, 
each one entirely at variance with some practical course 
of conduct later. I haven•t heard of a single case in which 
he did a decent thing by one of the dollar-a-year men who 
served him during the War. The unanimous feeling of those 
I have talked with--and I haven't gone out of my way to 
talk to any of them--was that Wilson was personally a skunk. 
I remember Mrs. Douglas Robinson telling me of her brother 
rapping the table on one occasion and in a loud voice in-
forming the whole group sitting around that his sister had 
told him he mustn•t call the President a white-livered skunk. 
There are many things in the administration of Wilson of 
which I approved. His selection of men to run the World War 
was pretty good, apart from the Secretaries of War and Nayy, 
the first of whom knew enough to keep his hands off and the 
second of whom was a buffoon. But Pershing, Hoover and 
Davison were ten-strikes. I entirely approve of his not 
letting Roosevelt go to the other side to fight. Roosevelt 
wasn• t a trained soldier and Wilson had plenty of trained 
soldiers to send. Roosevelt ought to have known enough to 
realize that it was a young man•s job and a trained man's 
job and no place for an elderly politician. I can•.t believe 
but that Roosevelt did know it and tried to get the job, 
not for political glory, hut with some ulterior object, 
such as stirring Wilson into action by arousing public 
opinion. Also, I think Wilson was right in not sending 
Genera! Wood to take command in Europe. Wood was senior 
to Pershing and was not friendly to him and his presence 
in Europe would unquestionably have been an embarrassment 
to General Pershing. That, however, does not excuse the 
very clumsy manner in which Wood's desire to go overseas 
was treated, nor does it justify the failure to use him in 
this cduntry in a capacity commensurate with his abilities. 
There were at least a half-dozen jobs, which could properly 
have carried the rank of lieutenant-general, for which Wood 
was peculiarly fitted, such as ••.••••• General Wood would 
have had an opportunity to put his experience ••• to good 
____ : ________ ~· ~-----; ___ _ 
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advantage. The contemptible procedure o£ allowing him to 
1 train a division and then recalling him just as he was 
stepping aboard the transport, letting the people think 
1 that it was General Pershing's doing that he was not sent 
, over--was to my mind indef'ensible £rom every point o£ 
view and merely one o£ several dozen schoolmaster gauche-
ries with which Wilson's record is smooched, 
But when you come right to it, can a man as mean-
spirited as Wilson was and as you show him to be in your 
book in little personal ways, be a true idealist? There 
must be magnanimity o£ heart i£ there is to magnanimity o£ 
mind and the £act that Wilson's egoism had ingrown to such 
an extent that he could not abide criticism, opposition, 
or, what is worse, credit £or a success going to one o£ 
his subordinates even if' deserved, marks him to my mind as 
lacking in one of' the essential elements of' greiJ!ji?ness to a 
degree I f'eel sure posterity will not overlook.~ 
In any event, Forbes was not the type o£ man to sulk. 
He could dislike a man, but he would not lose himsel£ in 
de£eatism. And yet, on the other hand, he could not remain 
in a country run by Woodrow Wilson. When, in 1914, the 
Maine Court of'£ered him the sole receivership of' the Brazilian 
Railway Company and a chance to throw himsel£ into work of' 
an entirely di££erent nature f'rom that of' the Philippines--
and on second thought, perhaps not quite so dif'f'erent in 
many respects--he leaped at the opportunity. For six years 
he'labored at the operation o£ the Railway, which had a 
valuation of' three hundred million dollars, with thirty-
eight dif'f'erent corporations in f'ive South American coun-
tries, and with branches and properties extending f'rom 
Brazil into Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia. His ef'f'orts 
to,make it into a prof'itable undertaking turned out to be 
I 
surcessf'ul. Most of' the stockholders were British, Belgian, 
34;. Forbes, Haitian Journal, pp. 93-96. 
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and French, and as he made money for them he felt that he 
was in addition helping the war effort. During the progress 
of the European War he crossed the Atlantic six times and 
the English channel seven, with an almost reckless disregard 
for danger. 
With the return of the Republican Party to power in 
1921, Harding sent Forbes with General Leonard Wood as a 
member of a commission to the Philippines to report on 
Democratic rule--or "mis-rule," as Forbes calls it in his 
11 In Retrospect11 --and on the readiness of the area for in-
dependence. Seven months later, in May, 1921, the report 
vo,iced opinions Which were; notably, far different in re-
lation to the Philippines from those made nine years later 
when Forbes considered Haiti. The 1921 report stated that 
the Filipino people were happy and peaceful and keenly aware 
of the benefits of the American rule. The movement for 
independence, however, was strong, more among Christian 
Filipinos than non-Christian. "We find a general failure 
to appreciate the fact that independence under the protec-
tion of another nation is not true independence. 11 The 
Filipino government was as yet weak and inefficient, but 
the character of public officials good. Forbes attributed 
this inefficiency to 11 lack of inspection and to the too rapid 
transfer of control to officials who have not had the neces-
sary time for proper training." Generally, the Filipino 
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capacity for self-government was found to be solid, although 
their politics were muddy, their justice departments lacking 
in confidence, and their economic shaky. 
Continued occupation of the country was recommended: 
We feel that with all their many excellent qualities, 
the experience of the past eight years, during which 
they have had practical autonomy, has not been such as 
to justify the people- of the United States relinquish-
ing supervision of the Government of the Philippine 
Islands, withdrawing their army and navy, and leaving 
the islands a prey to any powerful nation coveting 
their rich soil and potential commercial advantages. 
To withdraw, the report stated, would be a betrayal-of the 
Filipino people, a misfortune to the American people, a 
distinct step backward in the path of progress, and a 
discreditable neglect of our national duty.35 
Why Forbes did not accept further public service 
during the 1920's is not clear, particularly since he was 
friendly with Secretary of State Hughes whom he had given 
strong support in 1916 during the campaign to oust Wilson. 
35. In his The Philippine Islands (2nd. ed., revised in one 
volume; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), Forbes 
states: 11 President Harding sent the mission to the islands 
primarily to study and report upon their readiness for 
independence, and to render judgment whether 1 the Philippine 
Government is now in a position to warrant its total 
separation from the United States Government ••• • " (p. 345) 
Major-General Leonard Wood was chairman of the commission 
and Forbes second in command. Others on the staff were Col. 
Frank R. • ;McCoy, chief of' staff'; Mr. Ray Atherton, represent-
ing'the State Department; Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon John-
Ston; Major Edward Bowditch, Jr.; Lieutenant Commander 
Stewart F. Bryant, who repr~sented the Navy; Professor 
H. Otley Beyer, University of the Philippines, an ethnol-
ogist whq had dedicated himself to the special study of the 
Philippines area. 
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Whatever the reason, he returned to private life, purchased 
a ranch in Sheridan, Wyoming, and threw himself wholehearted-
ly into an active business career which centered about the 
J. ~. Forbes and Stone and Webster firms. He also began 
to experience poor health. Years of living in the warm 
climates of the Philippines and Brazil had made him in-
capable of enduring the rigorous New England winters he had 
loved as a child, and he started spending winters first iri 
Thomasville, Georgia, and then Taylor, Honduras, where he 
watched the interests of the United Fruit Company of which 
he was a director. 
His chief interest during these years, was the writing 
of his monumental The Philippine Islands, which appeared 
in 1929. Hoover had known Forbes personally since the days 
of the Wilson administration, was intimately acquainted 
with his work, and had become even friendlier with him as 
a result of their mutual friendship with Coolidge. The 
Philippine Islands, scholarly, definitive, and unusually 
well-written with Forbes' gifts for description and obser-
vation, convinced Hoover that Forbes was not only one of 
the men for his commission to Haiti, but the person to 
chairman the group. Hoover apparently had no intention of 
sending a group of youthful idealists into the area; what 
For the final report, see Forbes, The Philipline Islands. 
(2 vols.; Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 928), Vol. 
II, Appendix, pp. 542-543. 
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he wanted was a group of seasoned men, mature in thought 
and experienced in public affairs, each successful in his 
own right, whose reasoned judgments, untouched by emotion, 
wquld form a clear basis for (1) settling the internal af-
fairs· of Haiti quickly and to the b~st advantage of all 
concerned (2) determining a United States future policy 
toward Haiti and, by implication, Latin-America. 
On January 30, 193'0, Forbes received the following 
telegram: 
January 30, 1930 
The White House 
Washington, D.C. 
Hon. William Cameron Forbes 
Gulf Stream Cot.tage 
Delray, Florida 
Confirming previous communication the President hopes 
you will dine and spend the night at the White House 
on Wednesday, February fifth. 
George Akerson, 
Secretary to the President 
Forbes recorded in his half humonous style the course of 
events which ultimately brought him to Haiti: 
On arrival at Washington, where I was invited to 
stay at the White House, I was not met by the White 
House car; I suspected some· mistake and took the taxi 
up. Upon arrival, I found Mr. I. Hoover, the head 
usher, had read my telegram carelessly, assumed that 
I was coming from the North and figured the Miamian 
would get in at three and ordered accordingly. I had 
already had my lunch on the train and with some dif-
ficulty explained to the attendants that I was ex-
pected. They dug up the repentant I. Hoover and I 
was shown to my room where I washed off evidences of 
travel and mosied over to the State Department, where 
in the absence of my old friend Harry Stimson--now in 
London endeavoring to work out a disarmament agreement--
the Under Secretary, Joe Cotton, received me and broach-
ed the question of going to Haiti. 
' 
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Apparently I was to be chairman of. the Commission 
which was to be organized largely to suit my taste, 
and whom did I want? I found very ·soon tha, t this 
phrase 11 to suit my·own taste11 was largely verbal, as 
what I!IY taste was to be was laid out. for me in no 
uncertain terms. Henry Fletcher, an old friend and 
an able fellow, had already been drafted as second 
in commarid. This pleased me greatly. A man by the 
name of Elie Vezina, a French-Canadian resident in 
Woonsocket; Rhode Island, was to. represent .French:-, 
speaking and culture and also the Roman Catholic 
Church. Democrats and the opposition were to be 
represented in the person of James Kerney of Trenton, 
New Jersey, an editor and warm personal. friend of 
Woodrow Wilson, unlamented, about whom he had written 
a book and about whose fail~ngs, 1 afterwar'd learned, 
he harbored few illusions. Another member of the 
Commission was. to Will lam Allen White of Emporia, . · 
Kansas. 'And all these had been invited to serve as 
had been the President of the University of Yirginia. 
Did 1 want a lawyer? And if so, whom? Immediately· 
I thought of Jerry Smrth. Splendidl 1 called him 
up on the telephone but he said immediately it was 
utterly impossible a.nd·t~twas that.t · .. 
I personally felt the need of a· good lawyer, as 1 
had no legal training, and I knew I would be bombarded 
with legal and constitutional questions as they told 
me Port-au-Prince was .hopping with lawyers, a favorite 
profession among the Haitian elite, who despised 
materialism and looked down upon tradespeople·or 
those who worked with the· hands. In fact they were 
obsessed with the idea common to the uneducated or 
partly educated that the object of an education was 
to obviate the necessity for work, an attitude of3~ind I had been very familiar with in the Philippines. 
Forbes did not get his lawy.er, or anyone else he de-
sired. The only one he officially demanded and got for his 
staff was Robert c. Redmayne, who had been with him personally 
since 1914; Cotton filled up the remainder of the Commission 
and its staff. 
36. Forbes, Haitian Journal 1 pp. 8-10 • 
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That same evening in Washington, he had dinner with 
the President, £ound out what Hoover wanted--although Hoover 
preferred to deal in generalities, leaving Forbes untrammeled 
by too many instructions--and recorded the £ollowing: 
I had a cozy chat with the President £or over an hour. 
He is not a bit theoretical or visionary. He sees 
things exactly as they are. He honestly wanted to get 
out o£ Haiti and let them run their own affairs; and 
he honestly doubted whether it would prove possible. 
The United States is lousy with great-kind-hearted and 
woolly-heaqed enthusiasts who judge every community 
by their own. And who try to £igure out what we should· 
do to situations like that in Haiti by taking what 
they conceive to be the Christian position o£ doing 
by others as they think they would like others to do 
to them. 
Where these good souls £ail to be Christian is in their 
lack o£ tolerance. And I verily believe that were a 
group o£ these to be placed in authority to clean up 
a situation such as acceptance of their own recommenda-
tions would create in Haiti, that they would be so 
stirred up by the misery, injustice, torture, and 
anarchy, they would make the conduct o£ the trained, 
experience and restrained Army and Navy (Marine) o£-
ficers seem very mild in comparison. This however is 
hardly capable o£ proo£ £or fortunately this kind of 
unbalanced person is seldom selected for caring £or a 
situation of that sort ••• 
President Hoover ••• had •• ~a perfectly clear conception 
of the di££iculties likely to be encountered but with 
it a wish to let Haitians work out their own salvation 
even with more or less disorder and a substantial loss 
in the ef£iciency o£ the government. He also had a 
realizing sense both of the merits of the Marines and 
of their limitations.37 
Henry Prather Fletcher was well-known to Hoover as 
£ormer Undersecretary of State and as his confidant and ad-
viser during Hoover's November, 1928, trip as President-elect 
37. Forbes, Haitian Journal, p. 12. 
to Latin-America. During a formal banquet in Buenos Aires, 
President Irigoyen informed the visitor that he was not 
accustomed to formal speaking and that the Argentine Secre-
tary of State would speak for him, to which Hoover replied 
that in that event "Mr. Fletcher would reply for me.n38 
Fletcher, as events turned out, did not find a reply 
necessary, but Hoover could not have selected one more skill-
ed and experienced in diplomacy. Born in Greencastle, Penn-
sylvania, April 10, 1873, he was educated at Chambersburg 
Academy, and then entered in 1894 the practice of law. The 
Spanish-American War saw him in Colonel Roosevelt's Rough 
Riders a well-respected private, whose devotion to the mili-
tary appeared more and more to lead him away from the dusty 
routine or purely legal pursuits. Thereafter his life be-
came a continuous change from one government post to another. 
From 1899 to 1901 he served as First Lieutenant and Battalion 
Adjutant of the 40th United States Infantry in the Philip-
pines, Second Secretary-or the United States Legation at 
Havana in 1902, Second Secretary of the United States Lega-
tion at Peking from 1903 to 1905, and Secretary of the 
Legation at Lisbon, Portugal 1905-1907. In 1907, he was 
back at Peking, remaining there until 1910. 
His wealth of experience in Latin-American affairs, 
at least in Spanish America, came with his appointment as 
38. Hoover, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 213. 
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Un~ted States Minister to Chile from 1910-1914, United 
States Ambassador to that country from 1914 to 1916 under 
Wilson, and immediately thereafter Ambassador to Mexico 
during the difficult years from 1916 to 1920, when that 
country was torn by the early struggles of the social re-
volution precipitated in 1910 by the mystical Prancisco 
Madero. 
Not the type of man whose us_efulnesl! ended with the 
advent of a new administration, when the Republicans took 
command again in the l920 1 s he became Undersecretary of 
State 1921-1922, Ambassador to Belgium until 1924, and 
Ambassador to Italy until 1929, when he resigned from that 
post in protest ag~inst the Fascist government in that 
country. 
His career following the appointment to the Haitian 
Commission found him Chairman qf the Republican National 
Committee from 1934 to 1936; General Counsel until June, 
1944; Special Adviser to the Secretary of State July, 1944; 
a member of the American delegation to prepare plans for 
the International Organization at Dumbarton Oaks; and Special 
Adviser to the Secretary of State on foreign subjects.39 
As second in command, his first-rate knowledge of 
Latin-America surpassed that of any other member of the com-
mission, including that of Forbes himself. Fletcher was , 
39. Who's Who in America (Chicago; A.N. Marquis Co.,l956-57), 
Vol. 29,-p. 860. 
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a quiet man, soft-spoken, given to deep reflection,with a 
devotion to the job that Forbes particularly liked. Of the 
five men, he was the only career diplomat, and his. advice 
and judgment carried great weight. 
James Kerney, the noted New Jersey editor, had been 
a close personal friend of Woodrow Wilson, although he liked 
to call himself a progressive independent. He was born April 
29, 1873, the son of recent immigrants from the west coast 
of Ireland, educated in Trenton, New Jersey, where he attend-
ed parochial school and occasional night classes. For a 
time he did just about anything he could find--he painted 
wagon wheels, was a stenographer, then a reporter in New York 
City, 'Philadelphia, Trenton, and Newark. The difficulty of 
his ea·rly years never dampened the natural spark of his quick 
Irish wit or the geniality of his disposition, but if any-
thing, ignited them and gave him a somewhat joyous outlook 
onjeverything he did. 
He became editor of the Atlantic City Press in 1902, 
then the next year editor of the Trenton Evening Times, which 
he eventually purchased. With the acquisition of the Trenton 
True American in 1912, the Trenton Sunday Advertiser in 1912, 
and the Trenton State Gazette in 1926, he virtually exercised 
a monopoly over journalism in that city. Realistic, he pre-
ferred the commission form of government, which carried over 
to. the use of the commission in many other aspects of 
·-·----
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administration. A member o~ the State Civil Service Com-
mis~ion ~rom 1908 until 1911 be~ore he became a newspaper 
I 
owner and publisher, he later returned to public service in 
I 
1918 as Director o~ the American Committee on Public I~or-
mation in Paris, ~or which he won the Legion o~ Honour, served 
on the Haitian Commission, and was lay judge o~ the Courts 
o~·, Errors and Appeals and Pardons ~rom 1931 to 1933.40 
! He had originally opposed Woodrow Wilson in the race 
I 
~ori the New Jersey Governorship in 1910, but later became 
not: only his ~irm supporter but his close ~riend. His 
Polcitical Education o~ Woodrow Wilson (1926) still remains 
' 
a.c ,fairly valuable insight into the machinery Wilson's mind. 
Forbes declares in his Journal that he enjoyed many hours 
dif1cussing Wilson with Kerney, and that the latter finally 
admitted that Wilson did have shortcomings. But one 
suspects that Kerney was more tact~ul than con~essing. 
Forbes admired Kerney ~or his achievement in li~e, 
his ideas, his charm, his wit, but apparently found him 
mo~e charming than capable in the actual labors o~ the 
Commission. Actually, Kerney was not a well man. He 
su~~ered during the Haitian venture the ~irst o~ the 
series o~ heart attacks which eventually brought about his 
death on April 8, 1934. 
40. New York Times, April 9, 1934J Nation, April 25, 1934; 
Who's Who in America, 1932-33, Vol. XVIII, p. 2~+0J 
DictionarS o~ American Biography, Vol. XXI, Suppl. 1, 1944, 
PP' lj0b6-Lj::7. 
J 
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William Allen White, the usage of Emporiau and a 
personal friend of Hoove~was probably better known to the 
American public through his articles in the Emporia Gazette 
than any other member o~rth~ Commission. He knew little 
about Latin-Americ~, ha4~ apparently small acquaintance with 
the problems of Haiti, but had a reputation for deep human 
sympathies with the under-dog. One suspects his being chosen 
more for the humanitarian impulse he was likely to give the 
Commission than for any intellectual contributions he might 
make. 
Born in Kansas, of New England Puritan stock through 
his father and pure-bred Irish through his mother, White 
studied at the University of Kansas, but left to edit the 
El Dorado Republican. In 1891 he became Kansas City Editorial 
writer on the Star, and four years later purchased the Emporia 
Daily and Weekly Gazette. His article "What's the Matter with 
Kansas?", his attack on Populism in 1896, and the almost 
ceaseless stream of articles and books that flowed from his 
pen made him before long the best-known editor in the nation. 
Where Kerney preferred the fast pace of metropolitan journal-
ism, White chose the quiet nonchalance of small-town living. 
Between the 11 sage of Emporiau and Forbes' grandfather, the 
- -
usage of Concord_,'~ there might have been a good deal in common. 
The years from 1891 up to the period of·the Haitian Commission 
and beyond until his death in 1944 saw a steady production of 
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short-stories, sketches, novels, political essays, biographies, 
editorials, and autobiographical mate.rial. Included were 
two biographies of Calvin Coolidge--one in 1925 and one in 
1938--as well as the one which Forbes himself could not wel-
come, the Life Of Woodrow Wilson, published in 1924. That 
Forbes could possibly work for any length of time with two 
admirers of Wilson was a tribute to his New England sense 
of tolerance and fair play. White did, however, belong to 
the liberal wing of the Republican party, and this may have 
in some fashion excused his heresy in Forbes' mind. 
During the First World War (1919) White had gone to 
France as an observer for the Red Cross, and the same year 
had been selected as a member of the Commission to Prinkips 
in Russia, bu~ apart from these two appointments, had had 
official touch with diplomatic life.41 His main at-no 
tribute, apparently, was that he had a fervent desire to do 
right, to see the right prosecuted, and perhaps served as 
41. New York Times, January 30, 1944. 
Newsweek, February 10, 1947. 
David Hinshaw~ The Man from Kansas (New York: G. P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1945) passim. 
William Allen White, Autobiography (New York: Macmillan 
Co. 1946), passim. . 
D.C.Fisher1 American Portraits (New York: Henry Holt, 1946), passim. 
A partial list of White's writings included The Real Issue 
(1890), The Court of Boyville (1899), Stratagems and Sboils 
(1891), collections of short stories; In Our Town (190 ), 
sketches; A Certain Rich Man (1909), a novel; The Old Order 
Chan;eth (1910), a group of political essays; God's Puppets (191 ), short stories; In the Heart of a Fool (1918), a 
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an emotional balance ·to Forbes' and Fletcher's calm and 
studied intellectual approach to the Haitian enigma. That 
Forbes thought very well or him is seen rrom the rollowing 
extract of a letter written to White April 15, 1930: 
.I cannot tell you how great a joy it was to meet you 
and to get to know you, and I sincerely hope that our 
path~ may lie in such a direction that w& shall often 
meet ••• I should have told you, had I been able to see 
you, that I feel your modesty in regard to the part 
which you played on our Commission is far greater than 
the racts of the case justify ••• r ~~lued your helpful 
advice more than I think you know.~ 
Despite this, when White years later was asked about 
his public service in reference to a biographical sketch of 
himself, he replied with excessive humility: "I have served 
on one or two travelling commissions of no great importance." 
That he said this either indicates the genuine humility ror 
which he was famous or else his failure to understand the 
place the Forbes Commission held in the formulation of a new 
American foreign policy.43 
novel; Life of Woodrow Wilson (1924); Calvin Coolidge (1925); 
Masks in a Pa~eant (1928); A Puritan in Babylon (1938), another 
biography of oolidge; For Years on Main Stneet (1937); The 
Changing West (1939); The Editor and His People 1924), a col-
lection of editorials. One of his finest pieces and one which 
delves most deeply into the mind and spirit of White is his 
very beautiful essay on the death of his daughter at the age 
of seventee. 
White's reply to Cotton's request that he be a member of the 
Haitian Commission reads as follows: "Your telegram to Governor 
Forbes. Tell him that I shall go with.rull kit and accouter-
ment, excepting possibly dancing bells, gas mask and shroud, 
with the .sartorial tonnage sufficient to warrant ninet-een guns 
for which affiant shall ever pray. W.A. White." (Forbes, Haitian 
Journal, p. 9) 
42. Forbes, Haitian Journal, p. 83. 
43. Stanley J. Kunitz and Howard Haycroft (eds.) Twentieth 
Century Authors (New York: H.W. Wilson Co., 1942), p. 1513. 
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Elie Vezina bad been a student of Haitian politics 
for some time. Although born in Canada, he moved in 1889 
at the age of nineteen to Chicago where he became an Ameri-
can citizen. A journalist by profession and active in po-
litics, he eventually settled in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, 
where he became well-known through his activity in community 
affairs and his secretaryship of L 1 Union St. Jean Baptiste 
d'Amerique, an organization claiming 16,000 members. His 
knowledge of Haitian letters, language, education, and his-
tory were superior to the others of the Commission, and 
Hoover named him to the Commission precisely for his ability 
at the French tongue, because of his Catholic religion, and 
his interest in education. His primary task lay in making 
a report on Catholic schools in Haiti, as an American Catholic 
sympathetic to French culture might vi~ them. (In the Fall 
of 1930- the Moton Commission made a more comprehensive and 
exhaustive report of Haitian education, but the Moton Com-
mission was Protestant and Negro in composition.) Holder of 
the Legion of Honor, a Knight of the Order of St.Gregory, 
Vezina was probably the qmetest and least noticeable member 
of the Commission.44 
A sixth member appointed was Willis Abbott. He never 
communicated with the Commission, however, and never appeared 
despite the telegram from Cotton to Forbes: "Abbott is a 
44. Providence Journal, Feb. 8, 1920. 
106 
! 
fu~l member of the President's Commission. His appointment 
ha$ been announced. His status is complete.n45 
Generally, the newspapers agreed that the members of 
the Commission were well-selected. The Kansas City Journal-
Post, Feb. 9, stated: "It will be seen that the Commission 
is inot only equipped to ascertain facts but it will be able 
' 
to 1give full publicity to its findings. Mr. White is always 
sure of a multitude of readers and Mr. Kerney is not without 
' experience in preparation of printed words. This is badly 
needly, because of the literary assaults that have been made 
on
1
American performance of necessary but distasteful duties 
in :the Black Republic." The New York Times, Feb. 8, declared: 
11 M~. Hoover on last Tu~sday said the Commission would be com-
posed of •men of unbiased minds,' who would •work out in 
brqad vision' the •sequent steps which will lead to the 
liquidation of our responsibilities and at the same time 
assure stable government in Haiti' after the marines lead 
,, 
th~ island.' "The Dallas Morning News, Feb. 8, felt the 
members to be well-qualified. Their experiences "amply qualify 
them for the task. n46 
45~ Forbes, Haitian Journal, p. 138 
46~ For various views of the finally constituted Commission, 
its preparation for departure, and the popular outlook on 
conditions in Haiti, see~ 
· Boston Herald, Feb. 8, 1930 
Springfield Republican, Feb. 8, 1930 
Topeka Daily Capital, Feb. 8, 1930 
New York Times, Feb. 8, 1930 
Le Matin (Port-au-Prince), Feb. 7, 1930 
Herald-Tribune (New York), Feb. 8, 1930 
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Though Forbes has been credited with the actual job 
o£ arranging £or transportation to Haiti, time schedules, 
the choice o£ an adequate secretarial and advisory starr, 
this was really done by Cotton and ~ames Clement Dunn, the 
Counselor to the Commission. Dunn was relieved o£ his duties 
in the State Department a month before. During his eleven 
years with the Department o£ State, he had had a good deal 
or experience in Haitian a££airs, was Charge d 1A££aires at 
Port-au-Prince £or two years, and Cotton £elt he·would be 
help£ul to a commission in Haiti. Dr. Victor G. Heiser o£ 
the Rocke£eller Foundation went along on Forbes' personal 
request as Medical Adviser. Rees H. Barkalow o£ the American 
Diplomatic Service, although he was never in Ha:it:t, was 
chosen Secretary and Disbursing O££icer. He was £luent in 
French and generally handles the Commission's funds, the 
clerical starr, and made arrangements £or trips inside 
Haiti. Charles H. Marshall was Secretary. Chosen £or his 
knowledge o£ French, he was the contact between the Commission 
and the Haitian people, rece:ived petitions and representations 
£rom the Opposition parties, and handled all translations or 
documents. Warren H. Kelchner, Assistant Secretary, had just 
been appointed to the American Foreign Service. His job was 
Richmond Times-Dispatch, Feb. 8, 1930 
Wheeling Intelligencer, Feb. 8, 1930 
News and Courier (Charleston), Feb. 8, 1930 
Courier-Journal (Louisv:ille), Feb. 8, 1930 
San F'rancisco Chronicle, Feb. 8, 1930 
Tfmes-Picafrne (New Orleans), Feb. 9, 1930 
Hartford ~ly Courant, Feb. 9, 1930 
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that of assembling research material, which he had been 
doing for the previous two months. A noted scholar on the 
Haitian situation, he had nade a complete index of the re-
port of the Senate inquiry of 1921. Cotton placed him in 
charge of the library and documents that accompanied the 
Commission. Fernand L. Dumont was interpreter of the native 
patois or Creole which 95% of the Haitian masses spoke, 
Richard T. Strong was Stenographer-Secretary, and Redmayne 
was Forbes' personal Stenographer. In addition there were 
a number of women stenographers. 
On the 24th of February, the five members assembled 
in Florida, proceeded to Key West, and on the morning of 
the 25th, set sail on the Rochester for Port-au-Prince, The 
ship had been the old New York of the Battle of Santiago 
fame, and Forbes' personal cabin supposedly that of Admiral 
Sampson himself, Each of the members carried the rank of 
.Ainbassador. Kerney joked with White, Vezina stood quiet 
and alone, Fletcheri£rused the newspapers, and Forbes busily 
talked with members of his staff. 
That evening at sea Forbes took the advice of Huddle-
ston of Alabama and took a good book to bed, It was H. P. 
Davis' Black Democracy: the story of Haiti, which had come 
off: the presses a year or two before. He could not have done 
better reading, It was one of the trunkload of books, papers, 
reports, and documents which Cotton had sent down at the last 
moment. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE INTERNAL POL IT !CAL SETTLEMENT 
The Rochester arrived within sight of Port-au-Prince 
at 2:30 p.m., the 28th of February, a h~l.lf-hour before the 
officially scheduled time of arrival. To prevent upsetting 
reception plans, Forbes asked that the ship delay for the 
. 1 
required time before proceeding into the harbor. 
Forbes' Journal relates the crowds to be extensive, 
the reception warm, and the route from the wharves to the 
city lined with demonstrators carrying posters and signs 
asking for the end of American occupation. If violence 
occurred, he made no mention of it. 
The Commission was driven from the wharf to the Ameri-
can Legation, where it was joined by the American High Com-
missioner General John H. Russell, and then to the Hotel 
Excelsior. Actually, Port-au-Prince had no hotel. The 
building where accommodations had been made was a large white 
poorly constructed frame house, with the high ceilings and 
wide verandas so typical of the tropics. The first floor 
consisted of four large corner rooms off a long corridor or 
hallway, the second of five smaller rooms and a tiny office. 
The. bottom four rooms became the sleeping quarters of the 
ambassadors, the upper six the working areas. Forbes chose 
1. Forbes, Haitian Journal, p.27. 
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on~ or two rooms which he, Fletcher, and three secretaries 
could use for offices; the other members of the Commission 
used the remaining rooms, 
After a moment or two of rest and refreshment, the 
five men were taken to see President Louis Borne, Borne 
seemed to be happy to see them. He and his ministers spoke 
approvingly of the work of the American Occupation and the 
accomplishments of the Haitian people since 1915. Because 
of the need for continued American assistance, they general-
ly appeared insistent that American marines remain on Haitian 
soil, Forbes noted Borne's light skin, excellent manners, 
nervousness,and rather annoying habit of punctuating his 
comments with sudden harsh bursts of quick laughter each 
time he wished to make a particular point, He did not make 
a good impression upon the Commission. William Allen White, 
in a vein inappropriate to his normal great gift for human 
sympathy, remarked in a letter to his wife: "He is thin, 
tall, toothy, and most disagreeable, and lives entirely apart 
from reality ••• He has a little sneering laugh,,.I kept pinch-
ing myself--and Kerney said he did also--to realize that I 
was not listening to a stage melodrama. It just did not seem 
possible that any man should be so patent a stage villain. n 2 
2, Walter Johnson, William Allen White's America (New York: 
Hertry Holt and Company, 1947), p. 421• -Also see Forbes, 
Haitian Journal, p. 29. 
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White, Forbes, and the other members of the Commis-
sion modified their first impressions of Borno in the course 
of their stay in Haiti, but in the first flush of their meet-
ing, they were still under the influence of Borno 1 s critics 
both in Haiti and in the United States. White and Kerney, 
well before their departure from the United States, had been 
of the opinion that Borno was an arch-tyrant, trampling upon 
the bodies of his people with the support of American marines. 
As a matter of fact, White and Kerney were convinced from 
the start that the Commission should recommend clear steps 
to withdraw United States forces immediately from the black 
republic. So much did they fear that the Commission might 
be too conservative or too cautious or perhaps be swayed by 
the double-talk of the incumbent president that, even before 
they joined the Commission, they spent a day together at 
Palm Beach planning some strategy toward effecting their aims. 
Forbes was less impassioned. He had had too much 
experiertce to allow himself the luxury of judging before he 
had command of the facts. Neither White nor Kerney could 
move him to condemn Louis Borno as the villain he so obvious-
ly seemed to be. Emotion did not rise swif~ with Forbes, 
particularly when he soon became suspicious of the motives 
of the Haitian opposition parties. 
Millspaugh speaks well of Borno, despite the general 
antipathy toward him in both the Haitian and the American 
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' press. A member of the elite, light of skin, he had bee~ 
distinguished 11 for his intelligence, culture and high charac-
ter,." Before entering public service he had gained the repu-
tation of a capable lawyer, served in virtually every posi-
tion of the Haitian Cabinet and been three times minister 
of foreign affairs. As minister of foreign affairs, Borno 
had signed the treaty of September 16, 1915, as well as the 
act which extended that treaty. Although he had been called 
a puppet of the United States Occupation, in reality Borno 
was genuinely convinced that Haiti needed a period of tute-
lage under American leaders. As late as 1925 he stated that 
he could not call general legislative elections because he 
did not believe that Haiti was ready to govern herself. 
His refusal to play the part of puppet was evidenced by his 
refu,sal to accept a new land title law which both the High 
Commissioner and the Financial Adviser wanted in 1927, be-
cause he felt that it would be unconstitutional and im-
practicable. Like most of the presidents of Haiti, Borno 
made the error of believing himself indispensable to the of-
flee; he did not go so far, perhaps, as to identify his own 
interests with those of the nation, but he did believe that 
Haiti desperately needed the policy which he alone could render. 
Honest in his own dealings, precise, and patriotic, his chief 
fault was an over-sensitiveness to the taunts of public 
opinion. The very keystone of his policy--a close relationship 
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between himself and High Commissioner Russell--became the 
subject of the strongest vituperation. He b-elieved that 
this close relationship would most impress the Commission; 
strangely enough, this aspect of his administration least 
favorably impressed them,J 
On leaving Borne, the Commission visited Sansariq, 
Min~ster of Foreign Affairs, then returned to the Hotel 
Excelsior, where it was paid a return visit by Sansariq 
accompanied by Louis Borno 1 s son. 
The Commission ate at the Hotel, the members being 
cautioned not to eat anywhere else because of the danger of 
dysente~. In the beginning a bit of difficulty was experi-
enced because the servants insisted upon garnishing all 
food with native lettuce. Though the hot and humid weather 
dulled appetites and made clothing wet and sticky, Forbes 
and Fletcher, who had had experience in such climates,were 
less discomforted than the others. James Kerney, whose keen 
Irish wit was such a delight to Forbes, throughout the mis-
sion, always seemed to have a story to turn discomfort into 
laughter, but for Forbes the discomfort was more mental than 
physical, His Journal records: 
Our Commission, with Marshal, Dunn and Heiser, ate 
at our hotel, our meals all being served on a porch 
overlooking a small yard beyond which was a highway 
down which and up which traffic was continually pass-
ing, Negro men and women from the interior always 
J. Millspaugh, Haiti under American Control, pp. 106-107. 
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completely if not elegantly dressed, mounted on don-
keys or very miserable ponies, appeared from the in-
terior with packs or panniers and loads, the little 
donkey often carrying a load and a full-sized negro 
or negress perched above. Some rode one animal and 
led another; and these were often most interesting 
types. It was tragic to think that it was the wel-
fare of these people our American occupation had pro-
tected and assured, and that our work in so far as 
it would lessen this control would inevitably inure 
to the disadvantage of these poor country people; and 
yet they are immeasurably superior to the so-called 
~lite here who affect to despise them and propose to 
despoil them and, producipg nothing themselves, are 
for the most part drones.4 
To Dr. Moton he wrote after the Commission's work was 
over in Haiti: 11 The whole situation to me is a tragedy--a 
tragedy because I don't see any good ending to it. 11 .5 
He had been in the Philippines, but there he had not 
experienced the sense of despair that he felt in Haiti. 
Where Haiti was tiny and over-populated, the Philippines 
were large and with great areas for expansion; where Haiti 
had been free since 1804 and the fresh optimism of newly 
won freedom had vanished, the Philippines were bursting with 
zeal for the future; no deep race problem existed for the 
Philippines; the land was rich. 
The first or second night the Commission was invited 
J 
to an American club in Petionville, a thousand feet or mo·re 
in the hills, where they dined with General Russell. The 
4. Forbes, Haitian Journal, pp. 34.,..3.5 • 
.5. "Letter to Dr. R.R.Moton, 11 April 10, 1930, in Forbes, 
Haitian Journal, pp. 74-76. 
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next afternoon ~ssell gave a ~arge reception to the Com-
mission, to which he invited the leading men of Haiti: 
prelates, ministers, and 
business men, navy men, and worlds or marines with 
their ladies. We were told that the American men 
got along all right socially with the elite until the 
American women came, then the color line was sharply 
drawn and definitely. There was no color line at 
General Russell's party; negroes, wholly black, rub-
bed shoulders with whites and mulattoes of all shades. 
General Russell and Mrs. Russell, so he told me, had 
made a determined effort to cultivate Haitian society 
regardless of color, had made repeated calls on the 
elite in their homes, had gone to their houses for 
meals, and invited them to the Russell home. I don't 
doubt General Russell did his best to p~y the social 
end of his difficult part to the limit. 
Forbes was favorably impressed with General Russell. 
He felt him to be a sincere man doing an almost impossible 
job, and he resented the inferences in American newspapers 
that Russell was little more than a joint dictator working 
with Borno to impose military government upon an unwilling 
people. He tried to judge both Borno and Russell as he found 
them, without preconceptions, and in the final report to the 
Secretary of State both Russell and Borno received good treat-
ment.7 
Russell drove Fletcher, White, and·Forbes around Port-
au-Prince, showing them the wharves of the Haitian-American 
6. 11Letter to Dr. R.R. Moton," April 10, 1930, in Forbes1 Haitian Journal, pp. 36-37· 
7. "Letter to Elie Vezina," May 19, 1930, Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
Also see Report of the President's Commission for the Study 
and Review of Conditions in Haiti, Publications of the 
Department of State, Latin American Series, No. 2 (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, March 26, 
1930), passim. 
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Company, the technical schools set up by the United States 
Government, the General Hospital, railroad, sugar central,, 
a maguey plantation still watered ~ an aqueduct of French 
colonial days, and an American agricultural school. During 
most of the drive, Russell talked optimistically of Haiti's 
future, explaining not only points of interest but the need 
for more time if the American tutelage was to bear fruit.8 
He did riot say so directly during these conversations, but 
Russell believed~-as did Borne--that withdrawal of the Ameri-
can Occupation would destroy the flower in the bud. After 
8. On pp. 32-33 of his Haitian Journal, Forbes records 
Russell's conversation as follows: 
I heard him talk very interestingly of various plans 
for the improvement of the people. Asked whether it 
was not possible, in view of the fact that within a 
moderate time it was going to be necessary to turn 
over the government to the Haitians, to prepare the 
Haitian officers in charge of the various services, 
he said he thought the idea was perfectly feasible 
and very desirable. This included health, engineer-
ing, finance, administration, education, and public 
order. It was pointed out ·to him that if this were 
done now while he still retained such control as would 
enable him to direct their affairs and remove the in-
competents, that he could in six years build up a ser-
vice with men trained to the job, whereas if such a 
body of men were not available at the end of six years 
and the Americans were withdrawn, leaving untrained 
Haitians to supervise and manage, there would be much 
less chance of their being able to do it successfully. 
To this General Russell agreed. 
We went out over the road along the southern shore 
of the bay upon which work was proceeding upon a rather 
extensive saale, the boulevard being straightened, 
widened and surfaced. In view of the sharp reduction 
in revenues now going on due to the low price· of coffee, 
this somewhat rather unnecessary expenditure seemed 
unjustified. 
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only fifteen years, for the first time in Haitian history, 
progress was being made; to withdraw now would throw the 
count~ hack into her traditional disorder and destroy any 
chances for democratic and technological growth, Indeed, 
this was to be Forbes' dilemma, He knew that upon the pro-
posals of his report on Haiti would be based Hoover's policy 
in that country and perhaps in the rest of Latin-Am~rica. 9 
From General Russell's account of his own social 
activities it seemed as though he had made every ef-
fort to give social consideration to the natives, 
going to their houses, making calls, and inviting 
them to his house. The large social question of the 
treatment of the colored people by officers in the 
Marine brigade was not discussed. 
The General showed special interest in the matter 
of land. He said that there was no homestead law, 
no law covering the matter of squatter's rights, and 
that the right of the people to the land they were 
using was merely the right of occupance, There was 
no land title law, and Mr. Fletcher suggested that 
the people were too poor to afford one, I took oc-
casion to explain to Commissioner Russell the manner 
in which we handled the matter in the Philippines, 
where we had a general cadastral law, 30% of the cost 
of the survey being divided equally among the insu 1 a r, 
provincial, and municipal governments, and 70% against 
the land owner to pay as taxes in five annual install-
ments; and as the whole township was surveyed at the 
same time, the cost was so small that it did not trouble 
the land-owner. It is, however, questionable whether 
this plan would work here. General Russell hoped that 
the Haitians would have some cadastral law. He also 
proposed a modification of the constitution by which 
the number of legislators should be reduced to fifteen, 
The idea that the Haitians should prepare their own 
constitution did not seem to be running in his mind; he 
had been doing the thing he thinks should be done for 
so long he cannot see it from any other point of view, 
His idea is to write a new constitution for them and make 
them take it, I several times checked this by asking how 
the people would feel about it and whether President 
Bor.no wanted such a measure. 
9. See Chapter Six, passim. 
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When the Commission was appointed, Haiti was big news 
(although soon to be pushed off the front pages in favor of 
the London Disarmament Conference) and the newspapers were 
well-represented in Port-au-Prince with correspondents: 
Brennan of the Associated Press, Frans of the United Press, 
Denny of the New York Times, as well as correspondents from 
the Baltimore Sun and the Roman Catholic Press. The pressure 
was on to find an immediate political settlement at least, 
and this Forbes proceeded to do as his first object. 
Aboard ship just before arrival, the Commission had 
prepared a statement which announced that hearings would be 
conducted at which everyone, for or against the present 
government, was invited to speak. Included were comments 
that the United States government pledged itself to withdraw 
its forces as soon as possible and supplant American civil 
officials with Haitians. The withdrawal comment had been 
inserted by Forbes against his better judgment by the pres-
sure of White, Kern~, and possibly Fletcher. Assistant 
Secretary of State Cotton objected to any mention of with-
drawal. White became angry as he had apparently been under 
the impression that this was the purpose of the Commission. 
In Forbes' view, that the Commission had no other purpose 
but to gather information and make recommendations; it had 
no power to guarantee.anything. On the day of arrival, Feb-
ruary 28th, the Commission issued its statement regarding the 
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proposed hearings, but made no mention of the withdrawal 
of United States forces. 
The result was a boycott by the Opposition of the 
proposed hearings. At this point, however, White made his 
first contribution to the Commission. Pierre Hudicourt, one 
of the elite leaders of the Haitian Opposition to the govern-
ment, and a friend of Oswald Garrison Villard of the Nation, 
was assured by Villard of White's liberal tendencies and 
that if anyone were go in9 to obtain the withdrawal of the 
American Occupation, this particular member of the Commission 
was the man. Hudicourt decided to present himself at the 
first hearing and was sufficiently impressed thereby to use 
his influence to terminate the boycott. 10 
The hearings had been set up to begin on Saturday, 
March l, 1930, at the presidential palace, in a large luxur-
ious hall with an abundance of long windows elegantly draped. 
Forbes sat in the center, Vezina at his left, Fletcher at 
his right, and Kerney and White beyond Vezina to the left. 
Forbes, Vezina, and Fletcher generally kept regular attend-
ance at the inverviews, but Kerney and White preferred to 
use much of' their time during the ensuing week in travelling 
about Port-au-Prince talking to the people in the streets. 
These interviews continued, with the exception of Sunday, 
March 2nd, through the following Saturday, March 8th. 
10. Johnson, William Allen White's America,pp. 419-420. 
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Anyone who wished, as indicated by the Commission, 
was permitted to speak, but the majority of those who eventu-
/ 
ally presented themselves appeared to be of the elite class. 
Th~ were well-educated, followed law or journalism as a pro-
fession generally, and chiefly light-skinned. 11 There appear-
ed to be no representation from the great mass of rural 
Haitians, which seemed to disappoint Forbes very much. He 
did not feel that he was truly listening to the Haitian people, 
but rather only to the literate few who spoke not for Haiti 
but for themselves. The hearings were held in French--the 
/ 
language of the elite--rather than Creole, but were trans-
lated into English for the benefit of the non-French-speak-
ing members of the Commission. First taken down in shorthand, 
the material was later typed for the benefit of the record. 
In addition Forbes made the habit of dictating each night to 
Redmayne the general gist of the interviews which occurred 
on that particular day. 
The first of these d leta tions by Forbes is especially 
significant as it gives a startling insight into Forbes• first 
impressions. This was the first hearing and the one in which 
Pierre Hudicourt made his appearance: 
When the session opened no people presented them-
selves, but a certain Mr. Hudicourt was brought in by 
11. '*Witnesses before the Commission, 11 Box 5, in the National 
Archives Collection of material pertaining to the Forbes 
Commission, Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited as National 
Archives Collection. 
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a lady, Mrs. William Hill Weed representing the Nation, 
and a daughter of an ex-Congressman from Connecticut 
who formerly visited the Philippines with the Taft Com-
mission. Mr. Hudicourt spent more than a hour in talk-
ing with various members of the Commission--Mr. Fletcher, 
Mr. White, Mr. Vezina, and myself--individually. No 
reporters were present. 
He represented that he felt that President Hoover 
should immediately announce that an election should be 
held, although the special time for it under the consti-
tution had passed. He was a lawyer himself and he said 
General Russell and President Borne, whom he represented 
as General Russell's tool and agent, had ignored for 
their own purposes-the strict construction of the con-
stitution on occasions when it suited their purposes to 
do so; and he aaw no reason why the President and General 
Russell should not ignore the strict clauses of the con-
Sitution when it suited the desires of the Haitian people 
that they should do so. He urged immediate announcement 
of an elect ion. 
He went on to say that if he were elected President 
he would not permit the High Commissioner to dictate to 
him, nor stand for any interference with the administra-
tion of the Government. 
I asked him what was the main grievance the Haitians 
had against the Americans, and he said 11 racial 11 ; that 
the Haitians were humiliated by the treatment handed out 
to them. He said when his wife and daughter drove in 
their car they were not recognized. Asked if that could 
not be eliminated by the ·· salect ion of off leers who would 
not conduct themselves in that way, he said that it was 
a thing that could not be remedied by law; that there 
was an inherent sentiment, and that as long as we sent 
American marines so would that sentiment be harbored by 
the Haitians. Asked what particular officers of the 
government had incurred the enmity of the Haitians ex-
pecially, he mentioned Duncan the engineer, who he said 
was organizing voodoo dances to be shown the Commission 
when going about the country in order to demonstrate their 
barbarous characteristics. He said these voodoo dances 
were prohibited by law, and I told him that if they were 
prohibited by law we should certainly not permit them to 
be performed before us, as we were a law-abiding body and 
would not countenance any infraction of the law. 
Asked about Dr. Freeman, (head of the Service Techni-
que) he said that.he was thoroughly disliked by the Haitian 
people. 
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He said that the American officials gave no credit 
whatever to the Haitians for the excellence of their 
work; that there had been good Haitian doctors, even be-
fore the American intervention, but the Americans were 
unwilling apparently to admit it. He said that American 
engineers sent Haitians out to do field work on construc-
tion of roads, etc., and then denied them any credit, 
and also held them down to the lower pos~tions and took 
every occasion to represent them as being imcompetent 
and untrustworthy. 
He did not speak of the schools. 
He said that he was asking Americans to be fair to 
the Haitians, and I asked him if it were not proper to 
ask the Haitians to be fair to Americans; for example, 
in the many memoranda and complaints I had seen or heard 
no credit whatever was given for American accomplishments, 
and that if they asked Americans to be fair to them was 
it not reasonable for us to ask them to be fair to what 
was done for them by the United States--at least giving 
them credit for such progress as could be proved to have 
been made. 
Mr. Hudicourt represented that the statem~nts given 
out to the press asking for interviews had not been favor-
ably received as they had interpreted them exactly as 
we had intended that they should be interpreted, namely, 
that we were not going to look into complaints about past 
actions, and were not concerned with future developments. 
This position was also made clear by Mr. Chauvet later 
who said that the whole delegation had a sinking of heart 
when our announcement was handed to the press; they felt 
their arms were broken, as he expressed it. We assured 
Mr. Hudicourt and later Mr. Chauvet that we had no in-
tention of raking up the past, nor of devoting ourselves 
to situations that had developed in the past. We wanted 
to study the present situation and formulate plans for 
the future; and with that object in view we hoped to 
have the fullest representations made. 
Mr. Hudicourt proceeded to prepare a proposed an-
nouncement for the press in Which he said we were here 
to prepare plans in accordance with the wishes of the 
Haitian people. Of this we could not entirely approve, 
because while we hope we will be able to meet some of 
their wishes we are very sure that we cannot meet all of 
them, and we do not want to represent that that is what 
we are here to do. We represented to him that we want to 
ascertain the wishes of the Haitian people. 
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Mr. Hudicourt made the direct statement that ir 
President he would not recognize the American High Com-
missioner nor permit the management or rinances or the 
Government by an American orricial adviser. 
Mr. Chauvet, who was called in later, asked ror an 
opportunity to present his views. He was a stout and 
somewhat soiled individual who owns a paper called the 
Nouvelliste, and represented many times that he had been 
in jaii himselr rour times. He was very positive about 
the misunderstanding the newspaper had in regard to our 
rirst announcement; and later prepared a correction which 
he announced that we are an administrative body planning 
to correct evils which he saw in the situation. This 
was utterly contrary to the ract and to our representa-
tion to him, which indicated something which we could 
readily see in his race--that was his unreliability. He 
inrormed us that he had ror years been trying to get 
answers to a number or questions but had railed, and he 
asked ir he could submit these questions to us in the 
hope that we would be more successrul than he in obtain-
ing answers; to this we replied we would be very glad to 
answer these questions. f~d as a matter or ract these 
were handed in on Monday. 
Forbes later commented that 11 0ne Pierre Houdicourt spent 
an hour talking privately with me. He was a candidate ror 
the Presidency, God save the day, and was very bitter and 
showed, I thought, little sense and marked unritness ror the 
orrice to which he aspired.nl3 White and Kerney, however, 
were much more ravorably impressed by the aspiring Hudicourt. 
As the days wore on, Forbes realized that rew among those 
who held power in Haiti--and this excluded the great mass or 
the black, illiterate, Creole-speaking people--wanted Borne. 
' Americans, the elite generally, and rinally the Archbishop him-
selr stood against him. Only the Marines and General Russell 
kept him in the presidential chair. 
12. Forbes, Haitian Journal, ,PP• 29-30. 
13. ~., P• 35. 
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The country was seething with Borne's latest action. 
Just before the Commission had set sail for Haiti, Borne 
had dismissed four members of the Council of State and ap-
pointed four others more amenable to himself. Lately he 
had been having difficulty, went the rumor, even with the 
members of a council whom he himself had appointed, and had 
become frightened at the possibility of the Council's elect-
ing another candidate for the presidential elections that 
year. The Opposition feared that Borno would be elected for 
a third term, any occurrence that might conceivably aid the 
pre sent administration's remaining in power alarmed the Op-
position. Upheaval had not yet come to Haiti, but Forbes 
felt that, unless the Commission worked quickly, the more 
radiCal elements in the Opposition would gain control of 
affairs. And in the meantime, the mobs increased in number 
and mobility. The first hearing served only to arouse the 
radicals to a suspicion that the Commission would do nothing 
but talk and listen and record. At this Juncture, William 
Allen White gracefully eased the tension. 
Hudicourt had become rather friendly with White, had 
introduced him to a number of leading men and women in Port-
au-Prince, and White enjoyed hospitality in the homes of 
several of the best families. On March 2nd, a parade had 
' been planned by a group of elite women to lay a wreath at 
the statue of Dessalines, but a government regulation pre-
vented parades or demonstrations of any sort without 
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permission having been granted at least three days before. 
The request had not come through on time, and the Borno 
government refused permission. White was asked during one 
/ 
of his visits to an elite home what he could do. He relayed 
the information to Forbes and earnestly requested that per-
mission be granted. Forbes said he could do nothing, but 
would ask Russell. Russell declared that, although the regu-
lation forbade parades or public ceremonies unless there-
quired time interval had elapsed, he would give permission. 
That afternoon of March 2nd, White lunched at the home 
of Pierre Hudicourt--11 1 never had so sophisticated and as 
beautiful a meal in my life ••• It was French food with de-
licious sausages, pickled fish, tomatoes in oil, garnished 
fish salad, breast of roast turkey, gravy with onions, 
potatoes, ice cream, cake and coffee." He attended services 
at the church where the parade was to begin, then walked 
back to the Excelsior Hotel, where he watched the marchers 
go by. At regular intervals the marchers would stop, hail 
him, and then continue. White's letter to Charles M. Vernon 
gives the picture in his inimitable style: 
' The elite of Haiti were heading the parade which means 
mulatto, octoroons, quadroons, and other multiple roons 
into the sixty fourths and ninety sixths, but all frankly 
calling themselves Negroes, though some of them were 
blonder than you and a few had light straight hair with 
blue eyes. They were--if I must say it--good looking and 
in many cases most beautiful women. This church parade 
was a woman's parade and started in the swell neighborhood 
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of the town at the aristocratic Catholic church. 
Suddenly from out of the line, or otit of the sidewalk, 
or out of the c~owd, I never knew which, appeared a 
gaunt, wrinkled, poor old peasant woman in a blue cot-
ton dress. She ran toward me and either fell, ·or kneel-
ed, or prostrated herself, Heaven knows which, it was 
so quickly done, before me. The parade stopped and be-
gan to jam and form a crowd around her. The fashionably 
dressed leaders began to glare at the ·old woman. I 
reached down and helped her up with both hands. She 
thrust toward me as she rose a little homemade Haitian 
flag made of two pieces of paper pasted together. She 
said something to me in either French or Creole or 
Patois, which I couldn't understand and which I knew I 
must not assent to for-that reason, being there more or 
less in an official capacity. But I smiled my prettiest 
smile and shook my head, and then she ran back into the 
crC,.,d toward where the line should be and was glared. at 
more or less by the well~dressed women. She stood for 
a second or two treffibling and frightened, and to re-
assure her and to reassure the crowd that I was in no 
way embarrassed by the.incident, I waved at the crowd 
touching the tips of my fingers to my lips in as af-
fectionate a gesture as I could make and conciliatory 
withal. For as much as two or three seconds the crowd 
stood dumb in amazement that any white man from America, 
and that White man with ambassadorial rank who had just 
taken a salute With nineteen guns, would do such a thing. 
Then a roar of applause broke ~pt and the reporters knew 
tm t an incident had happened. q. 
The Press reported that White had kissed the old lady's 
hand, and this is the way it hit the newsstands in the United 
States. In reality the reporters had not seen precisely 
wm t he did. Nor did W]1ite correct them. For him the story 
was essentially correct; had he thought at the moment of so 
' doing, he would have. 
ll.j.. William Allen White, "Letter to Charles M. Vernon", 
Selected Letters of William Allen White. Edited with an intro-
duction bY Walter Johnson (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
1947), pp. 305-307. .. 
Forbes makes no mention in his. Haitian Journal of the part 
played by White in the parade incident, although Walter Johnson 
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After this incident, coming so close to the beginning 
of the Commission's work, Forbes' task was incredibly easier. 
White wrote in this same letter to Vernon that it was there-
after "pie for the Commission. We could do anything we 
wanted to with the Haitian opposition-which had been teeter-
ing on the brink of revolution and bloodshed until that hour, 
having somewhat lost faith in all Americans." This over-
states the results, but at least the Opposition felt that 
the Commission consisted of sincere men actually planning 
to do something cons true t ive. 
On the other hahd, to American critics this incident 
appeared as though Borno and Russell, afraid of popular 
gatherings, had forbidden all public demonstrations, and 
that Russell had given permission on this particular oc-
casion because he feared the effect on the Commission. Forbes 
tried to correct this misconception by stating that the Com-
mission had nothing to do with granting permission to hold 
the parade, that this lay purely within Russell's preroga-
tive, and that the Commission was not in Haiti to correct 
dictatorship but merely as a presidential civil advisory 
body. His statements had little result in nullifying senti-
ment, however, and White emerged as the hero of the whole 
business. 
relates that Forbes observed to him: 11 There is no question 
but that Mr. White appealed greatly to_the emotional people 
of Hal ti for whom he evinced such sympathetic attachment." 
(William Allen White's America, p. 421) 
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Now Forbes issued a call f'or representatives of' the 
Opposition parties to meet with the Commission to state their 
grievances and to discuss how the present controversy might 
be settled. In the meantime, Russell proposed a plan, the 
substance of' which he submitted on March ~th in a conf'iden-
tial memorandum to the Commission: 
The present situation is tense and it is becoming 
.hourly more apparent that the Opposition intends to f'orce 
the issue of' National Elections, even at the .. sacrifice 
of' lives. It is therefore of' the utmost importance to 
endeavor to ef'f'ect a Compromise between the Opposition 
and the present actministration if' such a compromise could 
be legally accomplished within the provisions of' the 
Treaty of' 1915. 
I~ this connection, the following thoughts have 
suggested themselves to me: 
Mr. Theard Gdc. Russell misunderstood the name, 
which was Eth~art), the President of' the Court of' Cassa-
tion, is an elderly man of' high standing morally, socially, 
and professionally, .and has not been active in poll tics. 
He has been a member of' the Court of' Cassation f'or many 
years and its President f'or the past f'ive or six years. 
Mr. Theard is a close friend of' President Barno and I 
believe has his entire confidence. This morning, I re-
ceived information leading me to believe that Mr. Theard 
would be acceptable to the Opposition as a provisional 
Chief' of' State. A provisional government is impossible; 
but the following course of' action might be pursued: 
The Commission might frankly discuss this matter with 
President Barno and obtain his agreement to exert his in-
fluence f'or the election of' Mr. Theard as President of' 
the RepubUc, by the Council of' State on April 14th, next. 
In that event, President Barno could at once announce 
his choice of' Mr. Theard and Mr. Theard could then pub-
licly declare that. he would only accept the presidency 
as a patriotic duty and only until such time as he could 
legally call National Elections and establish a duly 
elected legislative body. Immediately following such ,_ .. 
~ections on January 10, 1932, he would agree to call the 
legislative body in extraordinary session as the National 
Assembly and to submit his resignation. 
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In order de£initely to establish a relinquishment 
o£ the o£fice o£ Chie£ of State immediately following 
the election in 1932, it would appear proper for Mr. 
Theard to address a communication to the representative· 
o£ the United States Government in Haiti, clearly stating 
that immediately £ollowing the National Election in 1932, 
he would convoke the National Assembly in extraordinary 
session and submit his resignation and that he would in 
no event serve as Chief of State after that time, 
The question o£ whether or not the elections of 1932 
should be supervised by the United States Government 
might be considered at a later date. 
If the Commission could obtain the consent of Pre-
sident Borno to the above program, .it is suggested that 
it then discuss the matter with the members of the Op-
position, with a view to the immediate announcement of 
the President's intentions in ~nder to relieve·the tense-
ness of the present situation. 5 
Borno seemed to like the plan, as indicated by the fol-
16 lowing Confidential MemorandUm £rom Russell, March 1-th. 
15. Generai . .rohri H. Russell, "Confidential Memorandum," 
March 6, 1930, in Fo~bes' personal collection of documents 
relative to the Haitian Commission of 1930 Append~x, Exhibit 
#1, in the Houghton Library, Harvard University. 
Forbes spent his retirement years collecting materials 
relating to his career. Those pertaining to Haiti he col-
lected into a leather-bound volume labeled "Personal Copy of 
the Rep,ort o£ the President's Commission on Conditions in 
Haiti. 1 This is an ambiguous title, because contained there-
in is not only the of£icial printed report issued by the State 
Department in Washington as Report of the President's Commis-
sion for the Study and Review of Conditions in Haiti, Latin 
American Series, No. 2, but masses of other material which 
have never been printed or reached the public eye; a con-
fidential memorandUm by Forbes on the political settlement, 
pictures of the members of the Commission during various stages 
of the trip, valuable telegrams, letters and confidential memo-
randa by Russell, Cotton, Dunn, and others. For this reason, 
and to avoid confusion with the official printed report, the 
present author hereafter refers to this personal copy o.f 
pertinent papers as Forbes' Personal Haiti Papers. 
16. One should note that Forbes and the Commission held· per-
sonal audience with Borno only .four times during the Commission's 
stay in Haiti. Every communication with Borno came through 
Col, Russell. This was in accord with Forbes' idea that Russell, 
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I took up with President Borno this morning the 
matter contained in my memorandum of yesterday, March 6i 1930. President Borno was enthusiastic about the 
p an. He stated that he was agreeable to any solution 
-of the problem that would be within the Constitution, 
the Treaty, and the laws of Haiti, and considered that 
the formula suggested by me was a happy solution to the 
problem. 
President Borno added·, however, that for psycholo-
gical reasons, he thought the proposal should be made 
to the Opposition by the Commission. This, I informed 
him, had in a general way already been accomplished. 
He said that there would be absolutely no difficulty in 
having a ·compromize candidate elected by the Council of 
State. I mentioned Mr. Emmanuel Eth6art•s name and Pre-
sident Borno stated that if he could be induced to serve, 
he would be an excellent choice. He pointed out that Mr. 
Eth6art has kept out of politics, that he has friends on 
bot~ aides, and that he holds the highest judicial posi-
tion in the government. Furthermore, his age and health 
would not permit him to take the office, under any cir-
cumstances, for six years, even were it offered to him, 
and that he felt that he would have to be urged as a 
patriotic duty to take it even for the short period con-
templated in the plan. In connection with a considera-
tion of the proposed plan, it is of interest to note that 
Mr. Eth6art•s name was first suggested by Mr. Chauvet, 
editor of Le Nouvelliate-, as one of the two men who would 
be acceptable to the Opposition. 
I believe that the successful accomplishment of the 
plan outlined would not only put an end to_the .present 
tense state of affairs in connection with the 1930 elec-
tion problem but that considered purely from the point of 
view of the political training of the Haitians and as a 
lesson in collaboration between groups of hitherto diver-
gent political views, it would be highly advantageous.l7 
as head of the A~erlcan Civil Government in Haiti, alone had 
the official right to act between the presidency of Haiti and 
the American Government, and that the Commission had no such 
official standing but was only a body empowered to investigate 
and make recommendations. See Forbes' "Confidential Memorandum: 
Steps taken to solve the acute political situation in Haiti," 
Forbes' Personal Haiti Papers, p. 6. . 
17. See Russell, "Confidential Memorandum/'~ March 7, 1930, 
~., Appendix, Exhibit #2. 
> • 
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The delegates of the Opposition parties, however, had 
strong objections to the Russell plan, although this was the 
plan actually used with modifications. 
The representatives of the Opposition finally met at 
three o'clock on March 6th. The Commission found facing it 
five reasonably well-educated men: Georges Leger, 11 an at-
torney of fine presence and good standing; a slight man, 
rather light of skin"; Simon Pradel, "mulatto, prominent 
lawy~ 11 ; Antoine Rlg~l, "darker of skin, but white-haired11 
and •tPresiden.t of the Federation of a number of 'patriotic' 
-
leagues" (there were eight of them); Pierre Hudicourt, 
"mulatto, attorney, very bitter toward the present govern-
ment"; Justin Sam, "Negro, student at St. Damien 1 s, leader 
of Students' Moveme~t.nl8 
Russell's plan was unsatisfactory because M. Etheart 
was unsatisfactory, because any friend of Borno was unsatis-
factory, and because, on any account, the Opposition refused 
to have the president elected ~ the Council of State, Which 
from their point of view was little more than a group of 
oligarchs whose sole purpose was to retain itself in power, 
or keep Borno in power. Furthermore, the main question seem-
ed to be that of national elections for the legislative 
assembly. General Russell, Colonel Cutts (commanding the 
Occupation marine forces), and General Evans (commanding the 
llj. Forbes• 11 Confldenti~l Memorandum," Forbes Personal Haiti 
Papers, pp.- 3~4-. 
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9:a_rd_e) held with Borne that no legal national elections 
could be held before January 10, 1932, and that the election 
of a President should be made by the Council of State. The 
most that Russell would concede at this point was that Borne 
eliminate himself as a candidate, and that some "neutral" 
candidate, as he proposed in his plan, be elected by the 
Council. The meeting came to an impasse, and Forbes adjourned 
the discussion to a later time. 
The crowds were becoming more and more hostile. As the 
Commission was to discover, the Haitian mass cared little 
for the efforts of the American people to stabilize the 
country. The only service the Haitians appreciated was the 
medical service. As for the rest, they looked upon Borne 
and Russell as joint despots whose every action, however 
good in itself was a device to solidify the hold of a foreign 
government upon Haitian soil. Everywhere the Opposition 
had gained control of the crowds, and long lines of men, 
women, and children, bearing placards, swarmed past the build-
ing where the Commission met. Just how fully_ the Opposition 
had mastered the crowds was to be seen by Forbes later on 
the Commission• s trip through the interior of the country 
to Cap-Haitien. 
Forbes urged Borne through General Russell to issue a 
"calming statement" to the Haitian Press, and then called 
for a second session on.March 7th of the Opposition parties. 
I 
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At this second meeting, Forbes modified the Russell 
plan}9 The Opposition parties were to present a slate of 
"neutralll candidates, one of whom would be chosen by President 
Borno. as acceptable to him. This candidate would then first 
be elected by the Opposition partie:s to satisfy the people, 
and then elected by the Council of State, to satisfy the legal 
requirements Cilf the Constitution of 1918. This neutral Pre-
sident would in turn supervise national legislative elections 
as soon as possible. Although the Opposition leaders did 
not care to have the Council of State vote, in any event, 
for the President of Haiti, since to their outlook it had 
long since become a morally (if not legally) unacceptable 
usurper of the people's power, they finally accededt:o:Forbes' 
wishes in the effort to stern increasing violence, 
Forbes telegraphed the plan to President Hoover that 
same day, the 7th and received acceptance the Sth. 20 Yet, 
Borno still had to be satisfied; he was as much opposed to 
the new plan as the Opposition had been to the first. His 
objections mainly centered about the question of electing 
the National Legislature. Allowing a temporary president 
to be elected by both the Opposition and the Council of 
State met his approval after long persuasion by Russell, 
but holding elections for the Assembly before January 10 1 
19. Forbes' Personal Haiti Papers, p. 7. 
I 
20. ~Ibid., Appendix, Exhibits;,/1'3 and 4. 
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19)2, was anathema for him. Nor was his reasoning unsound. 
Were the United States to recognize e.lections held before 
the time permitted by the Constitution of Haiti, the effect 
upon Haiti and the rest of the governments of Latin-America 
might be injurious. This would be tantamount to saying that 
the American people would recognize illegal governments and 
successful revolutions whenever the occasion demanded and 
the net result would be the discouragement of constitutional 
government. 
Forbes was caught between the demands of legality and 
those of expediency. After conference, the Commission finally 
decided that the new president, once elected, would call for 
national 1 egis lat ive elections 11 as soon as pass ibl e. n21 For 
- -
Ru_ssell and Barno, this phrase meant "not until 1932"; for 
Leger and the leaders of the Opposition, it meant "during 
193q." Forbes evidently satisfied the Opposition leaders by 
telling them that he would bend his efforts toward getting 
the State Department in Washington to agree to holding illegal 
elec'tions in 1930, wtyile Barno seems apparently to have been 
:forced to accept the plan by rapidly growing awareness o:f his 
unpopularity and the little support existing for his position. 
The ambiguous phrase "as soon as possible" was reluctantly 
accepted by both sides, and plans were set in motion for 
the presidential elections. 
21. Forbes' "Confidential Memorandum," Forbes• Personal Haiti 
Papers, p. 11 • 
. , .. 
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Another point of difficul~ arose--minor, but irritat-
ing to Borne. Was the new president to be called "tempo-
rary" or 11provisional 11 7 T.he Opposition circulated the 
statement that a provisional government was to be estab-
lished. Borne declared that the neutral president was not 
going ~o be provisional since he would be a legally elected 
president with all the powers of the Constitution conferred 
upon him, but merely temporary. The word "provisional" 
cast a stigma upon the preceding administration which Borno 
could not abide. 
Forbes sent an Informative telegram to Hoover, 22 and 
then set about finding a neutral candidate. Since Emmanuel 
Etheart had declined the honor of being candidate for the 
temporary presidency, the Opposition obtained authorization 
to compose a 1 is t of neutrals • 
Forbes in his Journal notes that Borne had evidently 
hoped that in some way the United States would recognize 
his services and perpetuate him in power. At his four meet-
ings with the Commission he usually dwelt upon the great 
accomplishments of the American Intervention, the particular 
achievements of Borne himself, and the incapability of the 
Haitian masses in governing themselves. He did not cease 
to stress the terrible misfortunes, the complete chaos that 
22. Forbes' Personal Haiti Papers, Appendix, Exhibit #5. 
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would engulr Haiti with the withdrawal or American rorces. 
Though Forbes and the Commission were aware or the cogency 
or Borno•s arguments, and even admitted Borno's views well-
taken, Forbes round himselr rapidly coming to the belier 
that the path to wisdom la! in American withdrawal not only 
rrom Haiti but from all the so-called protectorates. He 
... ~ 
relt that with or without mistakes, the Haitian people could 
only learn how to run their nation democratically by actual-
ly doing it. His later report to the President stated that 
only rapid Haitianization or the Haitian government would 
bring satisraction to_the people or that tormented land. 
As a practical measure in teaching Haitians how to run their 
government, he railed to see the userulness or the Occupa-
tion; people only really learn by doing and the Americans 
appeared to be doing most_or the doing. 
Forbes .. sent his orricial statement to the Press on 
March 9th. 23 A copy was sent to Borno by 1:30 p.m. Sunday, 
two and one-halr hours berore_~ein~ given to the Pres~, so 
that Borno could make any objections he wished to make in 
advance. He made none, and the notice went as originally 
written to the local p~ess at Port-au-Prince and to American 
newspapermen at Hinche. 
On March 9th, leavin~_Dunn in the capital, the Commis-
sion started its long proposed trip north into the interior 
23. Forbesi- 11 Conridential Memorandum," Forbes• Personal 
Haiti Papers, p. 13. 
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or the coUntry, Forbes remarks that everywhere the Commis-
sion went--Pont Beudet, Mirabelais, Las Cohobas, Themonde, 
Hinche, St. Michel, Massaide, Cap-Raitien--it was greeted 
by the same signs calling for the end or American occupation, 
BOrno 1 s regime, and for the return of government by a re-
presentative legislature. Everywhere the Opposition, as 
it did in Port-au-Prince seemed to have complete command or 
the mobs. After a while the Commission grew tired or the 
same slogans, the constantly repeated cries, so that the 
agitation had little rurther effect on the visitors. 
Our path lay through a number of towns and by the 
time we had passed through two of them it became evident 
that there had been an organized effort to create an 
atmosphere and we deduced the work of propagandists who, 
we soon learned, had preceded us and the very stupidly 
organized demonstrations. Everywhere were banners of 
paper, the Haitian colors, red and blue, with a strip of 
black pinned or glued to them, to indicate mourning for 
lost liberties. Everywhere were signs held up to us all 
in exactly the same words and asking for the same things: 
"Desoccupation," "Suppression of the Alcohol and Tobacco 
Tax," "Withdrawal o:f the Marines," 11 Supression of BOrne," 
"Legislative Assemblies," etc., etc. Always the same and 
usually shown by people who had not the remotest concep-
tion of whet it all meant. 
At Cap-Haitian the maid-servant in an American house 
told her mistress that she had to be out on the streets 
because an American o:f:ficer was coming to count the 
people o:f the town, and that they must all be out so that 
they could be counted. One very stout and well-fed 
negress held to our agonized eyes a placard which read: 
11 Save us or we perish." We ~plt her best chance ot: 
perishing was :from apoplexy. ~ 
24. Forbes, Haitian Journal, p. 45. 
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Forbes might have been more impressed had he felt that 
these were sincere demonstrations by the masses of the people, 
but he felt that they were little more than stage demonstra-
tions by professional demonstrators behind which stood the 
/ 
elite. 
At another point he gives the following interesting 
account: 
•••• In every town we went we were greeted with the same 
reception; no music; everyone with the same paper ban-
ners, cut out of the same roll of paper; and with signs 
carrying the same inscriptions.which rapidly became 
meaningless. We knew the names of the agitators who 
were going ahead writing the speeches for the officials 
and giving out flags and signs, all calling for the same 
things. It was a pitiable insult to our intelligence, 
and ultimately resulted in our cancelling nearly half 
of our trips as there was no use wasting time seeing 
the same tiresome silly things over again. 
Our advance guard and business agent, who went a-
head to arrange things for us with an officer of the 
Garde, .kept seeing these agents and the crowds being 
rehearsed for their parts,_ which they didn't more than 
half understand. The natives speak a kind-of patois, 
difficult for a Frenchman to understand, so the speeches 
had to be made in French, a tongue many of the towns-
people were not familiar with, and the head man of each 
town made his little address written out for him; and it 
made us sorry for them to see how they had to struggle 
to read and pronounce what was provided for them to say. 
At one town the presiding officer, wholly black, had 
endeavored to commit his speech to memory as had two 
friends; one of them stood on either side. Hardly a 
sentence could this poor man get through and. he was . 
prompted in a low voice by one or the other of his friends 
standing on either side. The crowds had been told to 
break out into applause at.a certain point but they didn't 
get their cues or something else went wrong, for the 
strategic moment usually passed and then someone as an 
afterthought would remember that they had been told to 
c,lap and applaud, and he would start with a ragged follow-
ing, as one after another of the assemblage would remember 
I, 
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that they had been told to clap. If there hadn't been 
tragedy underlying all this, it would have been all 
opera bouffe. The seriousness of it all lay in the fact 
that these poor dupes were really asking for things that 
they shou1d2pot have had, or, better said, had only a small part. ::> 
Forbes had made trips before. His career in the Philip-
pines had been marked by the extensive journeys made first as 
Chief of Constabulary and then as Governor. He went by pack 
mule, horse, wagon. Neither impassable road, nor forest, 
nor torrent, nor disease prevented his trave 11 ing throughout 
the islands in the effort to get to know the people, both 
Christian and Moro. But then he had been in his early thir-
ties. Now he was sixty years of age, Fletcher was sixty-one, 
nor were the other members young men. The trip this time 
was tpo quick. It was over a highway constructed by American 
engineers, and it touched only the towns. By the time the 
Commission reached Cap-Haitien, the members were so exhausted 
that they met the Rochester at that city and returned on it 
to Port-au-Prince by way of Gonaives. The photographs which 
were taken of the CommissJon show it only in little towns 
surrounded by official welcoming parties, or posing with 
noted Haitians. There is no indication that the Commission 
had any genuine contact with the Negro people themselves, 
visited their hovels, or actually saw them at their daily 
tasks. The trip was artificial at best. Forbes in the Philip-
pines was Forbes steeped in the blood, the tradition, the 
25. Forbes, Haitian Journal, pp. 48-49. 
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culture, and the very soul or the Filipino; Forbes in Haiti 
was a Forbes anxious to rormulate an American roreign policy 
and get out. The truth is that even ir he had wanted more 
time, Forbes could not have had it; Hoover was anxious to 
get him home and pack him orr as American Ambassador to Japan. 26 
Word came at St. Michel that riots were breaking out in 
Port-au-Prince. Dunn requested that at least one member or 
the Commission return to the Capital. Forbes rerused the 
request, reeling that by complying he might attach greater 
signiricance to the riots than was desirable. Instead, he 
decided to shorten the trip even rurther and return to Port-
au-Prince at the earliest possible time. The riots had come 
about, Dunn explained, as the result or the rollowing notice 
sent out March 8th by President Borno to all the Prerects: 
It is ralse that a provisional government will be 
ror.med as the agitators are trying to make the people 
believe. The presidential election will take place 
April 14 by the Council or State and President Borno 
will not leave the National Palace until next May 15. 
Here you have the exact truth which must be made clear 
to the people. With regard to the legislative elections 
they will not take place berore the nearest dat~ rixed 
by the Constitution, which is January 10, 1932.27 
The Opposition understood this to mean the complete nega-
tion or Borne's promise or presidential and legislative elec-
tions according to the Russell plan as modiried by Forbes. 
26. w. Cameron Forbes Journal, Vol. III, Second Se~ies pp. 
157-561. This is the rirst section or that part or Forbes' 
Journal known as the Japanese Journal, covering the year and 
one-half that Forbes spent as ambassador to Japan. 
27. Forbes' Personal Haiti Papers, Appendix, Exhibit #7. 
Actually, Borne did not mea~ this at all. Borne's 
explanation for his notice to the Prefects is recorded by 
Forbes in his Confidential Memorandum to Hoover, as follows: 
(that) the Opposition had immediately telegraphed that 
they had won a great victory over him, that he was 
immediately going to be put out, and that a provisional 
government, agreed to by the American Commission, was 
to be established. The notices sent around by the 
Opposition were technically incorrect and wholly unwise. 
The Government was to be temporary and not provisional. 
No agreement had been reached for the abilition of the 
Council of State. On the other hand, President Borne's 
telegram to the prefects, instead of clarifying the 
situation, was also misleading and provocative of 
unrest and misunderstanding.2B 
Although Borno 1 s notice confused the issue all the more, 
the Opposition apparently had faith in the Commission, for 
Dunn's telegram to Forbes in Cap-Haitien on March lOth 
indicated that things had quieted down in the Capital. Forbes 
and the Commission snet a telegram of information to Hoover 
announcing that the Commission intended to leave Haiti on 
the 18th, without waiting for the presidential elections 
to take place. The State Department through Acting 
Secretary of State Cotton objected to this,29 but Forbes 
remained firm. Once the political settlement machinery 
had been set into motion, he saw no reason to remain. Super-
vising the elections he felt to be not the job of the Commission 
2tl. Forbes• "Confidential Memorandum," Forbes• Personal Haiti 
Papers, pp.-16-17. 
29. Ibid., Appendix, Exhibit #10. "Have just consulted the 
President in regard to your radio received March 11 in which 
you state your in tent ion to return to Port-a.u-Prince evening 
but of the more experienced Russell, who, as Forbes never 
would allow himself' to :f'orget, was the official representa-
tive of the United States Government in Haiti. 
The Commission returned to a relatively peace:f'ul Port-
au-Prince on Tuesday, March 11th. The same day in the 
government gazette Le Moniteur Borne made his official an-
nouncement of' the details of' the Russell-Forbes plan and his 
complete acquiescence to its details. But by adding that he 
would do everything in his power to aid every constitutional 
method of' bringing peace and stability to Haiti, he implied 
unacceptance of' the Opposition's interpretation of' the plan 
as calling for national legislative elections be:f'ore the legal 
January 10, 1932, date.3° 
Forbes knew that the leaders of' the Opposition parties 
were c,onservatives. Despite the radical elements in the 
groups opposed to Borne, the conservative leaders had received 
votes of confidence from the parties they represented. "It 
was found," Forbes noted, "that their leadership was wholly 
contingent upon their ability to secure legislative elections 
of the twelfth and sail for Florida about the 18th. He assumes 
that you will not sail until you have reached definite written 
agreement to which all parties will accede on your plan or 
some substitute therefore mentioned in your radio as it seems 
to him of first importance that some definite plan be arrived 
at be:f'ore you leave the island and the situation which you re-
port as to Borno that more important. (signed) Acting Secretary 
of State Cotton. March 11, 1930. 
30. Le Moniteur: Journal o:f'ficiel de la Republique d 1Haiti 
paraissant le lundi et le jeudi, Directeur: Maurice C. Brun 
(Port-au-Prince: Mardi, 11 Mars 1930). 
earlier than the date provided in the Constitution, namely, 
1932. 11 31 Previous to this trip through the interior, Forbes 
had been sympathetic to the wishes of the population for 
national legislative elections in 1930; now, he realized that 
unless this wish were granted, the conservative leaders with 
whom he and the Commission had been dealing--and who had been 
probably responsible for the relative tranquillity of the 
country--might lose control of their parties to the radical 
elements. He had no wish to face the results of insurrection 
such as he had encountered in the Philippines. Nor was his 
friendship with Aguinaldo in Manilla wasted in all that he 
had learned as Governor-General of the Islands.32 
The Opposition indicated that it could no. longer be 
satisfied with the words 11 as soon as possible" with reference 
to these· elections. Once the temporary president was elect-
ed by the peo~le and the Council of State, it wanted the new 
president to call for legislative elections fifteen days 
after inauguration. Forbes objected. He did not want to 
tie the hands of the new executive to so binding a command. 
Long argument ensued, but the Opposition finally compromised. 
The words "as soon as possible" were to be permitted in the 
plan, but an interpretative letter was to accompany the 
31. Forbes' "Confidential Memorandum" in Forbes' Personal 
Haiti Papers, p. 21. 
32. W. Cameron Forbes, Journals, 1909-1913, 4 Vola. in Houghton 
Library, Harvard University. These journals deal with Forbes' 
administration as Governor General of the Philippines during 
the presidency of William Howard Taft. 
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written terms o£ the plan indicating that 1930 was the year 
to whi~h "as soon as possible" was generally believed to 
apply,33 Let the new president take office with the tacit 
agreement that unless ~egisl~tive elections take place the 
same year, he alone mu~t take the responsibility for a general 
uprising of the nation. Forbes agreed to file such an inter-
pretative letter, though he knew he did so without any prior 
approval on this matter from the State Department. Such 
approval he hoped to.obtain later; at the moment he sensed 
,. ·-· .. 
the necess~ty.~or immediate agreement with the leaders of 
the Opposition, 
On March 15th, the proposal agreed upon was published 
in French for the Haitian people: 
1. Each Arrondissement will on or bef·ore March 20, 1930, 
designate a delegate, except for the arrondissement of 
Port-au-Prince, which will designate three delegates, and 
the Arrondissement o£ Cape Haitian, Cayes, Gonaives, Port 
de Paix, Jacmel, Jeremie, St. Maro, Leogane, and Nippes, 
which will designate two delegates--a total of 38 dele-
gates. 
2, The representatives of the various patriotic associa-
tions will meet in the principal town (chef-lieu) of 
each Arrondissement in order to proceed to the selection 
of delegates. 
3· The delegates will meet at Port-au-Prince not later 
than March 26, 1930, to form the Central Committee which 
will be charged with the election of the candidate of 
the nation for the presidency of the Republic, This com-
mittee will be presided over by the dean o£ age. 
33. 11Letter from Federated Committee of the Patriotic Groups 
of Haiti to the Commission of President Hoover," March 15, 1930, 
in Forbes' Personal Haiti Papers, Appendix, Exhibit #14. 
4. It is admitted and understood that the American 
Government is pledged to respect the constitutional 
political organization or the Republic or Haiti. This 
declaration in no ways prejudices the right or ruture 
Haitian Governments to revise the Haitian Constitution 
by suitable methods. Any changes which might afrect 
the contractual relations existing between the United 
States and Haiti will naturally be the object or pre-
vious negotiation between the two governments. 
5. The candidate selected shall be politically a 
neutral and shall satisry the conditions required by 
the constitution. He will be acceptable both to Pre-
sident Borno and to the groups or the Opposition repre-
sented by their respective chiers. 
6. The citizen chosen, conformably to Article 3 above, 
shall publicly and solemnly undertake, and this will 
constitute a prerequisite condition to his election, 
to call legislative elections at the earliest possible 
date. These legislative elections shall take place not 
later than three months rrom the date or the calling 
or the primary assemblies. He will likewise pledge him-
self to take the measures necessary to guarantee the 
rreedom or the ballot without in any way restricting 
the exercise or the right or universal surrrage. He 
will pledge himselr to summon the National Assembly in 
·extraordinary session immediately arter the elections 
and thereupon immediately to present his resignation 
as President or the Republic. Finally, he will pledge 
himself not to be a ·candidate for the presidency of the 
Republ~c at this new and definitive presidential elec-
tion.34-
The all-important interpretative letter together with 
the Commission's acceptance or the provisions were filed on 
the same day, the 15th. To the documents were affixed the 
signatures of the representatives of the Federated Committee 
. ; 
of the Patriotic Groups of Haiti (consisting of Le Comite 
I I Federatif, L 1Union Patriotique, La Ligue des Droits de 
34-• "Memoir relative to the plan accepted by the Federated 
Committee of Patriotic Association," March 11, 1930, Forbes' 
Personal Haiti Papers, Appendix, Exhibit #13. · 
L'Hornme et Du Ci~oyen, La Ligue D•Action Sociale Haitienne, 
La Ligue Nationale D1Action Constitutionnelle, La L_!gue'de 
Derense Nationale, La Ligue de la Jeunesse Patriote, Le 
Parti National Travailliste, L'Union Nationaliste). 
Now Forbes' problem lay in getting the State Department 
to agree to having national l'egislative elections in 1930, 
or, putting it another way, not to interrere with such 
elections should they take place berore the legal date or 
1932. He sent a telegram orr on the l2th,35 but the next 
day received an answer £rom Cotton objecting to such early 
elections,36 
At rour o'clock in the arternoon or the same day, 
President Borne asked to meet personally with the Commission. 
He once again spoke of his achievements in Haiti, the 
excellence of American efforts in that country, and his 
desire that marines remain there. He went on to say that 
he had formed a party of his own, the National Progressive 
Party. Of the five ministerial places in the cabinet of the 
new president, he wanted two places for his own party. 
Forbes replied that this was really up to the new president, 
that the new government would be a coalition government, 
and that Borne's party would receive consideration along with 
other parties in Haiti. Forbes suspected that Borne's 
35. Forbes' 'tonfidential Memorandum," in Forbes 1 Personal 
Haiti Papers, p. 23. 
36. Ibid., Appendix, Exhibit #16. 
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requests were prompted by the demands of his friends who 
sought to retain their threatened preferred positions in 
the administration, and that his requests were the result 
of promises made on behalf of these friends.37 Borne seemed 
to be satisfied with Forbes• remarks, and then made his 
explanation of his notice to the Prefects which he had sent 
out While the Commission was touring the interior. Indeed, 
Borne seemed quite re~igned to the situation. The statement 
of the Archbishop of Haiti, to whom the Commission had 
paid an official visit, that he opposed the present regime 
and favored the new plan for the creation of a National 
Legislature, helped to stimulate ready acceptance by Borno 
and the country at large of the Commission's solution. 
The Opposition now presented its list of neutral candid-
ates. Five names were presented: Dr. Felix Armand, Ernest 
Douyon, Dr. Jean Price-Mars, Fouchard Martineau, and 
Eugene Roy.38 Though the names were listed alphabetically, 
the Opposition gently suggested that the last name would 
37. Forbes• "Confidential Memorandum," Forbes' Personal 
Haiti .Papers, .. pp. 25-26. 
38. Ernest Douyon was born Dec. 8, 1885. Educated at the 
College Chaptal in Paris and the Ecole de Droit de Port-au-
Prince, and the Ecole de Droit des Cayes, he received his 
Bachelor of Laws in 1908. He served as a teacher in the 
lower schools from 1905-1914- and as a Professor at the Ecole 
Libre de Droit des Cayes from 1916-1926. He was Secretary 
of Justice and Public Works at the time of the Hoover Commission, 
and a noted lawyer; Later he became Secretary of Finance and 
Public Works, 1931-32, then President of the Court of Appeals 
in 1932. 
be quite acceptable. Whe'n Russell brought Roy's name be-
fore President Borne, the latter accepted Roy as sa tis'-
factory to him. The task was no to have the Opposition 
delegates approve him on March 26th, to be followed by 
his election on April 14th by the Council of State. 
Forbes was worried, nevertheless. He knew that the 
whole purpose behind electing a temporary president was to 
call for legislative elections in 1930; but without approval 
Jean Price-Mars, a physician, is probably the most distin-
guished living Haitian. Borne at Grande Riviere du Nord 
Octobtlr'l5, 1876, he was educated at the Lycee Petion,l893-
95, the Ecole de Medecin,l895-98, the Schools of Medicine 
and Letters at the University of Paris,1898-1901. Entering 
political life, he became Secretary of the Haitian Legation 
at Berlin, 1901-1903, served on the Haitian Government Com-
mission to the St. Louis World's Fair in 1904,was a National 
Deputy to the Legislature,l905-08, Legation Secretary and 
Charge d'Affaires at Washington, 1908-11, General Inspector 
of Public Education, 1912-15, Minister to France, 1915-16, 
and served as Professor at the Lyc~e P6tion from 1918-30, 
his post at the time of the Commission. Later he became a 
National Senator to the Legislature, 1930-35. The author. o:t' 
a number of celebrated books, previous to 1930 he had already 
published the significant La Vocation de 1 1 elite (1919); 
Ainsi parla l•oncle (1928), a group of anthropological 
essays; and Une etape de l'evolution haitienne (1929). 
Dr. Felix Armand was a practicing physician, respected in 
his profession, wealthy, and free from politics. Probably 
the least known of the five candidates, this very fact 
made him desirable to the Commission. 
Fouchard Martineau had been several times director of 
Customs, an administrator of Finance, Delegate of Finance, 
and Deputy of the People. Honest and incorruptible, he 
was a senator at the time of the intervention in 1915. 
Eugene Roy, aged seventy, was a former head of the Bureau 
of Syndicat, a form of government clearing house, and a 
broker. He was invariably consulted whemever disputes 
occurred in the government. American bankers and business-
men thought well of him. 
frQm the State Department, such elections would not be 
recognized. Although he could not convince Acting Secretary 
of State Cotton, he did manage to swing Russell around teo 
his Way of thinking, and Russell finally convinced the re-
luctant Cotton. Forbes received a copy on March 14th, of 
the persuasive letter from Russell to Cotton that finally 
won acceptance by the State Department to Forbes' plans; 
It appears that in accord with the customs and history 
of Haiti, a Council of State was formed as an advisory 
'body in the early days o£ the American Intervention. 
On June 12, 1918, a new Constitution was voted on by 
the people. This Constitution ratified all acts of the 
American Intervention and the Haiti Government prior 
to that date and established a Council of State with 
legislative powers specifically stating that such Coun-
cil of State would exercise legislative powers until 
the constitution of a legislative body at which time 
the Council of State would cease to exist. 
Artie le (c) of the transitory provisions states 
that the first election of the members of the legisla-
tive body after the adopt ion of the present cons i tution, 
.shall take place on=t·he lOth of January of an even year. 
T)1e year wi 11 be fix~d bY.. decree .of the President of 
the Republic publ ished.at least three months before the 
meeting of the primazy assemb 1 ies. 
Last spring the question of whether or not National 
~lections should be held on January 10, 1930, was care-
fully considered. It. is well known that the installa-
tion of the normal legislative body with fifty-one mem-
pers will materially slow up the development work now 
being so successfully conducted by the American Inter-
vention in Haiti; In fact, it Is very probably that it 
will seriously interfere with the carrying out of the 
provisl'ons of the Treaty. On the other hand, the execu-
tive and judicial branches of the Government now in 
being are working, and with the time for the expiration 
of the Treaty approaching, it might well be said that 
the normal legislative branch of the Government should 
also be placed in operation under American guidance. 
After full consideration of the pros and cons of 
this question and having in view Article (c) of the 
trans !tory provisions of the Constitution of Haiti, as 
well as the fact of a presidential election in April, 
1930, it was thought by the Haitian Government that it 
would be better not to hold National Elections until 
1932. The Government of the United States, while very 
desirous of seeing National Elections held, decided 
that this was a question that should be passed upon 
by the President of Haiti in accordance with provision 
(c) of the Constitution. 
The time for calling elections was on or before 
October 10, 1929. When it was definitely understood 
that President Borno did not intend calling National 
Elections, the Opposition, at Port-au-Prince, began 
forming various pol !tical grrups and spreading propa-
ganda in towru throughout the country, principally in 
the ports; and the work of the Opposition in inciting 
the people was greatly aided by a student strike and 
more recently by the advent of the President's Commis-
sion. 
The leaders of the Opposition have succeeded in 
Joining their groups into a so-called Federation and 
have principally demanded National Elections, although 
withdrawal of the American Intervention is also one of 
the points raised by them. It is my belief that a fair 
estimate of the strength of the Opposition forces is 
not more than 25,000. The population of Haiti is two 
millions. The people represented in this group, how-
ever, are those that in the past belonged to the con-
troll.Ing class and will, in all probability, be those 
who Will run Haiti for a great many years until the 
mass of the people, if it is allowed to do so, becomes 
articulate. 
In accordance with the Constitution of Haiti, 
National Elections can not be held until January 10, 
1932. The people will not be more fit to .hold National 
Elections in 1932 than they are today; character build-
ing and development of a middle class cannot be obtain-
ed overnight. 
In view of the demands on the part of the control-
ling class, which it is thought includes even some mem-
bers of the present Government, that Natlonal Elections 
be held at the earliest possible date and considering 
the fact that the people of Haiti will be no better 
fitted to hold National Elections in 1932 than they 
are today, the question arises if it would not he 
possible to accede to the request of the groups to 
hold National Elections within the immediate future. 
Such action would he contrary to the Constitution 
and opposed to President Borno's vitWs of upholding 
the Constitution. President Borno, however, would not 
he in power after May 15th, and would, therefore, not 
he in any way responsible. For the United States Govern-
ment to recognize a violation of the Constitution and 
an illegally constituted assembly might establish a 
dangerous precedent, not only in Haiti, hut throughout 
Latin-America. 
On the other hand, the point is apparently only 
a technical one and if the new duly constituted and 
constitutional Haitian administration, which will go 
into effect May 15th next should request the holding 
·Of National Elections on popular demand, it would ap-
pear that the United States Government might well he 
justified in recognizing these elections and the new 
legislative body thus created. 
In view of the above the following is recommended: 
1. That if the President of Haiti, consitution-
ally elected by the Council of State on April 14th, 
next, after being installed in office on May 15th, 
1930, requests in the name of his Government, the United 
States Government to recognize the holding of elections 
prior to January lOth, 1932, as well as the legality 
of the legislative body thus constituted, it would ap-
pear that the United States Government might well he 
justified in acceding to this request. 
2. In taking the above action, the United States 
Government might point out that it is taken with a view 
to speeding up the withdrawal from Haiti and that the 
constitution of the normal 1 egis lative body is consider-
ed as the first act in such withdrawal. 
3. It is not believed that the leaders of the Op-
position ·groups should at the present time be given any 
information in this connection other than that the ques-
tion of National Elections is one to be taken up by the 
new Haitian Government and the Government of the United 
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States, after the new Government's installation; that 
at that time it would be discussed and that the United 
States is disposed to look favorably upon it, but will 
be guided to a large extent by conditions in Haiti be-
tween the present moment and that time.39 
Thus, the letter was worded in such a way that the 
United States would not definitely promise to recognize 1930 
legislative elections, but only to look upon such elections 
favor!\bly with the idea that they might be recognized if 
conditions in Haiti warranted such recognition. 
Cotton could not object to this, and he replied to the 
Commission in the following confidential telegram, filed 
at the Navy Department at 8:30P.M., March 14., and received 
on the Rochester at 12:25 A.M., March 15: 
We desire no public statement made as to the Depart-
ment's opinion for the reason that we should regard 
the other construction of the Constitution as like-
wise permissible. We should not,' therefore, like the 
pledge of a compromise President to call an early 
election to rest in any degree on our opinion, nor 
do we desire any moral duty to see that a pledge in 
that regard is carried out. It would seem, however, 
\ieHirable, that the several factions with which you 
are in negotiation be informed of this position, 
making it clear that whil~ we do not object to it, 
we do not insist upon it.~O 
Borno still continued to complain; he was never really 
brought to acceptance of unconstitutional elections. The 
fact is that Forbes, the Commission, and Russell (once 
convinced to the wisdom of the procedure) ignored Borno. Rus-
sell argued with Borno that once the new President was installed, 
39. See Russell, "Memorandum on the holding of national 
elections for deputies and senators" in Forbes' Personal 
Haiti Papers, Appendix, Exhibit #20. 
4.0. ~·· Appendix, Exhibit #21. 
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Borno had no further responsibility anyway, but Borno con-
tinued to object on principle. In any event, only four 
things existed to which Borno' s consent was needed--the 
election of Opposition delegates to the convention in Port-
au-Prince (which was already taking place), the sdectlon 
of a: neutral candidate (which had been made), the submission 
of the candidate's name to the Council of State, and elec-
tion by that body. Apart from these particulars, Borno· 
could be dispensed with. Indeed, his presence was more a 
source of difficulty than an aid in ironing out the Haitian 
problem. 
On March 15th, the Commission made its statement to 
the press: 
The Commission is glad to announce that its plan made 
'public on March 9 is now in a fair way to become ef-
·fective. The federated groups have formulated and 
sent in a signed statement of a program satisfactory 
to the Commission and to President Borno. They have 
also suggested five names of candidates for the tempo-
rary presidency who would be acceptable to them. 
·President Borno has informed the Commission through 
:General Russell that of these names that of Eugene Roy 
was satisfactory to him, thus making Mr. Roy the co-
: alit ion candidate. 
The statement wento'ltrtodeclare the date of the Opposition 
convention to be March 20t~ (not the 26th) and to outline 
the details of the plan. It announced that the program had 
the sanction and approval of President Hoover,. (which. was 
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not quite true, and expressed thanks to all those involved 
in reaching,this "happy solution o:f the problem."41 
On the 15th, in:formation was sent to the State Depart-
ment, texts o:f all pertinent documents w.ere later sent to 
Washington, and the Commission held a brie:f interview with 
Eugene Roy himself. 
On the 16th Forbes and the Commission le:ft Haiti ar-
riving in Miami the abth. On March 21st, Roy was nominated 
:for the presidency by the convention o:f Opposition delegates 
at Port-au-Prince, and on April 21st, the Council o:f State 
elected him Pres.ident. The CoWlcil was supposed to elect 
him April 14th, but as events occurred, a number o:f members 
o:f that body re:fused to vote :for Roy (despite the :fact that 
14 out o:f 21 members stated they would vote :for him at the 
time he had been :first suggested), and Borno postponed the 
date indefinitely. When Borno•s actions indicated that he 
might have had intentions o:f nulli:fying the Commission's 
plans, the State Department on April 12th warned him that 
no one except Mr. Roy would be accepted as temporary pre-
sident by the Hoover Government. Borne accordingly ejected 
ten members of the Council and replaced them with ten meh 
who were willing to go along with Forbes' plan. Inauguration 
ceremonies took place on May 15th with little disturbance, 
except at Port de Paix. 
Lp.. Forbes, 11 Con:fidentlal Memorandum," Forbes 1 Personal 
Haiti Papers, PP• 32-33· 
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Many of the new President's appointments were from the 
anti-Borno groups; and because of this and also because 
or the President's unramiliarity with the administra-
tion, current work was somewhat retarded. In the eyes 
of Haitians, the report of Mr. Hoover's commission, 
while not altogether satisractory to extremists, seemed 
anything but a vindication of the regime that had exist-
ed since 1921. American pr~stige and influence was, at' 
least temporarily reduced.qL 
President Roy rixed National Elections for October 14. 
Early in October, the United States Government made the an-
nouncement that it ~d no intention or supervising the 
elections, that all American ofricials in Haiti had been 
instructed to maintain a strictly neutral attitude and not 
to indicate by word or deed a preference for any individual, 
and that American marines would be kept in barracks on the 
election day. The elections came off with little disturbance.~3 
One would be foolish to suppose that the political set-
tlement pleased Forbes as an actual settlement of the Haitian 
internal turmoil. The settlement was superficial, and no 
one knew this better than Forbes himselr. It merely allowed 
the Opposition to get Borne out and get itself in. Through-
out his stay in Port-au-Prince, his trip through the interior, 
his glance at Cap-Haitian, he repeatedly heard the phrase 
"The Haitian people want ••• , the Haitian people need ••• , 
the Haitian people ••• , the Haitian people ••• " Yet he won-
dered if he had ever really heard from the Haitian people. 
42. Millspaugh, Haiti under American Control, pp. 191-192. 
43. See Chapter VI, this study1 for later developments in 
Haitian politics. 
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Three of Forbes' letters are significant at this 
point, one to White on April 15th, the second to Cotton 
on April 17th, the third to James G. MacDonald, Chairman 
of the Foreign Policy Assoclation.44 In these letters, he 
tried to correct misconceptions in the American mind about 
the settlement: (1) the disregard of the Commission for 
constitutional legalities (2) the portrayal of Borno and 
Russe~l as evil demons or at least the villains of the play 
(3) the reluctance of the Council of State to act in ac-
cordance with the settlement (4) the use of American marines 
as an arm of aggression. 
Dear Mr. White, 
I cannot tell you how pleased and touched 1 was to 
get your good letter of April 9th. The approval which 
. y,ou have given to our course in Haiti, and espec !ally 
tne kind expressions you used there and in your letter 
in regard to the manner in which the situation was 
handled, and in particular my part in it, have been most 
gratifying. The situation had so many elements that 
were not new to me, after ten years of service in the 
Philippines during which I dealt constantly with people 
Who l:ad grievances, who were racially very touchy, and 
who spoke a different language, and had been brought up 
~ith different habits of thought, that our course was 
comparatively simple to me; and 1 had very little doubt, 
and still have very little doubt, that the situation will 
b.e satisfactorily rounded out. 
The fact is that we are playing from such a strong 
hand of trumps that we have never had to show more than 
half of it. By withdrawing the Marines even temp.orarily 
and letting nature take its course, the Haitians would 
immediately have civil war or a dictatorship. They wanted 
44. The letter to White is found on pp. 81-83 of the Haitian 
Journal~ that to Cotton on pp. 87-88; that to McDonald.on 
pp. 84-o7. .. . 
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the assurance that the Borne regime was to end and 
that they were going to be allowed to choose their 
president. And so we could start off by giving them 
their main contention, and it was merely a question of 
finding some way to give it to them with a minimum o£ 
disturbance to the legal aspects o£ the situation and 
with a minimum show of force. We always had as a last 
resort martial law, and we still have it; that can be 
declared at any time, and if necessary will be, and 
the elections then carried on under the directions o£ 
the Marines and the Garde. The obvious disadvantage 
of this course is the attitude that South and Central 
American nations would take toward it, particularly as 
the defeated Candidate or Candidates--and there would 
be many--would probably charge that the Marines had 
influenced the election unfavorably to their cause. 
And so it is better to have the thirig run, in sofar as 
it is possible, by the Haitians themselves, particular-
ly this :first election. I think the way we selected 
out of the difficulty was probably as good a one as 
o££ered itself, and it is my opinion it is going to work 
out. 
Eve~one seems to have been afraid that President 
Borno was playing a double game. I have been trying 
to put myself in his position and I have great sympathy 
with him. In the first place, after eight years in 
which he has incurred great public odium on account of 
a poliqy of cooperation and doing his duty by his own 
people, an American Commission comes down and practical-
ly upsets eve~thing that he has been doing, the whole 
situation over to his enemies avowedly determlned to 
upset his policies, and does it with a very scant word 
o£ praise and appreciation to him. In thinking over our 
report, I :feel we made a strategic error in not devoting 
a paragraph to much more explicit praise of Borno 1 s part 
in the achievements which we observed and might have 
noted at greater length. As you noticed, I arranged 
that we deal with Borne wholly through General Russell. 
This was in respect to General Russell's office and his 
contact with Borne, which had been cordial and protracted, 
and it seemed tta. t he could handle it better. I did not 
arrange for any of us to be p~sent when General Russell 
met President Borno on these occasions, but I wondered 
at the time and I have wondered since how well Borno was 
informed. I£ certain aspects of what was being done were 
withheld £rom him and he found them out later--and the 
ones to be withheld would have been the things to which 
he would be likely to object--he would be much more hostile 
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than i£ he had been kept advised and persuaded as things 
went along. In other words, I have great sympathy with 
Borno' s right to £eel sore. I think that I should my-
self under similar circumstances. 
Coming to the Council o£ State, we were asking a 
practically impossible thing of them and I felt all the 
time that they were likely to balk. The opposition was 
just as bitter against the continuation of the Council 
of State as it was against Borno and the leaders, whom 
we couldn't muzzle, when they rushed about claiming a 
victory, were proclaiming an early termination of the 
Council of State. We were asking the Council to sanction 
this by voting for the man who was going to abolish them. 
You can see the inherent difficulty of the situation. 
!f there had been any chance at all that, by defeating 
the plan, they could have been kept in power, their 
adverse votes could be counted on with absolutely a 
certainty. The strength of the situation lay irt the 
fact that they also were between the horns of a dilemma. 
The popular mind was so inflamed against them that if 
they £ailed to carry out the Commission's plan, they were 
in danger of bodily extinction; whereas-!£ they carried 
out the plan, their extinction would be merely official. 
In otlier words, their 1 ives would not have been safe, 
and are not safe today if they fail to carry out the 
plan which meets with such popular approval. This is 
the reason why it will probably go through. But I 
recognized all the time that the Council of State would 
balk at the situation if there was any way they could 
do so and that probably pretty vigorous measures would 
have to be used to get them in line. And I so advised 
the Secretary of State, who was prepared to take the 
necessary emergency actions. 
• 
And so I have not been disturbed at all at the course 
of events, and I see by today's paper that President 
Borno has put over the election for another week and 
has recommended to the Counci 1 of State that our plan 
be carried out. Whether the Council of State acts or 
not, the plan will be carried out somehow; and I think 
there is very little cause for worry. I still hope that 
Roy will be elected by them, which would be the simplest 
way out of the difficulty; otherwise, I think he will 
be appointed a provisional president and he Will call 
the elections just the same. 
••••• We were a team in which all of. us took part; I was 
called upon to take the leadership merely by the acci-
dent of the President's chancing to name me as chairman, 
so that it was rather-up to me to do so. The extra-
ordinary thing about our work was that with our varied 
experiences and different backgrounds we should have 
had a practically unanimous decision on almost every 
point that arose, the only differences being minor ones 
in regard to the wording of our report. All the major 
matters in connection with the rehabilitation of the 
Haitian scheme were reached unanimously and harmoniously. 
I have been marvelling at this fact ever since ••• 
The following letter to Acting Secretary of State 
Cotton demonstrates the deep human sympathy for which 
Forbes was noted. Perhaps more than anything else, he 
regretted the fact that the Commission's work in Haiti 
might have injured the reputations of President Borno and 
High Commissioner Russell. In large measure they became 
the scapegoats of the liberal American press, the one 
emerging as an overly zealous administrator of an evil Occu-
pation, the other either a deliberate traitor to his country 
or a weaklipg dominated by the white men. Forbes tried 
to giye the American press a correct impression of these 
two men as he saw them, but he succeeded no more with the 
press than he succeeded with White and Kerney who were 
convinced that Russell was an incompetent and Borne a tyrant 
whose chief purpose was to perpetuate himself in power in 
the tradition of Haitian presidents. 
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Dear Mr. Secretary, 
I am disturbed at the nature of some of the pub-
Licity that I see going the rounds in regard to Haiti. 
The papers say that the Department is "ordering" Borno 
to do thus and so, directing him to. elect such and such 
a person, a cand !date "selected by the commission", just 
as though we were following the very course that makes 
all South and Central America angry, and adopting the 
dictatorial attitude which we are SO· often charged with 
assuming. This is exactly the opposite of the a ttl tude 
which our commission endeavored to assume--and I think 
did assume-c.in Haiti, and as a result of which we were 
enabled to get the support of the bitterest opponents 
of the American regime and the occupation. We did not 
$elect the candidate, as you know. He was chosen by an 
agreement between the members of the opposition groups, 
who suggested a list of names, and President Borno, who 
expressed himself as entirely satisfied that one of the 
list should be chosen president. The commission in its 
first public statement in regard to its activities in 
this matter expressly announced that it had no candidate 
to suggest. 
In their efforts to guess what the commission was 
going to decide, the newspapers have done General Rus-
sell a great injustice. They guessed that the commis-
sion was going to recommend his recall, announced that 
as its probable decision, and later distorted our re-
commendation that, when he does leave, he should be 
replaced by a non-military successor, into a justifica-
tion of their announcement th!.t he was to be recalled. 
It is now, I think, pretty generally and popularly 
supposed that General Russell's service there was un-
satisfactory, th!.t he is to be removed, and that that 
is the gist of our report. It was inevitable that this 
construction should be put upon it, but I feel very 
badly about the injustice it does to the reputation of 
an officer who has given the kind of service General 
Russell has given for such a long time. I cannot help 
Wondering whether there is anything that can be done to 
palliate this unfortunate consequence of our activities. 
Another thing that troubles .me is that Pres !dent 
Borno is being held up as some sort of evil genius in 
the situation, that the commission is supposed to have 
put an end to his machln~tions and forced him to re-
linquish a grip which the papers are portraying in such 
a way as to make it appear sinister. This does great 
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injustice to Borno. I should not blame him if he were 
very sore, after having incurred the odium of his people 
by reason of having adopted and maintained an unpopular 
poll~ of cooperation with the United States and the 
American forces, having supported their actions, and 
having as a result marvelously improved the condition 
of his people to a degree of which the youth of the 
count~ have no conception. They do not remember con-
ditions before these reforms were brought about, as it 
was fifteen years ago and before many of them were old 
enough to take notice. Hence, as a result of the un-
fortunate form in which the publ !city has been handled, 
President Borno, instead of being held up as a wise, 
capable and courteous administrator, is getting some 
such reputation in the United States as attached to the 
name of Castro in Venezuela, or other Central American 
dictators whose reputations were not creditable. While 
! do not rank Borno as anything like in the class with 
Porfirio Diaz, still I think he should be given credit 
for honest, courageous, and progressive administration, 
perhaps with its mistakes, but still vastly b~tter than 
anything which had ever preceded it in Haiti.~5 
I donlt know just how far to go about correcting 
these impressions. I think they have gone too far to 
be eradicated from the public mind. They were instilled 
fnto the American public while our news was front page 
stuff. The nine days 1 wonder has ended and Haiti is 
being relegated to the back pages and small type of such 
newspapers as keep on publishing Haitian items. The 
correction will not reach the public in any way as the 
misrepresentations have. 
I have been asked to speak to Haiti over the radio, 
.but I. have an inherent avers ion to rushing into print 
and still more to public speaking. Yet I feel as if I 
should undertake something to undo, as far as my efforts 
would reach, the harm I have indicated as having been 
done. If you approve of the idea, I will perhaps pre-
pare an article for publication, indicating the degree 
of cordial cooperation which General Russell and Presi-
dent Borno gave the commission while in Haiti, and the 
Commission's genuine admiration for the achievements of 
the Haitian government during occupation. If it had 
~5. Forbes• elevated view of Diaz is surprising for so 
shrewd an observer. Diaz as late as the second decade 
of the 20th century was still held in the minds of many 
responsible people as the benevolent but firm ruler which 
all Latin American nations needed rather than as the cor-
rupt. oppressor of the Mexican Indian which he actually was, 
but by 1930 it is odd that Forbes knew no better. 
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not seemed to me strategically unwise to do so, I 
should have laid more stress on these racts and given 
them a place in our report and in our public utterances 
at the time or our return, when they would have com-
manded popular attention to a much greater degree than 
now. I think, however, that our compromise plan would 
never have gone through or been accepted by the opposi-
tion groups in Haiti ir they had known how much or it 
emanated rrom the initiative or General Russell and 
President Borno. They were so bitter against these two 
that the very ract that they wanted such a solution would 
have sent the opposition against it. I kept discreetly 
silent in regard to these racts,. ·not even emphasizing 
them in my talks with the commission. And I think until 
Roy has been rinally selected by the Council or State--
and I don't see how that body can do otherwise--it would 
be inopportune to let the public know how rar all or 
this was done in cooperation with the powers that be 
in Haiti. 
Forbes was disturbed by an article .entitled "Progress 
in Haiti, 11 written by James G. McDonald, Chairman o:f the 
Foreign Policy Association, in which the work or the Commis-
sion had been somewhat critically appraised. McDonald had 
stated that "constitutional institutions had been scrapped." 
Forbes replied that technically they had been observed 
more than they had in the past. Not calling ror elections 
at all over the course o:f the thirteen years since the 
adoption o:f the Constitution in 1918 seemed to Forbes to be 
:far more agains~ the spirit or the document than evading 
the January lOth :formality. Second, "rights o:f rree speech 
and rree press have been ruthlessly ignored." But Forbes 
discovered no in:fringement o:f the rights or rree speech and 
the press in Haiti. "Unless you have lived," he wrote, 11 in 
a country with a press such as they have in Haiti, you can 
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have no conception of the lengths to which they will go. 
Vitriolic abuse and misrepresentation are their daily en-
deavor, partly with the idea of levying blackmail, partly 
to indulge spite, and conversely these papers will turn in 
favor of an office-holder or candidate or aspirant for of-
fice 1n return for a small stipend ••• They do not know the 
difference between 1 iberty and 1 icense." Of course Forbes 
himself was the first to admit that the government's claim 
of abuse of liberty was in itself occasionally abused or 
used as a device to silence critics of the present admini-
stration, but there was no question that, generally, the 
Haitian papers, particularly those in Port-au-Prince, in-
dulged all too often in invective rather than in constructive 
criticism. Thirdly, "some of the public works have been 
more useful to the American occupation than to the Haitians/.., 
referring to roads and docks, warehouses and bridges, and 
other constructions that would prove valuable to the mili-
tary in squashing insurrection. Forbes found this absurd 
and without proof. Everything that had been done was done 
not with military motives in mind, but with motives of 
benefit to the commerce of the nation. The major buildings 
had been constructed out of money saved from Haitian revenues 
by the American Receiver-General. Fourth, 11 The American 
sYStem is designed to array the peasant leaders against the 
educated and cultured classes." But this was meaningless. 
The weakness of Haiti was her lack of a middle class. 
Borne 'and Russell knew this. Mechanics were unavailable, 
and the number of ca~penters, blacksmiths, and skilled 
laborers was pitifully small. If struggling to build a 
skilled middle class together with a class of trained 
artisa'ns was seeking to set the people against the cultured 
! 
classes, then Forbes was guilty. Fift~, Forbes took excep-
' tion to the statement that "ostensibly Mr. Roy is to be 
named 'by the Council of State, but tm t is only a face-
saving device." Sixth, he resented the slurs intimated by 
use or the phrase "the recall of General Russell." To this 
Forbes' wrote: "General Russell is a competent conscientious 
official who ~as rendered a great service to Haiti under 
very difficult and disagreeable circumstances. He deserves 
recognition, promotion, and applause." Forbes stood too 
far above the passions of the mob to permit his making Russell 
and Borne the scapegoats for the Haitian venture of the United 
States. He was deeply sympathetic to everything they had 
tried ~o do, especially Borne. If anything, he blamed Wilson 
and the Haitian ruling classes themselves. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OT!JER ASPECTS OF THE REPORT AND THE LONG RANGE VIEW 
The first draft of the final report to the president 
was made aboard the Rochester steaming back to Miami. During 
the stay in Haiti each evening had been devoted to a dis-
cussion of the situation as it had manifested itself during 
the preceding day, and by the time the Commission was ready 
to leave Port-au-Prince, Forbes had some conception of the 
thinking of his associates. On the first night out, he 
compo'sed a series of questions which he put to the men for 
their. 0pinions, in an effort to resolve any differences in 
views, preparatory to distributing the specific assignments 
of the report. The only differences he found were in degree, 
not :k!ind. White and Kerney wanted immediate withdrawal, 
considered American Occupation an affront to liberty-loving 
people, and did not see any purpose in remaining until the 
legal expiration date of the Treaty, 1936. Forbes and 
Fletcher chose a gradual withdrawal that would be completed 
by 1936. They were not convinced that the United States 
was doing the average Haitian particular good in leaving 
. I 
him to the mercies of the elite class but they adopted a 
"go to it and letts see" attitude. 
Fletcher was assigned the sections 0n law and public 
order, the Garde d 1 Haiti, Marines, and Judiciary; Vezina 
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took the relations of Church and State; Kerney took health, 
publicity, and education; 1 White dealt with race problems; 
and Forbes took the remainder---the historical background 
to the Occupation, the achievements of the Occupation, the 
appointment of the Forbes and Moton Commissions, the settle-
ment of internal political affairs, publlcworks, finance, 
the specific recommendations, and sequent steps.2 There 
were to be sections on commerce, industry, and prisons, but 
these were omitted through .error revolving about the mysti-
cal sixth member of the Commission,. Willis Abbott of the 
Christian Science Monitor: 
While in Delray I had received a telephone message 
from the President's secretary telling me he wished 
to add the name of-Willis Abbott to our Commission 
and asking if I had any objection ••• (I)t seemed to me 
rather inappropriate as we had already two editors 
out of five; but the president wanted to do it; after 
pointing out that I felt five a better n~mber than 
six and that there.was a disproportionate number of 
1. Kerney had.been ill, however, in Haiti, and was unable 
to bear the labors of a strenuous report. Vezina had done 
most of the work relating to education, and this was in-
corporated into Vezina's section on the relations between 
Church and State. Forbes eliminated publicity as super-
fluous, and Helser, although not technically a member of 
the Commission, eventually wrote the entire section on Health. 
Forbes tried to give Kerney Finance, but as will be seen 
later in the chapter,.he ultimately did it himself. 
2. Heiser detlared in private conversations with the author 
that the report was really Forbes•. He had a trenchant 
mind that seemed to dominate the situation. After each 
man had handed in his portion of the Report, Forbes went 
over it with him, making suggestions, and assimilating data 
in an effort to make the Report a cohesive unit. 
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publicity members I said I had no objection on per-
sonal grounds; so the President went ahead and named 
him, and this fact was given out to the newspapers. 
I telegraphed asking if he were coming and all we 
heard about it was that we needn't concern ourselves 
about him. Later from Port-au-Prince we had tele-
graphed asking if he were really a member of the Com-
mission, and we received a reply that he was. And 
that's the last any of us ever heard of it or him. 
He never attended a meeting or communicated with any 
of us about it, and we w.ere all rather myst if led. I 
half expected that he 1 d come on the weekly liner from 
New York, but no Willis Abbott, no word. I was rather 
holding the commerce and industry assignment to give 
him, and when he seemed to be turning out to be an il-
lusion, I got so engrossed in the business of electing 
a new President that I let the Whole matter slide.J 
1. Health 
As indicated earlier, the only phase of the American 
occupation of which the Haitians unanimously approved was 
the Navy Health Service. They saw in the demobilization 
of the Army and the establishment of an efficient Garde only 
a shre~d method of eliminating opposition to American dic-
tatorial tyranny. Th~ saw in the great edifices of public 
works an American attempt at self-glorification, and in the 
new highways which enabled produce to travel quickly to mar-
ket the swift military transportation required to keep a 
people in sul>J ect ion. / For the elite, the technical education 
introduced meant an attempt to destroy the aristocratic rural 
life which had been their pride for generations. And the 
Marines were the arch-criminals who had introduced Dixieland 
racial discrimination for the first time since Dessalines had 
). Forbes, Haitian Journal, pp. 60-61. 
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expelled the Whites. But the Health Service was different. 
Once Haitian mass had conquered their original fears that 
the hypodermic needle was an instrument of black magic and 
the naval doctor a demon of torture, the gradual relief from 
the scourge of malaria, yaws, tuberculosis, and malnutrition 
proved the single remeeding feature of the whole Wilsonian 
enterprise. 4 
Victor George Heiser5 often referred to himself as a 
"veteran of foreign wars}11-' but his wars were fought in 
Ethiopia, in Egypt, Ceylon, the Philippines, Hawaii, Polynesia, 
and the enemies were beri-beri, hookworm, cholera, pellagra, 
malaria, smallpox, and leprosy. He had been referred to as 
4. National Archives Collection, "Witnesses before Commis-
sion", Box 5. This seems to have been the only aspect of 
the Hearings which was not criticized by the witnesses, 
5. The. a·uthor is indebted to Dr. Heiser for much of this 
matter relating to Dr, Heiser's life. See also Maxine Block 
(ed), Current Biogralhl, (New .. York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1942)1 pp. 360-362. Since 9 2, Dr. Heiser has been included in 
each publication of Who's Who in America, with the exception 
of the 1960-61 edition (this was an error for which the 
editors apologized to him). Material pertaining to special 
aspects. of Heiser's work is to be f0und in the New York Times, 
June 25, 1941, p.-23, and June 26, 1941, p. 25; the New York 
Times Book Rev! ew (May ll, 1941), p. 2; Newsweek, Vol, VIII 
(August 29, 1936), pp. 29-32, and Vol. XIV (July 3, 1939~ 
p. 30. 
At the time of this writing, Dr. Heiser is currently 
associated with the National Association of Manufacturers, 
and, although 87 years of age, spry, energetic, quick of 
mind, eye and hearing, and very much the living example of 
his medical theories of health and vitality. His memory of 
people, personal !ties, and events concerned in the Hal tian 
venture is remarkably sharp and detailed. 
the "private physician to the world." Although he had not 
as yet acquired the grass-roots £ame which the publication 
of his An American Doctor's Odyssey6 brought him after its 
publication ~n 1936, by 1930 he had already become a legend 
in the medical world for his exploits into the most rugged 
parts of the world. He had an amazing ability to get things 
done and a passionate devotion to medicine which would admit 
of no hypocrisy. Forbes could not have found a better man, 
as a specialist in tropical diseases, nor one more inclined 
to pierce the veil of charlatanism. I£ the Public Health 
Service in Haiti were a failure, Heiser would see it. 
Heiser was born in 1873 in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. 
He led a rather sedentary life which made him "ready for 
college but ill-equipped for life," until at the age of six-
teen the Johnstown flood destroyed his home and the lives 
of his parents and forced him into the open world. The de-
struction and misery and homelessness which he witnessed 
about him after the catastrophe unwittingly led him to the 
resolve to lessen misery wherever he could in the world. 
6. Heiser told the author that An American Doctor's Odysse~ 
originally consisted of two volumes, which Included his wor 
in Latin America, but the publishers felt that a two-volume 
work would never sell, and Heiser reluctantly condensed the 
manuscript. His efforts on the Haitian enterprise were not 
included. Years later, when a new market developed, he was 
unable to find the unpublished portions of the manuscript, 
and to the present writing they have still not been discovered. 
When the book was published, it was criticized in some quarters 
as a masterpiece of egomania whose title might better have 
been Alone in the Orient. 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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He became an assistant to a plumber, then to a carpenter, 
and did various odd jobs until the sale of his father's real 
estate enabled him to enter college, He took up engineer-
ing first, then decided to switch to medicine, receiving 
his Bachelor of Arts from the University of the State of 
New York in 1894 and his Medical degree (doing four years 
in three) rrom Jefferson Medical College in 1897. 
While at Lankenau Hospital on his internship, Heiser 
became interested in the Marine Hospital Service, took an 
examination for admittance, and was accepted although he 
had only gone half-way through his internship, In 1898 he 
was sent to care for returning disabled and wounded Spanish-
American War veterans, Only twenty-five when his career 
started, he was to travel seventeen times around the earth 
before that career came to .an end, 
His first important task lay in the realm of immigra-
tion, Sent to Europe to examine and set standards for emi-
grants to the United States, then to Canada to help bring 
Canada's immigration laws in line with those of the United 
States, he developed conclusions and recommendations which 
were finally embodied in the United States Immigration Act 
of 1907. In the meantime, he had helped stem bubonic plague 
in Egypt and, as a result, been invited to the 1902 Inter-
national Congress on Medicine at Cairo, where, he later 
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insisted, he learned more from sitting on the veranda and 
chatting than he did from 1 istening to learned papers at 
the regular sessions. 
In 1903 he received the appointment which brought him 
into contact with Forbes, that of Chief Quarantine Officer 
for the Philippine Islands. He was also Director of Health 
for the area. Hundreds of men worked with him on a single 
campaign to bring an end to a cholera epidemic by eradica-
ting rats and by sanitating swamps. Leprosy, beri-beri, 
tuberculosis, malnutrition became common words for him, 
enemies to be destroyed. Despite the opposition of local 
Filipino politicians, peasants who felt that in sanitating 
their fields and swamps he was encroaching upon their 
liberty, and the jealousy of fellow American doctors, he 
slowly constructed a Public Health Service. The Health 
Service vaccinated almost two million people in one year, 
attempted to disseminate medical knowledge among the people, 
and established hospitals and clinics throughout the islands.? 
In 1915 Heiser became Assoc late Director of the Inter-
national Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, the 
. 
posit ion he held at the time Forbes called him to Haiti. 
As a result he was not only closely aware of health condi-
tions in Haiti, hut he was also equipped to compare what he 
7. Forbes, The Philip~ine Islands, Vol. I~ pp. 174,332,333, 
332n, 335, 341n, 344, 45n, 358n, 360, 364; Vol. II, pp. 
169n, 224n, 249, 250n. . . 
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saw wlth what he knew of similar areas throughout the world, 
and he was not one to be easily impressed. His knowledge 
of tropical diseases, his wealth of personal experience in 
Latin-America as well as in other parts of the world, and 
his past close association with Forbes in the Philippines 
where both of them had worked together to solve similar 
health problems, made Heiser eminently capable of assessing 
the wo7k being done in Haiti. 8 
Though Heiser was not technically a member of the Pre-
sidentrs Commission, he was actually an integral part of it. 
He sat in on all the nightly sessions, several of the Hear-
ings, gave his advice, and travelled during the Commission's 
stay in Haiti more actively throughout the country than any 
other member of the Commission or its staff. He spent the. 
first two days listening to the Hearings, then started his 
side-trips. He attended the Commission on its trip through 
the interior, and when the Commission's travel was cut short 
by Dunn's news of disturbance in Port-au-Prince, preferred 
not to ,return with the Commission, but to continue his leisure-
ly study of towns and villages. 
Apart from the Hearings and the brief trip made, the 
Commission, had relatively little time in two and one-half 
8. In the Philippines he had been Forbes• personal physi-
cian. A good many of the health problems-of the Philippines 
had been discussed over games of chess, which both men loved 
and played frequently in their tents at night during their 
frequent travels through the islands. 
I 
i 
I 
\ 
\ 
I 
I 
l 
I 
I 
I 
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weeks to become intimately acquainted with Haitian lire; 
accordingly, except ror the question or internal politics, 
much or the Commission's inrormation was orten derived not 
so much rrom its own observations as rrom second-hand 
sources--the statements or Haitians, Russell's discussions, 
9 
Russell's Annual Reports to the Secretary of State (es-
pecially that or 1929), interviews with ofricials or the 
American Occupation Forces and the Catholic Church hier-
archy, the Haitian Press, and so on. Heiser's in£ormation 
alone was not obtained second-hand. It would be well to 
10 
trace brierly his precise activities on the Commission. 
On February 18, Heiser met with Dr. C. s. Butler, U.S.N., 
former Director or the Public Health in Haiti, who had been 
recently replaced by Dr. Kent c. Melhorn, USN. Butler stated 
11 
that the uprisings in December had been sparked by Freeman's 
9. Russell's Annual Reports, especially the last one, ror 
the year 1929, were enormously valuable as a source of sta-
tistics and general inrormation. The Commission found them 
reliable and candid in their pronouncements. Each consisted 
of a general statement by Russell or arrairs during the par-
ticular year in question, rollowed by an appendix containing 
detailed summaries of the current work and achievement of 
the several departments of the Occupation. 
10. The rollowing inrormation on pp. 173-192 is taken rrom 
Heiser's Diary. 
. . I 11. George Fouche Freeman, despite the great criticism levelled 
at him during his administration or the Service Technique in 
Haiti, was a noted plant geneticist. As a matter of ract, he 
had been chosen to head this phase or the Occupation because 
of his special knowledge. He had been educated at Alabama 
Polytechnic and Harvard University, where he received his 
Doctor or Science degree, then went into teaching at the 
Massachusetts College pf Agriculture and the Kansas State 
Agricultural College. He later joined the Arizona Agricultural 
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refusal to continue grants to students in Agriculture (the 
Service Technique), that the Haitians in agriculture had 
been taught by what were, in his opinion, American rough-
necks who knew no French, and that the violence spread from 
the agricultural students to those in the medkal school. 
He found that seventy per cent of Haitians had yaws, and 
that the two great enemies were malaria and tuberculosis. 
When Heiser asked about the ability of Haitians eventually 
to take over their own progressive medicine, he learned that 
they "are capable of acquiring knowledge and manual dexterity 
and can apply it to many practical problems but have no 
ability "in administrative organization. (They) lack medical 
conscience. (It is) doubtful .jf medical ethics could be 
developed in spirit or practice. Devotion, sacrifice; human 
sympatby and moral obligation do not exist. (They) have 
no originality in research and are content to follow and 
do not question a rule laid do.vn by others. (They.) would ... 
not serve in rural area unless controlled by white~.nl 2 
-
Heiser 'was not content with this generalization; he had seen 
Experiment Station, became acting dean of the Arizona College 
of Agriculture and finally Director of the Arizona Experi- _, _, 
ment Station. He was chief of plant breeding for the Societe 
Sultanienne d 1Agriculture, Cairo, Egypt, Chief of the De-
partment of Cotton breeding at the Texas Agricultural Experi-
ment Station, and. just before he accepted his position in 
Haiti, had been on special assignment as adviser in agri-
culture to the French Government in Indo-China. 
12. Heiser, Diary, p. 5260. 
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the opposite demonstrated too many times in other parts of 
the world, particularly in the Philippines and Southeast 
Asia, and in other parts of Latin-America itself. 
In Port-au-Prince, on the 28th of February, he was met 
by the Head of the Medical Service of the Gendarmerie, who 
offered to prepare an itinerary for him in Haiti. Heiser 
consented, and thereafter found the way prepared for him 
through most of the valleys and towns of the country. 
His first impression of Port-au-Prince was favorable. 
Local chlorination of the water provided a seventeen-day 
supply, the people appeared reasonably well-dressed, side-
walks and paved streets, though not general, were evident 
in large number, and he noted in his diary that soap con-
sumpti'on was greater here per capita in Haiti than elsewhere. 
/ Of course, since the elite used Port-au-Prince as their 
major residence, conditions were likely to be better here 
than in other towns of Haiti, but what Heiser saw impressed 
him as better than he had expected. At the end of a brief 
tour of the city, Heiser met Dr. Melhorn, who gave much the 
same information as had Butler in Florida on February 18th 
and put into his hands a copy of the 1929 High Commissioner's 
-Annual Report, which gave a summary of medical progress to 
date. 
March 1st and 2nd, Heiser remained at Port-au-Prince, 
studyi11g the Annual Report and attending the Hearings in the 
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hope of gleaning information from purely Haitian sources. 
He gained little information from the Hearings other than 
the previously noted information that the Navy medical ser-
vice was the only phase of United States operations of 
which all classes of the people unanimously approved. 
On March 3rd, he drove out to the Pont Beudet Isolation 
Camp for the Insane. This institution was twenty miles out 
of town in an old abandoned Gendarmerie Barrack. A. Dr. 
Ropp of the United States Navy was in charge. Primitive 
compared to United States standards, the camp held 193 
patients, each of whom was fed for less than fifteen cents 
per day. In Haiti, people lived ordinarily on bananas, 
mangoes, corn, and beans, with meat perhaps once a week. 
Here at Pont Beudet, the patients enjoyed meat every day. 
Attached to the Camp was a boys• reformatory, making 
the entire population.274. The cost per month was $2750.00, 
which was thirty-three cents per day per individual. The 
main trouble, Heiser found, with the institution was that 
no organized work had been provided for either boys or in-
sane, but this was answered by the statement that the in-
stitution was relatively new and psychiatrists and social 
workers difficult to obtain. In any event this was the 
first institution of its type in Haiti. Formerly the insane 
had been chained or driven from village to vilh ge as pos-
sessed by demons, and delinquent boys had been pressed into 
army service or government construction work not much dif-
ferent from slave-labor. 
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March 4th, Heiser went to Dufort, thirty miles out of 
Port-au-Prince, accompanied by Kerney, to see a local clinic. 
He found the whole affair somewhat crude. A charge of four 
cents was made for each patient, and more time was spent in 
collecting these few cents than in diagnosis. When he pro-
tested what he felt to be rather sloppy diagnoses, he was 
told that the diagnosis was usually correct, since most of 
the Haitian diseases were either yaws, malaria, tuberculosis, 
or syphilis. So many Haitians had yaws that the doctors 
felt that if they prescribed for this disease, they could 
not be far wrong. 
The examinations were amusing. As Haitians proved to 
be unusually modest each pati~t strutted behing a table 
which hid his lower parts. The examining physician made 
notes, asked questions about the patient• s medical history, 
and answered just as many questions regarding the fee. The 
patient was told to dress, handed a prescription, and led 
out to argue with an orderly on the subject of payment •. 
Generally, Heiser noted, the patients were not confident of 
the medical adv1,ce, usually seeking additional remedies pre-
scribed by both Catholic priest and Vodunwitch-doctor. 13 
13. See Leyburn, pp. 131-165, 11Vodun"; pp. 166-1741 "Rel i-gious Contributions· ~ 1 Vezina found Roman Catholicism to be 
stronger in certain.areas of the country than in others. 
To a great extent, Roman Catholicism remained the religion 
of the upper class, French-cultured Haitians, a formalized 
religion that did not appear to strike deeply into the vitals 
of the black mass. At best, in the isolated rural valleys, 
it became permeated with the African spirit in varying degrees, 
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This type of rural clinic was held weekly, ordinarily 
in connection with the market, when the farmers in the val-
leys came to town to sell their produce. The clinic had 
no building, only a structure with a grass roof, for which 
the United States paid the owner eight cents per day for 
rental. Heiser asked twenty of the patients, as a matter 
of curiosity, the name of the President of Haiti at the 
present time, and none knew. 
On March 5th, Heiser saw the .Haitian General Hospital 
at Port-au-Prince. The structure, started in 1915, stretch-
ed over several city blocks and contained three hundred 
beds. The institution tried to increase receipts by ser-
vice to Americans and Syrians (one of the foreign white 
groups living in the country), who would not have gone to 
Haitian doctors anyway, with the result that fees were 
. higher here than charged by local practitioners. Revenues 
had increased from $5774.00 in 1924-25 to $19,13.t·. in 1929-
30. Much of this revenue had been used for new buildings, 
quarters for sisters and priests (who found employment in 
all medical centers in Haiti), and a children's ward• 
Heiser was distressed--~nd annoyed--because he could find 
no one who coul-d give exact figures as to disease incidence 
or treatment results. This certainly seemed to be a weak-
ness of the Navy Medical Service. He jotted down the fol-
lowing figures which the finance office had given him: 
Coat or each patient per day 
Haitian doctors 
Haitian interns 
Navy Doctors 
American Red Cross Nurses 
Haitian nurses 
Haitian pupil nurses 
Large number or Sisters (exact 
$1.10 
11 
! 
20 
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28 
number unrecorded) 
The Paris-trained Haitians made a particularly good 
impression upon him. He noticed that the urology, akin, 
gynecology, and obstetrical departments had Haitian heads, 
but Americans operated the remainder of the Hospital. The 
Red Cross nurses were Americana paid by the Haitian Govern-· 
ment. 
Nurses' training was good. Only recently the passing 
grade in all courses had been changed from sixty to seventy, 
and the nurses appeared to have won the respect of Haitians. 
The main problems were dissatisraction with Dr. Butler's 
ruling that the nurses could have vacations with pay only 
once in every three years, rapid turnovers (twenty-two in the 
last ten years), color jealousy (not only between white and 
Negro, but between light-skinned Negroes and black-skinned), 
and occasional thieving. 
To be certain that no disease might be prevalent that 
had not been previously ascertained and treated, and as a 
protection against the dreaded plague, autopsy was per-
rormed on everyone who died at the hospital. One or the 
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things that startled Heiser was the information that many 
Haitians would leave their babies at the hospital, dead or 
alive (either for·autopsy or treatment), and never call for 
them again. 
Unfortunately, even here Heiser found resentment of 
Americ.ans by Halt ians, even among Haitians being treated. 
Ernest Chauvet had reported in his newspaper Le Nouvelliste, 
that the Hospital had discharged 12 Haitians to make room 
for one German. When confronted with the lie, he said not 
to worry, that his readers demanded that sort of sensation-
alism. I 
From the Hospital, Heiser went to the Ecole Nationale 
de Medlcine et Pharmacie ·run by the Rockefeller Foundation. 
Once a shack., it now consisted of two fine buildings, 
housing eighty students in the medical school, fifteen in 
I the School of Pharmacy, and ten in the Dental School. 
Equipment was not elaborate, .but well-selected, and had been 
donated by the Rockefeller Foundation along with eleven 
fellowships. Furthermor~, the Director, seemed to be a man 
of unusual energy and conscientiousness whose administra-
tion and planning of curriculum were good, especially in 
the fields of anatomy, histology, pathology, and obstetrics. 
Entrance requirements demanded a Bachelor's degree. 
That evening, Dr. Heiser addressed the Haitian Medical 
Society on "World Happenings in Medicine 11 at a meeting 
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I 
attended by 100 to 150 Haitian doctors. A Dr. Hudicourt--
Presiident of that august body and not the Hudicourt who 
i had !appeared at the Hearings--read a paper which impressed 
Heis:er as being more concerned with that gentleman's recent 
visilt to Panama as a representative of Haitian medicine than 
wit~ medicine per se. 
The next day, Heiser began a three-day provincial trip 
I 
to sjtudy the medical aspects of the Navy Health Service as 
! 
it ~resented itself in the more isolated areas of the country. 
I 
i At ~etit-Goave he saw the barracks of the Garde (in charge 
! 
of a, Lieutenant Andre, "a fine phys leal mula tto11 ), the 
pr is:on which the Garde rna intained, and the hosp !tal. The 
hos~ital, overlooking a lovely garden dotted with flowers and 
I 
shrubs,held thirty-five beds, separate operating and dispen-
i 
sar~ buildings, a latrine, and a fine kitchen with modern 
sto~es. The hospital was in charge of a 11 coal black" and 
-
lacked 11 that cleanliness found where whites were in charge." 
I 
i Before the Occupation, nothing had been here, and three 
I day~ by horseback over a difficult trail had been necessary 
to det patients to Port-au-Prince. 
I 
I An eff ic lent Jama lean in charge of forty-five men 
handiled sanitation. The problem with getting figure on 
an adequate census in 
the local churches could 
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be of; inestimable value in this regard, but to the present 
time absolutely no effort whatsoever toward obtaining ade-
quate: statistics had been nade. 
At Miragone he found an active dispensary and street-
cleaning department. A Second-Lieutenant Kline of the 
Garde, who spoke with a German accent and who, for all his 
thoroughness, demonstrated a distinct Prussian arrogance 
t£? $ezything he was asked, supervised the medical admini-
.- -' ---
stration. (A Lieutenant Blanchard administrated a contin-
gent ~f fifty marines in the area; typical of the American 
Occupation, he had been in Haiti two years and knew no 
/"'""fl>enlfh. ) 
~.--- '. 
On March 7, Heiser was in Cayes,l4 which had been the 
scene<of recent riots, strikes, and confusion. He found 
malaria more serious here than in any other town in Haiti. 
~ ~- ·Although Cayes was called a town, its fifteen thousand 
population lay scattered over miles of territory, with twenty 
miles :of intervening ditches, cesspools, and water-holes. 
' .In~lity, Cayes was a great mass of tiny farms cluttered 
......,...-,~ .JI, 
~'" ·: 
r-. in hodge-podge fashion about irrigation-ditches and spots 
14. General John H. Russell, High Commissioner's Annual 
Report for 1929 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government 
PrinUng Office, 1929), Appendix IV, pp. 67-71. The strike 
of tht students at the Medical school on November 1, 1929, 
~·sympathy with that of the School of Agriculture. 
~medical school was closed until October, 1930. "Our 
students were more in sympathy with the strike movements 
than with the health interests of two million of their country-
ment." (p. 70). 
,. 
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of arable soil. These ditches, mud-holes, and water-de-
posits, when added to the numerous distilleries left vacant 
by the recent alcohol tax, 15 were excellent breeding spots 
for mosquitoes. Drainage was essential, however, not only 
for ending the malaria, but because sugar cane, so important 
to the economy of the area, required a much drier soil. 
Distressing was the lack of cleanliness in the market 
place:• Meat, for example, was brought down from the hills 
without curing of any sort and dumped into large tubs cover-
ed by screens to await sale. A portion sold, the desired 
weight or part was cut from the whole with dirty knives, 
and the remainder dumped back into a tub well-occupied by 
dirt and insects. 
At St. Louis de Sud Heiser noted the fine cement cul-
verts, which were built with funds obtained from a lapsing 
appropriation which would have gone to build a Catholic Church. 
The town hospital contained one hundred beds, but did 
not have the thoroughness found in Port-au-Prince. A Sister 
was in charge of each ward, but trained Haitians were in 
. . ~ 
__...c-the-~perating room. These operating room Haitians trained 
their own assistants by a system of apprenticeship. 
March 8th Heiser returned to Port-au-Prince to attend 
the_s~nfidential sessions of the Commission at the completion 
--- ....+-' 
--
----
of the Hearings and listen to the plan of compromise which 
lS. Russell, Annual Report for 1929. Two thousand acres of 
swamp were reclaimed near Gonaives and Cayes at a cost of 
$1.78 per acre. 
• . 
... / 
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Forbes propos~d. Th~ next day, he was in Hinche on th~ 
tour into the inter! or taken by the Couuniss ion. 
"Th~ Hinche ar~a was particularly desolate and barren, 
having been virtually destroyed by Cacos during the y~ars 
of revolution and turmoil. De-forestation, erosion, and 
lack of irrigation had run their course, with littl~ attempt 
at all in the way of soil control. 
Malaria was widely prevalent, with no systematic treat-
ment, Heiser thought,' although the large field swamp near 
the hospital had recently been drained, which gave some re-
1 ief •i Dousing the soggy earth and mud-pots with Paris green 
had also been done in increasing degree. Poor sanitation 
probably made its contribution to the high malaria rat~; 
str~et sweeping, red rubbish tins, and house to house in-
spections comprised all attempts at sanitation. Nor were 
latrines in evidence. Dr. Brinkley, in charge of the 120 
bed hospital, complained that all repairs on equipment had 
to be made~ himself personally, as Haitians could not do 
anything in that line, although Jamaicans could. But he 
lack~d suffic lent numbers of whit~s or Jamaicans. He did 
not think Haitian nurs~s to be satisfactory, esp~cially with 
th~ menial tasks, which they consid~red to b~ beneath them. 
He dl.d like the plump vegetables which the ever-present 
Sisters grew in Haitian gardens. 
Heiser recounts that Forbes and Fletcher were upset by 
the yaws cases th~ saw along the roads of Mirebelais, Las 
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Cahobas, Thomaside, and Hinc~e, and the country paths in 
general. Forbes had seen yaws before in the Philippines, 
but those had been cases inherited .from Spanish domination. 
The United States Navy had been in Haiti fifteen years and 
still, yaws cripples were to be seen at the corners of vir-
tually every village and hamlet through which the Commission 
I 
had passed. 
At Cap-Haitien on the lOth Heiser saw the hospital which 
he called a monument to the Occupation. Covering several 
city blocks in area and completely new except .for the center, 
the hospital possessed excellent equipment, latrines, kit-
' 
chens, proper facilities, and even a private-rooms build-
ing (Which was also used .for nurses• quarters). Plans were 
being made for an X-ray plant. Physicians, American and 
Haitian, nurses, and Sisters seemed to be plentiful. 
Shrub~ery, flowers, and trees were in profusion. 
Two Navy doctors, Lane and Shipley, were in charge of 
the h?spital. Oddly enough, both of them, to Heiser's 
amusement, had originally been eye, ear, nose, and throat 
men. ,They informed him that malaria was uncommon, and that 
the city of Cap-Haitien suffered little.disease. No diabetes 
case had come along in two years. Seldom did they see gall 
stones, gastric or intestinal ulcers, kidney or bladder 
stones. The Incidence of cancer was not alarming. Catar-
acts and typhoid were rare. They did see syphilis in adults 
who had yaw markings. When mangoes were plentiful diarrhea 
increased in number. But, generally, the disease rate was 
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very low. "Even if (their} diet (is} unbalanced, (they) 
seem to avoid many diseases. The centuries of neglect 
I final~y produced this apparently immune race, or does yaws 
I protect--or does undernourishment--lead to avoidance of 
16 
many diseases?" mused Heiser in his diary. He had one 
answer for it. He had been told that few people had grey 
hair; :perhaps diseased persons died before getting to the 
hospital. Nonetheless the theory of an "immunity" tanta-
lized'him. 
In the port of Gonaives, on the 12th, he found the 
chief problem to be that of dealing with foreign vessels. 
With no facilities for quarantining or handling infected 
ships,: the town was vulnerable to plague, although Heiser 
had not been informed of any recent epidemics. 
With the handling of the malaria problem, he was pleased. 
Here he found the best active effort in Haiti toward eradi-
cation. An excellent map in the health office--the first 
17 
of its type in Haiti-- showed breeding areas together with 
those lowlands where draining and filling had either been 
i 
completed or in progress. Surveys made of children living 
. on th~ edge of the swamps showed 90 per cent infection, while 
16. Heiser; Diary, PP• 5329-30. 
17. ~t the Health Center at Port-au-Prince infant, pre-
natal,, and post-natal care were also offered for the first 
time in Haiti. See Russell, Annual Report, 1929, Appendix 
IV. 
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those o:f other groups in or close to the middle o:f town 
showed reductions :from three per cent to zero depending 
upon the distance :from the breeding areas. The Director 
o:f the hospital at Gonaives, a Dr. Logue, had given the 
drainage activities his personal direction so that the 
work proceeded as quickly as time and money would permit. 
Heiser saw one main ditch o:f several miles in length stretch-
ing :from the swampy areas into great cement drains that ran 
through the town into the sea. The street along the low 
swampy :fields was known as the Avenue du Mort over which 
none but the dead passed; when Heiser saw It, it had be-
come a street of residences, one o:f which was owned by Dr. 
Logue himself, and the :former swamps were used :fcir the pro-
duction o:f crops. The ditches used as drains were regular-
ly cleaned, and Heiser saw evidences that :fish were enter-
ing. At the time o:f Heiser's visit, only a :few cases o:f 
malaria tad been reported. 
The hospital at Gonaives had seventy-:five beds, with 
cots on the veranda. In 1915 a dilapidated building, ul-
timately razed, stood on that same spot. The buildings o:f 
the hospital now covered a small block and additions were 
being continually made :from a gradual accumulation o:f 
savings, although the sta:f:f saw :few private patients. Pri-
vate patients were charged $2.00, and subsistence was $.11 
per day. Rarely did a case o:f cancer, hookworm, or 
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appen4icitis occur; no intestinal ulcers or stones were in 
evid~ce. Hernia made a frequent appearance, however, and 
yaws, :as in most of Halt 1, predominated. The hospital staff 
consisted of two Haitian doctors, three trained Haitian 
nurses, and six Sisters. 
Water in Gonaives had to be boiled, although Dr. Logue 
claimed that when drawn from a source in the hills, it·.was 
safe. ; Sanitation consisted of the usual street-cleaning 
emplo~ed in most Haitian towns, with latrines only half-dug. 
Dr. Lo·gue stated that, as Gonaives was a port town, he had 
great .difficulty keeping it clean for any length of time. 
Generally he used the large refuse and sweepings to f U 1 in 
the low lands and swampy areas rather than follow the pre-
scribed method of burnlng. 
Heiser found St. Marc in charge of an Haitian, Dr. Louis 
Jourdan,1 8 who concerned'himself chiefly with the hospital. 
Altho~gh the hosp !tal contained sixty beds, not all of them 
were filled, a condition which Heiser noted in most of the 
clinics, rural and urban, run solely by Haitian personnel. 
He alsb made the notation in his diary that he caught Dr. 
Jourdan in several false replies to his routine questions; 
Jourdan claimed that 100% of the latrines were in use, for 
example, but Heiser saw many evidences to the contrary. 
18. Russell, Annual Report, 1929. Four of the ten Sanitary 
Distri~ts were run by Haitian~: Port-de-Paix by Dr. s. Rey, 
St. Marc by Dr. L. Jourdan, Jer6mie by Dr. L. Tarchon, and 
Petit-Goave by Dr. J. R. Jeanty. 
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' This tendency to falsify he found to be a characteristic 
trait among Haitian medical personnel. 
A'rchaie had a dispensary and a sanitary inspector who 
limited his duties primarily to relief, although the auth-
orities were attempting to have the sanitation force extend 
its activities as to mosquito control. 
On March 13th, Heiser returned to Port-au-Prince where 
he rejoined the Commission •. Dr. Melhorn spoke before the 
Commission on the question .of how to guard the health of 
the Haitian people should American forces be withdrawn, since 
this matter was of the gravest concern to Forbes as well as 
to Dr. Heiser. Melhorn stated that (1) it was essential to 
obtain a proper functioning of the courts in the effort to 
maintain enforcement of sanitary regulations already esta-
blished and yet to be established (2) it was essential to 
create ,a Civil Service to protect trained medical personnel 
from the encroachments of political favoritism or patronage 
(3) the Navy should continue a system of advisory personnel 
to the Haitians on a basis similar to the mission of the Navy 
in Peru and Braz 11. 
Except for yaws and malaria, he continued, Haiti ex-
perienced little epidemic disease under the American Occu-
pation: no bacillary (he tried hard to show by records that 
they had had a serious outbreak in 1922, but it had resulted 
in only fourteen cases and no deaths at the hospital), no 
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plague,, no diphtheria, measles, pneumonia, diabetes, stones, 
gastric and intestinal ulcers. The tuberculosis problem, 
he admitted, was serious in the towns. Exact figures were 
not available because, although births and deaths were re-
quired by law to be registered under penalty for failure 
to do so, many Haitians still refused to do eo because of 
I 
the fee levied for registration. 
Melhorn agreed with Heiser on the dire need for a census, 
if an accurate tabulation was to be made of precis.ely what 
the Occupation had done in matters of health. The Church 
census claimed 2,652,000 Haitians, but Melhorn could not 
vouch for its accuracy. For instance, in Port-au-Prince, 
the Church census claimed 123,000 persons, yet the Service 
d'Hygiene claimed 88,000 for Port-au-Prince. 
Once again the phenomenally low disease rate for Haitians, 
considering the poverty, poor living conditions, malnutri-
tion, lack of proteins, and.universa~ yaws;,amazed the in-
vestigators both in the Navy and on the Commission. Heiser 
suggested having the weights of school children in Haiti 
compared with those of Negro school children of the same age 
in the United States. 
Was Melhorn confident that should American forces be 
entirely withdrawn, Haitians would be able to handle their 
medical needs? He was confident they would. Assuming 1936 
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as the withdrawal date, he said that if he could get the 
entire medical service Haitianized by 1934, with a two-year 
supervisory period to follow, all should be well. 
0n March 11th, Heiser went to the Central Penitentiary, 
He found 525 prisoners, many of' whom--he was shocked to 
find--had been waiting two years for trial. Thirty-two were 
under sentence of death, but no executions had taken place, 
as President Borno refused to take the responsibility. 
The general health, so far as Heiser could ascertain, was 
excel~ent, with little tuberculosis and a noticeable ab-
sence of any other diseases. The prisoners experienced an 
average gain of weight of five pounds. Food, including meat, 
cost $.11 per day per prisoner. Although the men received 
little stimulation of mind and spirit, they were kept busily 
occupied in making furniture and uniforms. The Commandant, 
a certain Coyle, stated that it was impossible to teach 
Halt ians the finer aspects of nachine work. When the work 
demanded a greater accuracy than one sixteenth of an inch, 
they failed. Heiser suggested teaching them how to repair 
government vehicles. 
The Garde d'Haiti had its own special hospital in Port-
au-Prince, consisting of thirty beds. Those men requiring 
further treatment went to the General Hospital. 
Helser was surprised at the size, completeness, and 
organization of the Health Center in Port-au-Prince, occupying 
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a two story building. Among its many activities, it had 
a special department for examining servants, food-handlers, 
the blind, the crippled, and so on. Photographs were taken 
of the trouble spots in the city, and Port-au-Prince was 
divided up into districts for quick action. Much was done 
to stimulate Haitians to complaints of hazardous health con-
ditions, attendance at lectures and follow-up interviews. 
Students from the nurses' training school of the General 
Hospital were sent here frequently as a part of their cur-
riculum. The Women's Volunteer Service at the Health Center 
had been started by Mrs. Melhorn herself, and helped to dis-
/ 
solve the social barrier and stigma attached to the elite's 
taking part in service efforts that required menial work. 
The co:lors, Heiser noted, were mixed. 
When Heiser actually sat down to write his report, he 
demonstrated a gift for distinguishing the important from 
the unimportant.l9 Where he felt that the doctors of the 
country showed no·willingness to bring relief to remote 
place$ in Haiti, the United States Medical Service had set 
up 153: rural clinics with 1,341,596 visits made in 1929 a-
lone, and 11 modern hospitals having a c~pacity of 11,000 
beds where before only a few hundred of the almshouse type 
existed. Although the entire burden of medical care lay 
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on thi government (private hospitals and voluntary aid 
virtually lacking), Heiser could not specifically state 
what benefits had accrued through government aid since no 
decent census apart from the inadequate Rockefeller Founda-
tion ~ensus of 1924 had been done. Port-au-Prince and the 
majority of the towns were virtually free of malaria, while 
i the rural areas were gradually being brought under control. 
Economic conditions would have to improve, however, before 
malaria could be completely eliminated. Tuberculosis was 
highest in Port-au-Prince. Typhoid and dysentery had been 
eliminated by ··chlorinating the water supply, hookwonn was 
not serious, and diabetes, heart disease, pneumonia,_and 
stones of gall bladder, kidney, and urinary bladder were 
all rare. In regard to malnutrition, he stated that 11 no 
one need gCD hungry in Haiti." Mangoes, yams, rice, bea~s, 
were in abundance and to be had with a minimum of effort; 
but thl diet was protein deficient through the lack of eggs, 
milk, and meat. A major share of the difficulty lay in the 
ignorance of the people in public health, which the Health 
Center at Port-au-Prince was doing much to counteract. 
Heiser.seemed satisfied with the practical courses in nurses' 
training at Port-au-Prince, the hospital corps-men trained 
by the medical officers of the Garde and the General Hospi-
tai, and very pleased with the new medical school run under 
the auspices of the Rockefeller Foundation, though nowhere 
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in his report did he mention the Foundation by name. He 
mentioned that one of the products of the Haitian Nurses' 
Training Center was a graduate nurse at Columbia University, 
Whb was soon to return to open classes in her field at Port-
au-Prince. 
Four of the ten health districts were in charge of 
Haitians. Of the 2,222 pers'ons in the National Public Health 
Service, 2,120 were Haitian, twenty medical navy officers, 
fourteen Navy hospital corps men, sixty-three French nuns, 
two F'rench priests, four American Red Cross nurses, one French 
librarian, one Jamaican plumber. Of the 159 Haitian doctors, 
40: were employed in the Government Service. 
But the important thing was not making the President a-
ware :of facts Which he could read in the High Commissioner's 
Annual Reports. What was important was that he had veri-
fied Russell's Reports on the Medical Service, that much had 
been accomplished during the Intervention, and that much 
more still had to be done. What the Navy had tried to do, 
so far as Heiser could determine, had been the result of sin-
dere intentions to benefit the Haitian people. They had also 
been extensive for the fifteen years they had operated. 
He closed his report with the following comment and 
recommendations: 
There is abundant evidence that great improvement has 
taken place in the health of the people since the Oc-
cupation. The National Public Health Service enjoys 
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the confidence and approval of the public to an unusual 
degree. The streets of the towns are well-swept; gar-
bage and refuse are removed; slaughter houses are in-
spected; and an earnest effort made to control soil pol-
lution and to provide safe drinking-water. The Gendar-
merie has a good medical service. The jails are clean 
and sanitary, and the average health of the prisoners 
has been greatly improved. The hospitals are well-ad-
ministered, and high-grade medical and surgical skill 
is provided. Machinery is available for the control of 
epidemics and to prevent the introduction of disease 
from abroad. Medical relief through the vast rural 
clinic system can be had by everyone, even in the most 
remote sections of the country. Diagnosis based upon 
laboratory findings is available for all necessary cases. 
The health and medical work has been directed and largely 
done by the United States Naval medical officers, ably 
assisted by Haitians and the French nuns. 
Steps have been taken to provide training to enable 
Haitians to take over the entire National Public Health 
Service. In view of the importance of building up the 
disease weakened Haitian people, it is recommended that 
it be 'ffiade possible for the government of Haiti to avail 
.itself of United States Naval medical officers to serve 
as advisers after the present treaty expires. It might 
also be desirable to employ a few American medical men 
other than naval officers to insure longer tenure and 
continuity of service. In the meantime the assignments 
of the United States Naval medical officers and hospital-
corps men should be lengthened, so that the experience 
gained in language, customs, and the conditions may be 
available to the people of Haiti for the greatest pos-
sible period. 
Unless these steps are taken, it is feared that the 
Medical Service may deteriorate and that ground will be 
lost ~filch has been won with so much sacrifice and ef-
fort. . 
20. President's Commission for a Study and Review of Condi-
tions in Haiti, p. 15. 
Heiser did not mention that a department of Legal Medi-
cine had been established in the Haitian Government, under 
F. Jean-Louis. The purpose of this department was to make 
a revision of the Medical, Dental, Nursing, Midwifery Prac-
tice Act, modernize control of food and drugs, collect sta-
tis4ics, and enforce compliance with these and future acts· 
2. The Marines21 
Fletcher reported that the l'llarines, \whose expense was 
borne' solely by the American Government, were a stabilizing 
and s~pporting force in the preservation of order. He found 
essential to the maintenance of good health. In 1929, there 
were convictions in 38.3% of 1,157 cases of infractions of 
the Sanitary Code. Russell felt strongly that before the 
Haitian Government could get its feet off the ground in mat-
ters of health, it must first be provided for adequate law 
enforcement of stringent codes. 
,The total coat o:f the Health Program for 1929 was 
$991,332. Government allotments amounted to $887, 085 and 
communal allotments to $29,029. Reimbursements at the hospitals 
were $25,971 and in sanitation $2,418. Donations made by the 
Central Relief Commission, the Rockefeller Foundation, and 
the American Red Cross amounted to $26,829, $10,000, and 
$10,000 respectively. 
Supplies had been transported 133,499 miles, 19,824 
miles. by horseback over difficult trails and through moun-
tainous terrain through areas hitherto almost inaccessible • 
. The relationship of yaws and syphilis was being probed 
extensively during this period by aid of' the Committee on 
Research in Syphilis, and American organization, and a 
special entomologist, Dr. R.L. Turner, had been brought into 
the country specifically for the control of malaria. 
See National Archives Collection, Box #4, "Public Health 
Service": Testimony by K.C. Melhorn, Director General of the 
Public Health Service, before James Kerney, March 15, 1930, 
5_·PP• This is probably the testimony which Dr. Heiser refers 
to in his Diary, although this testimony took place on the 
15th of the month rather than the 13th. In this same folder 
is included a reprint of' an article also by K.C. Melhorn, 
"Public Health in Haiti," United States Naval Medical Bulle-
tin, Vol. 27, Nos. 3-4 (Washington, D.C.: 1929). 
21. President's Commission for the Stud 
Condit ons in Ha , pp. • Co • e rd M. u s com-
manded the brigade as of June 25, 1929, relieving Col. John 
T. M~ers. The High Commissioner's Annual Report for 1929 stat~s the strength to be 6oo men rather than the 800 that 
Fletcher reports. 
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little complaint as to the presence or the marines, except 
as they rormed part of the American Occupation itself. As 
a matter of fact, he did not see many evidences of the 
marines at all while he was in Haiti, he said, since all 
of them, with the exception of 150, were at Port-au-Prince, 
and the rest stationed at Cap-Haitian. The Commission, he 
state~, had discussed the idea of removing them from the 
cities altogether to a barracks outside, where they would 
not be on public view at all, but this was round to be im-
practical and unwise. Although he recognized that the 
marines would be necessary to protect Americans and foreign-
ers in cases of riot or public disturbance, he did recommend 
the gradual reduction or the Marine Brigade if (a) both 
United States and .Haitian Governments concurred and (b) the 
situation warranted--although the Commandant of the Gll,rde 
d 1Haiti should be consulted prior to taking action. He 
cautioned that any withdrawal of the spending money of Boo 
orficers and men of the Marine Brigade would have a dele-
terious effect upon the economic life of the country, es-
pecia~lly in the Depression days through which the country 
was presently passing. 
3· Law and Order 
The section on Law and Order really referred to the 
'' 
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22 Garde alone. Much of Fletcher's information on the subject 
came 'not only from Helser• s observations (whose travels 
gave .him a good deal of opportunity to see the Garde in 
operation as well as the Health Service) but from interviews 
with Haitian and American Garde personnel and with Major 
General Frank E. Evans, who commanded the Garde d 1 Haiti~ 
rn an interview on March 13, 1930, much like the one which 
Dr. Melhorn gave before the Commission on the Health Ser-
vice, Evans answered critics of the Constabulary. Speaking 
rather emotionally and with apparent conviction, he stated: 
The need for an efficient Haitian Garde is clear. The 
new Haitian Government will face conditions traditional 
in Haitian government from 1804 until the American In-
tervention in 1915. Those were: a desire on the part 
of unscrupulous politicians to find a one-way road to 
the treasury; dishonesty and graft by some in office; 
the possible conversion of the government into a mili-
tary despotism; exploitation of an illiterate and in-
articulate peasantry. Like most Latin-American repub-
lics, Haiti was a republic in name only. Peasants were 
impressed into warring armies. To travel from one town 
to another a passport was necessary. The so-called 
Haitian armywas incompetent and parasitical, and the pay-
masters absorbed the bulk of the soldiers• pay. Under 
their favorite conception of a parliamentary government 
at whose head there was a military despot, control was 
centered in the hands of a few irresponsible leaders 
with little conception of high and disinterested nation-
al government. 
Our Haitian officers want no return to such condi-
tions. Utalics inserted by present autho~ In answer 
to a confidential memorandum issued to· them a.few weeks 
ago they expressed their desire for some form of legis-
lation that would protect them from displacement by any 
22. President's Commission for the Study and Review 
of Conditions in Haiti, pp. 10-11. 
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political favorites. They have impressed this on me 
in personal talks for the past two years. They are 
desirous of a retirement law for officers and men, 
based on the American idea, that will further protect 
them in their chosen career; and of another providing 
for the creation of a reserve of honorably discharged 
Gardes that will furnish troops for any national emer-
gency. 
The thought crossed Forbes' mind that this Garde, 
Haitianized, might very well form, after Americans had 
/ 1 eft,, an elite In itself, a Praetor ian Guard which, once 
corrupt, could bring through its very efficiency and pre-
cision more terror and loss of freedom to Haiti than the 
motley, over-generaled, over-officered Army which had gone 
before. Evans thought that this did not necessarily have 
to be so if a broader democratic base could be simultaneous-
ly created in the country. 
Returning to conditions that will face a Haitian govern-
ment after American withdrawal, there seems to be one 
remedy that depends almost wholly on the stability and 
foresight of that government. Haitians of the requisite 
standard of patriotism will have to face the demands 
of a "lunatic fringe" of unscrupulous leaders, a growth 
of communistic gendencies fanned by unscrupulous agi-
tators and a newborn strike consciousness. If the pa-
'triotic organizations will rally to the support of the 
government and exercise their influence to enforce dis-
cipline within their ranks, and keep the radical fac-
tions in the background, they will contribute much to 
the economic development that is necessary for a stable 
government. 
Under the old regime the spoils system and over-
centralization thrived •. Legislative bodies were, in 
fact, simply appointed by.a military despot. Free and 
honest elections were a fiction. 
All these possible handicaps will require an efficient 
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Garde, and the legislation needed to ensure its per-
manency and freedom from political influence should 
receive most serious consideration • 
. This last remark merely rephrased Dr. Melhorn's plea--
a civil service for the employment of professionals on the 
basis of merit rather than political influence and favorit-
ism. 23 
23. National Archives Collection, Box 2, '1Garde d•Haiti 11 ; 
Testimony Major General Frank E. Evans, Mar. 13, 1930, 43 
pp., pp. 2-4. 
The Garde was in many ways the symbol of Occupation 
achie¥ement so far as the Navy and Marine officials were 
concerned. The intervention had taken place originally to 
stabUize the country permanently, and the Garde represented 
this idea to the military men who largely administrated the 
nation in cooperation with the Haitian Government. 
The Annual Report for 1929, which Fletcher employed 
heavily for his statistical information, reported the follow-
ing: Before 1915 the Haitian army consisted of 38 line and 
4 artillery regiments comprising 9,000 men; the Gendarmerie 
of 1,800 men; four regiments of the President's Guard. 
Throughout this force were 308 generals, 50 colonels, with 
pay averaging $.20 per month and an allowance of $.80 per 
month for rations. Corruption was rampant, the prisons were 
evil, with a system of recruitment that amounted to impress-
ment. Bribes of $2.00 usually were sufficient to avoid ser-
vice, but few of the black mass had the money for so small 
a bribe as this. Now, by 1929, the Army has been dissolved, 
and in its place is a Garde consisting of from 2,537 to 
2,622 men, well-paid, literate, properly housed and equip-
ped, with a special medical service of its own, and perform-
ing all military and police functions the corrupt, over-
generaled, over-staffed Haitian Army did before, and doing 
it efficiently. The ratio consisted of one Garde to each 3.4 
miles and 690 inhabitants. Navigation, the registration and 
licensing of motor-vehicles, the care of prisoners, the in-
sane, juvenile delinquents, had been added to the duties of 
this new constabulary. 
Furthermore, for more efficient administration, the Re-
public had been divided into 21 districts, each approximately 
lj.O square miles. Each district held generally· one captain, 
five officers, 100 men, with two sub-districts- each under a 
lieutenant, and seven outposts. A sanitary detachment was 
assigned to each district. Within these districts, in addi-
tion to the duties above enumerated, the Garde tended to 
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rletcher and Forbes both considered Evans overly 
sanguine. Tempered as such, Fletcher's Report went as 
follows: Article 10 of the Treaty had obligated the Haitian 
Government to create a constabulary composed of native 
Haitians organized and officered by Americans for (1) the 
preservation of domestic peace (2) the security of indivi-
dual rights (3) the full obs·ervance of the treaty. Those 
American officers (Marine officers of second lieutenant and 
up) were supposed to be replaced gradually by Haitians after 
examinations conducted by a Board specially selected by the 
senior American officer of the Garde, such examinations to 
take place in the presence of representatives of the Haitian 
Government. Over the course of the fifteen years, other 
agreements had been made regarding the salaries of Garde 
construction, communications through rugged country, fire,. 
the maintenance of highways, the administration of law and 
justice on the local or communal level. The officers knew 
both French and Creole (at least the Haitian officers, if 
only a minority of the American). 309.5 miles of telephone 
lines, 9 airplane fields, and all trails were under the 
strict control of the Garde. 
· See also from National Archives Collection, Box 2, 
11 COJ1lpendium of Information on the Garde d 1 Haiti (2 folders); 
James H. McCrocklin, Garde d'Haiti: Twent ears of or ani-
zation and trainin b the Unite tates Mar ne or s 91 -
19 Annapolis: United States Nava Institute, 19 • 
So far as Haitianization of the Garde went, with which 
Forbes was so much concerned, in 1917 the number of Haitian 
officers went from 5% to 19% in 1922 to 35% in 1928 and to 
36.42% in 1930. At the Ecole· Milita:)t-e, 75% of the trainee 
officers were Haft ian. 17 officers· had been graduated, with 
13 to go. Out of presently 198 officers, 78 were Haitians. 
How~ver, 71 of these, or 46.2%, held ranks below that of 
Major. 
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persqnnel, conditions of living, uniforms, duties, general 
activities, and so on. At the present time (1930) the Garde 
performed not only police duties but acted as communal ad-
visers on the disbursement of communal revenues, handled 
the Coast Guard, and was responsible for all lighthouses. 
The future significance of the Garde lay in its ability to 
maintain order after the withdrawal of United States Naval 
forces. 
Fletcher declared the Garde to have performed con-
scientiously and well. Haitianization, however, had not 
proceeded as rapidly as had been expected, in the opinion 
of the Commission. No Haitian bad been appointed above the 
rank of Captain, two Haitians were Captains out of twenty-
three, seventeen Haitians First Lieutenants out of fifty-
eight, nineteen Second Lieutenants out of fifty-seven; out 
of all the cadet officers, twenty-eight of them, were 
Haitian. The Garde bad a 1930-36 program prepared for total 
Haitianization, but this was only in the planning stages. 
Fletcher stated that Haitianization could take place 
rapidly without changing the Gendarmerie Agreement in the 
treaty, if the American authority would simply transfer 
American Marine officers back to the Marine Brigade, and 
It was also reported that the Garde gave medical care 
to 45,711 prisoners and insane~ that over one 9-month period 
in 1929, 9,160 prisoners were vaccinated against smaH-pox. 
Granted the merit of the medical services, the question still 
arises as to why the Garde was holding so many prisoners. 
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let,their places be taken by Haitians. If this could not 
be done through local authority, then Haitianization must 
lie.with the Navy Department and Marine Corps Headquarters 
in Washington. Such reform, the report emphasized, was es-
sential, even if discipline and efficiency temporarily might 
suffer. The Ecole Militaire, which had been temporarily 
closed at the end of 1929 because of the disturbance, Fletcher 
felt' should be reopened for the training of Haitian officers, 
with: support from the United States. Until the Garde was 
Haitianized, however, he stated that it would be advisable 
that some provision be made for orderly promotion and for 
protection against promotion by political influence. 
4. Judicial Procedure24 
Frict.ion had arisen between the Haitian courts and the 
American treaty officials. On one hand the courts refused 
to enforce (or preferred to obstruct) certain administrative 
measures, while, on the other hand, treaty officials refused 
to obey orders of the courts on the grounds that the treaty 
of 191.5 was the real law of the land, superior to Haitian 
statute and case law, and not any of its operations to be 
interfered with by the Haitian Judiciary. Fletcher· recom-
mended that future conflicts be settled by direct and friend-
ly negotiations between the two Governments rather than 
24. Presidentls Commission for the Study and Review of 
Conditions in Haiti, pp. 17-18. 
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thro~gh the strict use of the courts, In any event, he re-
ported that although the administration of Haitian justice 
was unsatisfactory to the people (reforms were needed in the 
system itself i.e. the enactment of adequate salaries for 
judges), the Commission viewed the matter as something pri-
marily for Haitians to ha.ndl e and out of fts OIVII particular 
province. Fletcher noted, though, that if a stable govern-
ment were to be achieved after the withdrawal of the Occu-
pation, the Judiciary had to receive careful consideration. 
5. The Constitution25 
The major complaints that Fletcher found were (1) in 
regard to the manner in which the Constitution of 1918 had 
been adopted (the plebiscite) and amended in 1928, (2) the 
manner in which the present Government (Borno 1 s) had inter-
preted its provisions relating to powers of the Council of 
State (the refusal to call for legislative elections), (3) 
the granting to foreigners of the right to own Haitian land. 
Fletcher recommended that, since the Haitian people from 
1804- to 1918 had prohibited foreigners from owning real es-
tate,' the United States should raise no objection if the 
Haitians wished to amend this particular provision of the 
1918 Constitution. The United States would merely stipulate 
that the very few rights and titles acquired under the present 
25. President's Commission for the Study and Review of 
Conditions in Haiti, p. 18. 
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com;t itution should be respected. The Commission, stated 
Fletcher, found no instance of undue advantage being taken 
by Americans as a result of the clause enabling them to ac-
quire title to Haitian soil. 
6. Race Prejudice26 
I White, writing rather emotionally, reported that racial 
antipathies lay behind many of the problems which the United 
States faced in Haiti. He recounted essentially that Hoover 
already knew; that the 6'1 ite cons is ted of five per cent of 
the population, was urban, French cultured, educated, mulatto 
("shading from octoroon to black"), weal thy ("careful to 
- . 
maintain its own caste1 as is any other ruling class"); that 
the masses were poor and ignorant, black, of pure African 
descent, and generally because of their illiteracy politi-
cally inarticulate ("except in case of mobs or bandit gangs 
which formerly infested the countryside and furnished the 
forces of revolution"). Although the wild roaming bands had 
disappeared under American rule, the social forces that 
created them were still present, namely, poverty, ignorance, 
lack of a tradition of or desire for orderly free government. 
I • 
From what White could discover, the aim of Americans in 
Haiti had been to broaden the base of the articulate pro-
letariat and in so doing, provide for future democracy. Such 
26. President's Commission for the Study and Review of 
Conditions in Haiti, pp. 18-19. 
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means as education, sanitation, roads, telephones, tele-
graph, regular mail routes, and generally improved means 
o:r communication had aided in this e:r:rort. / The elite, how-
' ever, saw in these things a threat to its leadership, and 
here lay the heart o:r Haitian opposition to American rule. 
Where the Occupation :railed, thought White in his report, 
was its :failure to understand these social problems. Its 
11 brusque attempt to plant democracy there by drill and har-
row, its determination to set up a middle class-however wise 
and necessary it may seem to Americans--all these explain 
why, in part, the high hopes o:r our good works in this land 
have not been realized.n27 
White did not mention another source o:r discontent on 
the part o:r the tlite. The Navy Department had been assign-
' ing marines :from the southern states, with the result that 
' I the elite, who had :for all practical purposes considered 
itsel:r white and French and had drawn a color line between 
itse1:r and the black mass, now :round itsel:r socially once 
again in the position it endured during colonial days. In 
this 'sense at least, so :far as the 'lite was concerned, the 
Occupation had thrown Haiti back 150 years. The best night 
spots, ca:res, restaurants were :frequented by Americans whose 
white skins and jingling pockets became at one and the same 
time the envy and hatred of the mulatto aristocrat. The Cercle 
27. President's Commission :ror the Stud and Review o:r 
Conditions in Haiti, p. 1 • 
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Bellevue, which had been one of the most celebrated res-
taurants in Port-au-Prince, frequented primarily by the 
/ 
wealthy elite, now became the scene of stormy quarrels among 
Amer;ican officers who would not eat with Negroes, no matter 
how light the colo.ring, and mulattoes who filled their cups 
to overflowing with hatred. 28 
7. Financial Situation29 
'Forbes tried to shift this section of the Report to 
Kerney's :tands, but the attempt proved unsuccessful. 
I While I had put finance as m.Y job, I happened to be se 
busy when the financial adviser appeared to give us his 
quota of information that I asked Kerney to take it for 
me, and this came back to trouble me as he undertook to 
write up our report and it was a holy terror. He had 
.taken the few aspects of American work which had been 
'done badly or unwisely and then dressing them up to a 
distorted degree. He proceeded to light into them hard, 
keeping all explanatory or favorable word back, so that 
lf adopted as written we should b8ve g-iven a wholly 
:wrong and wholly unjust picture • .3 
28. The Cercle Bellevue became almost a symbol of {rite 
humiliation, and in addition became a hotbed of opposition 
to American superiority and the American Occupation. After 
several incidents which proved embarrassing to the Haitian 
Administration, President Bomo closed down this "oldest 
social club in Port-au-Prince" on the charge of "political 
manifestations' •11 See the New_York Times, February 4, 1928. 
When Eugene Roy became President, one of the first acts of 
his administratien was to open up once more the Cercle Belle-
vue (May 17, 1930). 
29. President's Commission for the Study and Review of 
Conditions in Haiti, pp. 11-12. 3o. Forbes, Haitian Journal, p. 61. 
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Forbes reported the work of the Americans in handling 
the revenues and expenditures of the Haitians "so .far note-
worthy."· A modern budgetary system was established with 
preaudit, one of the latest devices .for "accurate, economi-
cal, and expeditious management of accounts." Witnesses 
claimed improprieties connected with this department, par-
ticularly that they were kept in ignorance o.f what was being 
done~ but no one said Forbes needed to be in ignorance when 
the careful reports o.f the Financial Adviser were readily 
available in both English and French. Six auditors, moreover, 
from the United States Comptroller's Office had made a 
thorough analysis of all accounts for the Government, and 
found these accounts correct except for very minor errors 
and adjustments, since rectified. Revenues had a conserva-
tive, margih of S\l!'plus over expenditures, which margin was 
used to pay o.f.f several million. dollars worth o.f the princi-
pal of the public debt 11 in excess of the amount called .for 
by the amortization plan." Forbes questioned the use o.f this 
money for reducing the public debt when it could have been 
used to reduce taxation, especially the export tax, and left 
the debt to work itself out during its normal term, keeping 
more money in the 
though Forbes did 
country where it was badly needed (and--
/ 
not say so--giving the wealthy elite pal-
pable benefits which might have urged them to more kindly 
views o.f the American Achievements). Over the course o.f the 
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fifteen years, the Occupation had expanded its financial 
operations until 60% of the revenues were expended under 
American supervision, including the service of the public 
debt. 
Forbes recommended that the 5% maximum allowed out of 
Government revenues to cover the costs of the General Receiver-
ship should not be considered a flat allowance expected to 
be s~ent each year, but only a limit within which the Receiver 
must, operate. He further recommended that appr?priations 
disbursed by the treaty service in Haiti be budgeted with 
the same detail as "are the appropriations for the regular 
publ~c services of the Haitian Government." 
Generally, Forbes seemed satisfied with the financial 
work of the Occupation--and certainly his long and varied 
experience in Boston bus !ness and in handling the finances 
of the Brazilian Railway during World War I entitled him 
to speak with assurance. Certainly the difficulties of set-
tling Haitian finance were unusually complex. Regarding the 
question of taxation, Russell had said in his 1929 Annual 
Report, in referring to two major problems which the Finan-
cial Adviser-General Receiver faced: 
The Haitian Government originally depended on customs 
revenue for income. Twenty percent of Haiti's popula-
tion consists of ignorant peasants. Direct taxation is 
extremely difficult to enforce on such people. There 
are neither proper land laws, land survey maps, regis-
tration offices, nor an adequate system of settling titles. 
Therefore, the imposition of a land tax lies in the future. 
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Due to ignorance and primitive conservatism of the popu-
lation, it is necessary to educate rather than to legis-
late. Therefore, moderate, balanced systems regulating 
incidence of taxation can only be arrived at gradually. 
The second aspect of this situation covers increased 
and diversified production, and, until this is scienti-
fically organized and accomplished, the forward movement 
in public finances must be extremely slow. The great 
hatred and suspicion which exists between town and coun-
try complicates the situation. The Government financial 
program in face of these difficulties must be carried 
out with extreme skill, political wisdom, honesty, and 
impartiality, apy it needs many more years for its full 
1 accompl ishment • .:l 
31.' pp. 19-20. In addition, the Annual Report states the 
fonowing pertinent figures: Total revenue receipts were 
$8,504,305.68, 15.66% less than 1927-28 (a record year), with 
total customs receipts $7,049,530, 21.81% less than 1927-28. 
Internal revenue receipts for 1928-29 were $1,207,052.96 com-
pared with $848,324.02 in the previous year, making an in-
crease of $358,728.93 or 42.28%. Excise taxes more than ac-
counted for the increase, collections from other sources having 
dec~ ined 9. 77%. Receipts from emigration declined 56.08%. 
Income from public land rentals, however, showed a slight 
increase. The first full year's operation of the new excise 
tax ; law produced $452,763.67 and 11 is a fiscal success" • 11 
Thene was no difficulty in collecting the alcohol and_cigarette 
and cigar taxes, although opposition was evidenced'to the 
requirement that smoking tobacco be wrapped in small packages 
and stamped • 
. Total expenditures from revenues received in 1928-29 
amounted to $8,828,900.79 compared with $8,195,582.90 in the 
previous year, an increase of 7.66%. Disbursements on ac-
count of the public debt increased .2.78%. There were smaller 
expend! tures for the Garde, Foreign Relations, Justice, Agri-
culture, Labor. Those for Public Works, the Agricultural 
Service, Religion increased. Expenditures from revenue ex-
--;?ceeded revenues for the year by $319,595.11 or 3.76%. 
Total cash assets as of September 3lr, 1929 were $6,538,672.38, 
making a decline of 4.29% from 1927-28. 'The unobligated cash 
balance on September 30, .1929, amounting to $4,072,291.65, was 
the.largest on record, and the public treasury was in a better 
condition than ever before to meet the contingencies incident 
to an abrupt change in the trend of revenues such as that in 
prospect for 1929-30. 11 (p.55) The public debt was reduced 
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8. Public Works 
Forbes did not devote a special section to Public Works, 
but ,included his remarks in the general discussion of the 
achievements of the Occupation.32 The major share of his 
information came from Russell's Reports, the remainder from 
his own observations and the testimony of Commander G. A. 
Duncan, USN, Engineer in Chief.33 
He reported the construction of 800 miles of highway. 
"Before the intervention the road between Port-au-Prince and 
Cap-Haitian, the two principal ports and cities of the Re-
public, was practically impassable except on horseback. The 
journey of 180 miles. took three days. Now it is done in six 
hour's by automobile. 11 34 A Coast Guard was organized, light-
houses built, and navigation rendered much safer, agriculture 
duri~ the year by $1,152,143·81 or 6.10%. It was reduced 
5.28% in 1927-28. All amortization requirements were ful-
filled well before the close of the year. 
In personnel, by the end of 1929 there were 26 Ameri-
cans in the Finance Department and 50B Haitians, compared 
with 23 Americans and 424 Haitians the previous year. 
32. President's Commission for the Study and Review of 
Conditions fn Haiti, pp. 6-8. 
33. National Archives Collection, Box 4, 11 Public Works"; 
"Testimony of Commander G.A. Duncan, USN, Engineer in Chief." 
This testimony consists of two pieces: "A brief summary of 
accomplishments of the Public Works Administration of Haiti 
under the treaty with the United States of America 1916-193011 
and 11A concise statement of accomplishments of the Public Works 
Administration of Haiti under the treaty with the United States 
of America 1916-30. 11 
34. President's Commission for the Study and Review of 
Conditions in Haiti, P• 7. 
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encouraged through irrigation projects, and hospitals, public 
buildings, and parks constructed. In seven years the regis-
trations of automobiles had increased from 400 to 2,800, the 
linear feet of bridges multiplied by three, and a significant 
increase noted in the number of permits issued for private 
building construction. Gross trade enjoyed a wholesome in-
crease as measured by the value of exports and imports.35 
35. Although the Official Report of the President's Commis-
sion had no section devoted to Commerce, the High Commis- · 
sioner 1 s Annual Report for 1929 ~ave the following information; 
Foreign trade went from $42,915,502 in 1927-28 to $33,961,755 
in 1928-29. Imports declined 14.87% to $17,237,822 and ex- · 
ports declined 26.22% to $16,723,833. Thus, in 1929 there was 
an unfavorable trade balance of $2,418,989. (This was the re-
sult, undoubtedly, of the world-wide general depression rather 
than any particular fault of the commerce policies of the Oc-
cupation, since previous to this time the favorable trade bal-
ances had been increasing each year.} In 1928-29, France pur-
chased most of Haiti's exports (55.29%}. The tourist trade 
had been poor for some reason, as well, which deprived the 
country of needed dollars. 
'The prosperity of Haiti depended (as it still does} on 
coffee, forming 60-7-% of the country's exports. The 1928-29 
crop was lean due to unfavorable weather conditions. When in 
October, 1929, the coffee valorization program of Brazil, 
which had been in operation since the close of World War I, 
coll,apsed, Halt i' s economy was seriously affected. Russell 
had ~de attempts to switch the economy to sisal, pineapples, 
even corn, but with little success; coffee was the single crop 
that interested the masses of the growers, and this was chiefly 
wild coffee that needed only to be harvested. 
Air lines by Pan-American Airways at the time were in 
the process of being set up between Haiti, Cuba, Florida, and 
Puerto Rico, and Russell hoped that this latest development 
would have a salutary effect upon the depressed economy of 
the country. 
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Automatic lighthouses increased from four to fifteen; tele-
1 
phohe subscribers from 400 to nearly 1,200, and the number 
I 
of telephone calls from approximately 1,000,000 per year to 
over 5,ooo,ooo. 36 
' 
36. Regarding the Public Works Department, the Annual Report 
for. 1929 gave the following information: Before 1915 the 
motto had been in Haiti, "Never cross a bridge if you can go 
around it. 11 The only telephone system in the country failed 
in ~911, automobiles were unheard of, and only a rudimentary 
telF. graph system existed. By 1929 Haiti had 3,000 vehicles, 
1,006 miles of roads, 210 bridges with a total span of 5,870 
feet, a modern telephone system (automatic in Port-au-Prince 
and! Cap-Haitien, paved streets in her major cities, public 
parks, 12 lighthouses built since 1915 (only four were in 
operation when the Americans arrived), 9 wharves, a revival 
of irrigation that had been allowed to lapse since French 
colonial days, 100 miles of canals to serve a population of 
62,000, and water supplies for 64 villages. 
• During 1939 the Public Works Department had given em-
ployment to 8,933 people (where the previous year the number 
was, a little over 7 ,ooo) •.. .$2,249,909 had been spent on public 
works: A Headquarters Building at Las Cahobas for the Garde, 
250 student units for the Brothers' school at Port-de-Paix, 
20 student units for the Sisters at Gonaives, 10 standard 
rurf3.l dispensaries, public comfort stations at Port-au-Princ·e 
(at Place· Louverture and under the Tribune, an old Government 
bui,lding), a fishmarket at Fort St. Clair, post office build-
ing: at Port-au-Prince for the Financial Adviser-General Re-
ceiver, a Public Works administration office at Gonaives, 
and' 16 farm schools. In addition, the start of a 6,000 stu-
de~t industrial school for the Service Technique was made 
(dalf and evening classes) and a dormitory for 32 students at 
Pla!isance started. Repairs had been made on the church at 
Hin'che. 
The Public Works was also responsible for many smaller 
rou'tine tasks which ordinarily go unnoticed, but, neglected, 
are· sorely missed, such as the installation of 10 fire hy-
dralltS in Port-au-Pirince and a chlorinator at the Bourdon 
Res.ervoir for tJ;~e sterilization of the water supplies of Po:rt-
au-,Prince and Petionville, renewal of the entire Plaissance-
Cerisier aqueduct system at Port-au-Prince, improvements in 
the' water supplies at Furey, Petionville, Miragoane, Petit-
' 
· Forbes did not mention that this department of the Oc-
cupation with the possible exception of finance had been 
found to be the most unpopular of all. The Negro peasant 
needed no great highways to carry his tiny produce to the 
local market; the urban dweller had neither car nor horse 
to travel hundreds of miles, much less the desire; and the 
mulatto viewed the highways, buildings, and wharves as a 
further means of both subjugating the country and destroying 
the slow-paced cultured life he worshipped. 
9. Relations between Church and State37 
In his interview with the Archbishop of Port-au-Prince, 
Vezina had been told that the clergy welcomed the Commission 
to Haiti, but that it could have no part in the settling of 
affairs. Anti-clericalism--especially under Calles in Revo-
lutionary Mexico--had become too virulent in Latin-America 
to risk the chances of its spread to Haitl. 
The clergy ••• is almost wholly foreign and will be foreign 
probably for many years. In 1921 the Bishops founded 
the Apostolic School of Notre Dame for the training of 
Haitian priests. In spite of all that has been done, up 
Goave, Gonaives, St. Marc, Cayes, Cap-Haitien, Jacmel (the 
city with the most abundant water supply), Jeremie (which had 
an inadequate supply), the paving of John Brown Avenue in 
Port-au-Prince with penetration asphalt, /the enlargement of 
the Momanoe Dam, the rebuilding of the Petionville Road, which 
was .the Royal Road of Christophe, built in the early days of 
independence (a car could now go from Cap-Haitien to Milot in 
less than 30 minutes), the building of the Trouin-Jacmel Road, 
and a start made in the construction of the P{tionville-Kenskoff 
road. 
37. President's Commission for the Study and Review of 
Conditions in Haiti,pp. 15-17. 
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' to now the nwnber of our students remains small. I 
~ sincerely am grateful to M. Vezina :for having visited 
our Apostolic School the second day after his arrival 
in Port-au-Prince and I thank him :for the kind words 
which he addressed to the students pointing out to them 
the important services which they will be in position 
to render to their country. 
. The :fact that the clergy is :foreign creates :for it 
·a delicate situation and one which at times is difficult. 
· It must abstain from politics. It does, nevertheless, 
take a profound interest in everything_which affects the 
, well-being of the people, sharing the joys and sorrows 
' of that people. 
The 1915 Treaty and the occupation in the beginning 
were not looked upon alike by· all Haitians although they 
were all inspired by an equally great patriotism. It 
seemed to me~ therefore, personally to be our duty to 
remain outside of the parties which resulted. The clergy 
remained independent of the opinions of them all. 
But the clergy will rejoice with all its heart when 
the present situation is ended and will joyfully chant 
' a Te Dawn in solemn- Thanksgiving. 
Ministers as we are of a Church which teaches that 
the occupation by another country is an abnormal thing 
· and sorrowful thing which everyone should seek to end 
· as soon as possible; knowing moreover as we do now this 
· beloved people suffers in its national dignity by being 
: held in tutelage, with all our hear-ts we make our own 
their sufferings, their complaints and their hopes.3~ 
Vezina restricted himself in his report, after a brief 
historical presentation, to statistics. He reported the 
i 
orgahization of the Church to consist of an Archdiocese at 
Port'-au-Prince, and four dioceses--at Cap-Haitian, Aux Cayes, 
Gonaives, and Port-de-Paix. Two hundred and five priests 
were: resident in Haiti, 156 secular priests engaged in active 
missionary work and in charge of parishes,39 while the others 
38. ·National Archives Collection, Box #1, "Clergy": State-
ment o:f Clergy in Haiti. 
39. At the time of the Commission, there were 465 mission 
chapels and 112 parishes in the country. 
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did'educational work or were involved in labors connected 
with the dioceses. Of the 205 priests, only eight were 
Haitian.40 There were 105 Brothers of Christian Instruction, 
(eighty-three French, ten French-Canadian, nine Spanish, three 
Haitian), in addition to three congregations of Sisters: St. 
Joseph de Cluny, (with 146 Sisters), Les .Fi11es de la Sagesse 
(198), and.Les Filles de Marie (22). The priests, stated 
Vezina, not only spread religion but founded schools, parish 
churches, and mission chapels. The Brothers of Christian 
Instruction conducted seventeen boys! schools consisting of 
6,731 pupils, half of the instructors Brothers and half lay-
men, each instructor paid by.the Haitian Government less than 
forty dollars per month. The Brother Superintendent received 
a monthly salary of 100 dollars. The Sisters conducted thir-
ty~six girls' seconda·ry and boys' and girls' primary schools, 
in addition to one girls' industrial school conducted by 
Belgian Sisters and under the Service Technique of the De-
partment of Agriculture. Furthermore, the Haitian Govern-
ment authorized priests to establish rural schools (presby-
: 
terial schools), which now numbered 153 and employed women 
teachers paid by the Haitian Government at the rate of six 
dollars per month. These rural schools,. comprising 10,623 
pupils, Vezina felt constituted the foundation of the 
40. The Haitian Government subsidized a seminary in France 
for the training of priests for Haiti, as well as a seminary 
at Port-au-Prince for the training of Haitian priests. 
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educational system of Haiti. Four colleges existed with 
' a tdt al attendance of 2,500. 
! Vezina had done much more work, however, than his brief 
I 
report indicated. He had made a splendid report on Church 
education in the country.41 The main trouble with education 
as undertaken by the Church, he stated in this special re-
port (which never saw publication) lay in the fact that the 
I 
I 
educational arm of the Church was bound up by contract with 
! 
the !Haitian Government, and could only act along channels 
pe~itted by and in accordance with that Government. 
Brothers of Christian Instruction cannot act but in 
strict conformity with the contract they signed and 
with the law which sane tions it. They waul d not take 
the liberty of doing anything not stipulated by the 
contract. 
As soon as the Department of Public Instruction, 
upon which they depend, amends or reforms the program 
of education, the Brothers immediately strive to give 
full and entire satisfaction. 
Therefore it is evident that the Brothers and Sis-
ters are not responsible for the program of education 
which is compiled absolutely by the Secretary of Public 
lnstruc ti on. 
, Dependent on the Department of Public Instruction were 
thelthree congregations of Sisters mentioned above, but only 
! . 
4-1. National Archives Collection, Box One, 11Education11 : 
Special Report on Education: Facts and Statistics colle.cted 
by Mr. Elie Vezina from Brothers and Sisters having charge 
in some schools in Port-au-Prince. 6pp. 
. , Each regional council was to consist of the Prefect, 
the[Chief of the Diocese or Pastor of the Parish, Dean of 
the Tribunal of First Instance, President of the MedicaU Jury, 
a delegate of the Protestants' Missions, representatives of 
the public superior schools, the public secondary schools · 
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Les 11 Filles de Marie had been able to obtain a contract and 
i 
carty on public instruction. 
! The system of public instruction was centered in a 
National Council instituted by the law of August 4, 1920 
(which he reported had been convened only once, on January 
9, l921). This National Council consisted of the Archbishop 
of ~ort-au-Prince, the Supreme Justice, the President of the 
I 
central Medical Jury, an agricultural engineer, a delegate 
of the Protestant missions, a delegate of the Council of 
I 
Administration of the School of Applied Sciences, two dele-
gat~s of public superior education, two delegates of public 
secondary education, two delegates of congregational secondary 
' 
education, de.legates from free secondary education, normal, 
voc~tional, and primary education, and five members repre-
senting letters, arts, science, commerce, industry (to be 
named by decree of the President of the Republic upon nom-
ination by the Secretary of Public Works). In addition, 
regional offices were to be established with regional coun-
cils in Cap-Ha.itien, Port-de-Paix, Gonaives, St. Marc, Petit-
1 
I - . 
Goave, Anse-a-Veau, Jeremie, Cayes, Aquin, and Jacmel, these 
' 
reg~onal councils much like the National Council. The whole 
affair was to be under the auspices of the University of 
Hait,i. 
I 
(if lthey exist),the private superior schools, a delegate of 
the free secondary schools (if they exist), two representatives 
of primary education, three members chosen from the merchants, 
industrialists, engineers, men of science, artists, residing 
in t:he region. 
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1 If' anything suited the Gallic temperament, if' anything 
satisfied the French appetite for detailed paper-apparatus, 
not~ing suited better than this conglomeration of' phrase 
and :fancy. Here was constitutional ism appl led to education, 
French culture applying an impractical mechanism to an im-
possible situation. So long as the matter seemed settled 
on.parchment, the Government appeared at ease. Yet, the 
system had not worked. Almost pathetically, Vezina wrote~ 
Since the creation of the National Council o:f Public 
Instruction, there has been but one meeting. If' this 
National Council of Public Instruction had been convened 
at least once a year, Dr. Freeman's repeated errors 
would not have occurred. The Haitian Treasury would 
have saved millions of dollars, and the Haitian people 
would have been given an education more in accordance 
with their traditions and powers of absorption for pri-
mary and secondary education. 
10. Recommendations42 
The Commission had seven speci:fic recommendations to 
make to ease the :frictions arising between the United States 
and Haiti: 
(a) That the detail of' Naval and Marine officers for 
all Haitian services be made :for a minimum o:f four 
years and that an ef:fort be made to secure Americans 
who will agree to continue employment in these ser-
vices, so that upon the expiration o:f the treaty a 
force of American doctors, engineers, and police of-
ficers will be available :for continued assistance to 
the Haitian Government, should it then desire it. 
This recommendation was made primarily because of the :follow-
ing circumstances: Personnel :for the Occupation w-a.s. selected 
~2. President's Commission for the Study and Review of' 
Conditions in Haiti, pp. 19-20. 
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from the Navy and Marines. These officers were usually de-
tailed for three years in the country, and a good two years 
were necessary for these men to learn French and the native 
patois spoken by the mass of Haitians. Just when they ap-
proached maximum efficiency in their tasks they were relieved. 
If,Americans could be selected for a four-year term in Haiti, 
with the chances that they would remain another term at least, 
the benefits to the Occupation would be considerable. 
(b) That, if possible, some form of continuing appro-
priation for roads be urged for expenditure by the 
Haitian Government, with a policy that will provide 
enough funds to keep all existing roads in suitable 
repair before any new construction is undertaken; 
also, in regard to further construction, that only 
roads most urgently needed to develop regions now 
settled and under cultivation be undertaken until 
the present economic depression has passed; 
(c) That the United States interpose no objections to 
a moderate reduction of the customs duties, internal 
revenue taxes, especially those imposed upon alcohol 
and tobacco, or to a reduction or elimination of the 
export tax on coffee, if the condition of the Trea-
sury warrants; 
(d) That it be suggested to the Haitian Government that 
it employ one American adviser in each administra-
tive department of the Government to perform such 
work as the respective Cabinet Minister may delegate 
to him, these officers to give expert advice and 
assistance to the Haitian Government, similar to 
that given by American officers in China, Slam, and 
Nicaragua, for naval matters in Brazil, and for edu-
cational matters in Peru; 
{e) That, as an act of graciousness on the part of the 
United States, a moderate appropriation be made 
available during the continuance of the treaty to 
defray the cost of American civil officials in the 
Haitian Government service; 
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(f) That an appointment of a military attache be made 
to the Legation when the time shall have arrived 
for a Minister to replace the High Commissioner, as 
the question of the preservation of order is of 
first importance and the Minister should have the 
advantage of his advice on military and police mat-
ters: 
(g) That an adequate Legation building be constructed 
immediately by the Government of the United States 
in the city of Port-au-Prince to provide a suitable 
residence for the American Minister and appropriate 
off ices. 
The s43uent Steps and the New United States Policy toward 
Halt 1 
Although White and Kerney strongly favored the immediate 
withdrawal of all American forces from Haiti, Forbes thought 
that this would be too drastic a change. He preferred We.·let 
i;l::\E;l. ~ty: expire naturally in five years, and then get out. 
As he finally made his report: 
The Commission is of the opinion that the progressive 
steps looking toward the withdrawal of the assistance 
now being given by the American Occupation should be 
taken on the theory and understanding that the present 
treaty Will remain in force until 1936, it being under-
stood that such modifications as circumstances require 
and the two Governments agree upon may be made at any 
time. It is too early to suggest in what form the Ameri-
can Occupation should be liquidated upon the expiration 
of the treaty or in what form such further aid and assis-
tance as the Haitian Government might desire from the 
United States. should be provided. This can be more wise-
ly decided, ~n the light of the experience of the next 
few years.44-
Forbes had become convinced that to demand another extension 
of the original treaty would be of no purpose, and that to 
I 43. Presidentls Commission for the Study and Rev.iew of 
Conditions in Haiti, pp. 20-21. 
~. ~ •• p. 9. 
I 
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remain in Haiti at all after 1936 would be a serious blunder 
of foreign policy. In conversations with Heiser, Dunn, 
Hoover, Redmayhe, and his brother Edward during or shortly 
after the working period of the Commission, he seemed to 
come to the view that, no matter what the United States did 
in Haiti, it was becoming the scapegoat of every politician 
who aspired to power. Its mere presence in the country 
I 
geherated ill-feeling. Unquestionably, over the course of 
their 125 years of independence Haitians had known little 
stability, had turned the word Republic into an empty term, 
and by 1915 had become cannibals devouring themselves from 
an insatiable hunger. Unquestionably, too, we had given 
them stability, tutored them in democracy, and brought a 
nearly complete halt to corruption. Yet the change was not 
genuine. The flower of democracy had been grown elsewhere 
and planted in·Haitian soil; it was not a natural product 
of the Haitian climate. Democracy in Haiti stood without 
roots, without a national will, without a tradition. If 
Haiti were ever to find herself, it had to do it through 
its own disorder, and, though the path be difficult and 
spotted with blood, by finding its own solutions to the ills 
of the Haitian body-politic. 
Forbes' sequent steps, following the line of his think-
ing, were for the United States 
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(1) to effect over the course of the next six years a 
rapid Haitianization of all services--finance, medical, coast 
guhrd, Garde d'Haiti, public works, education; 
I . 
· (2) to select American officers for the Occupation de-
partments who were more liberal in their thinking and atti-
tudes toward the colored race; 
(3) to recognize the temporary president provided for 
by the internal settlement so that a legislative assembly 
might be readily gathered to elect a permanent president and 
retake the reins of administration; 
(4)to recognize the president elected by the new National 
Assembly, provided that no fraud was found to be involved 
in' the electi onj 
(5) to replace the High Commissioner with a non-military 
minister; 
(6) to insist that, loss in efficiency or not, this new 
non-milita~ Minister to the Haitian Government was to achieve 
Ha.itianization of the services without delay; 
(?) to effect gradual withdrawal of the Marines; 
(8) to modify the treaty when necessary to enable the 
Un.ited States to cut the strands of the Occupation by 1936.45 
' 
45. "When we sat down," states Forbes 11 to agree on our recom-
mendations and devise and outline our ''sequent steps" the Com-
mi~sion found little trouble in agreeing upon both form and 
substance. Each one studied them over and had suggestions 
whdch were discussed in full committee, Fletcher, as usual, 
inl the matter of preparation of our documents, taking a leading 
part. He is most accomplished and skillful." (Forbes, Haitian 
Jorrnal, p. 61J _ 
'j' 
'' 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE MomJN COMMISSION ON EDUCATION 
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Had there been less of a disposition to deal with 
the island as a conquered territory and more to help 
a sister state in distress, less of a desire to demon-
strate efficiency and more to help others to the ef-
ficient direction of their own affairs, less of en-
forced control and more of helpful cooperation, the 
United States might today have greater reason to be 
proud of per intervention in the affairs of a struggling 
neighbor. 
Thi:s statement by Dr. Robert Russa Moton, Chairman of the 
Presidential Commission on Education in Haiti represented 
his' attitude toward our policy during the past fifteen years, 
and his doubts as to just how much assistance we had given'~ 
to the development of democracy in that country. 
Robert Russa Moton2 was born on August 26, 1867, the 
child of former slaves in Amelia County, Virginia. Like 
many of the freed Negroes· of the South after the War between 
the States, his parents settled down to work in the same 
area where they had lived most of their lives, obtaining 
employment on the plantation of Samuel Vaughan in Prince 
Edward County, where his father supervised the hands and 
1. Report of the United States Commission on Education in 
Haiti, Publ !cations of the Dept •. of State, Latin American 
Series, No. 5 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government 
Printing Office, October, 1930), p. 731 hereinafter referred 
to as Moton Commission Report. 
2. Robert Russa Moton, Finding a Way OUt: an Autobiography 
(Garden City: Doubleday Doran and Co., 1929). 
Dr. Moton died May 31, 1940. See also 11 Progress of 
Negro .Education in the South, 11 Proceedings of the National 
Education Association, 1916, pp. 106-11. 
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his mother was cook. Moton £ound the li£e idyllic, with 
play and £un alternating between childhood labors and the 
normal chores o£ the children o£ tenant £armers. 
His mother, who had somehow learned the rudiments o£ 
reading and writing, began surreptitiously, out of fear for 
the disapproval o£ her employer, to teach the child some-
thing o£ her small knowledge. Vaughan, £ar from being angry> 
on'making the discovery, heartily approved, and even assisted 
in the task. When a free school for Negroes was established 
by a former Con£ederate officer, Vaughan enrolled the boy 
in the third grade, where he proved, i£ no.t a prilliant stu-
dent, an enthusiastically curious one. His playmates were 
both white and colored, and one of these little white play-
£ellows, George Denny, the son o£ a local minister, later 
in life became as President o£ the University o£ Alabama 
a partner with him in the development o£ interracial under-
standing.} 
His elementary educa.tion proved to be intermittent in 
those di£ficult years, and his later schooling was interrupted 
by many odd periods of work--in the homes o£ wealth Virginia 
gentlemen, in lumber camps, and on various plantations. Only 
by his tenacious character and his growing awareness o£ the 
3. Jacques Cattell and E.E. Ross, Leaders in Education, 
(Lancaster, Pa.: The Science Press, 194&k p. 272. 
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need for education did he manage to complete his pre-college 
training. 
At the age of eighteen, he entered Hampton Institute, 
where he again demonstrated, if not brilliance in his studies, 
a tremendous capacity to grasp the essentials of the 1 ife 
about him and his place in that life. At Hampton he met 
Booker T. Washington, whose philosophy of vocational educa-
tion for the Negro as a means toward advancing the American 
Negro along the proper path to his destiny gave him pride in 
himself and confidence in his race. Important for his later 
chairmanship of the Commission to Haiti was his conviction 
that the path of the Negro lay not so much in emulating the 
characteristics and absorbing the civilization of the white 
man as in developing his own special contributions to modern 
twentieth century life. The Negro, before he could make 
these contributions, must have pride in himself as a partner 
in 'civilization, not a hostile belligerent pride, but the 
quiet pride which comes from the awareness of his own capa-
bi~ities. Even before graduation the enormously popular 
Moton was marked for a position on the faculty of Hampton 
Institute. 
In 1890, upon graduation, Moton was selected as comman-
in charge of military discipline at the school, with 
title of "major", a title thereafter attached to him for 
remainder of his life. Drawing ever closer in friendship 
• 
·• 
, 
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to' the great Booker T. Washington, he travelled over the 
South and North on interracial committees, raising funds 
for the Institut~and meeting with northern philanthropists, 
such as Juiius Rosenwald and George Eastman, who became his 
close personal friends and admirers. In countless discus-
sions with Negro leaders, ·he developed great skill in recon-
cUing divergent points of view concerning their educational 
and general aims. 
After the death of Washington, Moton was selected for 
the principalship of Tuskegee. He was by now one of the 
most noted, and yet most humble, Negro leaders in the coun-
try. Moton's close association with the methods and ideas 
or Washington and the similarity between the administrative 
practices of Tuskegee and Hampton enabled the new adminis-
trator to assume his tasks with little confusion. The phy-
' 
sical plant was enlarged, endowments increased, and a so-
called "college department" established to train teachers 
and technicians. 
What Clyde Barnett said of Booker T. Washington applied 
equally to Moton: 11 In politics Booker T. Washington was the 
recognized leader of the Negro people. He was a Republican, 
although he rarely took part in open political combat. Dur-
ihg the period when his influence had been established, there 
wlre a few important appointments made to Negroes which Booker 
Tl· Washington did not pass upon, and it would have amazed the 
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white South of that day had they known how many important 
! 
pqlitical posts went to white men in the South simply be-
cJuse Dr. Washington had pointed them 
cl!ass men with a sense of fairness as 
out as capable, high 
to race."4 Moton was 
astute, a student of human nature, with a yast fund of com-
min sense to temper his idealism, and was sought after by 
high government officials who had learned to trust his 
I 
I 
I jtidgment. 
I 
I 
Moton enjoyed familiarity with Taft, Wilson, Harding, 
' I 
C~ol idge, Hoover, and Frankl in Delano Roosevelt. He knew 
TJft because of Taft's association with Hampton Institute 
' a~, a trustee, and thus began his counsel at the White House, 
al'though he actually went there infrequently. 
During World War I he asked Wilson to appoint Emmett 
Scott, a Negro, Assistant to the Secretary of War, that a 
camp be established for the training of Negro officers, and 
that a combat unit composed only of Negroes be created--
al;l three of which requests Wilson granted. Later he became 
Wi!lson' s personal representative in France. Wilson issued 
I 
hi1
1
s famous anti-lynching letter in reply to a letter by 
Moton. A Negro defending a colored girl from the attack of 
two white men had shot one of the white men, and before trial 
4.1 W.H.Hughes and F.D.Patterson, editors, ~R~o~b~e~r~t~R~u~s~s~a~M~o~t~oco:n 
of Hampton and Tuskegee, (Chapel Hill: University of North 
carolina •r•••· I956r, ••· 188-189. 
I 
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been hanged by a mob. Moton thought that an official state-
ment of condemnation by the President of the United States, 
I 
who was himself a Southerner and the first man of the South 
to occupy the White House since the Civil War, would go a 
long way toward eradicating lynching. 
Very shortly after the First World War, Moton turned 
part of his attention to our foreign policy in regard to 
independent Negro nations. He wrote to Harding on February 
14, 1921: 
I 
As far as I have been able to ascertain, there has grown 
up in the countries south of us a feeling of distrust 
of the motives of our country with respect to them. I 
also understand there has grown up in Haiti and Santo 
Domingo, not only distrust, but a bitterness against this 
country. I hope that you may find it possible to use, 
if necessary, an utmost of your authority to re-establish 
confidence in the minds of these sister countries. With 
respect to Haiti, San Domingo, and Liberia, I hope you 
may in your own wise and sympathetic way take a firm 
hand in the economic, educational, and sanitary rehabili-
tation of these countries and, especially, in the develop-
ment of their wonderful natural resources. It is further 
hoped that whatever America does for these three Negro 
republics it will be done in the spirit of cooperation 
and not of domination, and that there will be no encroach-
ment on their rights and prerogatives as individual na-
tions.~ 
He suggested that a joint commission of American white and 
colored persons be appointed to report upon the pressing needs 
of these three nations and make pertinent recommendations. 
He was on very intimate terms with Herbert Hoover, pro-
bably more so than any other Negro and in many ways more than 
5. !Hughes and Patterson, Robert Russa Moton of Hampton and 
Tuskegee, P• 193. 
I 
' 
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many whites. Before Hoover became president and while 
Secretary of Commerce under Coolidge, he had appointed Moton 
to organize a committee of outstanding colored people in the 
South to work with the Red Cross to help alleviate the mise-
ries of the 1927 Mississippi River flood. Moton found Hoover 
to be just. On Moton's complaint, for example, Hoover dis-
charged a woman government employee in Louisiana because of 
he:rJ notorious injustice to Negroes. 11 In my judgment, 11 wrote 
Moton to Mr. Sidney B. Thompson, "Secretary Hoover is a man 
who disregards differences in race, color, creed, and condi-
tion. He sees and serves humanity in terms of equality, 
justice, and absolute fairness. I have known him for many 
years, and rather intimately ••• and ••• this is the impression 
he has universally made on all who have come in intimate 
contact with h1m. 11 6 
Yet despite his prominence in American education, Moton 
never lost his essential humility and his sense of dedica-
tion to the elevation of the Negro. 11 I have to pray often 
for patience, 11 he said once, "----patience with whites are 
satisfied with so little progress, patience with Negroes 
who are so slow in grasping opportunities, patience even 
with God who seems sometimes to move so slowly. 11 7 His dedi-
cation to the Negro had two aims--the elevation of the Negro 
I 
6. Hughes and Patterson, Robert Russa Moton of Hampton and 
Tusk'egee, pp. 201-202. 
I 7• [bid., P• 228. 
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as an American and the elevation o~ the Negro in terms o~ 
race everywhere in the world. 
I 
hi~ provocative book, What the 
I 
When in 1929 he published 
Negro Thinks, 8 he was large-
i ly dealing with the Negro o~ the South, but to Hoover it 
settled the question whether or not Moton should be the 
colored member or the Forbes Commission. 
As had been indicated earlier in this study, the Senate 
and House were willing that a Negro be a member or the Com-
mission, and both Hoover and Forbes thought it a wise step. 
Bu~ as the objection came rrom Haitians themselves,9 Hoover 
ririally decided to entrust to Moton and an all-colored com-
mission the ~ield or education.alone. Moton wrote to Forbes 
asking him when he should go to Hai~+. and Forbes replied 
tha.t to go sooner than the April 14th elections would be un-
wis'e, and that it would be better to be there just in time 
' 
~or, Roy 1 s inauguration, which was May 15.10 As matters 
8. Robert Russa Moton, What the Negro Thinks (Garden City: 
Doubleday Doran and Co., 1929). Moton's depth o~ character 
is noted by the well-known rollowing anecdote: Once, at the 
corner o~ 5th Avenue and 42nd Street in New York during the 
late a~ternoon rush, a woman was heedless o~ the automobile 
signal lights. She started to cross the street just as the 
trar~ic moved against her. Thoughtless o~ sel~, Moton threw 
himsel~ in ~ront o~ the tra~ric and rescued the jaywalker 
~rom almost certain death or serious injury. When he was 
asked his name by a newspaper reporter, he replied, 11 Just say 
a black man did itl 11 · 
9· ,See Chapter Two, this study. 
lO.IDear Dr. Moton: 
Your cordial letter has come and I am hoping that we can 
meet and talk things over very thoroughly at Hampton. The 
I 
situation in Haiti is very mixed and tragic. 
fOur commission immediately established contacts with the 
opp?sition to the government, which ~as vocal and much more 
I, 
i 
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developed, the Moton Commission got to Haiti a month later 
wnen Moton felt that the political broil had· quieted enough 
for him to make an investigation without incident. 
numerous than the friends of the government. The Americans, 
by the manner in which they seized control and carried it 
on, had made their activities very unpopular except in the 
matter of sanitation. For example, they had the Church 
strongly set against them, partly by reason of their incur-
sion into the educational field. I am writing to the State 
Department, requesting that all the material which were-
ce,ived applicable to education be turned over to you. You 
wi'll have noticed in our report we touched very lightly on 
the educational aspect of things, and we: gave as a reason 
that this was a field to be developed later by your group. 
I should advise your going to Washington and reading 
over the testimony submitted to our commission. We had re-
lays of stenographers take down in shorthand everything that 
was said, and while much of it is worthless and not worth 
reading in detail, yet I think it would be wise for you to 
haye a running knowledge of about what was put before us. 
The testimony of Mr. Leger was most important. That should 
be read with care. In that he charged the Americans with 
having for the first time introduced a color consciousness 
ambng the Haitians. He was about the most intelligent and 
straight man with whom we dealt, and was the leader of the 
opposition group through whom I conducted most of my nego-
tiations with the opposition. 
The whole situation to me is a tragedy--a tragedy be-
cause. I don 1 t see any good ending to it. I cannot feel hap-
py over what we have done because it wil 1 inevitably for a 
while incure to the disadvantage of the great mass of the 
population. We have acted in a fair way to wreck a working 
or~anization that was doing a great good for the people. 
Unfortunately this structure was built on unsound and in-
secure foundations. It had not got popular support and so 
it: could not endure. Hence I feel that the action of our 
commission was the best way out of a very bad situation. 
In fact, when we got there it looked as if there were no 
way out. And it was only by dint of a lot of manipulation 
and negotiation, using persuasion here and pressure there, 
that we managed to reach any kind of conclusion. The de-
tails of aU this 1 will give you when we meet. 
Some of the things the United·States has done in Haiti 
have been done admirably, and some, on the other hand very 
ba?ly. It is very hard to apportion the proper amount of 
praise and blame. Where really intelligent work has been 
I 
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The other members of his Commission were noted Negro 
educators as well. Mordecai Wyatt Johnson was born in Paris, 
i Tennessee January 12, 1890, studied at Morehouse College in 
done by really intelligent men, it is heart-breaking to have 
to criticize and there is a great deal that we left unsaid 
and that had to be left unsaid. If, for example, we had put 
ou~r critical comments in our report, the Haitian newspapers 
and the hostile press in the United States would have culled 
those items, left out the words of praise, and, using our 
own words and our findings as their sanction painted a wholly 
black picture which would have been utterly unjust. That is 
a very easy thing to do if one wants to be mean. None of 
the good achievements would have been noted. 
My experience in administration of dependencies is ex-
tensive enough so that I have absolute familiarity with many 
of the fundamental problems with which General Russell and 
his cohorts were confronted, and I had met and solved many 
of the problems which he had to meet. This in one sense 
equips me for such a job as I had to do in Haiti, and in 
another sense disqualifies me because of my being wedded to 
a certain line of policy. Hence, I had to be very self-
distrustful in criticizing what General Russell was doing, 
fearing lest I should be unfair and too much inclined to my 
own preconceived ideas. 
I come now to the important part of my letter; namely, 
answering your question as to when you had better go to Haiti. 
Under no circumstances would it have been wise for you to go 
prior to the elections which take place on April 14. Condi-
tions are extrem~ly tense and highly critical. President 
Borne retires from off ice on the 15th of May. If the Council 
of State fails to act Monday, April 14, and to elect Mr. Roy, 
the compromise candidate, according to the compromise plan 
which we worked out and which was agreed to by both sides, it 
will have been due to the unwise action of the opposition 
leaders in rushing about and claiming too much and setting 
the administration against them. That is to say, these fool-
ish opposition leaders will have announced the immediate 
abolition of the Council of State and will then expect the 
Council of State to sign its own death warrant by electing 
the man who is to abel ish the Council. All the opposition 
leaders had to do was to keep quiet and the whole situation 
would have worked itself out. But the leaders down there 
impressed me as a very poor set, not well-grounded in morals 
and not men abounding in good sense. I think you will be 
co*vinced of this if you read tbe testimony submitted to us. 
I ~on 1 t doubt they were not in the group of agitators that 
appeared before us. 
I 
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Atlanta, the University of Chicago, the Rochester Theological 
Seminary, where he received in 1919 a Bachelor of Divinity 
degree, and at Harvard, which awarded him the Doctor of Di-
vini~ in 1923. From 1911 to 1913 he served as professor 
of economics and history at Morehouse, served on the YMCA, 
was pastor of the First Baptist Church at Charleston, West 
Virginia, and eventually rose in 1926 to the presidency of 
Howard University at Washington, D.C. As the first Negro 
president of Howard, he had a major hand in securing the 
passage in 1928 of a congression act which gave the univer-
sity federal status and made possible the granting of federal 
funds for its support and operation. Howard thus became the 
Now, in case the Council of State fails to elect the 
compromise candidate agreed upon, there will be precipitated 
into the situation a new problem which will immediately and 
vitally affect the question of when you should go. And un-
til the next steps have been decided upon, both in Washing-
ton. and in Haiti, and the new president selected, I think 
it would be. highly inopportune for your commission, or any 
commission, to expect to accomplish anything there. In fact, 
my recommendation would be that, probably under any circum-
stances, the lOth of May would be the earliest date on which 
it would be wise for you to arrive. Upon the point, however, 
if the election of Mr. Roy goes through smoothly, General 
Russell would have a perfectly good opinion, and I should 
ask his advice if you want to be there before the.lOth of 
May'. The reason I say the lOth of May is because the in-
auguration of the new president will take place on the 15th 
and I think it might be a good thing to have your commission 
there to attend the inauguration and that that would be a 
favorable time to conduct your investigation ••• ! am afraid 
we are going to have some rather trying problems at the 
Hampton meeting. (Forbes, Haitian Journal, pp. 74-76l 
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1'irst university o1' any description receiving annual direct 
su~port 1'rom the Federal Government. 11 
Benjamin Franklin Hubert was born in May1'1eld, Georgia, 
December 25, 1884, and was educated also at Morehouse. 
Further study brought him to the Massachusetts State College 
' 
at Amherst, the University o1' Wisconsin, Allen University, 
-
the University o1' Minnesota, and Harvard University. From 
19l2 until 1919 he was director o1' agriculture and the agri-
cultural extension service at South Carolina State College, 
and 1'rom 1920 to 1926 pro1'essor o1' agriculture and superin-
teJ:\dent o1' agricultural instruction at the University o1' the 
State of Alabama. In 1926, he became president of Georgia 
State College (later called Savannah State).l2 
William Taylor Burwell Williams was born at Stone Bridge, 
Virginia, on June 3, 1866, and was the oldest member of the 
Commission. A student at Hampton Institute, from 1886 to 
1888, he went on to Phillips Academy at Andover from 1889 
to 1893, then to Harvard. He served as a public school prin-
cipal in the Indianapolis schools 1'rom 1897 to 1902, then 
1'ield agent for Hampton Institute 1'rom 1902-03. His close 
contact with Moton came with his appointment to Tuskegee in 
1927 as Dean o1' the college.l3 
11. · G. James Fleming and Christian E. Burckel (ads.) 
Who's Who in Colored America (Yonkers-on-Hudson, Christian 
E. Burckel and Associates, 1950), p. 307. 
' 
' 12. I Ibid. , p • 27 5. 
' 13. Who Was Who in·America, Vol. I, 1897-1942 (Chicago: 
A.N., Marquis Co., 1942), p. 1356. 
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Leo Mortimer Favrot, born in 187~, was known chiefly 
for his work in the county training schools for Negroes in 
Louisiana. 1~ 
The Commdssion remained in Haiti for only rive days, 
from June lOth to June 15th, 1930, and the official report 
was printed in October of the same year. 
1. Three School Systems 
The Commission found three major school systems in 
Haiti: the National Public free schools operating under the 
1912 Compulsory Education Act, which all Haitian children 
wer,e eligible to attend; the older Roman Catholic parochial 
system in which some schools were free, while others charged 
fees, depending upon the location and the circumstances in-
volving the establishment of the particular school; and the 
Service Technique established by the Americans in 1922. In 
addition, Protestant denominational schools had been created, 
such as those set up by the Seventh Day Adventists, Baptists, 
Episcopalians, and so on. 
As Elie Vezina had indicated in his probe of the Catho-
lie educational system, all schools except the Service Tech-
niqUe were required by law to operate under the State Secre-
tary for Public Instruction, which meant that the National 
Ilj:. Leo Mort1Dier li'avrot, Some Problems in the Education of 
the Ne·gro in the South and How We Are Tryinp; to Meet Them in 
Louisiana. An address before the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People, Cleveland, Ohio~ June 25, 
1919 (Baton Rouge!Ramirez-Jones Printing Co., 19191• Also 
see his A Study of County Training Schools for Negroes in the 
South (Charlottesville, Virginia: Trustees or the John F. 
Slater Fund, 1923). 
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Pul),lfc Schools were the official school system of Haiti. 
Th~ Haitian Government favored these schools and expected 
! . 
the~ eventually to become the sole educational system of 
the' nation, Moton found, which substantiated Vezina's find-
' 
ing': that Catholic schools found difficulty getting permits 
to 'operate or expand.15 The National Schools consisted of 
217! urban primary, 384- rural primary, and six secondary 
' 
I ,. (tlle lycees), equalling three fifths of all schools in Haiti. 
! 
Tea:chers were chosen by the Secretary for Public Instruction, 
I 
whol had cabinet position and was usually close to the Pre-
1 
sid~nt of the Republic, and the entire mechanism was supposed 
to bperate under this Secretary with the aid of the afore-
mentioned Central Council of the University of Port-au-Prince 
and! the various local councils of the nation. This National 
System did not demand strict uniformity, however, for within 
the' system were the free Communal schools, with teachers 
cho~en by local communal commissions and paid out of communal 
! 
treksuries rather than that of the National Government. 
There were ninety-six of this type (twenty-two urban, seventy-
, 
' four rural), enough to give a flexibility to the entire pat-
tern of the official educational matrix. 
The Roman Catholic schools, apparently not very popular 
with the Government, despite their long tradition and their 
15.' See El ie Vezina 1 s report on the Church, Chapter Four, 
this study. 
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excellence, were, as indicated, both free and private, de-
l 
pen?ing upon circumstances. The Congregational schools were 
I 
' in ~he towns and were taught by Brothers; the Presbyterial 
I 
were on the farms and taught by priests. These schools, 
pri~rily under the administration of whites, had the taint 
of the foreigner in eyes of Haitian officials, and more than 
onc;e were referred to as a relic of French colonial ism in 
' the! country. 
Generally, the primary level consisted of six years of 
tra:ining, the secondary level of six or seven years. Super-
ior! education was limited to law, medicine, and applied 
sci'ence (chiefly civil engineering). Law was most popular, 
. , 
as dt offered the elite a path to civil service and politi-
cal' careers, medicine far less popular, and applied science 
a p'oor third. Few lower schools gave very much in the way 
of preparation in the physical sciences, Which may have been 
why applied science did not attract many students. Haitian 
sc~ools offered few vocational and commercial courses. 
The Service Technique operated under the Department of 
Agriiculture of the Halt ian Government. Dr. Freeman, the 
Di:r"ector, was appointed by the President of Haiti on nomina-
tidn by the President of the United States, which made him 
fori all practical purposes an American appointee. Though 
Moton did not make such a recommendation, Forbes privately 
the opinion that a good deal of criticism might have 
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been avoided had the Service Technique been under a well-
known Haitian agricultural technician acting with the advice 
of a council of American and Haitian scientists. In any 
everit, the emphasis at the Service Technique was upon agri-
cultural and industrial education, with opportunities for 
practical learning offered in its operation of veterinary 
clinics, experimental stations, and special departments of 
forestry and markets. 
2. Statistical Data 
I 
I The Commission travelled comparatively little and the 
i 
statistics reported are probably unreliable. The following 
table gives the general picture of the urban and rural pri-
mar~ national and presbyterial schools, but the table comes 
from J.D.Dorsainvil's Le Probl~e de L1Enseignement Primarie 
en Haiti, which was published in 1922.i6 No other table, 
Motci:n, states, of any comparable rel !ability was available. 
Department Schools 
West 
South 
North 
Artibonite 
Nortb.Arest 
Totals 
221 
159 
201 
92 
36 
709 
Population 
of Haiti 
744,220 
511,740 
353,600 
331,330 
981,000 
2,038,890 
Child 
Population 
of Haiti 
{ages 7-18) 
126,5o8 
89,272 
60,092 
56,311 
17,680 
349,863 
16. Moton Commission Report, pp. 5 and 6. 
Enrollment Attendance 
12,179 
11,110 
13,513 
4,889 
1,984 
43,675 
8,143 
7,989 
9,648 
3,007 
1,174 
29,961 
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Dorsainvil's figures included only a few types of Catho-
lic, primary schools, and no private schools at all. Consider-
! 
ing all of these, public and private, Moton--working more by 
intuition more than anything else, one suspects, as he had 
! 
very little else to go by--figured the school population of 
Haiti to be by 1930 approximately 400,000 to 450,000, with 
about a fourth of that enrolled in school and 80,000 attend-
ing'. If these figures are not quite correct, they illustrate 
the fundamental that only a pitiful fraction of the school 
! population of Haiti actually attended anything resembling 
elementary education. 
I The poor attendance, stated the Commission, was the 
result of failure in the rural areas rather than the urban. 
' 
! 
Moton found that the cities with a gross population of 250,000 
peo,ple and 54,000 children had good enrollment, but the rural 
areas with 1,750,000 people and almost 350,000 children of 
sc~ool age had only 46,000 enrolled. Haiti bad a compulsory 
school law (Act 32, October 4, 1912), but if it operated at 
allJ, it certainly did not in the rural areas of the country. 
If they did anything, peasants in the rural areas made token 
entollment of their children in order to comply with the 
written law, then withdrew them for needed work on the tiny 
far:ms, in the homes, and in getting goods to the central 
i 
rna kets. In the cities, the children served few purposes 
~ o~ school; in the rural districts, they served ~ew pur-
poses £n school, at least in the minds o~ poor ~armers whose 
' onl~ power-source lay in human hands and ~eet. 
Moton totalled all primary schools at 1,067, with an 
enrollment o~ 86,284 (53,936 boys and 32,348 girls), and a 
total attendance o~ 67,458. 17 Secondary schools (including 
private schools ~or boys and girls, public schools ~or boys, 
normal schools ~or girls, and special schools) equalled 28, 
with a total enrollment o~ 5,527 and an attendance o~ 5,062. 
The: one superior school in the country, the University o~ 
Por
1
t-au-Prince, had an enrollment and an attendance ot: 25. 
How[ many o~ these were women Moton did not state. 
' 
' 
"It is clear," stated the Commission's report, 
that the number o~ schools in Haiti is insu~~icient 
to provide school facilities t:or all the children 
o~ Haiti at any level, primary, secondary, or su-
perior; that the children in the towns are ~ar bet-
ter supplied with opportunities to attend school 
than the children in the country; and that not 
enough types o~ schools are provided, especially at 
the secondary and superior levels, to serve the 
needs o~ the Republic. It is clear also that the 
majority o~ the teachers and school ins~ectors are 
not properly quali~ied ~or their task.l~ 
The Service Technique, 1 9 despite its brie~ period o~ exist-
ence, had sixty-nine schools, 311 teachers and employees, and 
a petal enrollment ot: 11,430. This total enrollment included 
9,274 day, 1,709 night, and 447 summer, which meant that the 
I 17• Moton Commission Report, p. 8. 
18/. nll•, P• 14. 
19. Ibid., P• 9• 
Service Technique had a year-round curriculum compared to 
' 
the, ten-month curriculum of the Haitian National and religious 
institutions (October through July). The Service Technique 
was' composed of the Ecole Centrale, Ecole Elie Dubois, Maison 
Centrale, five Boys' Industrial Schools, one Girls' Industrial 
Schpol, and 60 farm schools scattered throughout rural Haiti. 
3. Primary Education 
The Commission was particularly disappointed with the 
state of elementary education, 20 since this was the level 
at which democracy would either stand or fall. The salaries 
of teachers were low (especially in the rural areas, where 
teac~rs were paid 4-8 dollars per week), trained men teachers 
for,boys were highly limited (the Commission suggested they 
/ be recruited from the boys' lycees in the cities), and the 
ratio of teachers to pupils was one to seventy (82,284) pri-
mary pupils were taught by 1,196 teachers). This ratio did 
not apply to the Service Technique, however, where the ratio 
was more acceptable. 
The Commission considered the National Schools to be 
the ,weakest in Haiti, with most of them located in rented 
buildings, lacking in equipment, and with low certification 
requirements or none for teachers. The Roman Catholic, on 
the other hand, md suitable buildings, were better equipped 
both with physical apparatus as well as trained teachers, 
20. 1 Moton Commission Report, pp. 15-18. 
and appeared to set the standards for both elementary and 
secondary education in Haiti. 
The curriculum at both National and Roman Catholic 
schpols, determined by the Secretary for State Instruction, 
was essentially the same--French, reading and writing, moral 
and, civic instruction, religious instruction, history and 
geography, manual work, arithmetic, elementary geometry, 
algebra, elementary science, hygiene, drawing, games and 
songs. 
Primary education at the Service Technique gave greater 
emphasis to the vocational aspect, less time to the literary 
branches which had been the mainstay of Haitian education 
for the past hundred and one-quarter years. In the cities 
the stress was on the industrial, in the rural, on the agri-
cultural, but the curriculum was fundamentally identical. 
During the last three years of the course of study, which 
was eight years in length instead of six as required in the 
Nat;ional and Catholic schools, students were expected to 
specialize in a particular trade or occupation.21 
21.: For girls, the specialization gave the following choices: 
embroidery, lace-making, dressmaking, millinery, cloth-
weaving, basket-weaving, cooking, domestic science, house-
keeping, bookkeeping, shorthand, typewriting. 
For boys, the choices were shoemaking, saddle-making, 
basket-making, tailoring, forging, sheet-metal work, plumbing, 
automobile mechanics, carpentry, cabinet-making, cement work, 
bricklaying, masonry, bookkeeping, shorthand, typewriting. 
The Service Technique differed from traditional Haitian 
education in two basic respects: in purpose and in method. 
The purpose of Haitian education still lay along the lines 
of hierarchical or caste philosophy, which asked education 
not so much to liberalize the masses as to teach each class 
its traditional function in life, not to break with the 
i past but to strengthen the past. As to method, where Haitian 
edU:cation sought to adjust the child to the school, the Ser-
vic1e Technique attempted to adjust the school to the child 
and provide for individual differences. 
' 
' 
The latter method 
/ 
tended to destroy the social order upon which the elite had 
based its way of life. 
Moton found that the buildings of the Service Technique 
were excellent, well-equipped, and generally new. Seventy-
three new structures had been completed since 1922. As a 
matter of fact, the only new buildings constructed for edu-
cational purpose, he found, since 1922 had been built for 
the Service Technique. 
4. ' Secondary Education 
Public secondary education22 was established for boys 
/ I 
only (the lycee). The most important lycee, and the biggest, 
was at Port-au-Prince, but the nation had five others. As 
with the public primary schools, buildings were poor, 
22. Moton Commission Report, pp. 19-22 
libraries and laboratories were either non-existent or in 
exceedingly poor condition, and the individual schoolrooms 
lacked blackboards, desks, lighting, and lunchroom facili-
ties in many cases, Physical education and opportunities 
for sports were entirely lacking, nor was space provided 
for school assemblies, The Catholic schools seemed better 
ho~sed and equipped, 
Both National and Catholic secondary levels had a six-
ye~r program which started approximately where the seventh 
grade in the American schools begins, and which consisted 
generally of reading, French, Latin, mathematics, history 
and geography (including the history of Haiti), Greek, 
Spa~ish, and the sciences, Hygiene was taken in the first 
year, botany the second, zoology the third, physics and 
chemistry the fourth and fifth, physics, chemistry, physi-
ology, the sixth, With laboratories and libraries so in-
adequate, the sciences could not have been very effective-
ly taught. Civics and moral instruction, together with 
drawing, completed the course. 
An additional seventh year was offered to students with 
promise, adding courses in hygiene, cosmography, philosophy 
and the history of philosophy, common law, and political 
economy. Students planning to advance to Law and careers 
in government service, theology, and journalism, ordinarily 
took this seventh year. 
I 
The Commission reported that Haiti had a total of 6,609 
students above what would be the eighth grade in the United 
States, and 5,567 in the secondary schools generally, 2,8 
persons per thousand in Haiti were in the secondary schools, 
compared with 9.8 per thousand Negroes in the United States, 
Despite the longer period of secondary education in Haiti, 
the, ratio of enrollment of students in the Haitian secondary 
I 
schools to the enrollment of students in all Haitian schools 
I 
was smaller than that of the United States, 
' .1' 
: The lycees were taught by Haitians, the Catholic sec-
ondary schools by Brothers and priests. Salaries in the 
National schools at this level amounted to thirty to sixty 
dollars per month for a twelve month period; in the Catholic, 
professors received fifty dollars, directors sixty. 
Once' again, Moton felt that the great defect in the 
secondary system was the overwhelming emphasis upon literary 
education rather than vocational, especially since the Ser-
vice Technique as yet extended only to primary education, 
5. :Higher Education 
Higher education23 trained only in four major categories: 
Medicine, Law, Applied Science, Teacher Training, As of June, 
1930, the School of Medicine had sixty-nine students (fifty-
one 'in Medicine, nine each in Pharmacy and Dentistry); the 
23. Moton Commission Report, pp. 23-29. 
School of Nursing, thirty-eight (thirty-six in Nursing, two 
in Midwifery); Law, 271; Applied Science, twenty-five; the 
Ecole Centrale (the Service Technique school.for the train-
ing of agricultural and industrial teachers, the only of-
ficial teacher-training institution in Haiti),654. One hundred 
and fifty more had to be added for the seventh year of sec-
ondary schools, which corresponded roughly to the first and 
second years of college, making a grand total of 1,207 stu-
dents above the twelve years of primary and secondary educa-
tio~, or one out of every three thousand in the population, 
Moton's chief objection in this scheme was the total 
lack of teacher training, with especial reference to the 
scientific fields upon which modern strong stable nations 
are'constructed, 11 Theconsequence, 11 hs said, 11 is that there 
is ~lmost entire absence of objectively gathered and scien-
tifically organized information regarding human problems in 
Haiti, There is no training in social work, and there is no 
organized activity which corresponds to the social service 
so prevalent in the cities of the United States or in the 
leading countries of Europe, 11 24 
The School of Medicine was organized under the State 
Department of the Interior in the Public Health Service, with 
clinical advantages at the Haitian General Hospital at Port-
au-Prince, 11 its out-patient service ••• in daily touch with the 
24 •. Moton Commission Report, p. 24. 
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faro.reachi ng public-health work of this department, ll25 As 
with the School of Nursing, the main trouble seemed to have 
bee11 that students r·eceived poor preparation in the National 
and'Catholic schools for the training demanded at the higher 
lev~l. Medical graduates seemed to be good and generally 
respected, nevertheless. Since 1920, seventy-eight had been 
I graduated, giving the entire nation 159 physicians, 42% of 
I 
whiqh made their livings in the Public Health clinics. 
1 Law was administered by the Department of Justice, but 
the 
1
legal requirements demanded in terms of student prepara-
tion were not enforced, Moton found. The faculty consisted 
of twelve professors and a director. 
I 
:The School of Applied Science had been founded in 1902, 
and had since graduated eighty-five engineers (civil pri-
mari;ly, with a few mechanical, electrical, chemical, and 
architectural). Occupying three ancient buildings, one of 
I 
which was more than a hundred years old while the other two 
! 
had originally been foundries, few aspects of the training 
were' little better than archaic. The last-received equip-
! 
ment! had arrived twenty- to twenty-five years before, only 
a handful of books were in the library, and the twelve pro-
fessors (seven of whom were former students) were paid at 
' 
the miserable rate of two dollars per hour. 
25. Moton Commission Report, p. 25. 
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The Ecole Centrale at Damien, the teacher training 
institution of the Service Technique, marked a contrast to 
the rather sombre picture of higher education under tradi-
! 
tional sponsorship. Housed in a beautiful new building, the 
! 
school possessed completely new equipment, modern shops, 
exp~rimental farms, gardens, and so on. Because of the strike 
of 1929~30, the school had difficulty obtaining students 
with the certificate of graduation from philosophy or rhetoric 
in the secondary classical course. Freeman accordingly ad-
mit~ed students with lesser qualifications, which resulted 
in domplaints from the Departments of Agriculture and Pub-
I 1 ic 'Instruction. 
6. 'objections to the Service Technique 
Regardless of its achievements within the relatively 
brie1:f period of its elltistence, the American-sponsored Ser-
i 
vice' Technique had not been a success in Haitian eyes. "Not-
' withstanding the evidence of good faith and good work set 
I 
:forth in the program of the Service Technique, the intelli-
gent Haitians, with the exception of a :few immediate1y con-
nected with the service, are practically unanimous in their 
opinions that the Service Technique is not a success," said 
Moton, although he noted that the critics generally approve 
the underlying idea.26 
26. Moton Commission Report, p. 57. 
See Annual Report of the Technical Service of the De-
partment of Agriculture and Professional Education,l928-29, 
Bulletin No. 17, Republic of Haiti, Port-au-Prince. 
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What were the major objections727 First, the Service 
was on too large, too costly a scale; it should have been 
in~tiated on a small scale and gradually been extended. 
How would the Haitian Government with its meager revenues 
support so huge an enterprise when the United States with-
dre~ its financial support at the end of the Occupation? 
Thei weakness of this objection lay in the fact that the 
United States most likely was willing to continue financial 
' aid, after American troops were withdrawn, until the Haitian 
! 
Gov~rnment became capable of supporting the Service. Had 
theiService begun on a small level in 1922, and evolved 
slowly, what could it have achieved in the mere fourteen 
years remaining to the Occupation authorities? Working on 
a large scale, the Service was subject to Conservative at-
tacR on the basis of its threat to financial stability; on 
I 
a smaller scale, it would have been equally subject to at-
tack from the liberal elements on the basis of insincerity 
and'inaction. With this first objection went the complaint 
that the peasants were taught the use of machinery before 
they were taught the use of the hoe, which appears equally 
invalid when one realizes that machinery makes the hoe ob-
solete. 
Second, too many American specialists in the Service 
27. 
1 
Moton Commission Report, pp. 57-61. 
wer~ paid high salaries from the Haitian treasury, inti-
mating that American imperialists were exploiting the na-
tion's reserves. To the average Haitian accustomed to a 
low standard of living these salaries might have appeared 
high, but they were not high when one considered American 
standards and the difficulty of getting specialists from 
the ,united States. 
Third, some specialists were so llacking in tropical 
knowledge as to be of little assistance. Some were accused 
of not being properly equipped for the work they had to do. 
Fourth, the Service operated extravagantly, with too 
much dupl.ication of effort, too much overhead; the misuse 
of funds was a frequent charge. Moton felt that this was 
only partially correct, since the Service was something 
new to Haitian experience and judgment. 
Fifth, American heads of department did not speak French, 
nor ,did they make any effort to learn. Moton agreed with 
this~ as had Forbes in regard to the remainder of the Occu-
pation machinery. 
Sixth, young Haitians were used as interpreters in the 
classrooms. Not only was this a deleterious factor in the 
teaching-l.earning situation, but frequently American in-
structors did not even bother to come to class, leaving in-
competent young Haitian interpreters to carry on classroom 
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instruction. Freeman had investigated this objection, and 
' found it applied to only a few instructors, who had been 
rep]:'i mand ed. 
the 
Seventh, the Service Technique intended to supplant 
/ 
elite's traditional goals of Haitian education. This 
was,correct. Here lay a difficult philosophical problem, 
' 
which Moton did not resolve. Was the United States to re-
constitute the Haitian educational machinery on the basis 
of ~eeds determined by the Haitian ruling class? Follow 
the iformer and suffer accusations of dictatorship; follow 
the latter, and continue the same type of education which 
originally led to the Occupation. In either case, the oc-
cup~ing power is on the horns of a dilemma. The Occupation 
ended too soon for the.United States to take a stand on 
this issue, but had it continued, two paths would have been 
open. Assuming that technical education is indispensable 
to a nation in a world where scientific and industrial 
prog'ress mean stability, mass production, high standards of 
living, and military strength, the United States could have 
' 
elth,er imposed technical education on the country despite 
outcries of dictatorship, or through a widespread system of 
, 
publicity tried to re-orient the elite to an acceptance of 
technical education. The latter path is undoubtedly better--
though slower. Certainly, judging matters from world events 
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in the thirty years which have elapsed since the Haitian 
Co~issions of 1930, a country either accepts industriali-
zation as a way of life or that pattern of life is forced 
upon it by extreme radical movements within and without. 
Eighth, the design to build twelve industrial schools 
at ?crt-au-Prince reached toward an excessive number, dis-
regarded the people in the Port-au-Prince area, and would 
tend to impoverish them. 
; Ninth, Service Technique officials were high-handed in 
that! they failed very often to consult with the Haitian 
i 
Government and in many ways considered themselves represen-
tatives of a superior philosophy. The Commission thought 
this charge justified. Setting up separate primary schools 
in town and country, said Moton, was a mistake. Haitian 
school law had been violated. Moton contended that the 
United States, by establishing an entirely new set of schools, 
retarded rather than hastened the solution of the educa-
t ional problem. The Service Technique had better bu i1 dings, 
equip~ent, and teachers than other schools because it had 
great:er funds available, 28 which promoted jealousy and envy 
from the competing National and Catholic schools. Had the 
United States poured its funds and assistance into improving 
28. Sixty-five percent of United States educational appro-
priations to Haiti went to the Service Technique, while the 
National Schools were neglected. Moton felt that the educa-
tional apparatus in Haiti which had proved its worth was that 
of the National Public Schools, and that only in these Nation-
al Schools was the salvation of the nation to be found. 
the National fre.e schools, it would have gone a long way 
toward obtaining for Haiti the well-equipped, well-housed, 
' 
well-staffed educational system which the American Occupa-
tion desired for her. 
Tenth, no increase in agricultural production or in 
the improvement of standards of living among the peasants 
had' occurred. This was hardly fair, since eight years were 
required to complete the primary curriculum1 and relatively 
few,teachers had as yet been graduated from the Ecole Cen-
trale. This objection was somewhat inconsistent with the 
first. 
Eleventh, instead of increasing opportunities for in-
dustrial enterprise, the Service had destroyed enterprise 
by competition with Haitians, putting many of them out of 
business. Products made in its industrial shops were sold 
at low prices in the cities and town, the revenue used for 
the 'improvement of the physical plants. In the United States, 
this, was standard procedure, but in Haiti, where manufactur-
ing 'existed only on a small scale, the better finished, 
cheaper products were a threat to urban enterprise. For 
example, the Service Technique's printing plant with modern 
equipment ruined the business of local Port-au-Prince print-
ing establishments. 
'Tw!ifth, the Government used revenue from sales of these 
industrial products to supplement its allotment, encouraging 
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further extravagance and mis-use of funds. In reality, 
Freeman hoped, through the sales of these products, to help 
the' Service Technique to be self-supporting. Theoretically, 
the, Service in time might have become a self-operating mechan-
ism independent of government allotment. 
Thirteenth, financial reports were not sufficiently de-
tailed to enable the Haitian Government to see just where 
its ,money was being spent. The Amer lean Finane ial Adviser 
accepted these reports, leaving the Haitian Government help-
less. in its demand$. 
I 
Fourteenth, the lowering of admittance standards after 
the strike of October, 1929, endangered the entire Haitian 
educational system. 
Fifteenth, in the haste to supply teachers, the Service 
Technique sent many poorly trained graduates out to rural 
areas. The major difficulty seemed to be that a good number 
of teachers with an urban industrial background were going 
to agricultural rural areas. 
Sixteenth, American employees who had come to Haiti with 
preco'nceived notions regarding the colored races practiced 
racial discrimination. Moton, as did Forbes, agreed with 
this objection. 
7. Recommendations. 
The recommendations which the Moton Commission made were 
extensive, and were aimed at four major objectives which Moton 
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set,up for the Haitian people: (1) the raising of the stan-
daras of living for all the people, (2) the increase of a-
griqultural and industrial effectiveness among the people, 
(3) 'the preparation of the masses for intelligent partici-
pation in the government, and (4) the training of leaders 
for 'the nation.29 Unless the educational system worked to-
ward these particular objectives, it was not working in the 
best interests of the Haitian community. 
Clearly, this was the philosophy which Booker T. Wash-
ington applied to the former Negro slave of the South, and 
the philosophy which Moton himself had been furthering at 
Tuskegee. Yet he realized--perhaps more than did Forbes, 
and, because of his race, with more sympathy--how much op-
position these objectives would engender among the culti-
, 
vated elite, whose position, thus threatened, was not far 
removed from that of the white southern planter in the years 
immediately preceding the American Civil War • 
. To understand the Haitian people one must bear in mind 
,constantly something of their history and traditions. 
'It must be remembered first that they emerged from 
•s lavery and that they threw off the yoke of the French 
completely in 1804. Few nations have thrown off the yoke 
of slavery and survived as an independent nation over 
so long a period. They have a right to be proud of 
this achievement and to honor the heroes who led their 
fight for freedom. This achievement lives vividly in 
their memory. Their books, .their songs, and their ·-
~ations echo constantly the fervor of their patriotism. 
They have maintained their f~eedom for this long ~erlod 
of years and expect to continue to maintain it. Any 
gesture on the part of a foreign nation that might be 
29. Moton Commission Report, pp. 62-64. 
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interpreted as a desire to infringe upon or limit this 
freedom in any way arouses instant suspicion and oppo-
sition. 
The Haitians are basically members of the Negro 
race. Th~ are proud of their achievements as black 
people. They know full well that the white race is 
dominant in the world today and resent bitterly the air 
of superiority on the part of any member of the white 
race that this dominant position may sometimes cause 
him to assume. Th~ are proud of their noteworthy con-
tributions in the fields of history, 1 iterature, and 
poetry; of the sculptors and musicians they have pro-
, duced; of the physicians and lawyers, the statesmen 
· and rulers that have gained recognition. Any intima-
tion that any race regards them as -inferior is a source 
of keen resentment, and the manifestation of such an 
attitude is a marked aloofness toward that race. They 
do not care to come to America because here they detect 
signs of racial discrimination. They enjoy travel in 
France because in that country their race and color 
cause them no embarrassment. They call themselves the 
oldest child of the French Revolution, and to them the 
slogan of that period, 11 liberty, equality, fraternitY," 
has a significance not exceeded anywhere on the face 
of the globe.30 
30. Moton Commission Report, p. 65. 
on pp. 51, he ~ives his observations and comments, in 
which he remarks: 'Whatever the shortcoming of Haiti's pre-
sent school system,-evidence is not lacking that the Haitian 
people have an abiding faith in education. The school laws 
framed under the direction of her rulers and statesmen dur-
ing past years show a clear grasp of many of her educational 
needs and a completeness of detail in the wording of the 
regul!ations to make these laws effective. There is found 
outlined in a law of 1864, for example, a special three-year 
secondary course differing from the early courses of the 
/ lycees and providing for agricultural and manual arts. In 
1890, the establishment of a school for practical agriculture 
for boys at Thor was authorized by law. In 1912, a trade 
school for boys was similarly authorized at Port-au-Prince~ 
and Ecole Elie Dubois with practical courses for girls was 
established the same year. An appreciation of the value of 
normal training for all types of teachers is likewise reflected 
in the certification laws. The general plan for the organi-
zation and administration of her school system, while perhaps 
not fully adapted to the needs of a democratic society, is a 
workable plan, and, in the hands of a well-qualified personnel, 
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The recommendations made to the President by the 
Mpton Commission were so important that they deserve 
to be read in full:3 1 
I. Administration 
In pursuance of the foregoing presentation 
of the present status of education in Haiti and 
discussion of her social and economic needs, the 
Commission makes the following recommendations: 
(National Schools) 
1. That a unified educational· program in 
Haiti be restored, whereby all types of education-
al institutions shall be under the direction of 
the Secretary of State for Public Instruction. 
2. That the state educational council au-
thorized under the laws of Haiti be. restored and 
made to function; its membership to be representa-
tive of the five political departments of theRe-
public, of education at its three levels--primary, 
secondary, and superior--and also of vocational 
education; the number to be limited to constitute 
a working body; that the council by legislative 
enactment be clothed with authority to adopt re-
gulations for the general administration of all 
schools, to recommend the educational budget to 
the legislative assembly, and to operate in the 
administration of schools; the chairman and ex-
ecutive officer to be the Secretary of State for 
Public Instruction. 
co~ld be made to produce results. On reading the school 
laws of Haiti, one is forced to the conclusion that Haiti 
has not lacked the capacity to conceive and the will to 
provide a school system, but she has unfortunately lacked 
the trained personnel and the money to execute her ideals. 
It is the belief of the Commission that with certain modi-
fications and additions her exacting educational program 
can be made to meet fully the demands of a democratic society. 11 
· At still another point, he significantly stated: 11 The _ 
approach to a practical idea must be made with full regard 
fo~ the people's national ideals, and with the objective of 
preserving what is fine and noble in their present system, 
while supplementing this with such practical training as 
will produce a complete and well-rounded educational program." 
(p. 66). . 
31. Moton Commission Report, pp. 57-61. 
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3, That the Secretary of State for Public In-
struction be provided with an adequate staff of assis-
tants to include trained directors, one each in the 
fields of primary, secondary, and superior education, 
and one in the field of agricultural and industrial 
education; each of these to be charged with the gene-
ral dire.ction of his particular field of education; 
these directors to be selected for their superior 
training and fitness for the task, their tenure of of-
fice to be made reasonably secure, 
4. That the district inspectors and their assis-
tants be appointed by the state educational council 
on the nomination of the Secretary of State for Public 
Instruction; qual if !cations of inspectors to include 
minimum requirements of academic and normal-school 
training: in addition to the inspectors, supervisors 
be provided in the fields of agricultural and industrial 
education and other special supervisors as may be needed. 
5. That local school boards be created either 
in the several districts or in the communes for the 
encouragement of local interest in, and responsibility 
for, the educational program in their section. 
6. That funds from the National Treasury be bud-
geted and distributed for education in accordance with 
a more equitable plan as regards number, residence, 
and classification of pupils and other considerations 
involved, 
7. That a schedule of teachers' salaries be a-
dopted, giving payment on a basis of-their preparation, 
type of service rendered, and success in their work, 
as well as on their fitness in other respects as pro-
. vided in the laws of Haiti. 
8. That immediate steps be taken for the increase 
of teachers• salaries, on the lower levels especially, 
on such a scale as will permit all teachers to devote 
the full amount of time to the work called for in the 
schedules of the department, thereby adding to the dig-
nity of the profession and increasing its attractions 
for qualified persons. 
(Service Technique) 
9. That there be an immediate cessation of capital 
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outlay for farm schools until those already built can 
be adequately staffed and efficiently operated. 
10. That there be an immediate reduction in the 
scale of operations in all branches of the Service 
Technique, so as to provide a more equitable alloca-
tion of the budgetary funds for education between the 
schools operated by the Service Technique and those 
operated by the National Government. 
11. That a clearly defined separation be made 
in administration and in the budget, between the ex-
perimental and extension work in agriculture and the 
strictly educational work of training teachers and 
technicians. 
12. That the operation of farm schools and the 
extension service be conducted within the limits of 
the number of teachers and agents with standard quali-
fications for the work. 
13. That measures be taken to coordinate more 
closely the activities of demonstration agents and 
the teachers of farm schools. 
14. That teachers in farm schools be encouraged 
to live near the schools and that model teacherages 
be built for their use as part of the farm school e-
quipment. 
15. That a differentiation of courses be made 
at the Ecole Centrale !o give (a) advanced training 
in agriculture and industrial arts for technicians, 
demonst~ation agents, supervisors, and secondary tea-
chers, and (b) for teachers in farm and industrial 
schools for primary grades. 
16. That a careful articulation be made of pri-
mary school courses in farm and industrial schools with 
the work of the lycees and colleges to avoid a too early 
determination of the type of education which the child 
shall ultimately pursue. 
17. That a type of work be inaugurated for rural 
homes and schools that will combine for the present the 
.work of the Jeanes supervisor in the United States and 
Africa, the home demonstration agent, and the rural 
public-health nurse. 
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18. That the practice be continued of extending 
courses to advanced students and workers for study in 
foreign countries to prepare them for positions of 
higher responsibility in the service. 
19. That the allocation of courses at the Ecole 
Centrale be made to students from different parts of 
the island with preference to the students with rural 
background and agricultural interests. 
20. That the boarding department at the Ecole 
Centrale be maintained for the accommodation of stu-
dents from the rural districts and distant cities of 
the island. 
21. That the policy be continued till the ex-
piration of the treaty of placing Haitians in all po-
sitions_of responsibility as rapidly as possible, and 
where necessary the association of Americans with them 
in an advisory capacity till the ability of such Hai-
tians to direct the work has been satisfactorily de-
monstrated. 
II. Institutions--Courses 
The Commission would recommend the following ad-
ditions and improvements in the existing educational 
pro gram of the Republic: 
1. The establishment of a National University 
by bringing together the Schools of Medicine, Law, and 
Applied Science under one organization and adding a 
School of Liberal Arts, a School of Accounting and 
Business Administration, and a College for-the Training 
of Secondary Teachers, all to be operated under one 
administration. · 
2. The establishment ·of one new institution, or 
the adaptation of some existing institution, for the 
training of men teachers for elementary schools. 
3. The establishment in the rural districts of 
home-makers' schods of primary grade for girls, with 
dormitory faci 1 !ties • 
. 
4. The establishment of a secondary agricultural 
and industrial school with boarding facilities in each 
department of the Republic, with a view to enlarging 
the educational opportunities of those who live in the 
rural districts. 
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5. The enlargement of the capacity of the pre-
sent normal school for girls to provide for an increase 
in the number of trained teachers for girls. 
6. The formulation and adoption of a building 
program that will house the national schools and pro-
vide them with adequate equipment, this program is to 
extend over a definite period of years and to be sus-
tained from a special fund set aside for this purpose. 
7. The establishment of an adequate library at 
Port-au-Prince that shall serve the needs of the Na-
tional University and public-school system as well as 
the general public, with assured resources sufficient 
to its effective maintenance and functioning. 
8. The introduction into the university, when 
established, of two-year courses in normal training 
to prepare the different types of teachers required 
in the secondary schools. 
9. The introduction into the university, when 
established, of advanced courses in liberal arts; natu-
ral, physical, and social sciences; and business ad-
ministration to extend two years beyond the present 
lyce'e courses. . 
10. The introduction into the present colleges 
and lycees for boys and girls, of normal courses de-
signed for the training of elementary teachers. 
/ 11. The introduction into the lycees of modern 
courses (in social science and laboratory courses in 
the natural sciences) as provided in the Haitian law. 
12. The operation of summer school and extension 
courses for teachers of the na tiona! primary schools 
that will raise the general level of qualifications 
among these teachers in the island. 
· 13. The enrichment of primary courses with activi-
ties and studies designed to give elementary instruc-
tion in the phenomena of nature, to develop the senses 
in observation and construction, and to provide expres-
sion through the medium of play, signing, story tell-
ing, and dramatization. 
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14. The differentiation of the curricula of pri-
mary and secondary schools so as to adapt their train-
ing to a rural or an urban environment accor4ing to 
their location. 
III. Superior Schools 
The Commission recommends: 
1. That the Schools of Medicine, Law, and Applied 
Science be consolidated into a National University, as 
' previous! y indica ted. 
2. That the several schools be provided with a 
minimum staff of full-time professors. 
3. That the several schools be provided with the 
. equipment appropriate to classroom instruction, labora-
i tory study and investigation, library facilities, and 
housing. 
4. That fellowships be provided for members of 
the faculty and for advanced students that will give 
opportunity for study, investigation, and research in 
foreign countries as well as original research and in-
vestigation at home. 
5. That the effort be made to increase the number 
of medical and dental students and nurses to meet the 
urgent needs of the country. 
6. That the standard of requirements for admis-
sion into the Law School be raised. 
7. That arrangements be made whereby students in 
medicine, dentistry, law, and engineering may have the 
benefits of the experience to be gained through contact 
with the practical operations of the Public Health Ser-
vice, public works, the courts, and similar institutions 
and activities under private management. 
8. That special facilities be provided in the medi-
cal school for the study of tropical diseases. 
9. That the department of dentistry undertake 
training of dental hygienists for prophylactical health 
service in the schools of the Republic, such hygienists 
to be taken into the employ of the state. 
10. That the equipment of chemical, physical, and 
biological laboratories in the secondary school system 
be completed in order to have a more adequate prepara-
tion of candidates for admission into the professional 
schools. 
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IV. A Program of Education 
Reviewing the needs of Haiti for the establish-
ment and proper maintenance of a number of different 
, types of schools and institutions at each level--su-
' perior, secondary, and primary--the Commission recom-
mends that the complete educational program include: 
(For Superior Education) 
1. A National University embracing: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
The School of Medicine, 
The School of Law, 
The School of Applied Science, 
A School of Liberal Arts, 
A School of Accounting and Business 
Administration 
A Teachers' College for Training Secondary 
Teachers, 
Ultimately, a School of Fine Arts. 
{For Superior and Secondary Education) 
2. The Agricultural and Industrial College for 
Boys at Damien with divisions on two levels as follows: 
{a) A superior school for training technicians, 
extension agents, supervisors, and teachers for schools 
on the secondary level in agriculture and the industrial 
arts. 
(b) A secondary school for training farm-school 
i and industrial-school teachers for schools on the pri-
mary level. 
3. A College of Industrial Arts for Girls for 
training teachers of home economics, with an organiza-
tion corresponding, whenever the need requires it, to 
that of the Agricultural and Industrial College for Boys. 
(For Secondary Education) 
4. {a) A normal school for training men teachers 
of primary schools. 
(b) A normal school for training women teachers 
of primary schools. 
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/ (c) The lycees already in operation in the 
larger cities. 
{For Secondary and Primary Education) 
5. (a) Industrial secondary and primary schools 
:for boys in towns and cities. 
(b) Agricultural seconda~ and prima~ schools 
1 
:for boys in villages and rural centers, with facilities 
:for boarding students. 
{c) Industrial secondary and primary schools 
for girls in towns and cities. 
(d) Home-makers• schools :for girls in villages 
and rural centers, also-with :facilities :for boarding 
students. 
(For Prima~ Education) 
6. (a) City primary schools with accommodations 
sufficient :for all city children. 
(b) Rural primary schools with accommodations 
sufficient :for all rural children. 
7. A general public library, with extension ser-
vice. 
Recommendations were also made in regard to handling the 
:financial aspects o:f the Haitian educational system more e:f-
' 
:fici~ntly, but these need not concern us for this particular 
study. 
iThe major recommendations, of course, were that the Ser-
vice Technique come under the Secretary o:f State :for Public 
Insttuction; that the National and local councils be made 
operative; that the Service Technique stop expanding and be-
gin adapting itself to the limits, expense-wise, o:f the Hal-
tian Government; that a National University be established 
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whic~ would be the focal point of Haitian education and which 
I 
would, through the advice of the most brilliant men and wo-
1 
men ~f Haiti, set the standards for public and private in-
str~ tion throughout the primary and secondary 1 evels, in 
' 
' 
bothlliterary, industrial, and agricultural education; that 
' / the '!traditional" education of the elite be recognized by the 
i -formation of a National University composed of both technical 
I 
and liberal arts colleges; that sufficient teachers of high 
' I 
standards be produced to supply the demands of a great re-
I 
vitalized Haitian educational system through the establish-
ment in the National University of a school of education; 
that the Service Technique, now comprising only primary edu-
cation of eight grades, once absorbed into the National schools, 
I 
I 
be ettended to include secondary and superior levels of in-
strudtion; that girls' education be extended into the secon-
1 ~ 
' dary
1 
and superior levels; and that throughout the warp and 
woof: of the Haitian educational fabric· be infused the phil-
i 
osopfy of individual differences and preferences. 
!When all was said and done, the Moton Commission re-
I 
port/proved more useful to the Haitian Government than to 
' the ~rican. Its value to the United States Occupation was 
limited to (1) its activities in the Service Technique and 
(2) a more general awareness of how deeply and extensively 
the ~oots of modern democratic education had gone, and with 
I 
this i awareness some inti mat ion of how long it would take for 
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Haiti to become a stable, industrialized, pro~perous nation. 
The perplexing question about the Moton Commission is Hoover's 
decision to send it after the Forbes Commission had already 
settl'ed the internal political problem and decided upon with-
draw~! of the Occupation as the best solution. One would 
assume that the findings of Moton would have been an inte-
' 
gral !part of Forbes' thinking on the matter of our future 
foreign pol icy toward Haiti. 
I 
Sending Moton down after Forbes 
had made his report had something of the quality of doing 
rese~rch after the conclusions had been drawn. Most likely, 
what was really on Hoover's mind was to present to the Hai-
tian 'Government a pattern for future educational develop-
ment> a blueprint, so to speak, of the educational system 
I 
required to prepare a nation for the strength, prosperity, 
and genuine democracy demanded by the Western liberal phil-
osophy of government in the modern world. 
CHAPTER SIX 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
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In any assessment of the Forbes Commission, certain 
' 
questions must be answered: (1) Were the methods employed 
by Forbes in gathering information adequate to the situa-
tion's demands? (2) What were the immediate and long-range 
results of the internal political settlement? (3) Did the 
' laterjhistory o:f Haiti, after withdrawal had been made com-
plete, justi:fy Forbes' personal apprehensions? (~) What is 
the p~ace of the Forbes Commission in the formulation of the 
new attitude? (5) What were the results of the Commission's 
recommendations for a new foreign policy in regard to Haiti 
I 
and the other nations of the Americas ·south of the Rio Grande? 
(6) And finally, what have been the flaws in this new foreign 
I policy as they have appeared in Latin America during the in-
tervening twenty-eight years from the end of Hoover's ad-
ministration tot he beginning of Kennedy's? 
Before these questions may be answered, however, a clari-
fication of the nature of our Occupation of Haiti is alto-
gether proper. Did we enter Haiti for reasons of morality 
or self-interest? 
!!'he moral or idealistic versus the realistic :·or self-
interest schools of thought have debated our methods of 
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establishing American foreign policy since the Revolution. 1 
! 
The problem has never been adequately settled. Should this 
nation, trusting in the goodness of man, and believing that 
' 
the ~vils of society are the result of lack of education, 
obsolete patterns of life, and poverty, follow a foreign 
policy based not upon its own self-interest at any particu-
1 
lar time but upon abstract principles of justice, fairness, 
and ~harity as set down by the Judea-Christian tradition? 
'I 
Or should it recognize that noble and desirable as such ab-
stract principles are, they are goals only to strive for, 
unattainable in this life, and that, therefore, if we are 
to survive, our prime consideration in all questions of 
fore~gn policy must be the benefit of our own American de-
mocracy? For those on the moral side of the fence, the world 
is e~visioned as a network of coordinate states working to-
gether in a trusting union much like the states of the Ameri-
can Union, the cantons of the Swiss Confederation, or the 
I 
I 
British Commonwealth of Nations. Those on the realistic side 
1. Dexter Perkins, The American A roach to Fore! n Pollc 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19 2 , passim. See also 
C.A.Beard, The Idea of National InteTest {New York: Macmillan, 
193~); S.F.Bemis, A Diplomatic History.of the United States 
(New York: Henry Holt, 1950); George Kennan, American DiBlomacy, 
1900-19~ (C.hlcago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); .J. 
Morgant u, In Defense of the National Interest (New York:. 
Alfred Knopf, 1951); R.W. Tucker, "Professor Morgenthau' s Theory 
of Political Realism," Amer lean Poll tical Sc fence Review, .Vol. 
XLVI (March, 1952); for an excellent introduction to the ideal-
ist!~ and realistic positions, see Kenneth N. Vines and Morton 
Gordon, Theor and Practice of American Forei n Pol ic (New 
York: Thomas rowell o., 19 3- 9. 
'. 
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think of the world as a constantly seething mass of .rising 
and falling powers, those dominant at any given moment or 
tim~ checked by the traditional 11 balance of power" technique. 
' i 
Which method dominated the American scene from the struggle 
for independence until the Occupation of Haiti in 19157 The 
real;ists see an amazingly successful foreign policy guided 
I 
by ~he star of self-interest. Our alliance with France in 
1778 brought us the aid we needed for a successful revolt, 
and ,the treaty of 1800 freed us from this same alliance when 
i 
we rto longer needed it. The wars with the Barbary states 
ended the threat to our trade in the Mediterranean, and the 
War of 1812 (in which we sided with-Napoleon) strengthened 
our rights upon the sea, eliminated Britain from the North-
west Territory, and completed our domination of the Mississippi. 
The_acquisition of Louisiana, the Floridas, most of Oregon, 
the !whole area formerly owned by Mexico north and west of 
the Rio Grande, the Mesilla River Valley, Alaska, the Philip-
pines and Puerto Rico were achievements made at the expense 
of either weak nations or strong ones too much involved in 
i 
trotibles elsewhere. As Bemis puts it, "America's advantage 
from Europe's distress. 11 2 The Civil War from the realist's 
view point could be judged not as a struggle to free the 
slaves but one to free American northern industrial enterprise 
niversity 
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from the shackles of southern legislative domination. If 
John Quincy Adams, Polk, and Hay were realistic statesmen, 
their philosophy of foreign policy could not have been more 
! 
richly rewarded by material success. 
• Even Jefferson, whom we view as the progenitor of the 
moralistic conception, shifted to the realistic when the 
neeas of the nation demanded. Few played the 11 ba1ance of 
i. 
power" game as carefully as he. While Britain held the 
asc~ndancy until the rise of Napoleon, he was pro-French; 
when Napoleon raised his shadow over Europe, he favored 
British sea supremacy despite his previously avowed pre-
dilect! on for French liberalism. He was willing to 11marry11 
the United States to the British fleet and nation if Napoleon 
were to supplant Spain on the Mississippi, but after the 
battle of Trafalgar, he was back again on the side of the 
French. The year 1812 saw him again hoping that a return 
to political balance in Europe might restore the peace, in 
1814 he was against Napoleon, in 1815, he was wavering again. 
11 It was only when, after 1815, the danger to the balance of 
' 
-- ! power seemed to have passed that Jefferson allowed himself 
again to indulge in the cultivation of moral principles di-
vorced from the political extigencies of the hour. 11 3 
3. Hans J. Morgenthau, 11 The Mainsprings of American Foreign 
Polley: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions,'! Ameri-
can Political Science .Review, Vol. XLIV (December'1 1950),. p.B. 
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~coking at this same period (1776-1915) from the ideal-
istic viewpoint, one might say that, after all, democracy 
and lliberalism are the real interests of the United States, 
Surely the era following the Mexican War saw a surging influx 
ot moral conceptions into our national attitude, The Civil 
War was fought to tree men, not tor economic reasons; the 
Pan-American Union was established as an indication of our 
I 
good-will toward our sister states to the south; we liberated 
Cuba ~t the expense or our own blood and treasure; we under-
1 
took the social and economic regeneration or the Philippines, 
Central America, and the Caribbean. 
But one rather thinks that American foreign policy can-
not b.e divided on such lines. Morgenthau has some justifi-
cation tor his belief (1) that our nation started out with 
a realistic policy which was enormously successful; (2) that 
i 
after' the Mexican War we spoke or moral principles but acted 
still along realistic lines; and (3) that moral considerations 
which. entered with the McKinley administration triumphed 
with that or Wilson, and have continued to plague us ever 
since1.4 ·Yet these lines are too pat. Moral considerations 
have always been with us. We have tried during the course 
ot o~ history to do what any self-respecting individual tries 
to do--live a lite which is at one and the same time both 
4. Morgenthau, American Political Science Review, passim, 
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materially successful and reasonably compatible with high 
I 
spiritual values. The United States has never pursued deliber-
i 
atel~ either a long-term self-interest policy or a long-term 
moral policy; it has pursued a foreign policy into whose 
fibers have been woven the stuff of both. 
: 
When Forbes accused Wilson of "woolly idealism," 'he erred. 
I 
A study of Wilson's administration shows very clearly that 
his moral actions were rarely divorced from the self-interest 
! 
of the nation. Somehow, the interests of the United States 
' 
coinqided with the high moral concepts of his philosophy. 
We intervened in Haiti because Wilson desired to end the cen-
tury
1
and a quarter of bloodshed and internal disorder, to 
teach the Negro Haitian in a day, so to speak, what the Anglo-
Saxon had learned in fifteen hundred years of history,6 
' 
because he honestly wished to use the might and treasure of 
the United States to lift the Haitian masses out of their 
ignorance, poverty, and degradation. At the same time, he 
wisb,ed to protect the investments of American citizens from 
5. 'See p. 97, above. 
I 6. Wilson never wandered very far from the thought that he 
. was 'the school-master in the presidential chair. If the 
classroom is the place where one learns in a short time what 
he would take years to learn through personal experience (if 
he learned at all), then Haiti, in Wilson's view, could be 
taught the principles and methods of democratic government. 
See Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters, 
(Ga~den City: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1927-1939), Vola. IV 
and V, passim. 
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conf'ilscation (one aspect of' dollar diplomacy) and to prevent 
Europ!ean powers, particularly Germany, f'rom using injury to 
! 
their: nationals as a pretext f'or getting a f'oothold in the 
i 
Caribbean (strategy diplomacy).? Wilson's Occupation of 
I , 
Haitil became vulnerable only after the First World War ended 
and we continued to remain in Haiti. only then did the Nation 
start the attacks which led ten years later to the Forbes 
Commi~sion. The Occupation became vulnerable because the 
d.efen~ible strategic self-interest aspect evaporated leaving 
only ~he ugly dollar interest aspect and the high moral pur-
l 
pose bf dem.ocratic tutelage. And much of' the liberal press 
i 
doubted that very much of the democratic tutelage purpose 
survived Wilson. We remained in Haiti because Haiti offered 
i 
' 
us a ~rand experiment: we had the chance to test in our own 
I 
little laboratory the "civilizing" doctrines which western 
I 
Europ~an expansionist philosophy was trying out on a vast 
scalejin Africa and Asia. And our Occupation failed for 
i 
the same reasons that those of' Britain, France, and Germany 
' I failed--because the American Government was accused of' having 
I 
only one purpose in Haiti, exploitation. Of' the three 
', 
reaso~s why Wilson entered Haiti--dollar diplomacy, strategy 
I 
diplo~cy, and democratic tutelage--all that remained in the 
eyes dr the world by 1930 was dollar diplomacy. William 
! 
7. J~ Fred Rippy! The Caribbean Danger Zone (New York: G.P. 
Putna~•s Sons, 19~0), pp. 182-193. · 
' 
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All~n White, listening to a particularly horrid story at 
I 
I the hearings in Port-au-Prince, wrote: 
In that twilight zone wherein the desire to help 
one's fellow-men passes from fraternal association 
to paternal control, despotism begins to rot the 
heart of benevolence, And here is a curious thing: 
I am satisfied by talking for hours with many Ameri-
cans here, that they are honest--as men go in poli-
tics--and are sincerely imbued with a desire to help 
the Haitians. They feel that we who oppose them are 
undeing a great work, Yet so inexorably does the 
possession of power disintegrate the spirit that 
benevolence is destroyeg by tyranny. There can never 
be a benevolent despot. 
\Frankl in D, Roosevelt is given credit for the Good Neigh-
if he is to be given credit it must be neither 
\ . . 
bor !Pol icy, but 
! 
for :originating the idea, nor for initiating the policy, but 
rat~ r for inheriting it from the CGol idge-Hoover administra-
tioJs and prosecuting it with vigor. During the 1920 pre-
1 
I side~tial campaign, in which he ran with Cox on the Democra-
' I 
tic ticket, he ridiculed the Republican argument against the 
I 
' Leagpe of Nations (that Great Britain would have six votes 
I 
in the Assembly while the United States had only one) by 
the :declaration (referring apparently to the political ad-
vant~ges of the protectorate system) that the United States 
I 
wou1 1,d have on her side the eleven tiny republics of the Carib-
bean'. He went on to boast that he himself had written the 
Halt !ian Constitution of 1918 and that it was pretty good, 9 
8. Helen Hill Weed, "victory in Haiti," Nation (March 26, 
1930~. p. 378. 
r 9, New York Times, August 19 and 23, 1920. 
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:Only when criticism of our Caribbean pol icy had become 
' 
so blatant two campaigns later, and the De~ocrats needed 
fighting issues against the apparently impregnable Repub-
' 
llcan administration, did Roosevelt make an about-face. 
In an article entitled "Our Foreign Polley," he stated: 
I 
In 1909 began four years which counted as a de-
finite setback in our liberal leadership. "Dol-
lar Diplomacy" as adopted by President Taft.and 
Secretary Knox placed money leadership ahead of 
moral leadership in the Far East •• Honduras ••• 
Nicaragua ••• 
The Wilson Administration started splendidly 
by eliminating "Dollar Diplomacy" ••• but interven-
tion as we practiced it .in Santo.Domingo and Haiti 
was not another forward step. It is not that 
assistance of some sort was not necessary; it was 
the method which was wrong ••• It is true ••• that ••• 
in Haiti we seem to have paid.too little attention 
to making the citizens of (that state) more cap-
able of reassuming the control of (their) own 
~overnment). But we have done a fine piece of 
_material work and the world ought to thank us. 
But does it? •• The other republics of the Am-
ericas do not thank us, on the contrary they dis-
approve our intervention almost unanimously. By 
what right, they say, other than the right of main 
force, does the United States arrogate unto itself 
the privilege of intervening alone in 1Be internal 
affairs of ~nother Sovereign Republic? 
! Yet what did words matter? Had the period of the 1920's 
continued prosperous for American business at large, the ques-
tion of the protectorates might never have been injected into 
the presidential political arena as the decade ended. Hard-
ing in 1920 had taken advantage of Roosevelt's revelation 
10. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Our Foreign Polic:Jt" FGreign 
Affairs, Vol. VI (July, 1928), pp. 573-586, passim._ 
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i 
that he thought we controlled eleven Caribbean votes by 
stat~g that i~ he were elected he would not use his 
I 
o~~ic1e to 11 cover with a veil o~ secrecy repeated acts o~ 
unwarranted inter~erence in domestic af~airs o~ the little 
repub1.ics o~ the Western Hemisphere." But, as Rippy says 
of Harding, "Any anti-imperialist who ever hoped to find 
I 
a kitidred spirit in him was doomed to disappointment." The 
remark was made purely for pusposes of the campaign and 
nothi~ more.l1 
What is important is not so much what men say when 
they 'are anxious for power but what they actually do once 
that power is conferred upon them. Despite Harding's state-
i 
ment,! the Harding and Coolidge administrations were a period 
of indecision between these o~ Wilson and Hoover. our with-
drawal! from the Dominican Republic was not Coolidge's work. 
The liquidation of our naval control of the Dominican 
Repub1lic in 1924 had been determined by Secretary o~ State 
Hughes in 1921, and preparations had progressed much too 
~ar tb be stopped by Coolidge anyway. 12 Our active inter-
vention continued in Honduras and in Nicaragua; in addi-
tion we ~ere seriously embroiled in Cuban and Mexican 
11. Rippy, The Caribbean Danger Zone, p. 247. 
12. 
1
Ibid., p. 248. 
f 
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i~ternal politics.l3 If the Harding administration followed 
some direction in terms of a Latin-American policy, that 
direction was the result of Charles Evans Hughes' work and 
not 'Harding's; when Calvin Coolidge took over and dismissed 
Hughes for Frank B. Kellogg, SuDIDer Welles "labelled the 
I 
period after Hughes' departure from the Department of State 
the 'unhappy four years' in which inter-American relations 
I 
dete~iorated.nl4 
Hoover came to the presidency of the United States with 
an e~ormous background in Latin-American affairs.l5 During 
Harding's and Coolidge's administrations he held the chairman-
ship of the Inter-American High Commission which, along with 
his post as Secretary of Commerce, gave him well-rounded 
I expe~ience with and Insight into Latin-American problems. 
He had been concerned with our continued interference in the 
' affairs of other nations of the Hemisphere, particularly 
in the last days of the Coolidge administration when the 
·, United States was awakening to the deterioration of our 
relations with the countries south of the Rio Grande. Yet the 
l3. See generally S.F.Bemis, The Latin American Policy of . 
the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1943); 
Graham M. Stuart, Latin America and the United States (4th ed.; 
New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1943); J. Fred Rippy, 
Latin America in World Poli·tics(3rd ed.; New York: F.S.Crofts 
Co.,.1938). 
14. !Alexander DeConde, Herbert Hoover's Latin-American Policy 
(Stanford: Stan:t?ord'. University Press, 1951), p. 7. 
15. , Ibid., pp. 13-33. 
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answe~s were not easily apparent. Many o£ the Latin-American 
i 
countries were not ready £or democracy. Were we to permit 
oppre 1ssive dictators rob and pillage their peoples while we 
stood silently by? What type o£ government were we to recog-
nize? Was it fair to permit Latin-American governments to 
renoupce their obligations both to our own citizens and those 
o£ t~sting foreign states? I£ we were neither to intervene 
I 
in the affairs o£ any nation in this Hemisphere nor to permit 
any o:ther to intervene, then far from helping our southern 
neighbors we were only increasing their irresponsibility. 
If we withdrew completely from the protectorates, were we not 
merely retreating from our own responsibilities? Could a 
' 
substitute be found for military intervention; and, i£ so, 
what might be its character? Hoover was not sure of the 
answers, but he knew that the old ones had not worked.16 He 
wanted to try a new foreign policy in Latin-America; Forbes 
was to help him shape it. 
:Breaching the constitutional wall and arranging to have 
the return of a Haitian national legislature had the immed-
iate 1value of ending the rioting, boycotts, and strikes, 
which had been engineered by the Opposition parties, and the 
long-range value o£ preparing Haitians to administrate their 
government when the Occupation ended in 1936. Withdrawing 
16. DeConde, Herbert Hoover's Latin-American Policy, pp. 79-89. 
. ' 
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our ;Occupation had the immediate value of ending in both 
! 
the United States and Latin-America the adverse criticism 
whi~h our stay in Haiti had produced, and the long-range 
value of setting a new American foreign policy of non-in-
terference toward our neighbors to the south. 
IBut as has been indicated previously in this study, 
Forbes himself was not altogether happy with what he did. 
I 
He c'ould not see any real good in the solution. As a re-
sul ti of the pressures upon him, those of the American 1 iberal 
' 
press, the Haitian Opposition press, opinion in Europe and 
i 
Asia, he was to a large degree oniy an instrument of histori-
cal ,forces stronger than he or his Commission. He knew that 
I . 
Borno was an enlightened member of the elite honestly work-
i 
ing 'with the Americans to instruct Haitians in the arts of 
Angl!o-Saxon democracy, and .that without the continued assis-
1 • 
tance of Americans the progress made in the past fifteen 
! 
years would disintegrate. He felt that once the Occupation 
was ,withdrawn, chaos would prevail once again, and the black 
mass would sink silently into the ignorance fromwhich it 
I I 
was slowly being lifted, while the cultured elite, apathetic 
to the misery of his dark brother, climbed once more into the 
driver's seat. He saw the revived legislature, in which the 
blacks would have little or no representation, as just a 
./ 
gen~eel means by which the elite would control the nation. 
Nor was his apprehension unjustified. In the generation 
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sinde the withdrawal of American forces, Haiti's e'lite has 
not !demonstrated a sincere desire to regenerate the nation. 
Poverty, illiteracy, and the degradation of the black mass 
I 
of the people through economic and social exploitation are 
I. 
still the stigmata of almost 90% of all Haitians. What de-
I pressed Forbes was the knowledge that the mulatto was not 
sincere. The mulatto hated the Service Technique because 
I 
it threatened his claim to leadership, the general receiver-
! 
ship because it deprived him of graft, the Occupation be-
i ~ause it drew an even stronger color-line than he drew him-
self against his own darker-skinned brother, and he hated 
Bo~o because he considered him a traitor to his class. 17 
Still, what was Forbes to do7 To maintain Borne in power, 
or someone else amenable to the Occupation, or to extend the 
I treaty another twenty or thirty years in the hope that with 
eno~gh time the United States might preduce tangible evidence 
that she intended nothing but good-will toward Haiti, ~ight 
I 
be dangerous. Regardless of good intentions, the Occupation 
I 
' 11. John H. Cralge remarks of Ernest Chauvet, a typical 
member of the __ elite: "I always had a feeling that perhaps 
Chauvet did a good deal of his laughing so that he would 
not weep. From his point of view, his situation was tragic. 
He was young, eloquent, able. Yet he was separated from a 
state job and had no chance to make his fortune in the tra-
dit;ional manner of his race. Naturally, he hated President 
Borno and the Government. Under a Haitian regime he might 
hav;e been certain that a few months, a few years, would bring 
a change. But the Americans had ended sudden changes. Mean-
while, the years were rolling by and his health was none too 
~o Gd. Of course he hated the Amer leans. 11 Cannibal Cousins, 
(New York: Minton, Balch and Company, 1934), pp. 265-266. 
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I 
' appeared like imperialism to Latin-America. And even if 
tankible results were obtained, could the United States oc-
cupy every Latin-American nation which it viewed as unstable 
' 
pol,itically and economically? It might Just as well annex 
every country south of the Rio Grande. In addition, nothing 
that had been done had been particularly appreciated. He 
knew that to set up a mulatto-dominated legislature, to top-
ple! Bemo, and to remGve Russell weuld be mistakes; but he 
alsp knew that to remain would be a greater mistake. So he 
I 
took the only path which seemed to him to be sensible--to 
rid~ a course between that of Vezina, who did not have any 
faith in the ability of the Haitians to govern themselves, 
i 
and that of Kerney and White, who wished to abrogate the 
treaty and withdraw immediately. He decided that the wiser 
path would be to speed up Haitianization of all services, 
establish a legislature, and begin a gradual withdrawal, so 
tha~ by 1936, with the end of the treaty of Occupation, the 
nation would see the Americans off in a spirit of amity and 
be prepared to administrate itself without bloodshed or dis-
ord;er. 
The over-all policy which Forbes aimed at in Haiti--and 
which, as we know, became Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor Policy" 
t~rd Latin-America--was that of withdrawing from the coun-
try all military and civilian forces which were not requested 
by the recognized government, but of letting Haiti understand 
283 
at the same time that the United States Government was pre-
i pared to aid her. At her request such aid could be obtained 
i in any reasonable venture which would help to establish an 
I 
orderly, democratic, economically and politically stable 
nation with a sense of international responsibility. Theo-
dore Roosevelt's corolla~ to the Monroe Doctrine was to be 
i 
scr~pped, and in its place to be put another type of in-
tervention--that of non-military financial, technical, and 
i 
diplomatic assistance. This might mean that foreign in-
' 
vestors would have to trust solely to the trustworthiness 
of the Haitian Government, or that the National Debt might 
not1 be adequately serviced, or that perhaps foreign nationals 
might occasionally suffer; but Forbes' final determination 
that the destiny of Haiti lay for better or for worse in 
Haitian hands has a sagacity that cannot be questioned. 
Britain went through a thousand years of turmoil before she 
had' her Glorious Revolution; 125 years of Haitian independence 
was1 not really too great a span. The British ConstitutiGJn 
became what it is because of the anguish which produced it. 
Onl~ by lifting themselves would the blacks of Haiti gain 
the intellectual capacities necessary to win contr0l of their 
nation; by their will alone, and not by that of a foreigner, 
no matter how well-meaning, would the black Haitians attain 
the strength to win equality with the mulatto. Ultimately, 
the pn)blems of Haiti would need to be solved by Haitians 
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if they were to be genuine solutions. All that the United 
States could do was to stand by waiting f$r the call for 
hel~, to give that help when it was asked, and to withdraw 
that help when no longer desired. Forbes• thinking had flaws, 
! 
as the next thirty years were to prove, but the thinking was 
! 
far, superior to that of too thirty years which had preceded. 
' 
In effect, Forbes said, the tutelage system pronounced 
by the French and English in the late 19th Century and which 
we adopted for Latin-America is a failure. It could only be 
I 
successful in a country such as the Philippines where na-
! 
tionalism had not yet assumed sufficient momentum. Once 
nationalism entered, tutelage had to depart. It was not 
successful in Haiti because that country had known indepen-
denCe for too long; it was successful in the Philippines 
because those islands had never known what it was to be free, 
and' Americanc (at least temporar,ily) were a welcome sub-
stft.ut e for the Spanish landlord. 
I <Japtain John H. Craige, Head of the Marine Police, had 
not~ing but contempt for the Commission: 
It remained for President Hoover to write the last 
act to the drama, more preposterous, inconsistent 
and unintelligible than any that had gone before. 
The intelligent mulattoes of the Port-au-Prince 
" elite still snicker discreetly behind the hand when 
they refer to this performance. They speak of the 
incident as the "Hoover Revolution. 11 18 
18. Craige, Cannibal Cousins, p. 293-294. 
... 
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i He complained that Hoover had no more right to send an 
Ametican Commission to Haiti "to try President Borno than 
Mr.: Stalin would have had to send a Bolshevik Commission to 
Washington to try him, Hoover."l9 He complained that after 
we had approved a constitution, protested for fifteen years 
that Haiti was a free and sovereign state, and repeatedly 
announced our non-intervention 
! 
in Haitian affairs except as 
we ll'ere authorized by the 1915 treaty, we could not justify 
! 
sending an ent !rely extra-legal commission into the country 
I 
to inquire into its pres !dent's methods C!lf governing his own 
land. 
:The fallacy in this thinking lies in the double assump-
tion. that the 1915 treaty and 1918 constitution were Haitian 
documents. They were American creations foisted upon the 
lit~le country whether we thought them to be for her own 
good or not. If Hoover's Commission was illegal, its ille-
: 
gality arose out of the supposed legality of our Intervention 
I 
to begin with. 
I 
.The weaknesses of the Forbes Commission were not in its 
I • 
legality or illegality, or its ultimate conclusions. Any 
weaknesses it possessed were rooted in its methods of opera-
tion. What were several of these weaknesses? 
:, First, Forbes stayed too short a time in Haiti. He was 
a man of experience, acquainted with colored races-at least 
19. • Craige, Cannibal Cousins, p. 295. 
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I 
the 'Malay and Indian--but neither he nor any of' the members 
of' the Commission had been in Haiti previously, nor had any 
close association with the type of' Negroihey'Mi!re to find in 
' I 
that Republic, nor with the exception of' Elie Vezina had 
! 
any, previous acquaintance with the peculiar forces at work 
in the country whose problems they were to try to settle. 
I • . 
They remained in the country a mere two weeks, and it was 
rumpred that Forbes shortened his stay in order to get back 
to his home in Thomasville f'or the polo season. They were 
ledl on a fast pace through the countryside, and even this 
brief' trip abridged by the news of' riots in Port-au-Prince, 
while W'hat they saw came either through the windows of' a 
limousine or along the paths of' guided tours. 
Forbes knew the Philippines because he lived there f'or 
ten years. He knew the Filipino people through observation. 
He 'studied and became prof'lc lent in their language, travelled 
throughout the islands and lived f'or lengthy periods in the 
towns, the villages, and the jungle habitations of' even the 
yet uncivilized tribes. His knowledge of' Haiti was a know-
ledge af books, of' hearsay, and inadequate personal obser-
vaticm. In order truly to gain the understandings essentia.l 
I 
to,ef'f'ectuate a settlement of' the compl!cated1 internal dis-
order, one needed to live among the people f'or at least a 
year <Pr twG>, speak the language (not merely the elegant French 
/ 
of', elite society but the patois of' the ignorant black mass), 
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travel the virtually inaccessible valleys of the mountain-
ous1 north, and partake heart and soul of the Haitian spirit. 
The! Ferbes Commission consisted of five well-meaning elderly 
men' who wanted to clear up the mess they found but who really 
had' anticipated little more than a vacation in a tropical 
co~try. True, a quick solution was necessary in view of 
i 
thEC turbulence aroused by Borno 1 s refusal to call for legis-
! 
la~ive elections, but the emergency does not change the fact 
that no man can possibly be equipped to solve so complicated 
a problem in two weeks' time. 
Second, the type of fact-gathering employed was not of 
the sort to establish a reliable view of the situation. The 
· ftearings were held in a resplendent atmosphere which was far 
! 
removed from the poor huts of the peasants. The witnesses, 
judging from the stenographic reports deposited in the Na-
tibnal Archives in Washington, were primarily of the very 
i cl~sses which the Occupation had displaced or at least 
thwarted and who could be expected to be little other than 
! 
opposed to a continuation of American intervention. Did 
' they speak for the Haitian people? Did they speak for the 
great, laboring, silent millions of farm and town? The 
answer is, of course, that they d.id not. To what purpese, 
then, were the hearings apart frem airing the antagonisms 
of the innumerable parties which pretended to speak for 
Haiti? The voice of Haiti was no more to be found at .±hese 
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elegant hearings than the voice of France was to be heard 
I 
in the palaces of Versailles or the voice of Russia in the 
Kremh in of the Romanoffs. 
I Yet, one might ask, even if the silent voice of the black 
mass could be made to speak, would it have added very much 
of s1ignificance to that which had already been spoken? Could 
it have revealed the answers any more clearly than did the 
! 
voiqe of the educated and cultured? Perhaps not, but it 
wou~d have at least revealed the Haitian soul in either its 
I 
blissful contentment or anger, its dullness or sensitivity, 
i 
its submission or its fury. The Hearings at Port-au-Prince 
should have been merely the first stage; they should have 
been continued in the slums of the towns and the hidden farms 
of the rural areas. 
'Third, too much reliance was placed upon documents--those 
of the High Commissioner, the Financial Adviser-General Re-
ceiver, statistics of the Secretary for Public Instruction, 
' 
repprts of the Service Technique. The Commission had gone 
to Haiti to observe for itself, and in writing its report 
it had weighted itself with the comments of other parties. 
' Had Hoover wished the collection of factual material, he 
could have done it by other means; the Forbes Commission, if 
it were to serve a genuine purpose, had to be less an infor-
mation bureau and more a direct observer. This was, as well, 
the great defect of the Moton Commission; it spent a few days 
,. ' 
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I in fact-gathering and not enough time in actually walking 
thr~ugh the physical plants of the educational system. Again, 
had:the members of both C<llmmissions been younger men on a 
rec~nized task of strenuous physical effort, their reports 
might have possessed greater usefulness. 
Fourth, the Forbes commission consisted of men in later 
I 
middle age whose physical capacities did not match the agility 
of their minds. Forbes was suffering from heart trouble--
he accepted both the Haiti chairmanship and the immediately 
I 
following ambassadorial post to Japan with reluctance--Her-
! . -
ney suffered from heart disease, and the other three members, 
' 
' Vezina, Fletcher, and White, were unable to sleep or eat 
properly on the trip. Th~ were unable to do the travelling, 
speaking, and first-hand observation which was required be-
cause such things were beyond their physical capacities.20 
. Fifth, too much publ !city was given tot he enterprise. 
No commission which is publicized by presidential announce-
' 
I 
ments, debated in both houses of Congress, discussed in the 
I 
leaaing newspapers of the United States and Haiti, dispatch-
ed ~n a cruiser, and received by military units, the high-
echelon Haitian officials, and batteries of journalists 
cou~d hope to discover very much that was not already known. 
I 
It resembled the opera bouffe of Haitian political history. 
20. These observations are based upon conversations with 
Victor G. Heiser. 
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Cou~d one wonder that the Opposition parties had their 
I 
stage-machiner,y at eve~ strategic point, that Russell and 
i 
Borno both were prepared to put forth their best appearance, 
I that the members of the Commission worked in an artificial 
atmlllsphere that smacked more of playhouse than pure sun-
li~t? Wherever the Commission went, with whomever it talk-
ed, lthe results were rehearsed performances and anxious, 
gua~ded words. 
,Sixth, the Commission was not properly balanced. Forbes 
I 
was
1
an administrator, Fletcher a career diplomat, but White, 
Vezina, and Kerney were editors, acquainted more with the 
I 
gathering and reporting of facts than the use of them. A-
part from Forbes, all of them earned their livings through 
writing. All were well-to-do men financially, and Forbes 
and 1 Kerney were very wealthy. Whatever their pol !tical af-
f!l~at!ons, all, with the possible exception of White, were 
of a conservative turn of mind. Forbes objected to the 
sim~larity of backgrounds in the meabers of the Commission, 
but, as his journal reveals, he had no hand in the selec-
! 
tion.21 The Commission would have been better balanced if 
i 
Forbes as an experienced administrator had been given an 
' 
engineer, an educator, an editor, a scientist, a physician, 
and 1 a lawyer as his five colleagues. Helser, who was not 
21. See p. 961 above. 
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re~lly a member of the Commission and who was asked to come 
I 
along by Forbes only as a member of the advisory staff, was 
' 
the only man with a strong training in objective reasoning. 
Heiser, who did more travelling, more direct observation, 
more calm probing for the truth than any member of the Com-
' 
mission, might as well have been officially marked as one 
I 
of
1
them. 
'. Seventh, the Commission was surrounded by too many in-
fluences which it could not escape--the depression at home 
i 
calling for reduced foreign expenditures, the recrimina-
tions of a domestic liberal press (particularly the Nation), 
the fear of effecting a solution incompatible with the 1918 
Codstitution, the obligations of Haitian debtors to American. 
French, and British creditors, and the indirect influences 
of ;the concurrent London Disarmament Conference. Craige, 
goe's so far as to say that the Forbes Commission ousted 
' 
their own men, Russell and Borno, after loyal service, sim-
I 
ply, to mollify the so-called liberal opinion in the United 
States.22 
I 
,.Finally, haste was the common denominator.23 Whether 
one. agrees or not with the precariousness of the situation, 
Forbes believed that a general uprising was imminent unless 
22., Cralge, p. 294. 
23.' Forbes, Haitian. Journal, passim. 
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a solution were immediately found. That a bloody uprising 
would have resulted is doubtful. Haitian history is marked 
' 
with caco and army revolts, but great mass risings were re-
I latively unknown. Speculation, however, is ft:uitless. What 
is
1 
important is what Forbes believed, and he did believe 
that a quick termination to the turbulence which had so far 
bebn displayed since December of 1929 was ·essential. 
These weaknesses, one must be warned, do not necessarily 
apply to commissions in general, nor do they necessarily ap-
ply to any of the other commissions which Hoover created 
and employed, For a good many of them, conservatism, ma-
turity in age, quickness of decision, and similarity of back-
ground in the membership were desirable. The weaknesses ~-,_ 
arose out of the peculiar rush which this particular commis-
sion had to undertake. (1) A longer period of stay in Haiti, 
(2) a knowledge of the Creole and French tongues, (3) fact-
finding based upon personal observations and hearings that 
offered genuine opportunities for all classes of society to 
i 
ex~ress themselves, (~) extensive travel throughout the 
country, (5) younger men whose physical capacities matched 
th~ agility of their minds, (6) a minimum of publicity, (7.) 
a greater balance in the occupational composition of the 
Commission, (8) a reasonable freedom from domestic influences, 
and (9) sufficient leisure for the members to judge their 
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ac~umulated kn0wledge in its relation to the purposes of 
th~ Commission, would have gone a great distance toward lm-
p~ving the final report. 
: In line with Forbes' view that our military occupation 
of! the country should be terminated and that in the meantime 
our relations with Haiti should be conducted by civilians, 
General Russell resigned and his place taken by Dr. Dana G. 
' 
' Munro. Munro, at the time of his appointment chief of the 
I 
Latin-American Division of the State Department, took over 
I 
the duties of High Commissioner and acted at the same time 
as diplomatic representative from the United States. His 
I 
knowledge of Latin-American affairs, experience, and sympathy 
! 
with the Haitians made him more popular than Russell had 
ever been. Yet one must remember that Russell's task had 
been more difficult. How Munro would have worked out as 
High Commissioner during the 1920 1 s is left to speculation. 
The
1 
forces at work would have made any man in that position 
a n~tural target for ambitious Haitian politicians, American 
and! Halt ian editors looking for good copy, United States 
Congressmen searching for issues, and travelling authors. 
Forbes• conclusion that Russell had done the best job pos-
sible in a difficult situation was probably more than jus-
tided. 
In any case, Munro started the Haitianization of the 
' 
treaty services--the Garde, Public Health, Public Works, 
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Setvice Technique, Finance.24- The new Haitian Government/ 
I 
comprised of a National Legis lattme. elected in October, 1930, 
I 
and Stenio Vincent, chosen by the National Assembly that 
I 
same month for the Presidency, insisted upon the withdrawal 
of: all aspects of the Occupation even before the scheduled 
1936 date. Hoover refused to withdraw immediately but made 
! 
the Haitianization Agreement of August 5, 1931, for the com-
1 . 
plete withdrawal of the Public Works, the 
I 
' 
vic
1
e, and the Service Technique by October 
Public Health Ser-
1, 1931. 25 The 
senvice of payments on the public debt and auditing of ex-
penditures were still to be under the control of the Ameri-
cani Finane ial Adviser-General Receiver. This was only lo-
gical in Hoover's mind because, where the Public Works and 
Health Services and Service Technique affected only Haiti, 
the' financial department affected American and foreign bond-
holders whom Hoover did not wish to see suffer in the event 
that Haitians were unwilling or unable to service the debts. 
i • 
Simultaneously martial law was discontinued and the American 
' military occupation came technically to an end. 
'Once control of the country passed to Haitians, the ques-
tion for the United States was just how f:ast American ele-
ments could be withdrawn. ·On September 3, 1932, a treaty 
24.' De Conde, pp. 88-89. 
25.' James W. Gantenbein,(ed.), The Evolution or Our Latin-
American Poll : A Documentar Record (New Yorks Co!umbla 
University 0 , pp. 919-922. 
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was signed in which all American officers were to be with-
I -drawn from the Garde by December 31, 1934, while the marines 
were to begin withdrawal not later than that date.26 A fis-
ca;l representative appointed by the president of Haiti on 
no~ination by the president of the United States, as a re-
pl~cement for the Financial Adviser-General Receiver, be-
l 
ginning December 31, 1934, caused a great deal of conster-
n~tion in the Haitian legislature. Although this fiscal 
re'presentative was suppGlsed to employ only Haitian personnel 
in, his department, the legislature felt that Haiti would 
no~ become truly independent until she regained control of 
her finances. As a result of this issue, the legislature 
rejected the treaty. Even though the treaty had gone so 
i far as to ·grant complete withdrawal of all American elements 
of' the Occupation by December 31, 1934, two years ahead of 
scpedule, the legislature refused to backtrack on principle. 
Nonetheless, Hoover continued the rapid Haitianization of 
the services on the basis of the August 5th agreement. 
I 
No further progress was made between the two 
un~il the administration of Roosavelt. 27 Norman 
26. Gantenbein, pp. 923-930. 
governments 
Armour 28 
27~ Edward o. Guerrant, Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy 
(Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, l9SO), passim. 
28. Norman Armour was a career diplomat. Born in BrightGln, 
England, October 14, 1887, he received his education at 
Princeton and Harvard (LL.B., 1913). He was admitted to the 
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riplaced Munro, and an Executive Agreement was arranged on 
August 7, 1933. 29 Roosevelt preferred this instead of a 
treaty because it obviated the necessity for approval by 
the legislatures Cl>f both countries and left both presidents 
fr,ee to work out solutions more effiCiently and quickly. 
The Haitianization of the Garde was advanced to October 1, 
i 
1934, and the date of the appointment of the fiscal repre-
se~tat!ve changed to January 1, 1934. The remainder of 
Hoover's agreement of August 5, 1931, remained substantially 
un;touched. 
In April, 1934, Vincent visited Washington to confer with 
Roosevelt. They had met each other years before and were 
able to conf~r on a basis of warm understanding.3° A Pan-
! 
American Conference had just taken place (1933) at Monte-
video at which the Latin-American nations had drafted a 
pr~posal prohibiting intervention by any state in the in-
te:nal or external affairs of any other state. Cordell Hull, 
N~ Jersey Bar in l9l~, but decided to spend his life in the 
diplomatic service. Before his appointment as minister to 
Ha~ti, he had seen service in Paris, Petrograd, Brussels,the 
Hague, Montevideo, Rome, and Tokyo. 
29! Gantenbein, pp. 930-936. 
30~ "Vincent and Roosevelt met at Cap-Haitien in 1917 when 
Roosevelt was Secretary of the Navy _and. Vincent was Secretary 
of· Interior in Haiti. Both were momentarily disgusted with 
pCI>litics; both swore they would never take public office again. 
But--Vincent chuckled--it was in the cards for Roosevelt to 
be :President of the United States three times and himself Pre-
sident of Haiti twice.'' Jehn Gunther, Inside Latin-America 
(New York:. Harper and Brothers, 1941), pp. 450~451. 
! 
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i Secretary of State, had said that, though he agreed with 
I 
thi~ principle, the United States needed time in which to 
make its withdrawal; but the other delegates demanded accept-
ancJ of the proposal without reservations of any kind.3l 
' The trnited States had rejected such a proposal in 1928, but 
now Roosevelt was too busy at home to quibble over the point, 
and Hull for all practical purposes accepted. With this fac-
tor ~n mind, Vincent asked an end to the financial remnants 
of the Occupation. 
I 
1Since Roosevelt, like Hoover, wished not to anger the 
many'American bondholders who might unjustly suffer were the 
United States to relax its grip on Haitian finances, Roose-
velt,and Vincent issued a joint statement in which they 
declared that the August 7, 1933, agreement was to be carried 
out, but with new commercial and financial agreements to be 
' nego~iated.32 In other words, modifications of the financial 
status were to be made that would insure the safety of American 
investors and at the same time give more freedom to the Haitian 
Gove~nment. To demonstrate his good intentions, Roosevelt 
ordezied a number of the buildings ari.d.mechanical equipment 
31. Report of the Dele~ates of the United States of America 
to the Seventh Internat onal Conference of American States: 
F rat Second and hth Comm ttees Montev deo , De-
partment of State, Conference Series, No.1 Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1934-l, passim. 
I 
32. Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), The Public Papers and Addresses 
of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Vol. III (New York: Random 
House, 1938), pp. 184-186. 
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own~d by the United States Occupation authorities surrendered 
to Haiti. 
i 
' In July of: the same year, Roosevlet visited Vincent at 
Port-au-Prince. He scheduled the marines to leave by August 
15; 1 they started leaving the end of: July, and true to his 
I 
word, the last marine let:t Haitian soil by the scheduled date. 
I Still, the Haitian legislature was not sa tist:ied. It 
dema!nded that the United States withdraw all f:inancial con-
tro~. Roosevelt f:inally et:f:ected this by two steps. (1) 
We p~oposed that the National City Bank of: New York sell its 
cont~olling interest in the National Bank of: Haiti to the 
Haitian Government. Vincent agreed to this heartily, as did 
' the majority of: the members of: the legislature. When eleven 
i 
senators objected, Vincent submitted the proposal to a , 
I 
National Referendum, which approved. The plan was accordingly 
I 
carried out. (2) On September 13, 1941, af:ter many cont:er-
I 
ences, an agreement replacing that of: 1933 was made, eliminat-
1 ing the t:iscal representative and transf:erring all t:unds t:rom 
I his hands to the National Bank of: Haiti. In short, although 
I 
the Occupation in all other respects ended in 1934, these 
i f:inancial controls were maintained until their f:inal liquida-
tion 1 seven years later.33 
1How did the subsequent· history of: Haiti justit:y the 
interlnal political settlement and new American t:oreign policy 
33. ~uerrant, pp. 9-10; Gantenbein, PP• 937-942. 
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engineered by the Forbes Commission? Vincent remained at 
! 
the head of the nation until 194-1. Once one of the bitter-
es~ opponents of the American Occupation, he came by the 
clbse of his administration to recognize Haiti's political, 
economic, and geographic dependence on the United States. 
/ Li~e Dartiguenave and Borne, he was a member of the elite, 
who spent his entire life in the Haitian Government. While 
I 
still a law student he worked as a school inspector, then 
I 
went to Europe as a diplomatic attache. On his return he 
I 
became in quick succession a government commissioner, judge, 
I 
senator, and president of the Senate. Intellectual, sen-
sitive, of enormous physical vitality into his late fifties, 
he 1 1 iked to think of himself as the "Second Libera tor. 11 
School children were taught to sing the happy little tune 
11M~rci, Papa Vincent" before school and during lunch. He 
compared himself and his work to that of Franklin Delano 
I 
Roosevelt and could not see why Roosevelt continued in power 
I 
while he, equally capable, and his job equally undone, had 
I 
to 'surrender his off ice.34-
l 
His first task after obtaining close control of the Garde 
i d'Haiti, which was now the only armed force in the country 
andi upon whose good ~!shes depended his continued security, 
was' the traditional altering of the constitution. Haiti 
34. GUnther, pp. 456-452. 
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still had not learned that a constitution is a ~ramework 
within which all parties work, a basic set o~ principles 
that may only be altered with due consideration, not an 
' 
ex post facto set of laws by which the victor consolidates 
his winnings. The power of the executive was enormously 
increased to the point where he held the whip-hand over that 
muc~-desired legislature which the Opposition parties had 
info~med Forbes was so essential to a democratic Haiti. 
The president could name ten of the twenty-one senators and 
' ! 
had the right to submit the names of the remaining eleven 
' 
to the Chamber of Deputies for ita rubber-stamped approval. 
By a later amendment, the president was given the power 
to remove senators. The Chamber of Deputies and local 
officials were chosen by the populace. at large, but the 
Senate and the president were chosen indirectly. As the 
reader notes, the president really selected the members of 
the ~enate, and the president was selected by the Senate 
and Chamber of Deputies, who were largely highly i~luenced 
by the Senate, with the result that the selection of a chief 
! 
executive was not very much more democratic than the selec-
tion of Borne by his own self-appointed Council of State. 
Although the Chamber of Deputies was supposed to be repre-
sentative of the nation, one must remember that 90% o~ the 
popul'a tion was virtually illiterate, and that the Chamber 
repre;sented the elite primarily. In 1935, a new constitution 
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wa~ adopted extending Vincent's term until 1941 and grant-
ing the pe@ple the right to choose the chief executive and 
re-lris e the constitution directly, "Both the constitution 
and its special clause were submitted to a popular plebi-
1 
scite, The government counted the votes and announced that 
' 
an 1overwhelming majority had given approval,n35 In 1939, 
I 
al$o by plebiscite, the people renounced their right to 
I 
ch~ose directly the chief executive and revise the consti-
1 
tution, The old pattern had not yet been changed; govern-
! 
ment in Halt i was not a trust but remained· personal property, 
I 
·During President Vincent's ten years in office he 
proved himself a capable:administrator, improving 
Haiti's domestic conditions and world position, 
Many times he went out into the fields and talked 
with the peasan~ urging them to rotate their crops 
and adopt other modern farming methods, But he 
permitted no interference with his plans, He kept 
the legislative branch in the subordinate position 
that it had occupied during most of the nation's 
history. He showed scant respect for civil liber-
ties, And.he maintained himself in power6through a close alliance with the Haitian Guard,J 
Vincent paid close attention to public works, commerce, 
and 1finance, but he failed to set the precedent which might 
hav~ brought Haiti into the modern era, In the period before 
the :Occupation, the mulatto claimed that he had to control 
the 1legis lature in order to offset the Negro president in-
staliled by a Negro Army. But in the Haiti immediately following 
35 •. Austin F. MacDonald, Latin American Politics and Govern-
ment! (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 2nd ed,, 1954), 
~93. 
' 
36. Ibid, 
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th~ Occupation, the legislature, the Garde, and the execu-
tive power were all in the hands of the mulatto. Had Vincent 
then demonstrated the faith and trust of a Jefferson or a 
I ,, 
Petion, the mulatto would have proved his sincerity when he 
I 
spoke of his patriotism. And it was not long before the 
blacks realized that the ~lite was under no great passion, 
as I the educated o-lass, to lead Haiti out of the merass of 
! 
ignorance and poverty. At best :it~ had only a half-hearted 
i 
will. If Vincent's administration did anything it demonstra-
' ted that Haiti's destiny did.!l2llie with the elite; it lay 
wi~h the vast black and, as yet, ignorant mass. Only when 
the president, the judiciary, the legislature were in the 
'· hands of trained, educated men of the black populace would 
Haiti take the first long step,toward modern, orderly demo-
cracy and a high standard of living. The question by the end 
ef Vincent's term was whether the black mass would come into 
its own by a gradual weakening of the mulatto hold or by a 
I 
violent social revolution such as had occurred in Mexico in 
thelfirst decade of the present century. 
jVincent wanted to remain president in 1941, but even the 
1935 constitution prevented his running for a third.time un-
' 
less approved by special plebiscite. Probably he could have 
obt~ined this plebiscite, for on March 10 the Chamber of Depu-
tie~ actually voted to extend his term. But his term was 
alr~ady longer than that held by Borno, and there were grumblings 
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in: the Garde. A month later he made up his mind that he 
I 
would not run again, naming another mulatto, Dr. Elie Les-
cot, then minister to Washington, his successor. Ten days 
after his announcement to this effect, Lescot was elected 
president by the legislature. 
I 
Lescot,37 whose administration ran from 1941 until 1946, 
ca~ried the authoritarian regime of Vincent to extremes. 
He ;declared war on the Axis, December 8, 1941, and· then pre~-
' 
ceeded to use the so-called "emergency" to maintain himself 
I 
in pa.o~er by prohibiting all elections :for the duration o:f 
th~ emergency. Bellegarde states that in 1944 the United 
States, with millions of men :fighting all over the world, 
:found no reason to limit its normally freely contested pre-
sid'ential election.38 Other attacks on Lescot came as the 
res1,1lt of rising prices, dropping wages, and the activities 
o:f the Halt ian-American Company, Whose experiments in the 
growth of a rubber substitute weed known as criptosteg(-a, 
the: peasants complained were destroying the best land in the 
country. A students' strike set the nation's capital aflame 
! 
with hatred, and mobs attacked the homes of cabinet ministers. 
No ionger supported by the Garde, Lescot fled with his :family 
to Ganada, January 11, 1946. A junta was :formed consisting 
o:f Colonel Frank Lavaud, commander of the Garde, Major Antoine 
37. Rodman, Haiti, pp. 27-29. 
38. Quoted in Rodman; p. 28. 
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L~velt, director of the Military Academy, and Major Paul 
' Magloire, who headed the Palace Guard. 
The junta recognized that the sixteen years following 
the Forbes Commission had not fulfilled the promises so 
! 
grandly proclaimed by the Opposition groups in 1930. Not 
orhy in Haiti, not only among the liberals of the United 
Slates, but throughout the world, the evidence was clear 
that the black Haitian was to receive little justice from 
tl'ie light-skinned politician who controlled the government. 
Fa1scis~ had been beaten,~~~~ Atlantic and United Nations 
Charters had proclaime~ in bold print the principle of hu-
man rights, and Red influence was making itself felt. The 
junta composed a new constitution in 1946; then, in an at-
' tempt to whitewash the elite class before the world, it look-
ed! beyond itself to a Negro for the next president. It chose 
, 
Dumarsais Estime, a forty-six-year-old lawyer, former farmer 
I 
and rural schoolteacher, who, although Negro and not of the 
I i 
elite, was nonetheless cultured, educated, well-to-do, and 
familiar with political office in Haiti.39 
/ Though the junta which selected Estime believed him 11 safe, 11 
I it~could not have been more mistaken. Estime believed that 
social revolution could not come slowly, that the future of 
" Haiti lay with the black working classes, that the elite 
39~ Rodman, pp. 29-30; MacDonald, p. 594; Herring, p. 422. 
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standards could no longer serve Haiti, and that the moneyed 
clalsses stood in the way of genuine progress toward 1 ifting 
the people out of illiteracy and poverty. 11 His announced 
I 
goall--was to improve the desperate 1 iving conditions of the 
I 
impoverished masses. 1140 That he was Communist is doubtful, 
but!! he was certainly 
phrlosophy. 
SGcial ist in his political and economic 
I 
Hated as few presidents before him, he produced during 
hisl administration genuinely worthwhile results. He dis-
charged the American debt; cleared and beautified the filthy 
slubs of the Port-au-Prince waterfront; publicized Haiti as 
a vacation-spot with the result that the tourist trade be-
cam~ Haiti's second largest source of revenue; constructed 
! 
\ 
an experimental modern city at Belladere complete with plumb-
ing,, electricity, and paved streets; fought hookworm by re-
i quirlng by law that peasants wear shoes; encouraged the de-
velopment of unions; formed an agreement with the Export-
, 
Impbrt Bank of the United States for the financing of a 
$6,000,000 irrigation and land-reclamation project in the 
Artlbonite Valley; and tried, though without too much success, 
I 
to collectivize the peasants by offering those who cooperated 
sixteen acres of land, seed, tools, and advice. A United Na-
1 
tions investigatory commission, however, reported that the 
40.; MacDonald, p. 594. 
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basic problem of Haiti came from the "relentless pressure 
! 
of ;a steadily growing, insufficiently educated population 
upqn limited, vulnerable, and--so far as agricultural land 
' I 
is concerned--alarmingly shrinking natural resources. n41 
I 
I Even with Estime•s advanced thinking, the forces were 
too 
, 
great for adequate solutions. The elite proved too strong-
I ly ioppos ed to Est! me • s program for 
bljck mass, and the Church opposed 
swift education of the 
bJ..rth control. Haiti has 
beeh, to a large degree, burdened with the same problem as 
lre!land and Italy, overpopulation. Yet Ireland's and Italy's 
surplus populations were able to find their way to the United 
I 
I 
States, to the Spanish and Portuguese-speaking nations of 
No one would take the surplus population of Latin-America. 
I 
I 
Halt i. When during Vincent's administration (October, 1937) 
Haitians crossed the frontier into the Dominican Republic 
i 
• I 
looking for work in the sugar-cane fie.lds, they were round-
ed up by the thousands and massacred with bullet and knife. 
I 
Batista 1 s hostili~y prevented their entering Cuba for the 
same type of work. Nor were they welcome in any other coun-
. I 
try !that had any color consciousness. As a result, Haiti be-
came in the 1940's a nation bursting with an exploding popu-
1 lation that had neither an outlet nor a solution at home. 
41. '1 Quoted in Lewis Hanke, Mexica and the Caribbean (Pr:lnce-
ton:l Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1959), p. 38; See United. 
Natibns Mission of .Technical Assistance to Haiti, Mission to 
Halt i (Lake Success, New York, 1949), passim. 
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I By 1950, despite Estime 1 s dissolution of radical par-
tie~s and newspapers, the e'lite, business communities, and 
Garde were anxious to rid themselves of his administration. 
! 
He had really proposed very little that Franklin Delano 
Roo~evelt had not proposed in his New Deal, but if the New 
Dea;l was a strong departure from Amer lean pol !tical philos-
1 ophY of the preceding years since the Civil War, how much 
! 
mor]e a departure, and 
to the cultured groups 
,. 
how much more shocking, was Estime's 
I -
in Haitil When Estime attempted to 
amehd the Constitution to permit himself to be reelected in 
! 
1950 (the 1946 constitution forbade immediate re-election 
i -but: retained the presidential term at six years), the Senate 
refused such amendment. When a mob sacked the Senate cham-
' ! 
. , ber> Estime praised the action in a newspaper article on 
May:8• 
The Garde once again acted. On May 10, 1950, it turned 
the I government over to the military junta, now controlled by 
Brigadier General Paul Magloire, and five months later Mag-
I loire was elected president of the nation. / Estime received 
a pension and exile. 
Magloire won the election without opposition, the people 
i 
voting directly after dissolution of the Senate and Chamber 
of Deputies. Although also 
I 
! 
had certain advantages over 
a Negro 
/ Estime. 
/ 
and not of the elite, he 
He was a military lead-
er, ifirmly entrenched in the Garde, the final arbiter of 
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na~ional pGlitics. He had a winning personality of a type 
whi1ch gave him wide influence with the leaders of the na-
tio~. Mgderate in his economic and sGcial views, he obtain-
i I 
ed the trust of the elite and the business community. He 
! 
advocated non-discrimination on the basis of skin-color in 
I 
his
1 
choice of government offices. He remained on friendly 
I 
terms with the Church; and he accepted the principle of a 
slo* evolvement of the black mass into its role of democratic 
actlon.42 
! 
1In 1950, at a Constitutional Convention held in Gonaives 
and !superintended by Dant~s Bellegarde, a new constitution 
was
1 drafted. The usual liberties of man were enumerated, 
I 
prinarily those included in the American "Bill of Rights" 
and ,the French Revo 1 ution' s 11 Decl a rat ion of the Rights of 
Man.," But too easy amendment, the fatal defect which in 
the ~st served as the poison shaft to strike at the heart 
I 
of any constitution, remained. Amendments could be proposed 
I 
by e1ither the president, the Senate, or the Chamber of De-
puties; both houses had to meet in joint session to consider 
the ~tter; two thirds of the total membership was necessary 
for ~ quorum, and two thirds of this quorum was necessary 
i 
for passage of a proposed amendment. 
! 
~lecticn of the president continued to be by direct vote 
(that is, communal electors where chosen by direct, secret 
42. !Rodman, pp. jo-31. 
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vot.,e) as well t as he Chamber of Deputies 
w , but the Senate 
as·, chosen by the provincial (Department) 
pres. id ent was assemb1 ies • The 
elected fo i r s x years, with 
for ',immediate no eligibility 
', re-election, senators (twenty-one) 
Y
e for six 
ar~, and deputies (thirt ) 
', y-seven for four yea~s. 
was granted to 1 Suffrage a 1 Haitians twenty-one 
regar'd to s · years of age without 
, ex, creed, or co lor b t h ', , u women, though they cou1 d 
old c;>f fice and vote on the local level, were 
' 
not permitted 
to vote th on e national executive level. The president, be 
it not•,ed, in additi ont-~ being empowered to select all ca-
binet minis't.'.ers, judges, f ' army o fleers., and diplomats, was 
grante~ the right to dissolve the Senate and Chamber of De-
puties ',at will--a clear road to despotism, for, unlike the 
' ' separations \~f the executive, judicial, and legislative 
powers \in th:~! Amer lean Constitution, ultimately all legis-
lative,' judiciial, and execut~ve powers vest in one and the 
~. L N same bo Y· N~r did the ational Assembly have any control 
over th~ president's appointments. In only two major ways 
did the Constitution cast restrictions upon the Chief Execu-
tive: (,1) the National Assembly had te approve all treaties 
' 
and declarations of wir (2) judges could not be removed by 
presidential whim. He alone may introduce appropriation 
' 
measures, may adjourn the National Assembly, and may cenvene 
I 
the National Assembly in special session to consider only 
too proposals which he desired to put before it. Why the 
' 
' 
\ 
\ 
I 
\ 
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' Conyention permitted the legislature the American device 
of overriding the president's objections to a law by a two-
' 
thir;ds vote of each house is not clear, for 11 (I)ega~IatJ:o.Ii 
by d¢cree is the rule rather than tne exeeption. Some of 
I 
I 
the ~ost important reforms in Haitian history have been made 
by pries id en ti al order. n43 
I 
'I:he cabinet became a cross between the British system 
I 
and tpe American. Like the British, each cabinet member sup-
I posedly took absolute responsibility for the acts to which 
I 
he gave his consent, yet like the Americans he did not re-
' 
present a particular party in the legislature hut remained 
merely, a head of department. The plain fact is that the pre-
sident.became so all-controlling that the cabinet members 
were little better than clerks performing routine duties. 
Direct vote of the people, though provided for by the 
Convent,ion, really meant little when one realizes that the 
' 
vast na':Jority could neither read nor write. Of what use was 
for Secret balloting when the people could not the prwis ion 
understand the issues involved, or make 
·read the newspapers, 
their v~ice heard? 
ders of the well-entrenched political 
The rural lea 11 ct the registration cards of machine usually co e a in a small sum for 
their unlettered f~l~~wer~~t~ lhe~e cards in hatches. 
this privilege--~n e~d for so maeyyears that no 
This system has ueen us 1; 1; 
thinks to challenge it.~ 
MacDonald, P• 596. 
' 
Ibid., 595-596. 
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I 
'From December 5, 1956, to May 25, 1957, Haiti was again 
I 
I 
throes of conflict. Four governments rapidly succeed-
another in the space of 170 days of chaos, rioting, 
and confusion. Magloire would not surrender his office de-
in the 
I 
ed I one 
I 
spite the dictates of the Constitution whose provisions he 
I 
supposedly accepted. Were Haiti under a succession of strong 
I 
executives, or under a succession of alternatin:g; strong and 
I 
' weak, rulers in the vein of Eng 1 ish history, pol !tical progress 
might have been attained. But one of Haiti's tragedies has 
I been ,her interminable line of weak executives. 
As of the present writing, the government is under the 
stric',t control of Dr. Fran~o is Duvalier, backed by a $6,000,000 
loan from the International Cooperation Administration and 
' . 
a military mission of marines authorized to go to Haiti at 
the i~vitation of Duvalier. In the meantime, added to her 
inter~! troubles is the double threat of Castro in Cuba and 
Truji~lo in the Dominican Republ ic.45 
D~ring the thirty years of Latin-American history since 
Forbes',, flaws have appeared in the 11 Good NeighbGlr Policy." 
Forbes'' apprehensions regarding the value of complete with-
drawal, did not lack foundation. To a large degree the "Good 
' 
Neighbqr Policy" has become in the last fifteen years the 
' 
"Forgotten Neighbor Policy." The United States went too far 
' 
45. Hanke, p. 39; Herring, p. 423; J. Fred Rippy, Latin 
America: A Modern History (Ann Arbor:. The University of 
Michigan Press, 1959), p·. 410. 
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inlpromoting democracy during the first three decades of 
th~ century, and it retreated too far in the fourth, fifth, 
', 
and sixth. In 1930 Latin America cried for the withdrawal 
I 
of ~erica; today it cries that we have neglected her. 
Forbes did not say that we must abandon Haiti and her sis-
1 
ters to the ravages of their O'Nll failings, but that we must 
! 
help them in a more palatable way. Occupying them and im-
1 pos~ng democracy did not work because this method smacked 
I 
of 1ppression. Appropriating large sums of money for their 
use ~s not worked, because those sums have only served 
I further to pad the pockets of those in power, while the 
! 
peop~e remain as poor, illiterate, and exploited as ever. 
' 
Investing large sums in their agriculture, commerce, and 
i, 
industry has only aroused resentment at Yankee economic im-
1 
peri~lism, leading to confiscation of American properties. 
I 
I Recognizing only strong governments with enough power to 
i 
maint!ain order and stability has led to our maintenance of 
dictaltors:who would destroy the very liberties we profess 
' 
to su~port. Attacking revolutions because of our fear of 
Commuhism in Latin-America has led many Latin-Americans to 
I 
believe that we are for the status guo and against social 
I 
and economic reform. 
I 
Wnat must we do? Forbes• idea was that we must help 
I 
Haiti Ito help herself; and this may only be done by aiding 
her td develop her own resources. American private ownership 
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muslt be kept out of Latin-Amer lea. Latin-American resources 
sho1ul d be developed not by private Amer lean funds but by 
Co~ressional appropriations. But these appropriations should 
I 
notl be handed over to the Latin-American governments to do 
with as they will. Funds should be appropriated only for 
spebific purposes--as the USSR did with the building of the 
I Aswan dam for Egypt--for a particular school or system of 
I 
schools in Cuzco, the widening of a designated river in Vene-
1 
zuela, the construction of a specific steel plant in southern 
I 
Chite• the deepening of the harbor at Port-au-Prince, and 
so ?n• In this way, the huge funds which are appropriated 
will be used for the purposes given, and Latin-America will 
own!what she has. The United States must avoid recognizing 
andlsupporting gove~ment leaders inimical to the tradit!Qns 
I 
of American democracy. It should support liberal movements 
I because these are essential to the liberation of that mighty 
I 
spirit within Latin America; but the United States must try 
I . 
to see that these movements achieve their goals within the 
! 
framework of human freedom. America needs once more the re-
I 
putation of being in the forefront of liberalism. 
I The United States faces a tremendous task in the final 
decades of this century, truly a new and more than ever '·Man!-
fest 
steJ 
Destiny. The Forbes Commission in Haiti took the first 
. . 
in the right direction. 
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APPENDIX 
\ 
II···· 
COPY OF DOCUMENT PROTESTING THE UNITED STATES 
OCCUPATION OF HAITI, PRESENTED TO THE FORBES 
COMMISSION BY THE OPPOSITION PARTIES 
1 V\' 
/ .. 
.. ,.., 
. :.:· 
'i HlE NATIONAL I.EAGUE OF. 
I 
\
. CO~'STJTUTIOi'iAL ACTION 
I Created ,~·ith a ,·iew· to protect tile 
Haitian·~tational rightS, interpreting the 
... ~epiratio1ns of the Haitian people. 
1 Doe3 lierehy expo:.c t"o :'llr. President 
of the United Stutes the following factS: 
I . 
1 l. - The troubles thnt hn<e lately 
Occurred irt Haiti producing such. a 
qccp reper~ussion in the world,_ speci· 
a:lly in Lollin-Al\IERICA, ha,·e attract· 
eo the nniv_ersa1 at'i:cntion on a situation. 
t,hal the llonorable Secretary of State, 
···. ~h. Stim::ont hn:; qunlified as· c: caus-
iryg ~cute. l!.n~ish >. 
r2. - T~e_e.xisting ·conditions in Haiti 
c:jcause ·acute anguish~ because, since 
tlic Americnn intervention on July 
-~ 2qrh, 1915, 3 military Occ!lpntion, im~ 
p'icnting a permanent l\Jnrtinl Law, has 
uQcn estnhlished, absorbing gradually 
all the t;o\·crmncntul and nclminis.trn· 
equally <transitory> prcscrihcs tluit 
c The fint eJection of the members of 
the Leg.i.sbt.ivc Tiody ~ltaiJ take place 
on the lOth of Jnnuary of an C\·Cn )~Can·, 
and· ·lhal such \·ear sha11 he determin-
. ed by .a. 'Pres.identfal ~CcrCe ~·ithiu . 
three months prc\·iOus to the ineeting of 
~he pri"m3iy ·As~emb.lilis .. Five even 
: );ea.fs ltaYe elapsed since, _and s~ill 'the 
Pt•esiUCnt,- - taking the prescription, 
in its Uenlin•~s w:itl1 tltc Co'nvoC3tion of 
• 0 • -- • 
electors, as a privilege ·ancl not as :- : 
obligation, - has been ·r~fr_airllng 11l:n· 
eelf from fulfiiling- t:tat foim.1l~ty. 
The forb~ararlce ~f the P1~csiCi~nt of 
H~iti has produced n= .... ~.~scq'uence th~t 
:the democratic, rcpuZ.u:l.!!l_!L and rc_prc· 
scntativc constitution of tl1C. Haitian 
GoYcr;nnent has been converted :into 
a dici.ntorship. __ 
5. - The present CoYcrnritcnt or 
Haiti ·is a dictntorship : 
1°) because th~ elCcth·e franchis~ is 
·refused to the Hnltian citizens, 
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L--··-· th•e ncth·itics of the Haitian Republic. 2°) because the Nation;--who is rc~ 
presc11ted by the unh·ers:tlity of 
those citizcps po;5~!~ing their 
political rights, do~s not p:utid .. 
p<llc dircc~ly to th_e mnrw.gemcnl 
of public nrrnirs. 
13. - This absorption rea.chcd its 
. cl}~mnx. with the dissolution twice, in 
19 6 and 1917, of the Lcgislnti,•e As· 
scttblies emanated from the popular 
vo c, a uti with their substitution by 
n Council of Stntc, a body of politicians 
rippointcrl by the Prcsiclcnt of _Huiti 
nn~J removable at his fnncy. 
4. - Dy virtnC of n « trnnsitory::. 
rrO\•ision of the Con~titntion of 1913, 
thQ Lcc;i$]ath·e Power is vested in the 
Co\mcil of State until the constilution 
of lthe Legislnt_h-c Body. 
;tl1e .Legislative Do(h· has "not bCcn 
' . 
coqstitutcd because another pro,•ision 
of l thut ~nmc. Con=titution of 1913 
. ·t 
.~: . 
! . .. - --- _:;__:_• 
... / 
I /-' ,. __ ,. ' . .. _ .. / 
3(t) hccausC --t~te Nation has to obey 
to laws nncl to pny--·tnxcs which 
hrwe not been ,·otcd hr its clcclctl 
rcpresenta ti ,·ca, 
.1ll.l because it Uocs not control the 
collection qf t:~xcs, nor the ex-
penditure made in hi:l behalf by 
foreign irrc::Opou~iblc cmployt.'e:;. 
6. -- This diC'tatur:;hip is of n mili· 
tnry dwrnctcr. bct'Oitt~c it iJ b;wkc1l hy 
nrmt•tl fon·t.·~ of tht• Fnitt.~tl StatP~ \dtu 
.:.J ,.-· 
,.., -
......... --.-.- -· -,. -- ····-----.--
) 
I 
. ' ., . 
' 
.. •. 2 ' '1,: if 
. '}'! 
• ,: .-:) ••• 'I"'. 
1 ----- l 
cnf¢rce and ·maintain that dictatorial 
' . Go,~ernment: 
• ~h I act, the. nctUul . Government or 
. Hahi is in hand of the American High 
Co~nmissioner who totally enslaves the 
na~ive Government. This fact has been 
established. without any possibl; con· 
te~tioo by Dr. 1\ULLSPAUGH, former 
Ffnancial Adviser in IIniti, and by 
niany American observers whose disin-
' ' tJrestedness aud impartiaJity in the 
1Jnuer are beyond all doubt. · 
/ .. 7. The military cli~tatorship 
~stablishcd in Haiti has prm·en to be a 
t
1
ota] failure. 
i ECONO~IlCAL FAILUHE. Noth-
~ng in an efficient ·way hns becri clone 
1'in order to increase the Haitian produc-
' 
1
1 tion; a~d while our export is dccrcas-
. in:;, many legislative measures discou· i rnging ngriculturists and imlustrinls 
; hnvc been adopted; commerce nlso is 
/ nt bay. . . . . 
~ SOCIAL FAILURE.- Many attempt• 
1' lun-c been put in action to sour the 
pcusnr~t's temper against ihe town. 
pcopiC.by muking them belief that the 
rural :'mnsscs wcr:e systematically nb.ms-
eU hy .the l-Inithm elite; but in fact no 
serious mcnsures hn,·c ever bccu adopt. 
cd to protect thc111 nnd to i-ncrease their 
sltmdanl of lh .. "in•r. On the coutrnr)' thc,-
.c • ' • 
hn,·e been illtrcnte<l physically hy 
means of.« con·Cc 1» (forced labor), n 
vestige of the colonial :-:)':"tcm, wronged 
in their- properties tbrough certain 
laws put forth with the scope of dcprh·· 
ing them of their Jands, and not hch1•' 
. 0 
protcC'tcd by the police force nor jtidgcs 
A ~=j)·· 
-. ~--- t-· ··---
.i· ' .' 
t: 
-
.•.r; . 
.,. -- ~ 
I 
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'. 
they were compelled to use violent 
rcvcudicntions which have leU to the 
hecatombs of 1918-1919. nnd those of the 
6th uecember last. : \-· 
POLrl'ICAL FAILURE.- The Haitian 
Nation has gone back rather than ad-
\'a .. ncCd in the path of democraiic pro· 
[jrc:.s and sciU-goYernmcnt; 
0
evcn th~ 
;\IuniC"'lpa] autonomy· ha~is of our poli-
tical organization · has been abolished 
as it is proved by the. uncl.erdealings 
employed in ?rder to bar the elections 
of 1930. The judicial power whose au-
thority lays on the competency, in· 
tegrity and independence of the ]u~gcs 
has been weakened and demoralized 
with the suppression of the inmo,•abi· 
lity of the J uugca. 
MORAL FAILURE. ----:- Neve~ before, 
the dcflnnce· of )m\-· had reached such 
un extent as no,wadays, for law 'is .not 
consid~rccl as emanation of the -N.ut.iou-
~tl wip but merely ns instrumcut. o£ 
tyranny and arbitrarics; ne\'er before, 
stoop· of characte~ mid corrtiptiOfi'"'·were 
as common as todny, - nepotism and 
fuvorhsm o. being· the inflexible rule 
follchn~d in the recruiting of _the. J{igh 
official; of the Republic. 
All these fncts _:which. could be easily 
esttlhli::ohed hy an impartinllil"Y'CBtign· 
tiou - hare produced unrest, insecur-
ity and a general ngitntion v,.·hieh en· 
fhmgcr public pc=:tce. 
Order prcvniJs in Haiti,· but u 1na-
tcrin1 and factitious ot•tler imposed ancl 
maintnincd hy 1ncnns of m:tchinc·guns. 
The rc<~l pc-:tcc, the Jn;;tiug and ft~rtilc 
pc:tcc, thnt which rcsta on liberty, 
justice and respect of·thc NatiOual ius-
·' ' . 
· ... I ··.'. 
: .... 
tiwtions and . on popular sympnthy, 
does not e..xisL 
8. ___; Al~·nre of this lamentable condi-
tion the President of the United Stutes 
has ,~x[>rcsscd his willingness to bring 
about those changes claimed for hr the 
I IInidnn opinion and by the American 
Co::~s:::cnce, Stating that it should Lc 
obserYctl -a more hun1nn attitude LO· 
. ::wards Haiti, nn attitude of more respect 
~for the di~nity nnd independence of ihc 
~Haitian people and more in nccorclnncc 
j with the democratic principles of the 
Government or the United States, a 
'measure that will contribute to calm 
the UJ.ILUral apprehensions of Latin-
'A,IEHICA-and that should be employ· 
eel in the policy of good understand-
'irw and unselfish friendship that Jlr. 
p . 
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drowned in u hloocl::hcd and the repa· 
n.1th·c measures promised hy )lr. Presi-
dclll IIOOYER indefinitely postponed. 
.Although the impor.tancc assigned to 
those trouhie.s were. exnggerated, it' is 
a matter e! fuct that they have reYe:\1· 
ell the 'di::content and the deep excite-
ment among the people as a result of 
the unjustified and ,.e.""Ctitious tyranny 
whereupon the pres£nl .sy.st~ is bas-
ed. 
The excitement' which upsets the 
whole Nation is a drawback to the 
development of its pacific .achie,·emenrs, 
entangles consequently the economical 
development of the country, and &;hall 
not come t~ an end unless- the dicta-
torship is suppressed. And that can-
not be obtained unless the Govern· 
ment o£ the United States' forrttnl pro-
: ){00VEH is willing to practice W· 
·\f. mise mndc in 1915 to the..H11itian.pcoplc 
'\\•nrds our sisters Repuhlics. 
· r · · bC an nctua.l Ca.ct, by assisting Haiti in 
.·\:i Th.cre!Qr_e,_ in ·his 1\fcssagc of 3th the cslublishlng of a stable go,·crn-
Dccembcr last to Congress, l\{r_ Prcsi- rncnt clcctecl by itself . 
.. dent .. of the United States did assert 9~- lienee, as a result of lhe armed 
his intention of sending to Haiti n forces employed by the Americnn Occu-
Comm.ission to inquire into-th~ua- ~l!.P·tio·n in 1916 and 1917 to ~xc the 
iion nnd 'to submit to l1is approval the Legislntivc Chn~nhers, in-'i920-l922-l92-1 
?cccssnry solution. llut, some days 1926 and 1928 to supprcs_§. the lcgi$la-
Uftet·\\'nrd!!!. ;:ts n con5CI!tiCHC_e · of the th·e elections, - that, in oppos-ition 
troubles occurrerl in ITniti during the with the Constitution of 1918 imposed 
*udcnts' strike, :\h·- Prc::;i,lcnt o£ the hy the Uuilcd States, - 'nu sot·ern-
Vnitcd Slillcs rccommcJHlctl thnt iru· .ment .by the pl'Oplu f;;~ ..... th""; proplf! 
rnctliatc steps should he taken Ly c:ould ct:cr be (•stnblislwd in lluiti. 
<j:ongrcss. On ] 2th of l\ugust 1915; ::lit•. Durti-
. Thc.se troubles were magnified in gul"n:t\'C h:ul Lccn clt.~ctl'd l~rl"~id,~ut o£ 
official reports in order to justify 1hc thc Ht.~puhlic hy the Nutiorwl .·ts.~embly 
~xpcdition of more nnncd Ion·cs to eompo:-:cd of the SenaiC! :uHl thl' Chamb-
·n:liti with the hope, by tloing so, that cr of D(~putif's. 
the. llnitinn rcn•n(liration:s woultl he The Nationoll _.\:;$Citlhly alom~, in ii:J 
\ 
:I 
I 
~ j I . 
4. 
C'onsiitutiomtl prh·ilcgc, is entpo'\:ercd. 
to elect a Prc~id.cnt of the Republic. ' 
r. The. Constitution of 1918, « which. 
was forced down the throat of Haitian· 
. . 
people with Auicrican bayonet~»_, ac~ 
cordi rig to the historical words of-Pr~i­
tlcnt HARDil\G - docs not differ on' 
thnt point from the .prc,·ious Consti-
tuti~n. Ita Section III, Chapter I, title 
Jll rcfcrifag to the National Assembl/ 
r~~~s as follows : · · 
<:Art, 40. - The lwo Chambers shall 
meet as a Nntional Assembly _in such 
cases as st:ttutab1c by the Coustitution. 
«The powers of the N~tionul .Assem-
bly arc limited nnd cannot be cx:crcis-
cd an any other subject but ·those 
.'i[Jecially assigned by the Constitution. 
«'Art; 4L - The- President of the 
Sc11ate prcsic1c3 the National Assembly 
. whcr~of tlte Prcsitlcnt or the Chnmbcr 
of ricputics is the Yic~.P~esidcnt, while 
the Sc(.•rctnrics of the Senate a!.uf of the 
Chamber of Deplllies are Secretaries of. 
the ,Nutionnl AsscmLir...... · 
~:Art. 42. --: The~tributcs. of the 
Nritjonal ~\~~cmh1y aie : · · 
lj ;t~ clc~t the Prcsi1lcnt of'\hc Rcpu· 
hlic und to rcceh·c his onth; 
2° Etc ... 
< .. Art. 48. - No rcsoltition· cnn he 
'' ndoJ>teU if the. prc::cncc of a majority 
of th~ 'two HousCs hns not been 'ascer-
tained.·» 
nb;tcc, in .the Haitian Constitutionnl 
systdm the N:tliotwl As:;cmbly consti· · 
tntcs ·a spceinl ot·ga.nizntion ''~-·ho~c at~ 
tributes nrc rcstricth·cly dctcrminccl 
nud it:; composition iuunu.taL1y fix~d Ly' 
the Cou~tilution; it is the joiniiig of 
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thc.two Leg-islative Chambers into. one 
sinSlc Assembly. Its attributes ':ire 
cJiffcrent front those of the Legislative 
n·ody composed of a House of Deputies 
arid a Seriate exercising separalelY 
¢ legislnth•e power :oaccordiug io the 
condition established by the Constitu. 
tion in its Chapter II (articles 49-70). 
10. - Article D of the < transitory::. 
provisions of the Consti..W.!ion._ of 1910 
prescribes that the Council of Staie 
shall exercise the Legislative" Power 
Until the Legislativ_e Body is elected. 
.According· to article 55, legislnth·e po~\·er 
('Onsist in the ~ m3king of laws on all 
matters of public i~Hereis.:. 
The practice of this «. legisln tive 
power ::t>, conferred pr.ovisionally and· 
temporary upon. the Council of State, 
f{oes not entitle it to ·exercise the altri~ 
butcs of the .National Assembly, nnme· 
ly to elect the President of the Repu. 
blic. ' 
Consequently, it is without any right 
no.r; Iitle tlHit the Council of State -
an uniqut...,. Assembly of employees np· 
pointed by.:tthc_ PrcsiU.Cnt of the Rcpu. 
blic - has elected Mr. LOUIS nORNO 
president o'r the Hcpublic in 1922, ndfl. 
ing n constitutional riolntion to another 
oue , :Mr. Bol'llO not hcing eligible to the 
prCsidency ns born o£ an nlicn father. 
{at_"ticlc 73, lst alincn). 
Jt is equally without anj right .nor 
Iitle thnt the 'Council or State, composed 
of employees appointed by l\[r. llOR-
. l\0, hns reclcctctl ,\[ r. n OHi\'0 in 1926 
n:: . Pn~~idcut of the Republic, not· 
witlt~tnnclirlg the cddcnt proof of hid 
incligi~ilit)' cstablishc<l by n · letter 
i . 
I ~ . -. 
.............. 
! I 
. ,_-. _- -~ . ·, 
wJich 
in he 
. -· . : 
he wrote uml toigncd, a.r_nl where· 
ndmits him~cli that his father 
was still a Frenchman at th~ time of 
his birth. 
' . 11. -The Counc1l of State, compos· 
ed: as it is_ of parents, relatiOns and 
partisans o£ j)Ir. BOfu"'O and blindly 
subdued so the latter, has - publicly 
and in writin"gs - declared that they 
will not receive any watch-word but 
from Mr. BORNO. It is n ~act that the 
Council of Stntc- has no constitutional 
attributes, neither moral authority nor 
I 
necessary independence to elect the 
President of the Republic in 1930. If 
Mr •. BORN'O, or any one else publicly 
or. secretly designated by himself, 
shbuld be nominated President of. the 
Republic in April. l4th, 1930, by the 
Cobncil of State, the discontent and 
h i . 1 . . '11 b t ~ gene_ra agJtatLon ·w1 e extreme 
an~- certainly the cause of diso~ders 
th~t the Americans only will-be able to 
chCck by a huge and heartless blootl· 
shed, 
!"~.:..-:- Un1te<l Sta'tes hn,·e promis:cd 
thdir assis~ancc to the Haitinn people 
in ~he estal\li5hme:nt of a stnl.U_e.Cgx.cnl· I - _:---. 
me:nt. Tim,e has come for \\r:lshington 
to feci> to ·its promises. 
The Haitian people ask the assistance I _- , 
of ;the Unitcrl States in the cstnblie-h· 
nH!'Ul of s;uch a ~ovcrumcut, wl~o:<e 
stnfi!ity rc:Hs on the free snffr01gC ·of-
th~ National Chumbers, nnrl the ct~.~c­
tiOJ.I of the President of the Hepublic 
by the National Asocmbly which COli· 
~dste, acconling to the- Constitution, of 
the [e~:11g of the Se11atc a11d the Cha111· 
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bcr of Dcp_t~:ties n1~ltctl into one single 
assembly. 
13. - Art. 27. or the Constitution 
reads as foUo,.,.· : · <The. National 
Sovereignty rr.sit!es in the.-u[liYersalitY 
of the citizens. :n 
On bch~li ~o£ that c. national So--
vereignty > the Haitjan citizens ask for 
an honest ·and _free election who will 
restore the Legislative and the Execu-
th·e Powers, - two principal elements 
o£ the Government o£ the Republic, 
which is_ e~sentially civil,. democratic 
and representative according. to. the ex-
pression ·_of_ the Constitution of 1~18 
(Article 28) • 
As the legislative elections are to take 
place at an early date,_ the inten·enion 
or the U. S.- Go,·ernment .is deemed 
necessary. by the Hnitia_n _~_citizens. 
This inten·e~tion is asked Jar be-
cnuse. )fr. BORNO, notwithstandin~ 
his formnl promise of a recon.:struction 
of the LcgislatiYe Chnmher.s contained 
in his message. or April 1928 to the 
Council of Stat-e,_ retrric_tea. under the· 
prct.cn::cs that a state of excitement 
JH'c\·ails in Haiti while the High. Com-. 
missioner us well as the Chic( o( the 
Gar<lc tl·Haiti in their orfidnl reports 
hun~ nwdc at thut \'Cry tim_e a quite 
dilTcrcnt ~tatcmcnt. 
The prC$-Cill agitation is due at _the 
<·oillrilr)' to a large extent t~ thOt vio-
hltion of .his forlllnl cng;t,:eua.•ut 1 to 
that tlist·eg:u·cl of the tnu.ot .:<.tl'rl'tl right 
of dtizeus : the ri~ht to 'vtc. 
The Con~rnnh:nt uf the Unltl"d Stntc-s 
i.'~mnot im·okL•, to r~jcl•t this th•nuuul 
,, 
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.· .. 
' \,, . ~· 
or inten·cntion, that the tr:eaty of 1915 
does T\Ot confer upon it the right to 
impose on the 'President of Halti the 
, 'respect of the constitutional p;rescrip-
' . . 
tions dealing ""·ith the constitution oi 
tl1e Legislative Body. 
General WALLER, Chief of the Ame· 
rican forces ·of Occupation, without 
takini;: ri'Otice of ~he treaty of 1915, 
had caused in 1916 the doors of the 
Haitian Parliament to be closed. 
. . 
:'. 
. '. :' : 
.. 
authority of the President of Haiti who 
is the Chief Coruttlander of all the arm-
ed forces of the Republic .. (Article 75 
of the Constitution). 
14. __;. The Haitian citizens ask for 
free and fair legislath~e elections in 
order that the Legislative Chambers 
once restored may be th~ _jaithful re· 
presentation o[ the interests~~nO aspi-
rations of the Haitian ·Nation. 
LiLerty ancl fairness aie not secui:ed 
_"'!:.--·:')' Colonel ELI K. COLE, Chief of the arm- at present because the e1ectora1. process, 
I 
I 
' 
ed for.ccs .. of Occupation· in 1917, forced adulterated .intetllionally by means of 
the Pl-csiden.t . .Pf~_ffaiti to decree, des- n _1m~ .. Yotcd !>Y the Council of State, is 
pite the Huitian cOnstitption, the disao- beyond all control of the electors, anU 
lution of the Haitian Legishtive Body, only the ExecutiH!·s ugcnts arc clothed 
,~·hile .Gcneral---Smedlcy BUTLER, with the power of jurlging of the vnli· 
chief of the Gendarmerie d'Haiii, threw dity_ of such elections. 
hoth Senntors and Deputies -f_J;Q.Jn_theit· --o-··.-'fhe Haitian citizeris ask for a ·new 
benches. · -T;.::-:;.:~-reg.ulatlon to bt~ adopted or that the 
/·. Jh~Unitod,._St~te!\._y..Q_,•e_rnm~nt is in. ·--o!'d eleCtor,!ll law, oiTedng 1norc gun-
the obli~;;ntion to restore twhat the Awe· ran tee of hcincstyt be in-7 force. · ~fany 
rican forces h:wc deStroyed in Haiti. homage has been paid to the U.S. 
Its honor and the rcsp.(msability it hns Government in 1927 when Honorable 
taken towards Haiti in face of the eivi- Uir. Stimson was commissionncd to stu· 
lizcd. \~'orld call-for s~Ch a ·m·e-;Surc of dy and t~ rccomlllend the ,Vny to put 
spprcmc. reparation. an· encl to the internal troubles in 
Ir Mr. LOUIS l30HNO, notwith- NlCAHACUA. --~-'--· '-'--~ 
stamling tl1c intervention of the Ame-
rican J Govcrur.ucnt; dcciincs to c01n~ene 
the 9lcctor•, ·it should be up to the 
.American Occlipntion to take cnrc of 
smnc,'for the sake or-'thc Haitian people.· 
nnd the .s-nfcgunrd of public peace. 
/. This ,'tlCL ~hn11 not he taxed ns being 
more· itrhitl'at·y than the reCc1\t actua· 
tton ·of .the OccuJHition Force~, )V"ho, 
hy virtue of the mnrtinl luw, had 
placed umlcr their onlcr the Ca.rdu 
d'Ilniti, - n nationnl force under the 
i'lir. Stimson W<ts comulissioncd to stu-
way wns to :;ivc n free nntl honest ·Ptcsi-
dcntial clectious to the Nicar:nguuns. 
Gencml.Frnnck ~Ic. Coy ''tns appointed 
to carry out the prog-ram of Colonel 
Stimson nnd peace eYer slpce has been 
n•s.torcd in Nicnrng-un. As ; 1-;l-:iltel· of 
ft~cl Unitcll Stones houl ns:>ttmcll lc5~ 
ohligoltion lowatlh Nicuragunthau thosf' 
it h<t::> ctmtrnetctl "'rlth IIniti. 
Hnitinn citizens nsk that lhc .Amcri~ 
c:m Gorcnuncnt shou.hl work out u si-
I. 
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~ilar plan for Haiti ·by sending here a 
~an of ~onsciez:ce - whose impartia-
li~y and spirit of justice might inspire 
confidence to the Haitian people - to 
organize and sU·rervise the coming 1egis-
1ith·e electio-ns. 
! 15. - Our detractors assert that the 
Haitian people is not ripe ·yet for uni-
v~rsnl suffrage~ This assertiOn is _a false-
l10od. 1-listory of llaiti shows at· the · 
(!Ontrary that the legislative electionS1 
tt;hcn-evcr they u:erc cnrried on freely 
and .honestly, have nl;.·ays brought the 
most clever artd -honest-l!LE;.D in the 
Chambers. 
1Illiteracy is still great in Haiti, but 
it: docs not reach beyOnd that of' certain 
democ_rntic countries of Europe and 
Abcrica. 
'There is a hnge pcrcentq~of Haitian 
n:;ricult uri ts, industrials, mcrchn nts, 
handicrnfsmen, skill workmen, cngi-
n¢crs, physicians, teachers, lawyers, 
artists, writers, etc. who form a numc-
rqus elite entitled to shnrc the _man:~gc­
mcnt and Ulrccti_S!!!_ of their own public 
affairs. Tl~rough their effort~, within 
the space o£ a century., the most Lack-
w~rd of masses sprun:.; from the_ mo:H 
abject ~~-r~ ~~rgilttizctl so-
ciCty, which} uudoubtctlly - like uny 
ot;hcr - ihas gone through n scric of 
trbu bles, but has, ncYerthclcss, nccom-
PVsh a 01oral and mntcrial achicvcm~nt 
tJint cannot he· denied. Those who per-
fidiously ilctrowt the Haitj,:m people ns 
nOt being t-nfTicit'IHly iutclligcnt to 
cqoose thdr rt·tn·f' .. t·o~tatin~s :trc the sn-
. m;C though 'dw admitted in 1918 ntul 
1928 that the Huitian people dcscrrctl 
· ... 
7 
to utter their opinion by means of a 
plebiscite on the most dcli~ate matters 
of Con~titutional Law. 
No material prosperity is to be obtain-
ed without peace, and a real peace 
never _w.i11 he. n!achCd unless popular 
elections are ordered and carried out 
honestly for thf! benefit of the recons~ 
truction of a National G-overnment. 
Only such a Governme'nt enjoying of 
peop]e"'s confidence shall have the neces-
sary authority to f~cilitate the work 
of. the Commission and to cqoperate 
'"·ith it in the task of reconstruction am.I 
reParation-longed for by U"Ir. President 
Hoover. 
The National League of Constitution~ 
al Action, interpreting the legitimate 
aspirations of the Hnitinn citizens, de~ 
munds: 
L-Thnt the Go\·ern-ment of the Unitctl 
States, appreciating the obligations it 
has assumed tewards the Haitian peo· 
ple in the· treaty of 1Ql5, and consider· 
ing the ruaintainance of a lasting peace 
in Haiti as th.e most primordial and 
indispensable conUition of ·arw econo-
mical mul mor;1l · adv~wccmcn~- of the 
country~ should take immcdintcly lhe 
~c.-cs::mt· • _men_surc o guarantee that· 
l'e;l('C, 
!!.- Th:1t :111 actunl pence, hl'ing im.·ompa-
tihlc with the existing militnry llicta.-
lot·:ohip. the Con~·l"mnent of the Cuitcd 
States should put an end to such a llicta-
tor~hip by rc-(•:;tahli.:;hin:; the ch·il, tlc-
mocrntic nnd reprc~l·ntoJtivc Co,·crn· 
mcnt ahuli:·dted by it:: ..-\gcnt3 in Haiti 
sim•c 1913 by tli~.·\llving the 'L<"gi~lath·c 
ll···'~ . 
-----------·---~---------
I 
•. 
·., 8 
' 
3.- That, owing: to tbe proximity of 
the 'Prc~idcntial election, ._ to which· 
:the Department of slate, ... according to 
his recent clcclarut'ion in a communique, 
cilnnot remain idilTerent,.- the GOvern· 
men~ of the Uni-ted State~ shoUld use all 
possible means to see· that ·the Hajlian 
e1cctors be convened at an earliest date 
with the view tO elect members to both 
Senate and ·House o( Deputies, say fOr 
instance on·the 15th dny of March ·1930 
in compliance with articles 35, 2nd _al~­
nen, and 39, 2nd :1linea, of the "Consti-
tution. 
4 . ....;_ That, ow~ng to the fact that po 
Legislative nor Presidential elections 
1 
shall meet the appro,•al of the Haitian 
people unless tlwr were conductci( on 
all liberty j;!Jld fairness, the Go,•ernment 
of the Unitcll States should cause to ·be 
adopted u new regulation of the e]ccto~­
.11 opcrntiotis, ani! that such elections be 
wutched hy non-suspcctuhlc' Agents and 
not b):' iho~c who, in some way or a· 
IJOthcr, hn,·e been mixed up in the Hai-
ti:tn adzuinistrution since 1915. 
1- Consitlcring the rtearncss of presiden-
ciul vncnncy nnd the constitutional iin-
possibility for the Council of State to 
i elect the Prcshlcnl of Haiti on the }41th 
' ; of .Apdt 1931), the National Laaguc of 
, Constitutionul Ac:tion rC"spCctfully do.cs 
( J,crcby ;~sk _l'\Ir.~_?rcuitlcr~t of the United 
:Stutes to_ ta~e ns soon as possible a dcci-
i slon jn the way indic~tcd nbove as a 
I. pn.·l~miunry mc~~surc whi~c the bill co~­cer.mng· the scntlin•r off of a Commis-
' 0 . 
'sion of Jrnquh·y uud Rcpnr.:1.tion is lny-
. 1iug- bcforc the Federal· Senate. 
i 'the $lgtwr.s of this appeal do nol. 
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obey in- thes~ r~endi~ations: tO dny Per-
sonal prejudice. They •do hereby take 
the ensagemt•nt to gine their. support 
-u.:ith the greate?st disinterc.stc?-ness·-
to the citi=en that the Haitian people 
may freely elect t~ the Presidency arnl 
to·assist him in tha practice._ of a policy 
of ·peace and improvement tending to 
lift up the moral level and to -better 
life.'• conditions of all classes of the 
Haitian society. They are equally aware 
thut only a close poliCJ~f friends/lip· 
iznd ·interamcrican good-understqndir:r-g 
t.S._neccssary, and first of till that such 
a policy· should. rest on the respect of 
the equality and indepe~dence of tlou·21 
State~ of AMERICA. Nothing in their 
opiniori is better fitted to he.lp. this po-: 
licy .e.t:jJrcssed wih s1~ch a high persuc;v-
sion by Mr. President HOOVER titan 
the i-cstoration of ihe Natio"nal llaitian 
Government. , 
Full of conjiri.oncc in the loyalty and 
I I 
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tlui spitit of j,;,tice of .ll r. Prt!sident ··-·· .. -· ..... ··,.·01 ... 1o .. -;·-!e'f.-;..;,.:-'~ 
HOOVER, tlzcr. 'beg to offer him }<er.q-.·~'· /!-="'-
by the anticipnted expression of their 
mo:;t. r('sp~~ct1rdl uml:fulnP.ss. 
by 
SE~:\IOUR PRADEL 
P!EflRg HUDICOURT 
President 
General Secretary 
'The·1llcmber.s of the Committee 
R. T. AUGUSTE. DANTES BELLE-
. GARDE, PLACIDE DAVID, Dr. J. C. 
DORSATNVIL, ERNEST CIUUVET, 
A. FAUBERT, CII. :IIORAVIA, G. N. 
LEGER, C. :lfAY,\lW, JL PAC'UWS-
SANI'iOI'i, STENIO VlNCENT 
T.·LALEAU 
W. CAMERON FORBES AND THE HOOVER COMMISSIONS 
TO HAITI 
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Haiti won independence in 1804 and for 111 years there-
after endured political and social turmoil. The mulattoes 
were locked in struggles with the blacks, the Army inter-
fered with the Civil Service, corruption in government was 
i 
considered to be normal, financial stability was destroyed 
by the break-up of the great sugar plantations and the shift 
from a sugar-based economy to one of wild coffee, literary 
• 
education was emphasized to the detriment of technical, and 
I 
the country.was beset by the problem of overpopulation. 
In 1915, in an effort to protect American investments, 
prevenf European (especially German) infiltration, and 
stabilize the nation, President Woodrow Wilson ordered our 
intervention in Haiti. But the character of the intervention 
change~ by the close of the First World War; from an inter-
i 
ventioh it became an occupation by the United States for the 
purpose of tutoring Haiti in the methods and activities of 
Anglo-Saxon democratic government. Backed by the power of 
I American marines, the United States set up active depart-
ments of public works, finance, commerce, public health, 
established the Service Technique (designed to promote 
I 
2 
technical education), and substituted an American officered 
constabulary for the inefficient Haitian army. 
Despite its efforts and good intentions, the United 
States was accused of imperialistic policies. Haitians 
i 
appeared ,to appreciate only one aspect of the Occupation, 
the Public Health Service. All others were interpreted as 
furthe1ances of American imperialistic policies. When by 
the end of 1929 Haiti experienced riots, strikes, and 
I general opposition to continued American occupation, Hoover 
decided that our foreign policy toward Latin-American 
countr:Les required serious review. 
Ho
1
over sent Forbes to Haiti (1) to end the violence, 
(2) to assess the fifteen years of American occupation, and 
(3) to recommend a foreign policy toward Haiti and Latin-
America' which would promote f'riendship instead of animosity 
between the United States and its neighbors to the south. 
I 
The Forbes Commission remained in Haiti approximately 
I 
two and one-half weeks, during which time it held hearings 
at which all Haitians and officials of the American Occupa-
tion were invited to speak, took a brief trip through the 
' 
interior of the country, and gathered information for its 
,, 
official report to President Hoover. The Commission ended 
the violence by acceding to demands for a return to govern-
ment byia freely elected National Assembly and a new Chief 
Executive of Haiti. It recommended that, despite the many 
good th1ngs done by the Occupation, the enmities aroused 
3 
thereby demanded the withdrawal of American forces, that 
this withdrawal be gradually done, and that it be completed 
by 1936. Finally, it recommended that the United States 
surrender its policy of intervention in the internal affairs 
of Labin-American countries, that we stand by to assist when 
our assistance is requested, but that we no longer intervene 
by untlateral decision. 
The Moton Commission, which was in reality merely an 
extension of the Forbes Commission, consisted of American 
Negro 'educators who went to Haiti in June, 1930, Solely to 
assess the Haitian educational system as of that year. 
It confirmed Forbes' conclusion that the education of Haitians 
should be left to Haitian control. 
The Forbes Commission had certain defects: (1) it 
remained for too short a time in Haiti, (2) its personnel was 
not sufficiently diversified in background, (3) its personnel 
was tQo advanced in age for the arduous tasks involved, (4) 
it placed too much reliance upon secondary rather than first-
hand sources of information, (5} it did not travel as exten-
sively throughout the country as it might have done, (6) its 
investigation received too much publicity, and (?) it was 
subject to too many world influences such as the London 
Disarmament Conference of 1930. 
Nevertheless, acting upon the conclusion of the Forbes 
Commission, Hoover started the withdrawal from Haiti which 
marked the beginning of the "Good Neighbor Policy" of the 
Roosevelt administration. 
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I 
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